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Add SVG figures fse-dust-collector-v1.svg, fse-dust-collector-v2.svg, fse-dust-collector-v3.svg, fse-dust-collector-v4.svg (list-2 visual plan)
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In woodworking plants a single-stage system uses one collector, either a cyclone or a combined cyclone and bag filter unit. A two-stage system places a cyclone ahead of a baghouse.<ref name="CH-9-12" /> Many plants began with a cyclone that exhausted its air outside and later added a baghouse so that the heated conveying air could be returned indoors. Newer units combine both functions: the lower part acts as the cyclone and the upper part holds the filter bags.<ref name="CH-9-12" /> In many installations about 80 percent of the collector air is returned to the plant. This saves heating and make-up air but brings serious fire protection concerns.<ref name="CH-9-12" />
In woodworking plants a single-stage system uses one collector, either a cyclone or a combined cyclone and bag filter unit. A two-stage system places a cyclone ahead of a baghouse.<ref name="CH-9-12" /> Many plants began with a cyclone that exhausted its air outside and later added a baghouse so that the heated conveying air could be returned indoors. Newer units combine both functions: the lower part acts as the cyclone and the upper part holds the filter bags.<ref name="CH-9-12" /> In many installations about 80 percent of the collector air is returned to the plant. This saves heating and make-up air but brings serious fire protection concerns.<ref name="CH-9-12" />
[[File:fse-dust-collector-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Two schematics of dust collection systems: a single cyclone and a cyclone followed by a baghouse with return air duct|Single-stage and two-stage dust collection systems in a woodworking plant.]]


Wet collectors pass the air through a water curtain and collect the dust as a sludge under water. They are used for very fine dusts and for combustible metal dusts, and apart from metal dusts they generally present no fire or explosion hazard.<ref name="LA-8-10" /><ref name="LA-8-11" /> High-efficiency particulate air filter units remove at least 99.97 percent of particles 0.3 micrometres (µm) in diameter from laboratory and industrial exhaust air.<ref name="LA-8-11" />
Wet collectors pass the air through a water curtain and collect the dust as a sludge under water. They are used for very fine dusts and for combustible metal dusts, and apart from metal dusts they generally present no fire or explosion hazard.<ref name="LA-8-10" /><ref name="LA-8-11" /> High-efficiency particulate air filter units remove at least 99.97 percent of particles 0.3 micrometres (µm) in diameter from laboratory and industrial exhaust air.<ref name="LA-8-11" />
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The bags also have to be cleaned while the collector runs, otherwise the media clogs and the airflow drops. Bag shakers or reverse pulse cleaners knock the dust cake off the bags at intervals, producing a concentrated dust cloud inside the housing. If burning material is present during a cleaning cycle, a deflagration is likely.<ref name="CH-9-14" /> Cloth and bag collectors are a special problem for another reason: the filter fabric is itself combustible, even where the collected dust is not.<ref name="LA-8-12">Lataille (2008), p. 8-12.</ref>
The bags also have to be cleaned while the collector runs, otherwise the media clogs and the airflow drops. Bag shakers or reverse pulse cleaners knock the dust cake off the bags at intervals, producing a concentrated dust cloud inside the housing. If burning material is present during a cleaning cycle, a deflagration is likely.<ref name="CH-9-14" /> Cloth and bag collectors are a special problem for another reason: the filter fabric is itself combustible, even where the collected dust is not.<ref name="LA-8-12">Lataille (2008), p. 8-12.</ref>
[[File:fse-dust-collector-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Cross-section of a baghouse showing dirty and clean air sides, pulse jet nozzle and dust cloud from bag cleaning|Bag cleaning cycle in a baghouse: a pulse of air blows the dust cake off a bag and forms a dust cloud.]]


A deflagration in a collector rarely stays there. Most explosion events in woodworking plants begin as one deflagration inside equipment such as a mill, sander, dust collector or silo.<ref name="CH-9-19">Cholin (2008d), p. 9-19.</ref> The first event may be small, yet strong enough to shake dust from beams and ledges or to rupture small equipment such as dust collectors. A larger secondary explosion can then run through the dust cloud this creates.<ref name="SC-6-141">Schwab (2008c), p. 6-141.</ref> Most of the damage and casualties in destructive dust explosions come from such secondary explosions.<ref name="ZA-2-100" /> In grain facilities, collection systems concentrate the dust and can carry flame or an explosion to interconnected equipment and areas.<ref name="MS-9-92" />
A deflagration in a collector rarely stays there. Most explosion events in woodworking plants begin as one deflagration inside equipment such as a mill, sander, dust collector or silo.<ref name="CH-9-19">Cholin (2008d), p. 9-19.</ref> The first event may be small, yet strong enough to shake dust from beams and ledges or to rupture small equipment such as dust collectors. A larger secondary explosion can then run through the dust cloud this creates.<ref name="SC-6-141">Schwab (2008c), p. 6-141.</ref> Most of the damage and casualties in destructive dust explosions come from such secondary explosions.<ref name="ZA-2-100" /> In grain facilities, collection systems concentrate the dust and can carry flame or an explosion to interconnected equipment and areas.<ref name="MS-9-92" />
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For the tea dust in the 20-litre test sphere, ''V''<sup>1/3</sup> = 0.02<sup>1/3</sup> = 0.271 m, so the rate is 59/0.271 = 217 bar/s. In a closed collector housing of 10 m³, ''V''<sup>1/3</sup> = 2.15 m and the rate becomes 59/2.15 = 27.4 bar/s. The zinc dust would give 125/2.15 = 58 bar/s in the same housing, more than twice as fast. The example shows why the index, not the raw rate from a small vessel, is carried over to plant scale. It holds only for a closed vessel at the optimum concentration, whereas a real collector holds a range of concentrations and is usually vented or suppressed.<ref name="SB-18-80" /><ref name="CH-9-14" />
For the tea dust in the 20-litre test sphere, ''V''<sup>1/3</sup> = 0.02<sup>1/3</sup> = 0.271 m, so the rate is 59/0.271 = 217 bar/s. In a closed collector housing of 10 m³, ''V''<sup>1/3</sup> = 2.15 m and the rate becomes 59/2.15 = 27.4 bar/s. The zinc dust would give 125/2.15 = 58 bar/s in the same housing, more than twice as fast. The example shows why the index, not the raw rate from a small vessel, is carried over to plant scale. It holds only for a closed vessel at the optimum concentration, whereas a real collector holds a range of concentrations and is usually vented or suppressed.<ref name="SB-18-80" /><ref name="CH-9-14" />
[[File:fse-dust-collector-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Chart of maximum rate of pressure rise against vessel volume for tea dust and zinc dust from collectors|Maximum rate of pressure rise against vessel volume according to the cubic law for two dusts taken from collectors.]]


== Sparks, embers and fires inside the collector ==
== Sparks, embers and fires inside the collector ==
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Return air brings its own risk. Smoke and hot gas from a collector fire would be blown into the occupied plant, often near the ceiling where the finest dust lies. The resulting hot layer could open more sprinklers than the riser was designed to supply.<ref name="CH-9-22" /> The abort gate is therefore usually triggered by a [[Spark detection and extinguishing system]], with detectors on the collector inlet or in the exhaust duct.<ref name="CH-9-22" /> Once the gate has operated, the building is considered protected and the noncombustible collector is allowed to burn. Prudent design also stops the automatic bag cleaning when the gate trips, to reduce the chance that the fire becomes a deflagration.<ref name="CH-9-23">Cholin (2008d), p. 9-23.</ref>
Return air brings its own risk. Smoke and hot gas from a collector fire would be blown into the occupied plant, often near the ceiling where the finest dust lies. The resulting hot layer could open more sprinklers than the riser was designed to supply.<ref name="CH-9-22" /> The abort gate is therefore usually triggered by a [[Spark detection and extinguishing system]], with detectors on the collector inlet or in the exhaust duct.<ref name="CH-9-22" /> Once the gate has operated, the building is considered protected and the noncombustible collector is allowed to burn. Prudent design also stops the automatic bag cleaning when the gate trips, to reduce the chance that the fire becomes a deflagration.<ref name="CH-9-23">Cholin (2008d), p. 9-23.</ref>
[[File:fse-dust-collector-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Dust collector outside a building with spark detectors, water spray unit, deflagration vent and abort gate on the return air duct|Protection of a woodworking dust collector as described in the 2008 Fire Protection Handbook.]]


A sprinkler system inside the collector, installed to NFPA 13, should also be considered. It will probably limit structural damage and speed the return to operation.<ref name="CH-9-25" /> Spark detection alone does not completely protect a collector, because a deflagration flame front can travel too fast to be diverted by the abort gate.<ref name="CH-9-25" />
A sprinkler system inside the collector, installed to NFPA 13, should also be considered. It will probably limit structural damage and speed the return to operation.<ref name="CH-9-25" /> Spark detection alone does not completely protect a collector, because a deflagration flame front can travel too fast to be diverted by the abort gate.<ref name="CH-9-25" />

Revision as of 08:45, 9 November 2026

A dust collector is the separating equipment at the end of a dust collection or pneumatic conveying system that removes chips, dust and other solid particles from the conveying air.[1] The main types are cyclone separators, fabric filter collectors known as baghouses, combined cyclone and bag filter units, and wet collectors that wash the dust out of the air.[2][3] Collectors control fugitive dust emissions and recover product that would otherwise be lost.[3] Because a collector gathers fine combustible dust in one place, it nearly always contains a zone where the dust is suspended at a concentration that can burn explosively.[4] It is therefore one of the places where a Dust explosion most often begins.[5]

German records for 1965 to 1985 show that 78 percent of dust explosions started in process equipment such as dust collectors, blenders, dryers, grinders, conveying systems and silos.[5] The Fire Protection Handbook (2008) describes how US practice of that time protected collectors. It combined noncombustible construction outside the building, deflagration venting or suppression, fire protection, and devices that keep flame and burning material out of the building.[6][7] These are NFPA rules as they stood around 2007–2008.

Types and operation

A dust collection system consists of ducts that run to each machine that produces dust, a large fan that provides the motive force, and a dust collector.[1] The chips and dust are sucked into the ducts, carried in suspension in the air, and separated from that air in the collector.[1] At sanders, for example, a Pneumatic conveying system usually pulls the dust from the machine towards the collector.[8] Separating equipment in the wider family of dust and stock conveying systems includes cyclones, condensers, wet-type collectors, cloth screen and stocking arresters and centrifugal collectors. The separated material then drops into hoppers, bins, silos or vaults.[2] Typical designs described by Lataille (2008) are the low-pressure cyclone, the high-efficiency centrifugal collector and the dry-type dynamic precipitator.[9]

A cyclone separator removes the larger particulate matter from the air stream, but it cannot remove fine dust well enough for the air to be returned to the workplace.[1] In grain handling, cyclone collection efficiencies range up to 80 percent for low-efficiency units and up to 95 percent for high-efficiency units, but only 50 to 60 percent for fine particles.[3] A baghouse passes the dusty air through an array of cloth bags inside a steel enclosure and retains particles larger than the weave of the cloth.[1] Maness and Sargent (2008) call the baghouse or fabric filter the most common collector at grain facilities, with a capture efficiency of up to 99.99 percent. A cyclone is often placed ahead of the bag filters to recover the coarse material.[3]

In woodworking plants a single-stage system uses one collector, either a cyclone or a combined cyclone and bag filter unit. A two-stage system places a cyclone ahead of a baghouse.[1] Many plants began with a cyclone that exhausted its air outside and later added a baghouse so that the heated conveying air could be returned indoors. Newer units combine both functions: the lower part acts as the cyclone and the upper part holds the filter bags.[1] In many installations about 80 percent of the collector air is returned to the plant. This saves heating and make-up air but brings serious fire protection concerns.[1]

Two schematics of dust collection systems: a single cyclone and a cyclone followed by a baghouse with return air duct
Single-stage and two-stage dust collection systems in a woodworking plant.

Wet collectors pass the air through a water curtain and collect the dust as a sludge under water. They are used for very fine dusts and for combustible metal dusts, and apart from metal dusts they generally present no fire or explosion hazard.[2][9] High-efficiency particulate air filter units remove at least 99.97 percent of particles 0.3 micrometres (µm) in diameter from laboratory and industrial exhaust air.[9]

Why a dust collector is an explosion hazard

Cholin (2008d) lists four conditions that must exist together before wood dust can deflagrate, that is, burn with a flame front fast enough to raise the pressure. The particles must be combustible and fine enough, generally with an equivalent diameter below 420 µm. They must be suspended in air at a concentration above the minimum explosible concentration (MEC), and a sufficiently powerful ignition source must be present.[10] For most wood particulates the MEC is about 30 to 60 g/m³ (0.03 to 0.06 oz/ft³).[11] The SFPE Handbook gives the same range as the typical lower explosive limit of dusts with particles smaller than about 100 µm.[12]

A collector meets these conditions by design. Because cyclones and baghouses separate dust from air, a continuous concentration gradient exists inside them during normal operation. This gradient effectively guarantees that some part of the interior can support a deflagration.[4] Most cyclones still produce a deflagrable atmosphere during start-up and shutdown. A baghouse is built to collect fine dust and contains deflagrable conditions during start-up, normal operation and shutdown.[4]

The bags also have to be cleaned while the collector runs, otherwise the media clogs and the airflow drops. Bag shakers or reverse pulse cleaners knock the dust cake off the bags at intervals, producing a concentrated dust cloud inside the housing. If burning material is present during a cleaning cycle, a deflagration is likely.[4] Cloth and bag collectors are a special problem for another reason: the filter fabric is itself combustible, even where the collected dust is not.[13]

Cross-section of a baghouse showing dirty and clean air sides, pulse jet nozzle and dust cloud from bag cleaning
Bag cleaning cycle in a baghouse: a pulse of air blows the dust cake off a bag and forms a dust cloud.

A deflagration in a collector rarely stays there. Most explosion events in woodworking plants begin as one deflagration inside equipment such as a mill, sander, dust collector or silo.[14] The first event may be small, yet strong enough to shake dust from beams and ledges or to rupture small equipment such as dust collectors. A larger secondary explosion can then run through the dust cloud this creates.[15] Most of the damage and casualties in destructive dust explosions come from such secondary explosions.[5] In grain facilities, collection systems concentrate the dust and can carry flame or an explosion to interconnected equipment and areas.[3]

Explosibility data and the cubic law

The violence of a dust deflagration is described by values measured in a closed test vessel: the maximum deflagration pressure, Pmax, and the maximum rate of pressure rise, (dP/dt)max. Laboratory tests are usually made in a 20-litre sphere.[5] The rate of pressure rise depends on the vessel size, so it is multiplied by the cube root of the vessel volume. This product is the dust deflagration index KSt, and the relation is called the cubic law:[16]

KSt=(dPdt)maxV1/3

Symbol Description Unit
KSt Dust deflagration index (dust characterisation factor) bar·m/s
(dP/dt)max Maximum rate of pressure rise in a closed vessel bar/s
V Volume of the closed vessel m³

The larger the index, the harder it is to vent or suppress the deflagration.[5] Data from a properly calibrated spherical vessel follow the cubic law over a range from 20 litres to 250 m³ and can be used to design explosion vents.[16] The index is not a true constant, although older literature treated it as one. The highest rate of pressure rise occurs only at the optimum dust concentration and with an ignition source at least as strong as the test standard requires.[17] The value also depends on the reactivity and particle size of the dust and on the turbulence of the cloud.[5]

The handbook's table of dust explosion test data includes several samples taken from collectors and filters. Black tea dust from a dust collector, with a particle size of 76 µm, gave Pmax = 8.2 bar (gauge) and KSt = 59 bar·m/s. Zinc dust from a collector, finer than 10 µm, gave Pmax = 6.7 bar (gauge) and KSt = 125 bar·m/s.[18]

Worked example. Rearranging the cubic law gives the maximum rate of pressure rise in a closed vessel of volume V:

(dPdt)max=KStV1/3

For the tea dust in the 20-litre test sphere, V1/3 = 0.021/3 = 0.271 m, so the rate is 59/0.271 = 217 bar/s. In a closed collector housing of 10 m³, V1/3 = 2.15 m and the rate becomes 59/2.15 = 27.4 bar/s. The zinc dust would give 125/2.15 = 58 bar/s in the same housing, more than twice as fast. The example shows why the index, not the raw rate from a small vessel, is carried over to plant scale. It holds only for a closed vessel at the optimum concentration, whereas a real collector holds a range of concentrations and is usually vented or suppressed.[17][4]

Chart of maximum rate of pressure rise against vessel volume for tea dust and zinc dust from collectors
Maximum rate of pressure rise against vessel volume according to the cubic law for two dusts taken from collectors.

Sparks, embers and fires inside the collector

In woodworking, the ignition source usually enters the collector with the dust itself. Process-generated ignitions are carried into the system together with the wood particulate from the machines.[11] Some plants have recorded dozens of sparks per hour, each sometimes no larger than a BB of about 4 mm (0.177 in.). Most are quenched on the duct walls, on large chips or in resinous material, and perhaps only one in a million survives the journey to the collector.[11] Cholin (2008d) nevertheless concludes that a fire will occur, sooner or later, in every dust collector that handles wood particulates. Decades without a fire therefore do not justify leaving a collector unprotected.[11]

A spark that reaches the collector meets one of four fates. It can start a fire on the filter media, and the next cleaning cycle then raises a dust cloud next to that fire, which usually leads to a deflagration.[11] It can fall through the concentration gradient and ignite the dust suspension in the hopper. It can burn through the media, so that the dust cake drops off and may or may not ignite, or it can burn out harmlessly.[19] A single spark rarely delivers enough power to start a deflagration, so a fire is the more likely result. With plenty of air flowing through, a fire on the filter media can rapidly involve the whole interior.[7]

Other ignition sources come from the system itself. Stones and tramp metal heat up as they strike the steel duct walls and can start a fire where they come to rest in the hopper.[6] Mechanical sparks, presumably from impact or friction, were the most frequent ignition source in the German dust explosion records, and impact sparks are often attributable to tramp metal in conveying systems or grinders.[5] Fans are another source, because wood blocks and knots can reach ignition temperature when they strike the impeller.[6] The fan should therefore sit on the clean-air side of the collector, so that the system runs under suction and the dust is removed before the air reaches the fan.[2] Electrostatic discharge has also ignited dust in a metallic collector duct, where thermoplastic dust had fused into an insulating coating inside a wye fitting.[20]

Protection in US practice

Cholin (2008d) summarises what NFPA 664, the US standard for wood processing and woodworking facilities, required as described in the 2008 handbook. Dust collectors had to be of noncombustible construction and placed outside the building. Where cleaned air was returned indoors, a listed spark detection system had to operate an abort gate that diverts the airstream to the outside.[6] Lataille (2008) adds general guidance: collectors built of steel or enclosed in steel, located outside and well supported, so that a collapse cannot raise a dust cloud. They should be designed for the expected explosion pressure, with allowance for deflagration relief vents.[2] Collectors that must stay indoors and cannot resist that pressure can be placed in rooms near outside walls to allow venting.[2]

For the deflagration itself, the handbook names three practical means. The first is Explosion venting designed to NFPA 68, and the second is venting through a listed dust retention and flame-quenching vent assembly to NFPA 69. The third is deflagration suppression to NFPA 69.[7] A suppression system detects an incipient explosion, in dust applications usually with pressure detectors, and discharges agent before the pressure reaches the damage threshold of the enclosure. Unlike venting, it discharges no flame or fuel, but it is costly to install and to refill after a discharge.[21] In grain facilities, dust filters were to be located outside with deflagration vents, placed in explosion-vented rooms, or fitted with explosion suppression.[3]

These measures deal only with the deflagration, not with fire, so prudent design adds fire protection, usually a sprinkler or water deluge system.[7] Bag-type collectors may need automatic sprinklers where they are important for production or expose other property. Automatic carbon dioxide, dry chemical or water spray systems can also be used in dust collecting systems.[13] For carbon dioxide, NFPA 12 as described in 2008 required a design concentration of 75 percent for dust collectors.[22][23] This compares with 50 percent for electrical hazards and 65 percent for bulk paper and fur storage vaults.[22]

Halon 1301 was tested on a wool bag filter fire in an industrial baghouse of about 13.3 m² (144 ft²). With rate-of-rise heat detectors and complete shutdown of the airflow, a 4 percent concentration extinguished a fully developed fire. After 20 minutes of soaking, however, toxic levels of hydrogen fluoride, hydrogen cyanide and hydrogen sulfide were measured in the unoccupied baghouse.[24]

Ducts, return air and isolation

A collector is connected to the rest of the plant by pipes, ducts and chutes. Deflagrations that travel into connecting piping and equipment can cause far more powerful explosions than the first one, and may even turn into detonations.[25] Where an outdoor collector is regarded as expendable, the remaining task is to keep the flame out of the building. Backflash dampers on the inlet ducts serve this purpose when those ducts are not deflagrable, and abort gates on the return air ducts divert flame outside.[7] Where the inlet ducts are deflagrable, upstream propagation must be stopped by other means of Explosion isolation. The conveying air does not help, because flame fronts generally move at least ten times faster than the air.[7]

Return air brings its own risk. Smoke and hot gas from a collector fire would be blown into the occupied plant, often near the ceiling where the finest dust lies. The resulting hot layer could open more sprinklers than the riser was designed to supply.[7] The abort gate is therefore usually triggered by a Spark detection and extinguishing system, with detectors on the collector inlet or in the exhaust duct.[7] Once the gate has operated, the building is considered protected and the noncombustible collector is allowed to burn. Prudent design also stops the automatic bag cleaning when the gate trips, to reduce the chance that the fire becomes a deflagration.[26]

Dust collector outside a building with spark detectors, water spray unit, deflagration vent and abort gate on the return air duct
Protection of a woodworking dust collector as described in the 2008 Fire Protection Handbook.

A sprinkler system inside the collector, installed to NFPA 13, should also be considered. It will probably limit structural damage and speed the return to operation.[27] Spark detection alone does not completely protect a collector, because a deflagration flame front can travel too fast to be diverted by the abort gate.[27]

Limits of heat detection and gaseous agents

Heat detectors respond poorly to a fire inside a collector because the large airflow carries the heat away. Cholin (2008d) gives an example for a collection system of 50,000 cfm (1,400 m³/min) at standard conditions. A fire of about 16 kW (15.3 Btu/s) raises the temperature of the air passing through by only 0.556 °C (1 °F).[27] Fixed-temperature heat detectors usually need a rise of about 27.8 °C (50 °F) before they operate. Differential systems are rarely stable below about 5.5 °C (10 °F), which corresponds to a fire of about 160 kW, roughly a 0.1 m² (1.0 ft²) pool of burning gasoline.[27] Cholin (2008d) gives no fire size for fixed-temperature detectors. Scaling his figure of 16 kW per 0.556 °C linearly to a 27.8 °C rise gives about 800 kW (own calculation from the values on that page).[27]

Using such detectors to release a gaseous extinguishing system can increase the hazard rather than reduce it. Discharging the agent and shutting down the airflow disturb the air movement while a fire of this size is burning, and a deflagration is then likely.[27] Similar concerns apply to water deluge released by heat detection.[27] Cholin (2008d) also advises against portable gaseous extinguishers in woodworking shops, because the discharge jet can lift settled wood dust into a cloud.[28]

Operation, maintenance and misconceptions

Good design lowers the chance of a fire without removing it. Fine sander dust ignites easily but burns out quickly, while large router chips are harder to ignite and may still be burning when they reach the baghouse. Conveying fine dust and large chips in separate ducts lowers the risk, and longer ducts give embers more time to burn out.[29] NFPA 664, as described in the 2008 handbook, permitted green material with a moisture content of 25 percent or more to pass through fans. Dry material was not permitted unless fire detection and extinguishment were provided downstream of the fan.[6] Magnetic separators should be fitted where tramp metal may enter the system.[30]

In a Woodworking facility, systems serving sanders should be designed to stay well below the MEC in the worst case, the maximum depth of cut at the maximum feed rate. The larger airflows and ducts cost more but remove the need for explosion prevention systems on the ducts.[31] Filter bags need periodic inspection so that damaged elements that let combustible dust pass can be replaced.[32] An excessive pressure drop across the bags shows that they need cleaning or changing, and a low drop can point to a broken bag or faulty operation.[3]

A common misconception is that a more efficient collector makes a plant safer in every respect. No collector removes all dust, and the finest particles pass the filter and settle on upward-facing surfaces in the workrooms. The better the collection, the finer and more combustible both the collected dust and the returned dust become.[4] Doing without a collector does not remove the hazard either, because the dust then spreads through the workplace. The choice is between a hazard spread through the building and one concentrated in a known place.[4]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 Cholin (2008d), p. 9-12.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Lataille (2008), p. 8-10.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-92.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 Cholin (2008d), p. 9-14.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-100.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Cholin (2008d), p. 9-15.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 Cholin (2008d), p. 9-22.
  8. ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-10.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 Lataille (2008), p. 8-11.
  10. ↑ Cholin (2008d), pp. 9-12–9-13.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 Cholin (2008d), p. 9-21.
  12. ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-403.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Lataille (2008), p. 8-12.
  14. ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-19.
  15. ↑ Schwab (2008c), p. 6-141.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Schwab (2008c), p. 6-150.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 Schwab (2008b), p. 18-80.
  18. ↑ Schwab (2008c), pp. 6-145–6-146.
  19. ↑ Cholin (2008d), pp. 9-21–9-22.
  20. ↑ Scarbrough (2008a), p. 11-65.
  21. ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-417.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 Wysocki (2008), p. 17-12.
  23. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-47.
  24. ↑ DeMonburn and McCormick (1973), as cited in Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-74.
  25. ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-157.
  26. ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-23.
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.4 27.5 27.6 Cholin (2008d), p. 9-25.
  28. ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-18.
  29. ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-16.
  30. ↑ Lataille (2008), p. 8-13.
  31. ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-11.
  32. ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-149.

References

  • Cholin, J. M. (2008d). Woodworking facilities and processes. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-3–9-25). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Lataille, J. I. (2008). Air-Moving equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-3–8-15). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Maness, J. E., & Sargent, L. M. (2008). Storage and handling of grain mill products. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-85–9-103). National Fire Protection Association.
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