New FSE wiki article: Large-loss fire (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
FSE wiki: fact-check corrections: date source context, scope statistics and use table totals (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
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A '''large-loss fire''' is a fire, or a fire and explosion, whose direct property damage exceeds a fixed money threshold. In the United States, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has used such thresholds since the early 1930s, raising them from $250,000 to $5,000,000 in direct property damage.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-87.</ref> Until the late 1980s, each threshold marked the cutoff for the largest several hundred fires of its time.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /> Large-loss fires are studied separately because they show what can happen, draw much of the public concern about fire, and are of special interest to insurers.<ref name="AhrensStewart-3-57">Ahrens and Stewart (2008), p. 3-57.</ref><ref name="HallCote-3-8">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-8.</ref><ref name="HallWatts-3-137">Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-137.</ref> | A '''large-loss fire''' is a fire, or a fire and explosion, whose direct property damage exceeds a fixed money threshold. In the United States, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has used such thresholds since the early 1930s, raising them from $250,000 to $5,000,000 in direct property damage.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-87.</ref> Until the late 1980s, each threshold marked the cutoff for the largest several hundred fires of its time.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /> Large-loss fires are studied separately because they show what can happen, draw much of the public concern about fire, and are of special interest to insurers.<ref name="AhrensStewart-3-57">Ahrens and Stewart (2008), p. 3-57.</ref><ref name="HallCote-3-8">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-8.</ref><ref name="HallWatts-3-137">Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-137.</ref> | ||
The largest US fire loss | The largest US fire loss in NFPA's list through 2004, the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, caused an estimated $33.4 billion in damage, or $35.6 billion in 2004 dollars.<ref name="Ahrens-3-89">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-89.</ref> Very large fires usually involve several major failures of fire protection at once, such as an impaired sprinkler system, a change in stored goods or the absence of automatic suppression.<ref name="HallCote-3-20">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-20.</ref><ref name="Moore-20-164">J. Moore (2008), pp. 20-164–20-165.</ref><ref name="McDaniel-20-186" /> Their statistics are difficult, because inflation distorts comparisons and a single extreme loss can dominate national totals.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /><ref name="Ahrens-3-77">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-77.</ref> Individually, however, large-loss fires do not dominate the total property loss from fire.<ref name="HallTwomey-1-21">Hall and Twomey (2008), p. 1-21.</ref> | ||
== Definition and thresholds == | == Definition and thresholds == | ||
In the early 1930s, NFPA defined a large-loss fire as one involving at least $250,000 in direct property damage. In 1978 the threshold became $500,000, and in the early 1980s at least $1,000,000. Each minimum represented the cutoff point for the largest several hundred fires of its time.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /> In the late 1980s, NFPA decided to treat a smaller number of fires in more detail and raised the threshold to $5,000,000.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /> Because the thresholds are in dollars of the year of the fire, inflation makes it difficult to compare large-loss experience over several years.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /> | In the early 1930s, NFPA defined a large-loss fire as one involving at least $250,000 in direct property damage. In 1978 the threshold became $500,000, and in the early 1980s at least $1,000,000. Each minimum represented the cutoff point for the largest several hundred fires of its time.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /> In the late 1980s, NFPA decided to treat a smaller number of fires in more detail and raised the threshold to $5,000,000.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /> Because the thresholds are in dollars of the year of the fire, inflation makes it difficult to compare large-loss experience over several years.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /> | ||
Other handbook chapters apply the same rule. Schwab (2008a), for example, lists the US chemical plant large-loss fires of 1971–2005 that each caused at least $5 million in direct property damage in the year of occurrence.<ref name="Schwab-8-18">Schwab (2008a), p. 8-18.</ref> | Other handbook chapters apply the same rule. Schwab (2008a), for example, lists the US chemical plant large-loss fires of 1971–2005 that each caused at least $5 million in direct property damage in the year of occurrence.<ref name="Schwab-8-18">Schwab (2008a), p. 8-18.</ref> For comparison, the SFPE handbook's third edition described the then-current UK definition of a large fire as one costing £50,000 or more in property damage.<ref name="Ramachandran-5-105">Ramachandran (2002a), p. 5-105.</ref> In fire risk analysis, Hall and Watts (2008) describe a severity measure set to 1 when damage exceeds $100,000,000 and to 0 otherwise. Such a measure focuses the analysis on large losses, which may suit an insurer that worries most about a single loss too large to cover.<ref name="HallWatts-3-137" /> | ||
The threshold applies to direct property damage, the core measure of [[fire loss]] in NFPA statistics. Indirect losses, such as business interruption or temporary shelter costs, are not part of that measure.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /><ref name="Bush-20-40">Bush (2008), p. 20-40.</ref> The term differs from "large loss of life", which the handbook uses for fires measured by their death toll.<ref name="HallCote-3-26">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-26.</ref> Several of the costliest US fires were conflagrations. The term has no fully standardised definition, but NFPA generally uses it for a fire with major building-to-building flame spread over some distance.<ref name="HallCote-3-8" /><ref name="HallCote-3-9">Hall and Cote (2008), pp. 3-9–3-10.</ref> | The threshold applies to direct property damage, the core measure of [[fire loss]] in NFPA statistics. Indirect losses, such as business interruption or temporary shelter costs, are not part of that measure.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /><ref name="Bush-20-40">Bush (2008), p. 20-40.</ref> The term differs from "large loss of life", which the handbook uses for fires measured by their death toll.<ref name="HallCote-3-26">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-26.</ref> Several of the costliest US fires were conflagrations. The term has no fully standardised definition, but NFPA generally uses it for a fire with major building-to-building flame spread over some distance.<ref name="HallCote-3-8" /><ref name="HallCote-3-9">Hall and Cote (2008), pp. 3-9–3-10.</ref> | ||
== How large-loss fires are recorded == | == How large-loss fires are recorded == | ||
NFPA | Ahrens and Stewart (2008) describe NFPA's Fire Incident Data Organization (FIDO) as a source of details on large-loss fires. They report efforts, including surveys of state fire marshals' offices, to track down reports of multiple-death fires, large-loss incidents and fire fighter deaths; NFPA considered these data complete.<ref name="AhrensStewart-3-57" /> Hall and Ahrens (2002) explain that fires with millions of dollars in loss tend to be widely reported. FIDO can therefore serve as a statistically representative, even complete, database for large fires.<ref name="HallAhrens-5-70">Hall and Ahrens (2002), p. 5-70.</ref> For other fires it is only anecdotal: its incidents show what can happen, not what is likely to happen.<ref name="AhrensStewart-3-57" /> | ||
Large-loss fires also strain the general [[fire statistics]]. Some very-large-loss fires are never reported to local fire departments, because the firms concerned handle them with their own resources.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /> Severe fires, particularly those with fatalities or unusually large losses, tend to have larger shares of unknown data. Causal information is harder to obtain in the largest fires, because more of the evidence of the fire origin is destroyed.<ref name="Ahrens-3-76">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-76.</ref> Known-cause fires show that the [[fire cause]] profiles of larger fires differ from those of smaller ones, so allocating unknowns ideally takes fire size into account.<ref name="Ahrens-3-76" /> | Large-loss fires also strain the general [[fire statistics]]. Some very-large-loss fires are never reported to local fire departments, because the firms concerned handle them with their own resources.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /> Severe fires, particularly those with fatalities or unusually large losses, tend to have larger shares of unknown data. Causal information is harder to obtain in the largest fires, because more of the evidence of the fire origin is destroyed.<ref name="Ahrens-3-76">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-76.</ref> Known-cause fires show that the [[fire cause]] profiles of larger fires differ from those of smaller ones, so allocating unknowns ideally takes fire size into account.<ref name="Ahrens-3-76" /> | ||
A single extreme loss can distort national estimates. In NFPA's projections, as Ahrens et al. (2008) put it, "an extreme value is multiplied", and many analysts exclude exceptionally large losses from their calculations but discuss them in the text.<ref name="Ahrens-3-77" /> The World Trade Center attack accounted for an estimated $33.44 billion of the US total of $44.0 billion for 2001.<ref name="HallCote-3-4">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-4.</ref><ref name="HallCote-3-6">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-6.</ref> NFPA's estimates of property damage in office buildings are too low in several years because of problems in handling large-loss fires. Examples are the 1991 One Meridian Plaza fire ($325 million) and the 1993 World Trade Center incident ($230 million).<ref name="Quiter-20-77">Quiter (2008), p. 20-77.</ref> | A single extreme loss can distort national estimates. In NFPA's projections, as Ahrens et al. (2008) put it, "an extreme value is multiplied", and many analysts exclude exceptionally large losses from their calculations but discuss them in the text.<ref name="Ahrens-3-77" /> The World Trade Center attack accounted for an estimated $33.44 billion of the US total of $44.0 billion for 2001.<ref name="HallCote-3-4">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-4.</ref><ref name="HallCote-3-6">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-6.</ref> NFPA's estimates of property damage in office buildings are too low in several years because of problems in handling large-loss fires. Examples are the 1991 One Meridian Plaza fire ($325 million) and the 1993 World Trade Center incident ($230 million).<ref name="Quiter-20-77">Quiter (2008), p. 20-77.</ref> To account for year-to-year variability, a US residential-sprinkler cost-benefit study described by Notarianni (2002) used mean yearly fire-loss values over the life of a sprinkler system.<ref name="Notarianni-5-61">Notarianni (2002), p. 5-61.</ref> | ||
== The largest US fire losses == | == The largest US fire losses == | ||
NFPA's list of the 25 largest US fire losses is adjusted to 2004 dollars with the consumer price index. It is limited to fires with a reliable dollar-loss estimate that occurred in or over the United States.<ref name="Ahrens-3-89" /> The World Trade Center (2001) leads the list at $33.4 billion in the dollars of the time, or $35.6 billion in 2004 dollars. The 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire follows at $350 million, or $7.3 billion in 2004 dollars, then the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 at $168 million, or $2.6 billion.<ref name="Ahrens-3-89" /> The Oakland fire storm of 1991, in the wildland/urban interface, cost $1.5 billion, or $2.1 billion in 2004 dollars. The 25th place, a fire at a nuclear power plant near Decatur, Alabama, in 1975, cost $100 million, or $351 million in 2004 dollars.<ref name="Ahrens-3-89" /> | NFPA's list of the 25 largest US fire losses is adjusted to 2004 dollars with the consumer price index. It is limited to fires with a reliable dollar-loss estimate that occurred in or over the United States.<ref name="Ahrens-3-89" /> The World Trade Center (2001) leads the list at $33.4 billion in the dollars of the time, or $35.6 billion in 2004 dollars. The 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire follows at $350 million, or $7.3 billion in 2004 dollars, then the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 at $168 million, or $2.6 billion.<ref name="Ahrens-3-89" /> The Oakland fire storm of 1991, in the wildland/urban interface, cost $1.5 billion, or $2.1 billion in 2004 dollars. The 25th place, a fire at a nuclear power plant near Decatur, Alabama, in 1975, cost $100 million, or $351 million in 2004 dollars.<ref name="Ahrens-3-89" /> | ||
In that list through 2004, twelve of the 25 fires occurred from 1990 through 2004, seven were wildland or forest fires and six were in California.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /> In the dollars of their own year, four of the top ten would fall below the threshold for the 2004-dollar list: the San Francisco, Chicago, Boston and Baltimore conflagrations.<ref name="Ahrens-3-87" /> The ten costliest fires and explosions of 1995–2004 were four wildland fires, four industrial incidents, an in-flight airline fire and the World Trade Center.<ref name="HallCote-3-8" /> The tenth was a warehouse fire in New Orleans in 1996, at $280 million, or $337 million in 2004 dollars.<ref name="HallCote-3-13">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-13.</ref> Except in the wildland/urban interface, the risk of conflagration had declined significantly from the pattern of a century before.<ref name="HallCote-3-8" /><ref name="HallCote-3-9" /> | |||
On the same day, the 47-storey World Trade Center Building 7, which had not been struck by an aircraft, burned for almost seven hours after the collapse of the north tower and then collapsed. It was the first known total collapse of a tall building primarily due to fires.<ref name="NIST-xxxv">National Institute of Standards and Technology (2008), p. xxxv.</ref> The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) concluded that the collapse could not have been prevented without controlling the fires before most of the combustible contents were consumed.<ref name="NIST-47">National Institute of Standards and Technology (2008), p. 47.</ref> These events are described under [[World Trade Center collapse]]. | On the same day, the 47-storey World Trade Center Building 7, which had not been struck by an aircraft, burned for almost seven hours after the collapse of the north tower and then collapsed. It was the first known total collapse of a tall building primarily due to fires.<ref name="NIST-xxxv">National Institute of Standards and Technology (2008), p. xxxv.</ref> The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) concluded that the collapse could not have been prevented without controlling the fires before most of the combustible contents were consumed.<ref name="NIST-47">National Institute of Standards and Technology (2008), p. 47.</ref> These events are described under [[World Trade Center collapse]]. | ||
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Impaired protection systems recur in the record. According to Snyder (2008), the historical collection of large-loss fires holds too many cases in which a badly managed impairment let a minor fire grow, uncontrolled, into a catastrophic loss.<ref name="Snyder-12-180" /> Cholin (2008b) gives the same warning for fire alarm systems, where an impairment can permit an inconsequential fire to become a large-loss fire.<ref name="Cholin-14-62">Cholin (2008b), p. 14-62.</ref> In warehouses and storage, a major factor in large losses is the inability of the sprinkler system to control the fire. This can follow a change in the type, volume, height or configuration of storage beyond the design, or an impairment such as broken piping or a shut valve.<ref name="Moore-20-164" /> The topic is treated further under [[warehouse fire]]. | Impaired protection systems recur in the record. According to Snyder (2008), the historical collection of large-loss fires holds too many cases in which a badly managed impairment let a minor fire grow, uncontrolled, into a catastrophic loss.<ref name="Snyder-12-180" /> Cholin (2008b) gives the same warning for fire alarm systems, where an impairment can permit an inconsequential fire to become a large-loss fire.<ref name="Cholin-14-62">Cholin (2008b), p. 14-62.</ref> In warehouses and storage, a major factor in large losses is the inability of the sprinkler system to control the fire. This can follow a change in the type, volume, height or configuration of storage beyond the design, or an impairment such as broken piping or a shut valve.<ref name="Moore-20-164" /> The topic is treated further under [[warehouse fire]]. | ||
In sprinklered industrial occupancies, a change in the hazard for which the sprinklers were designed has contributed to large-loss fires.<ref name="Demers-20-204">Demers (2008a), p. 20-204.</ref> In library and museum collections, the absence of automatic suppression is a common element in most large-loss fires.<ref name="McDaniel-20-186">McDaniel (2008), p. 20-186.</ref> Chemical plants pose a special danger of explosion: 27 of the 36 US chemical plant large-loss fires of 1971–2005 involved explosions. | In sprinklered industrial occupancies, a change in the hazard for which the sprinklers were designed has contributed to large-loss fires.<ref name="Demers-20-204">Demers (2008a), p. 20-204.</ref> In library and museum collections, the absence of automatic suppression is a common element in most large-loss fires.<ref name="McDaniel-20-186">McDaniel (2008), p. 20-186.</ref> Chemical plants pose a special danger of explosion: 27 of the 36 US chemical plant large-loss fires of 1971–2005 involved explosions.<ref name="Schwab-8-19">Schwab (2008a), p. 8-19.</ref> Table 8.2.1 totals $959.3 million in direct property damage without inflation adjustment, or $1,596.4 million in 2005 dollars, and 60 deaths for these 36 fires.<ref name="Schwab-8-18" /> Huggins (2008) notes that large losses in sprinklered buildings are a small percentage of overall fire losses. Most devastating fires in sprinklered buildings, he adds, can be traced to human error such as failure to maintain the system.<ref name="Huggins-16-31">Huggins (2008), p. 16-31.</ref> | ||
A large-loss fire does not by itself show that the fire department is inadequate. Denlinger (2008) points out that major fires often arise from a combination of circumstances beyond the department's immediate control.<ref name="Denlinger-12-71">Denlinger (2008), p. 12-71.</ref> Granito (2008) warns that failing to consider known combustibles, the life hazard, fire frequency and similar factors in planning can lead to a large-loss fire. A fire department's suppression capability, he adds, can never fully compensate for missing built-in fire protection.<ref name="Granito-12-7">Granito (2008), p. 12-7.</ref> | A large-loss fire does not by itself show that the fire department is inadequate. Denlinger (2008) points out that major fires often arise from a combination of circumstances beyond the department's immediate control.<ref name="Denlinger-12-71">Denlinger (2008), p. 12-71.</ref> Granito (2008) warns that failing to consider known combustibles, the life hazard, fire frequency and similar factors in planning can lead to a large-loss fire. A fire department's suppression capability, he adds, can never fully compensate for missing built-in fire protection.<ref name="Granito-12-7">Granito (2008), p. 12-7.</ref> | ||
== Indirect losses of large fires == | == Indirect losses of large fires == | ||
The SFPE handbook gives methods for estimating indirect losses "caused particularly by large fires".<ref name="Ramachandran-5-79">Ramachandran (2002b), p. 5-79.</ref> After the 1980 MGM Grand Hotel fire, the hotel claimed $211 million for direct damage and business interruption together. NFPA's best information put the direct damage at $30–50 million.<ref name="Ramachandran-5-83">Ramachandran (2002b), p. 5-83.</ref> The 1988 First Interstate Bank fire in Los Angeles destroyed four floors of a 62-storey building and took the whole building out of service for six months. The 1991 One Meridian Plaza fire destroyed more floors of a 38-storey building in Philadelphia, which never reopened.<ref name="Ramachandran-5-83" /> | |||
The wider effect depends on how easily the market can absorb the lost capacity. One Meridian Plaza represented about 2.5 percent of Philadelphia's office space.<ref name="Ramachandran-5-83" /> At the 1988 telephone exchange fire in Hinsdale, Illinois, about 9,000 businesses were affected. Even the most conservative estimate of the costs of delays and lost business would exceed the estimated $40–60 million in direct damage.<ref name="Ramachandran-5-83" /> Huggins (2008) adds that catastrophic losses to large employers erode the local tax base and so affect community services.<ref name="Huggins-16-32">Huggins (2008), p. 16-32.</ref> | The wider effect depends on how easily the market can absorb the lost capacity. One Meridian Plaza represented about 2.5 percent of Philadelphia's office space.<ref name="Ramachandran-5-83" /> At the 1988 telephone exchange fire in Hinsdale, Illinois, about 9,000 businesses were affected. Even the most conservative estimate of the costs of delays and lost business would exceed the estimated $40–60 million in direct damage.<ref name="Ramachandran-5-83" /> Huggins (2008) adds that catastrophic losses to large employers erode the local tax base and so affect community services.<ref name="Huggins-16-32">Huggins (2008), p. 16-32.</ref> | ||
Revision as of 02:18, 8 November 2026
A large-loss fire is a fire, or a fire and explosion, whose direct property damage exceeds a fixed money threshold. In the United States, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has used such thresholds since the early 1930s, raising them from $250,000 to $5,000,000 in direct property damage.[1] Until the late 1980s, each threshold marked the cutoff for the largest several hundred fires of its time.[1] Large-loss fires are studied separately because they show what can happen, draw much of the public concern about fire, and are of special interest to insurers.[2][3][4]
The largest US fire loss in NFPA's list through 2004, the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, caused an estimated $33.4 billion in damage, or $35.6 billion in 2004 dollars.[5] Very large fires usually involve several major failures of fire protection at once, such as an impaired sprinkler system, a change in stored goods or the absence of automatic suppression.[6][7][8] Their statistics are difficult, because inflation distorts comparisons and a single extreme loss can dominate national totals.[1][9] Individually, however, large-loss fires do not dominate the total property loss from fire.[10]
Definition and thresholds
In the early 1930s, NFPA defined a large-loss fire as one involving at least $250,000 in direct property damage. In 1978 the threshold became $500,000, and in the early 1980s at least $1,000,000. Each minimum represented the cutoff point for the largest several hundred fires of its time.[1] In the late 1980s, NFPA decided to treat a smaller number of fires in more detail and raised the threshold to $5,000,000.[1] Because the thresholds are in dollars of the year of the fire, inflation makes it difficult to compare large-loss experience over several years.[1]
Other handbook chapters apply the same rule. Schwab (2008a), for example, lists the US chemical plant large-loss fires of 1971–2005 that each caused at least $5 million in direct property damage in the year of occurrence.[11] For comparison, the SFPE handbook's third edition described the then-current UK definition of a large fire as one costing £50,000 or more in property damage.[12] In fire risk analysis, Hall and Watts (2008) describe a severity measure set to 1 when damage exceeds $100,000,000 and to 0 otherwise. Such a measure focuses the analysis on large losses, which may suit an insurer that worries most about a single loss too large to cover.[4]
The threshold applies to direct property damage, the core measure of fire loss in NFPA statistics. Indirect losses, such as business interruption or temporary shelter costs, are not part of that measure.[1][13] The term differs from "large loss of life", which the handbook uses for fires measured by their death toll.[14] Several of the costliest US fires were conflagrations. The term has no fully standardised definition, but NFPA generally uses it for a fire with major building-to-building flame spread over some distance.[3][15]
How large-loss fires are recorded
Ahrens and Stewart (2008) describe NFPA's Fire Incident Data Organization (FIDO) as a source of details on large-loss fires. They report efforts, including surveys of state fire marshals' offices, to track down reports of multiple-death fires, large-loss incidents and fire fighter deaths; NFPA considered these data complete.[2] Hall and Ahrens (2002) explain that fires with millions of dollars in loss tend to be widely reported. FIDO can therefore serve as a statistically representative, even complete, database for large fires.[16] For other fires it is only anecdotal: its incidents show what can happen, not what is likely to happen.[2]
Large-loss fires also strain the general fire statistics. Some very-large-loss fires are never reported to local fire departments, because the firms concerned handle them with their own resources.[1] Severe fires, particularly those with fatalities or unusually large losses, tend to have larger shares of unknown data. Causal information is harder to obtain in the largest fires, because more of the evidence of the fire origin is destroyed.[17] Known-cause fires show that the fire cause profiles of larger fires differ from those of smaller ones, so allocating unknowns ideally takes fire size into account.[17]
A single extreme loss can distort national estimates. In NFPA's projections, as Ahrens et al. (2008) put it, "an extreme value is multiplied", and many analysts exclude exceptionally large losses from their calculations but discuss them in the text.[9] The World Trade Center attack accounted for an estimated $33.44 billion of the US total of $44.0 billion for 2001.[18][19] NFPA's estimates of property damage in office buildings are too low in several years because of problems in handling large-loss fires. Examples are the 1991 One Meridian Plaza fire ($325 million) and the 1993 World Trade Center incident ($230 million).[20] To account for year-to-year variability, a US residential-sprinkler cost-benefit study described by Notarianni (2002) used mean yearly fire-loss values over the life of a sprinkler system.[21]
The largest US fire losses
NFPA's list of the 25 largest US fire losses is adjusted to 2004 dollars with the consumer price index. It is limited to fires with a reliable dollar-loss estimate that occurred in or over the United States.[5] The World Trade Center (2001) leads the list at $33.4 billion in the dollars of the time, or $35.6 billion in 2004 dollars. The 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire follows at $350 million, or $7.3 billion in 2004 dollars, then the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 at $168 million, or $2.6 billion.[5] The Oakland fire storm of 1991, in the wildland/urban interface, cost $1.5 billion, or $2.1 billion in 2004 dollars. The 25th place, a fire at a nuclear power plant near Decatur, Alabama, in 1975, cost $100 million, or $351 million in 2004 dollars.[5]
In that list through 2004, twelve of the 25 fires occurred from 1990 through 2004, seven were wildland or forest fires and six were in California.[1] In the dollars of their own year, four of the top ten would fall below the threshold for the 2004-dollar list: the San Francisco, Chicago, Boston and Baltimore conflagrations.[1] The ten costliest fires and explosions of 1995–2004 were four wildland fires, four industrial incidents, an in-flight airline fire and the World Trade Center.[3] The tenth was a warehouse fire in New Orleans in 1996, at $280 million, or $337 million in 2004 dollars.[22] Except in the wildland/urban interface, the risk of conflagration had declined significantly from the pattern of a century before.[3][15]
On the same day, the 47-storey World Trade Center Building 7, which had not been struck by an aircraft, burned for almost seven hours after the collapse of the north tower and then collapsed. It was the first known total collapse of a tall building primarily due to fires.[23] The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) concluded that the collapse could not have been prevented without controlling the fires before most of the combustible contents were consumed.[24] These events are described under World Trade Center collapse.
By 2008 the most common conflagration scenario was a forest or brush fire spreading to buildings in the wildland/urban interface.[25] The 2000 Los Alamos fire began as a prescribed burn under the control of the National Park Service, intended to cover 900 acres (about 360 ha). It spread over 48,000 acres (about 19,400 ha) and caused an estimated total loss of $1 billion.[22] Smalley (2008) notes that large-loss disasters in the wildland/urban interface almost always occur under severe conditions, the "worst-case combination of fuels, weather, and/or topography".[26]
Causes and contributing factors
Hall and Cote (2008) write that very large fires usually involve multiple major failures of fire protection design, although one or two deficiencies can be enough in a building with many excellent features. Large losses of life or property, they add, are virtually unknown in buildings that comply with the fire protection requirements of modern codes.[6] Large losses continue because many buildings, particularly existing ones excluded from newer requirements, do not comply.[6] Snyder (2008) reports that property insurers have shown statistically that what people do or fail to do has the largest effect on the size of a loss.[27]
Impaired protection systems recur in the record. According to Snyder (2008), the historical collection of large-loss fires holds too many cases in which a badly managed impairment let a minor fire grow, uncontrolled, into a catastrophic loss.[27] Cholin (2008b) gives the same warning for fire alarm systems, where an impairment can permit an inconsequential fire to become a large-loss fire.[28] In warehouses and storage, a major factor in large losses is the inability of the sprinkler system to control the fire. This can follow a change in the type, volume, height or configuration of storage beyond the design, or an impairment such as broken piping or a shut valve.[7] The topic is treated further under warehouse fire.
In sprinklered industrial occupancies, a change in the hazard for which the sprinklers were designed has contributed to large-loss fires.[29] In library and museum collections, the absence of automatic suppression is a common element in most large-loss fires.[8] Chemical plants pose a special danger of explosion: 27 of the 36 US chemical plant large-loss fires of 1971–2005 involved explosions.[30] Table 8.2.1 totals $959.3 million in direct property damage without inflation adjustment, or $1,596.4 million in 2005 dollars, and 60 deaths for these 36 fires.[11] Huggins (2008) notes that large losses in sprinklered buildings are a small percentage of overall fire losses. Most devastating fires in sprinklered buildings, he adds, can be traced to human error such as failure to maintain the system.[31]
A large-loss fire does not by itself show that the fire department is inadequate. Denlinger (2008) points out that major fires often arise from a combination of circumstances beyond the department's immediate control.[32] Granito (2008) warns that failing to consider known combustibles, the life hazard, fire frequency and similar factors in planning can lead to a large-loss fire. A fire department's suppression capability, he adds, can never fully compensate for missing built-in fire protection.[33]
Indirect losses of large fires
The SFPE handbook gives methods for estimating indirect losses "caused particularly by large fires".[34] After the 1980 MGM Grand Hotel fire, the hotel claimed $211 million for direct damage and business interruption together. NFPA's best information put the direct damage at $30–50 million.[35] The 1988 First Interstate Bank fire in Los Angeles destroyed four floors of a 62-storey building and took the whole building out of service for six months. The 1991 One Meridian Plaza fire destroyed more floors of a 38-storey building in Philadelphia, which never reopened.[35]
The wider effect depends on how easily the market can absorb the lost capacity. One Meridian Plaza represented about 2.5 percent of Philadelphia's office space.[35] At the 1988 telephone exchange fire in Hinsdale, Illinois, about 9,000 businesses were affected. Even the most conservative estimate of the costs of delays and lost business would exceed the estimated $40–60 million in direct damage.[35] Huggins (2008) adds that catastrophic losses to large employers erode the local tax base and so affect community services.[36]
Because an insurer may be unable to cover a very large fire, such risks lead to reinsurance markets, especially for properties that could suffer more than one very large loss in a short time.[37] An insurer with many customers normally sees its yearly losses stay close to the expected value. The range widens when many customers share a common risk, such as properties in one hurricane-prone region.[37] The cover itself is described under fire insurance.
Statistical analysis of large losses
Because large-loss fires are few, they call for special statistical methods. The probability distribution of fire loss is skewed. The logarithm of the loss is often modelled with a normal distribution, which makes the loss itself lognormal, a model widely recommended for fire insurance claims.[12] Ramachandran developed extreme order theory to make the best use of the limited data from a small sample of large-loss fires.[12] It is used to predict the tail of the loss distribution, to estimate the average loss in all fires and to assess the loss reduction due to a protection measure.[12]
For a lognormal loss, the logarithm of the loss is normally distributed with mean μ and standard deviation σ. The standardised logarithm t then follows the standard normal distribution G. The probability that the loss in one fire exceeds a value x, called the survivor probability, is therefore:[38][39]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Loss in a single fire (random variable) | money unit, here £1000 | |
| Loss level of interest | same unit as X | |
| Mean and standard deviation of the logarithm of the loss | – | |
| Standardised logarithm of the loss | – | |
| Distribution function of the standard normal distribution | – |
As a worked example, calculated here from parameters published by Ramachandran (2002a) for the UK textile industry, losses are in £1000 at 1966 prices with base-10 logarithms. Nonsprinklered multistorey buildings have μ = 0.401 and σ = 0.992, and sprinklered multistorey buildings μ = −1.419 and σ = 1.340.[39] For a loss of £100,000, log x = 2, so t = (2 − 0.401)/0.992 = 1.61 without sprinklers, giving P ≈ 0.054, or about one fire in 19. With sprinklers, t = (2 + 1.419)/1.340 = 2.55 and P ≈ 0.005, about ten times smaller. The values apply to fires larger than the very small ones excluded from the analysis as "infant mortality".[38][39]
The same theory estimates the probable size of the largest fire in a year. For the UK textile industry, an analysis of the 17 largest losses in each year from 1947 to 1967 found that a year with 1,000 fires would most probably bring a largest loss of £260,000. The confidence limits were £180,000 and £700,000, all at 1947 money values.[40] Inflation-corrected losses above the upper limit could indicate changes for the worse in fire fighting, fire protection or industrial processes. Data for 1968–1978 suggested that protection measures in that industry were coping well with fire outbreaks.[40][38]
Role in codes, insurance and design
Major fires have long driven changes in codes. Hall and Twomey (2008) note that many issues in building codes were addressed on the basis of individual major incidents rather than statistics.[41] Ahrens et al. (2008) explain that codes are expected to prevent any really large incident, so one bad fire can by itself lead to code changes. This is especially likely when the fire occurs in a place never before associated with really bad fires.[42] They add cautions: fire protection engineering provides deterministic solutions for a probabilistic world, and risk can never be reduced to zero.[42] Looking at the deadliest fires of the preceding decades, they conclude that the problem is often not weak codes but incomplete adoption or ineffective enforcement.[1]
Large-loss fires are not where most fire loss occurs. Individual large-loss fires do not dominate total property losses due to fire.[10] Most fire deaths and other fire losses do not occur in big fires, or even in the kinds of places where big fires occur.[1] Ahrens et al. (2008) distinguish programmes that reduce the loss actually being suffered from programmes that reduce the potential for catastrophic loss, which target properties with many lives or high property values at risk.[43]
Limiting large property losses is not always a legal aim. In the Netherlands, the explanatory notes to the building regulations (Bbl) state that the fire rules aim to prevent casualties and the spread of fire to another plot. Preserving the building is stated not to be an objective.[44] Preserving the building and its contents and keeping the business running are then goals that an owner may pursue, secured for example by an insurer's conditions or a company's own rules.[45] In industry, Snyder (2008) lists the options for handling such risks as avoiding the risk, reducing it, transferring it by insurance, self-insurance, loss control improvements or a combination of these.[46]
See also
- Catastrophic multiple-death fire
- NFPA fire experience survey
- Reliability of fire protection systems
- Fire risk
- Cost-benefit analysis
Notes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-87.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Ahrens and Stewart (2008), p. 3-57.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-8.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-137.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-89.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-20.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 J. Moore (2008), pp. 20-164–20-165.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 McDaniel (2008), p. 20-186.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-77.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 Hall and Twomey (2008), p. 1-21.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 Schwab (2008a), p. 8-18.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 Ramachandran (2002a), p. 5-105.
- ↑ Bush (2008), p. 20-40.
- ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-26.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 Hall and Cote (2008), pp. 3-9–3-10.
- ↑ Hall and Ahrens (2002), p. 5-70.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-76.
- ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-4.
- ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-6.
- ↑ Quiter (2008), p. 20-77.
- ↑ Notarianni (2002), p. 5-61.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-13.
- ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2008), p. xxxv.
- ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2008), p. 47.
- ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-11.
- ↑ Smalley (2008), p. 13-65.
- ↑ 27.0 27.1 Snyder (2008), p. 12-180.
- ↑ Cholin (2008b), p. 14-62.
- ↑ Demers (2008a), p. 20-204.
- ↑ Schwab (2008a), p. 8-19.
- ↑ Huggins (2008), p. 16-31.
- ↑ Denlinger (2008), p. 12-71.
- ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-7.
- ↑ Ramachandran (2002b), p. 5-79.
- ↑ 35.0 35.1 35.2 35.3 Ramachandran (2002b), p. 5-83.
- ↑ Huggins (2008), p. 16-32.
- ↑ 37.0 37.1 Ramachandran (2002b), p. 5-88.
- ↑ 38.0 38.1 38.2 Ramachandran (2002a), p. 5-107.
- ↑ 39.0 39.1 39.2 Ramachandran (2002a), p. 5-108.
- ↑ 40.0 40.1 Ramachandran (2002a), p. 5-106.
- ↑ Hall and Twomey (2008), pp. 1-5–1-6.
- ↑ 42.0 42.1 Ahrens et al. (2008), pp. 3-84–3-85.
- ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-90.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §1.2.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §1.
- ↑ Snyder (2008), p. 12-179.
References
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- Ahrens, M., Frazier, P., & Kelch, G. (2008). Use of fire incident data and statistics. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-61–3-92). National Fire Protection Association.
- Bush, K. (2008). Apartment buildings. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-37–20-47). National Fire Protection Association.
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- National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2008). Final report on the collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 (NIST NCSTAR 1A).
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- Schwab, R. F. (2008a). Chemical processing equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-17–8-29). National Fire Protection Association.
- Smalley, J. C. (2008). Wildland fire management. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-53–13-79). National Fire Protection Association.
- Snyder, M. (2008). Industrial fire loss prevention. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-177–12-198). National Fire Protection Association.
- Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.