New FSE wiki article: Emergency and standby power (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
FSE wiki: fact-check: clarify alternate sources, generator timing, WTC scope and cited figures (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
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'''Emergency and standby power''' is electrical | '''Emergency and standby power''' is an alternate electrical supply that serves selected loads when the normal supply fails. Sources include batteries, an uninterruptible power supply, an engine-driven generator and, in some circumstances, a separate electric service.<ref name="Chi-10-3">Chisholm (2008), p. 10-3.</ref><ref name="Chi-10-4">Chisholm (2008), p. 10-4.</ref> In the United States, NFPA 70, the [[National Electrical Code]] (NEC), distinguishes emergency systems, which serve loads essential to the safety of life, from legally required and optional standby systems.<ref name="Chi-10-3" /> Emergency systems supply loads such as illumination, elevators, fire pumps and fire alarms when utility power is unavailable.<ref name="Chi-10-3" /> The chapter on the subject in the 20th edition of the ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008) cites the Northeast blackout of 2003 and the hurricanes of 2005 as demonstrations of the need for such sources.<ref name="Chi-10-3" /> | ||
NFPA 110, ''Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems'', classifies systems by type, class and level. | NFPA 110, ''Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems'', classifies systems by type, class and level. In the 2008 handbook's account of NEC emergency service, the prime mover must reach full speed and power within 10 seconds of demand. An auxiliary source may serve the load until the engine is ready. The engine-generator must have on-site fuel for at least 2 hours at full output.<ref name="Chi-10-4" /><ref name="Chi-10-6">Chisholm (2008), p. 10-6.</ref> The equipment matters for fire safety in two ways. Fire pumps, alarms, lighting and lifts depend on it during a fire, and its engines, fuel and batteries are themselves fire and explosion hazards.<ref name="NK-15-106">Nasby and Kovacik (2008), p. 15-106.</ref><ref name="Big-8-106">Biggins (2008), p. 8-106.</ref><ref name="Chi-10-5">Chisholm (2008), p. 10-5.</ref> | ||
== Types of system == | == Types of system == | ||
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An engine-driven generator system consists of a prime mover, a governor, a generator, transfer equipment and distribution and protective equipment. It is most common where power is needed for a considerable time.<ref name="Chi-10-5" /> The prime mover can be a gasoline, diesel or gas engine or a gas turbine. Gasoline engines and their fuel are more susceptible to fire and explosion, and a natural gas engine depends on an off-site supply that may fail at the same time as the utility.<ref name="Chi-10-5" /><ref name="Chi-10-6" /> Gas turbines take more than 10 seconds to reach full speed.<ref name="Chi-10-6" /> | An engine-driven generator system consists of a prime mover, a governor, a generator, transfer equipment and distribution and protective equipment. It is most common where power is needed for a considerable time.<ref name="Chi-10-5" /> The prime mover can be a gasoline, diesel or gas engine or a gas turbine. Gasoline engines and their fuel are more susceptible to fire and explosion, and a natural gas engine depends on an off-site supply that may fail at the same time as the utility.<ref name="Chi-10-5" /><ref name="Chi-10-6" /> Gas turbines take more than 10 seconds to reach full speed.<ref name="Chi-10-6" /> | ||
For emergency service, the NEC | For emergency service, the handbook summarises the NEC as requiring the prime mover to reach full speed and power within 10 seconds. Alternatively, an auxiliary supply can power the load within 10 seconds until the engine is ready.<ref name="Chi-10-6" /> The engine-generator needs on-site fuel for at least 2 hours at full output. | ||
Water-cooled engines may not be cooled by the municipal water supply, and a starting battery needs an automatic charger independent of the engine.<ref name="Chi-10-6" /> A generator's output voltage drops suddenly when a load is applied. Because motor starting customarily draws two to three times the rated current, this initial voltage dip is one of the limiting factors in sizing the generator.<ref name="Chi-10-6" /> If the dip is too large, relays and motor starters may drop out. Under a short circuit, the generator current decays within a relatively short time to only several times its rating, so faults must be cleared quickly while the protective devices can still detect them.<ref name="Chi-10-6" /><ref name="Chi-10-7">Chisholm (2008), p. 10-7.</ref> | |||
== Transfer and load management == | == Transfer and load management == | ||
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The generator's fuel must last for 8 hours of pump operation at 100 percent of rated capacity, and the voltage at the [[fire pump controller]] may not drop more than 15 percent during motor starting.<ref name="NK-15-115" /> The power transfer switch must be listed for fire pump service. It must transfer to the alternate source when the voltage in any phase falls below 85 percent of the motor rating, and it typically waits about 30 minutes before transferring back.<ref name="NK-15-140">Nasby and Kovacik (2008), p. 15-140.</ref><ref name="NK-15-141-142">Nasby and Kovacik (2008), pp. 15-141–15-142.</ref> | The generator's fuel must last for 8 hours of pump operation at 100 percent of rated capacity, and the voltage at the [[fire pump controller]] may not drop more than 15 percent during motor starting.<ref name="NK-15-115" /> The power transfer switch must be listed for fire pump service. It must transfer to the alternate source when the voltage in any phase falls below 85 percent of the motor rating, and it typically waits about 30 minutes before transferring back.<ref name="NK-15-140">Nasby and Kovacik (2008), p. 15-140.</ref><ref name="NK-15-141-142">Nasby and Kovacik (2008), pp. 15-141–15-142.</ref> | ||
For lifts, including any [[firefighting lift]], the safety code ASME A17.1 does not itself require standby power, but building codes do. A manual selection switch lets fire fighters choose the cars that receive standby power.<ref name="Don-10-64">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-64.</ref> The NIST investigation of the World Trade Center noted that US elevator and building codes require at least one elevator serving every floor to be connected to emergency power. Elevators that the fire service uses to evacuate people with disabilities must also have emergency power.<ref name="Lew-161">Lew et al. (2005), p. 161.</ref> New York City's Local Law 16 required emergency power for | For lifts, including any [[firefighting lift]], the safety code ASME A17.1 does not itself require standby power, but building codes do. A manual selection switch lets fire fighters choose the cars that receive standby power.<ref name="Don-10-64">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-64.</ref> The NIST investigation of the World Trade Center noted that US elevator and building codes require at least one elevator serving every floor to be connected to emergency power. Elevators that the fire service uses to evacuate people with disabilities must also have emergency power.<ref name="Lew-161">Lew et al. (2005), p. 161.</ref> New York City's Local Law 16 required emergency power for high-rise life safety equipment, including smoke venting and stair pressurisation; this applied to WTC 7 but not retroactively to the WTC towers.<ref name="Eva-73">Evans et al. (2005), p. 73.</ref> Public emergency communication centres should have primary and backup power, a UPS for essential electronic equipment and enough on-site generator fuel for at least 24 hours at full load.<ref name="Mer-12-255">Merklinger (2008), p. 12-255.</ref> | ||
== Fire and explosion hazards of the equipment == | == Fire and explosion hazards of the equipment == | ||
The most common use of a [[stationary combustion engine]] is to drive a generator for commercial and emergency power.<ref name="Big-8-105">Biggins (2008), p. 8-105.</ref> Its hazards include liquid and gaseous fuels, lubricants, hot exhaust parts, arcing electrical components and combustible materials stored in the engine room.<ref name="Big-8-106" /> Exhaust systems can exceed 538 °C (1,000 °F) and should keep at least 229 mm (9 in.) from combustible materials.<ref name="Big-8-107">Biggins (2008), p. 8-107.</ref> NFPA 37 limits gasoline in buildings to the engine-mounted tank of at most 95 L (25 gal), so diesel engines are generally used where more fuel is needed indoors.<ref name="Big-8-107" /> Sprinklers are the typical protection for reciprocating engines inside structures.<ref name="Big-8-108">Biggins (2008), p. 8-108.</ref> | The most common use of a [[stationary combustion engine]] is to drive a generator for commercial and emergency power.<ref name="Big-8-105">Biggins (2008), p. 8-105.</ref> Its hazards include liquid and gaseous fuels, lubricants, hot exhaust parts, arcing electrical components and combustible materials stored in the engine room.<ref name="Big-8-106" /> Exhaust systems can exceed 538 °C (1,000 °F) and should keep at least 229 mm (9 in.) from combustible materials.<ref name="Big-8-107">Biggins (2008), p. 8-107.</ref> NFPA 37 limits gasoline in buildings to the engine-mounted tank of at most 95 L (25 gal), so diesel engines are generally used where more fuel is needed indoors.<ref name="Big-8-107" /> Sprinklers are the typical protection for reciprocating engines inside structures.<ref name="Big-8-108">Biggins (2008), p. 8-108.</ref> | ||
US nuclear power plant data quantify the hazard. The fire risk method NUREG/CR-6850 gives emergency diesel generators a generic fire frequency of 2.1 × 10<sup>−2</sup> per reactor-year, of which 84 percent are oil fires.<ref name="Now-6-3">Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 6-3.</ref> This mean is based on 49.5 events in 2,486 reactor-years and corresponds to about one fire every | US nuclear power plant data quantify the hazard. The fire risk method NUREG/CR-6850 gives emergency diesel generators a generic fire frequency of 2.1 × 10<sup>−2</sup> per reactor-year, of which 84 percent are oil fires.<ref name="Now-6-3">Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 6-3.</ref> This modelled mean is based on 49.5 events in 2,486 reactor-years and corresponds to about one fire every 48 reactor-years.<ref name="Now-C-15">Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. C-15.</ref> Manifold fires are very common among these events and count as potentially challenging when they spread to a secondary fuel or are fed by a continuing leak.<ref name="Now-C-9">Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. C-9.</ref> A worked example of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission considers a spill of 11 L (3 gal) of diesel fuel in a 0.093 m² (1 ft²) dike in a standby generator room. The pool burns at about 95 kW for about 42 minutes.<ref name="IS-3-27-28">Iqbal and Salley (2004), pp. 3-27–3-28.</ref> | ||
In World Trade Center Building 7 (WTC 7) in New York, several tenants installed diesel generators to keep critical operations running, with fuel stored in and under the building.<ref name="Lew-175">Lew et al. (2005), p. 175.</ref> The New York City code limited day tanks above the lowest floor to 1,041 L (275 gal), one per storey, each in a curb or pan holding twice its volume.<ref name="Lew-175" /> The base system of 1987 had two 900 kW generators supplied from two buried 45,400 L (12,000 gal) tanks. One tenant system ran nine generators from a pressurised fuel line.<ref name="Lew-176">Lew et al. (2005), p. 176.</ref><ref name="Lew-180">Lew et al. (2005), p. 180.</ref> NIST nevertheless concluded that diesel fuel fires did not play a role in the collapse of the building in 2001.<ref name="NIST08-49">National Institute of Standards and Technology (2008), p. 49.</ref> | In World Trade Center Building 7 (WTC 7) in New York, several tenants installed diesel generators to keep critical operations running, with fuel stored in and under the building.<ref name="Lew-175">Lew et al. (2005), p. 175.</ref> The New York City code limited day tanks above the lowest floor to 1,041 L (275 gal), one per storey, each in a curb or pan holding twice its volume.<ref name="Lew-175" /> The base system of 1987 had two 900 kW generators supplied from two buried 45,400 L (12,000 gal) tanks. One tenant system ran nine generators from a pressurised fuel line.<ref name="Lew-176">Lew et al. (2005), p. 176.</ref><ref name="Lew-180">Lew et al. (2005), p. 180.</ref> NIST nevertheless concluded that diesel fuel fires did not play a role in the collapse of the building in 2001.<ref name="NIST08-49">National Institute of Standards and Technology (2008), p. 49.</ref> | ||
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The report bases the first equation on one battery maker's data and calls both methods first-order approximations.<ref name="IS-16-10">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-10.</ref> In the source, both constants are written ''K''. Its worked example takes a 60-cell, 3,730 Ah battery near the end of its life, on equalising charge at 2.33 V per cell with the electrolyte at 33 °C.<ref name="IS-16-13">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-13.</ref> The float current of 450 mA per 100 Ah at 25 °C doubles for every 8 °C rise, giving 900 mA per 100 Ah.<ref name="IS-16-8">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-8.</ref> The charging current is 0.9 × 37.3 = 33.6 A, so ''H''<sub>gen</sub> = 33.6 × 7.56 × 10<sup>−6</sup> × 60 = 0.0152 m³/min, as in the report.<ref name="IS-16-13" /> | The report bases the first equation on one battery maker's data and calls both methods first-order approximations.<ref name="IS-16-10">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-10.</ref> In the source, both constants are written ''K''. Its worked example takes a 60-cell, 3,730 Ah battery near the end of its life, on equalising charge at 2.33 V per cell with the electrolyte at 33 °C.<ref name="IS-16-13">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-13.</ref> The float current of 450 mA per 100 Ah at 25 °C doubles for every 8 °C rise, giving 900 mA per 100 Ah.<ref name="IS-16-8">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-8.</ref> The charging current is 0.9 × 37.3 = 33.6 A, so ''H''<sub>gen</sub> = 33.6 × 7.56 × 10<sup>−6</sup> × 60 = 0.0152 m³/min, as in the report.<ref name="IS-16-13" /> | ||
In a closed 28 m³ room with no ventilation and perfect mixing, this flow would reach the 2 percent limit after about 37 minutes. It would reach the lower flammability limit of 4.1 percent after about 76 minutes. With 10 air changes per hour (''Q'' = 4.72 m³/min), the concentration levels off at ''G''/''Q'', about 0.33 percent. The report accordingly names ventilation as the most common form of fire prevention in battery rooms.<ref name="IS-16-11">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-11.</ref> | In a closed 28 m³ room with no ventilation and perfect mixing, this flow would reach the 2 percent reference limit used for the nuclear battery rooms in the report after about 37 minutes. It would reach the lower flammability limit of 4.1 percent after about 76 minutes. With 10 air changes per hour (''Q'' = 4.72 m³/min), the concentration levels off at ''G''/''Q'', about 0.33 percent. The report accordingly names ventilation as the most common form of fire prevention in battery rooms.<ref name="IS-16-11">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-11.</ref> | ||
== Failures, reliability and testing == | == Failures, reliability and testing == | ||
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The utility itself is not always reliable. US utility summer capacity margins shrank from one-quarter of capacity in the early 1980s to one-tenth in the late 1990s.<ref name="Chi-10-3" /> During the rolling blackouts in California in 2000 and 2001, the public utility was not considered a reliable single source for fire pumps.<ref name="NK-15-109">Nasby and Kovacik (2008), p. 15-109.</ref> Annex guidance in NFPA 20 (2007) treats a supply as reliable when, among other criteria, the source plant has had no shutdown longer than 4 hours in the previous year.<ref name="NK-15-109" /> Local rules often go further. One US state requires emergency power for fire pumps in high-rise buildings and in assembly and educational buildings with more than 300 occupants.<ref name="NK-15-109" /> | The utility itself is not always reliable. US utility summer capacity margins shrank from one-quarter of capacity in the early 1980s to one-tenth in the late 1990s.<ref name="Chi-10-3" /> During the rolling blackouts in California in 2000 and 2001, the public utility was not considered a reliable single source for fire pumps.<ref name="NK-15-109">Nasby and Kovacik (2008), p. 15-109.</ref> Annex guidance in NFPA 20 (2007) treats a supply as reliable when, among other criteria, the source plant has had no shutdown longer than 4 hours in the previous year.<ref name="NK-15-109" /> Local rules often go further. One US state requires emergency power for fire pumps in high-rise buildings and in assembly and educational buildings with more than 300 occupants.<ref name="NK-15-109" /> | ||
Engineering methods give credit for emergency power and for protecting its circuits. The Dow loss control credit table, used in fire risk indexing, assigns emergency power a credit factor of 0.98.<ref name="Wat-5-131">Watts (2002), p. 5-131.</ref> | Engineering methods give credit for emergency power and for protecting its circuits. The Dow loss control credit table, used in fire risk indexing, assigns emergency power a credit factor of 0.98.<ref name="Wat-5-131">Watts (2002), p. 5-131.</ref> The Australian Fire Safety Verification Method data sheets discuss criteria related to fire resistance levels. These may include the time for which a critical service, such as an emergency power supply cable, maintains its function.<ref name="ABCB-C6-172">Australian Building Codes Board (2020a), Data Sheet C6, p. 172.</ref> | ||
Testing keeps the equipment ready. Generators that serve fire alarm systems are tested under NFPA 110, and dedicated UPS units under NFPA 111.<ref name="Cho-14-63" /> Generators in communication centres should run under load for at least 1 hour every week.<ref name="Mer-12-255" /> The US requirements quoted here are those summarised in the 2008 handbook, which refers to NFPA 20 (2007) and NFPA 110 (2005).<ref name="NK-15-107" /><ref name="Chi-10-6" /> | Testing keeps the equipment ready. Generators that serve fire alarm systems are tested under NFPA 110, and dedicated UPS units under NFPA 111.<ref name="Cho-14-63" /> Generators in communication centres should run under load for at least 1 hour every week.<ref name="Mer-12-255" /> The US requirements quoted here are those summarised in the 2008 handbook, which refers to NFPA 20 (2007) and NFPA 110 (2005).<ref name="NK-15-107" /><ref name="Chi-10-6" /> | ||
Revision as of 00:52, 8 November 2026
Emergency and standby power is an alternate electrical supply that serves selected loads when the normal supply fails. Sources include batteries, an uninterruptible power supply, an engine-driven generator and, in some circumstances, a separate electric service.[1][2] In the United States, NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code (NEC), distinguishes emergency systems, which serve loads essential to the safety of life, from legally required and optional standby systems.[1] Emergency systems supply loads such as illumination, elevators, fire pumps and fire alarms when utility power is unavailable.[1] The chapter on the subject in the 20th edition of the Fire Protection Handbook (2008) cites the Northeast blackout of 2003 and the hurricanes of 2005 as demonstrations of the need for such sources.[1]
NFPA 110, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems, classifies systems by type, class and level. In the 2008 handbook's account of NEC emergency service, the prime mover must reach full speed and power within 10 seconds of demand. An auxiliary source may serve the load until the engine is ready. The engine-generator must have on-site fuel for at least 2 hours at full output.[2][3] The equipment matters for fire safety in two ways. Fire pumps, alarms, lighting and lifts depend on it during a fire, and its engines, fuel and batteries are themselves fire and explosion hazards.[4][5][6]
Types of system
The NEC recognises two types of private power supply system, emergency and standby, and divides standby systems into legally required and optional ones. Their installation is governed by Articles 700, 701 and 702 of the NEC.[1] Emergency systems supply power for illumination, elevators, critical heating, ventilation and air conditioning, fire pumps, alarms, public address systems and other loads essential to life safety, where codes require them.[1] Legally required standby systems serve processes or institutions where an interruption could endanger lives or hamper rescue and fire-fighting operations. Optional standby systems protect business or property where life safety does not depend on them, for example data processing and communications.[1] The chapter on electrical systems notes that legally required standby systems also serve ventilation and smoke removal systems.[7]
Loads on such a system are divided into critical loads, which must be served within a relatively short time to preserve life or property, and noncritical loads.[2] In hospitals, the alternate supply is called the Essential Electrical Distribution System and must be fed by one or more on-site generators. It consists of an Emergency System, divided into a Life Safety Branch and a Critical Branch, and an Equipment System, as set out in NFPA 99.[2]
Because the terms overlap, NFPA 110 does not use them. It places every system in a category defined by type, class and level.[2] Type is the maximum time that the load may be without acceptable power. Class is the minimum time that the source can carry its rated load without refuelling, and level sets the stringency of the equipment requirements.[2] A generator that provides secondary power for a fire alarm system, for example, must meet the requirements for a Type 10, Class 24, Level 1 system.[8]
Energy sources and equipment
NFPA 70 recognises five sources for emergency power: storage batteries, generator sets, uninterruptible power supplies (UPS), a separate service and unit equipment. A separate service is not accepted for occupancies covered by NFPA 101, the Life Safety Code.[2] The energy usually comes from liquid petroleum products, liquefied petroleum gas, natural or synthetic gas, or batteries. On-site storage for the whole period of need is important in areas exposed to storms, earthquakes and flooding.[2][6]
Batteries are the most dependable source and are used mainly for emergency lighting, either in a central battery system or in self-contained luminaires called unit equipment.[6] Batteries for this service must supply the total emergency load for at least 1.5 hours without the voltage dropping below 87.5 percent of normal. They are usually of the lead-acid or nickel-cadmium type.[6]
A true UPS supplies continuous ac power without transients, so that sensitive loads such as computers are unaware of the loss of normal power. In a static UPS, a battery on the dc bus between rectifier and inverter takes over immediately when the incoming power fails.[6] A stored emergency power supply system (SEPSS) is cheaper. It switches the load to a battery-fed inverter within a few milliseconds.[6]
An engine-driven generator system consists of a prime mover, a governor, a generator, transfer equipment and distribution and protective equipment. It is most common where power is needed for a considerable time.[6] The prime mover can be a gasoline, diesel or gas engine or a gas turbine. Gasoline engines and their fuel are more susceptible to fire and explosion, and a natural gas engine depends on an off-site supply that may fail at the same time as the utility.[6][3] Gas turbines take more than 10 seconds to reach full speed.[3]
For emergency service, the handbook summarises the NEC as requiring the prime mover to reach full speed and power within 10 seconds. Alternatively, an auxiliary supply can power the load within 10 seconds until the engine is ready.[3] The engine-generator needs on-site fuel for at least 2 hours at full output.
Water-cooled engines may not be cooled by the municipal water supply, and a starting battery needs an automatic charger independent of the engine.[3] A generator's output voltage drops suddenly when a load is applied. Because motor starting customarily draws two to three times the rated current, this initial voltage dip is one of the limiting factors in sizing the generator.[3] If the dip is too large, relays and motor starters may drop out. Under a short circuit, the generator current decays within a relatively short time to only several times its rating, so faults must be cleared quickly while the protective devices can still detect them.[3][9]
Transfer and load management
An automatic transfer switch senses the normal supply and, on its loss, signals the prime mover to start. A short delay prevents a momentary flicker from starting the engine; NFPA 110, as summarised in 2008, requires at least 1 second for diesel engines.[10] When generator voltage and frequency are acceptable, the switch transfers the load. After normal power returns, it transfers back, usually after a delay of at least 5 minutes under NFPA 110.[9] An isolation bypass switch allows very critical loads to stay supplied while the transfer switch is serviced. Closed transition transfer switches avoid the short power interruption when the load is returned to the normal source.[9]
Critical loads are served first and noncritical motor loads afterwards. Step loading is achieved with several transfer switches that operate in sequence in the order of priority, and load shedding frees capacity for critical loads when needed.[9] Because of the investment involved, some owners also use their generator sets for peak shaving, taking selected loads off the utility during periods of maximum demand.[9]
Power for fire protection and life safety systems
The sources for emergency lighting are storage batteries, a generator driven by a prime mover, or a second electric service separated electrically and physically from the regular one.[7] In hospitals, the transition from the normal source to an emergency generator must not exceed 10 seconds.[7] The handbook chapter on health care occupancies warns that the transfer switch is a point where normal and emergency circuits merge. A fire there could interrupt both, so the switch should be separated from the generator and from the rest of the building.[11]
A fire alarm system needs a secondary supply that takes over automatically within 30 seconds whenever the primary supply fails. Protected premises and supervising station systems need 24 hours of standby power followed by 5 minutes of alarm.[8] Emergency voice/alarm communication systems need 24 hours of standby followed by 2 hours of emergency operation, which NFPA 72 equates with 15 minutes at full load.[8] The capacity can come from batteries, from batteries with 4 hours of capacity combined with an engine-driven generator, or from several generators.[8] A UPS is treated by NFPA 72 like utility power, so a secondary supply is still required.[12]
Electric fire pumps depend entirely on their supply: loss of power during a fire disables the whole water-based protection system.[4] NFPA 20, in its 2007 edition as described in the handbook, requires at least one alternate source where the building is taller than the fire department can supply by pumping.[13] Multiple sources must be arranged so that a fire, structural failure or accident that interrupts one does not interrupt the other.[14] A standby generator for fire pumps must start and run the pump motors while supplying all other loads, and it must meet Level 1, Type 10, Class X of NFPA 110.[15]
The generator's fuel must last for 8 hours of pump operation at 100 percent of rated capacity, and the voltage at the fire pump controller may not drop more than 15 percent during motor starting.[15] The power transfer switch must be listed for fire pump service. It must transfer to the alternate source when the voltage in any phase falls below 85 percent of the motor rating, and it typically waits about 30 minutes before transferring back.[16][17]
For lifts, including any firefighting lift, the safety code ASME A17.1 does not itself require standby power, but building codes do. A manual selection switch lets fire fighters choose the cars that receive standby power.[18] The NIST investigation of the World Trade Center noted that US elevator and building codes require at least one elevator serving every floor to be connected to emergency power. Elevators that the fire service uses to evacuate people with disabilities must also have emergency power.[19] New York City's Local Law 16 required emergency power for high-rise life safety equipment, including smoke venting and stair pressurisation; this applied to WTC 7 but not retroactively to the WTC towers.[20] Public emergency communication centres should have primary and backup power, a UPS for essential electronic equipment and enough on-site generator fuel for at least 24 hours at full load.[21]
Fire and explosion hazards of the equipment
The most common use of a stationary combustion engine is to drive a generator for commercial and emergency power.[22] Its hazards include liquid and gaseous fuels, lubricants, hot exhaust parts, arcing electrical components and combustible materials stored in the engine room.[5] Exhaust systems can exceed 538 °C (1,000 °F) and should keep at least 229 mm (9 in.) from combustible materials.[23] NFPA 37 limits gasoline in buildings to the engine-mounted tank of at most 95 L (25 gal), so diesel engines are generally used where more fuel is needed indoors.[23] Sprinklers are the typical protection for reciprocating engines inside structures.[24]
US nuclear power plant data quantify the hazard. The fire risk method NUREG/CR-6850 gives emergency diesel generators a generic fire frequency of 2.1 × 10−2 per reactor-year, of which 84 percent are oil fires.[25] This modelled mean is based on 49.5 events in 2,486 reactor-years and corresponds to about one fire every 48 reactor-years.[26] Manifold fires are very common among these events and count as potentially challenging when they spread to a secondary fuel or are fed by a continuing leak.[27] A worked example of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission considers a spill of 11 L (3 gal) of diesel fuel in a 0.093 m² (1 ft²) dike in a standby generator room. The pool burns at about 95 kW for about 42 minutes.[28]
In World Trade Center Building 7 (WTC 7) in New York, several tenants installed diesel generators to keep critical operations running, with fuel stored in and under the building.[29] The New York City code limited day tanks above the lowest floor to 1,041 L (275 gal), one per storey, each in a curb or pan holding twice its volume.[29] The base system of 1987 had two 900 kW generators supplied from two buried 45,400 L (12,000 gal) tanks. One tenant system ran nine generators from a pressurised fuel line.[30][31] NIST nevertheless concluded that diesel fuel fires did not play a role in the collapse of the building in 2001.[32]
Batteries bring a different hazard. The gaseous products of electrolysis, hydrogen and oxygen, can be a fire hazard, so batteries need proper location, ventilation and electrolyte containment.[6] A lead-acid cell nearing full charge releases up to 0.42 L of hydrogen per ampere-hour of overcharge, and the mixture becomes explosive above 4.1 percent hydrogen in air.[33] US nuclear plants ventilate battery rooms at about 10 air changes per hour to keep hydrogen below 2 percent.[34] On 20 March 2001, a hydrogen explosion in the UPS battery room of a large computer data centre in Rancho Cordova, California, blew a hole of more than 37 m² (400 ft²) in the roof.[34]
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission report NUREG-1805 estimates the hydrogen flow from an ageing battery from its float current, capacity and number of cells:[35] The resulting concentration in a ventilated room follows from a method of NFPA 69:[36]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Hgen, G | hydrogen generation (discharge) rate | m³/min |
| FC | float current per 100 Ah, temperature-compensated | mA |
| AH | battery capacity (nominal 8-hour rate) | Ah |
| K | hydrogen evolution, 7.56 × 10−6 m³ (0.000267 ft³) per minute per charging ampere per cell | m³/(min·A) |
| N | number of cells | – |
| C | hydrogen concentration by volume | – |
| Q | ventilation air flow through the room | m³/min |
| Km | mixing efficiency factor, 1.0 for perfect mixing and 0.2 to 0.9 in practice | – |
| Na | number of theoretical air changes since the release started | – |
The report bases the first equation on one battery maker's data and calls both methods first-order approximations.[37] In the source, both constants are written K. Its worked example takes a 60-cell, 3,730 Ah battery near the end of its life, on equalising charge at 2.33 V per cell with the electrolyte at 33 °C.[38] The float current of 450 mA per 100 Ah at 25 °C doubles for every 8 °C rise, giving 900 mA per 100 Ah.[39] The charging current is 0.9 × 37.3 = 33.6 A, so Hgen = 33.6 × 7.56 × 10−6 × 60 = 0.0152 m³/min, as in the report.[38]
In a closed 28 m³ room with no ventilation and perfect mixing, this flow would reach the 2 percent reference limit used for the nuclear battery rooms in the report after about 37 minutes. It would reach the lower flammability limit of 4.1 percent after about 76 minutes. With 10 air changes per hour (Q = 4.72 m³/min), the concentration levels off at G/Q, about 0.33 percent. The report accordingly names ventilation as the most common form of fire prevention in battery rooms.[40]
Failures, reliability and testing
Emergency supplies can fail when they are most needed. During the explosion and fire at the World Trade Center on 26 February 1993, normal power was lost at about 12:18 p.m. and the emergency generators failed about 20 minutes later.[41] The loss of power, including emergency power, trapped occupants in elevators in both towers.[42] After the bombing, emergency power was provided for all emergency systems and the elevators of both towers, but not for the base building smoke purge fans.[43] By 2001, six emergency generators at basement level B-6 backed up the fire pumps, communications, elevators and emergency lighting.[44]
The utility itself is not always reliable. US utility summer capacity margins shrank from one-quarter of capacity in the early 1980s to one-tenth in the late 1990s.[1] During the rolling blackouts in California in 2000 and 2001, the public utility was not considered a reliable single source for fire pumps.[45] Annex guidance in NFPA 20 (2007) treats a supply as reliable when, among other criteria, the source plant has had no shutdown longer than 4 hours in the previous year.[45] Local rules often go further. One US state requires emergency power for fire pumps in high-rise buildings and in assembly and educational buildings with more than 300 occupants.[45]
Engineering methods give credit for emergency power and for protecting its circuits. The Dow loss control credit table, used in fire risk indexing, assigns emergency power a credit factor of 0.98.[46] The Australian Fire Safety Verification Method data sheets discuss criteria related to fire resistance levels. These may include the time for which a critical service, such as an emergency power supply cable, maintains its function.[47]
Testing keeps the equipment ready. Generators that serve fire alarm systems are tested under NFPA 110, and dedicated UPS units under NFPA 111.[12] Generators in communication centres should run under load for at least 1 hour every week.[21] The US requirements quoted here are those summarised in the 2008 handbook, which refers to NFPA 20 (2007) and NFPA 110 (2005).[13][3]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 Chisholm (2008), p. 10-3.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 Chisholm (2008), p. 10-4.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 Chisholm (2008), p. 10-6.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Nasby and Kovacik (2008), p. 15-106.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Biggins (2008), p. 8-106.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 Chisholm (2008), p. 10-5.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-163.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 W. D. Moore (2008), p. 14-6.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 Chisholm (2008), p. 10-7.
- ↑ Chisholm (2008), pp. 10-6–10-7.
- ↑ O'Connor (2008), p. 20-150.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 Cholin (2008b), p. 14-63.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 Nasby and Kovacik (2008), p. 15-107.
- ↑ Nasby and Kovacik (2008), p. 15-110.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 Nasby and Kovacik (2008), p. 15-115.
- ↑ Nasby and Kovacik (2008), p. 15-140.
- ↑ Nasby and Kovacik (2008), pp. 15-141–15-142.
- ↑ Donoghue (2008), p. 10-64.
- ↑ Lew et al. (2005), p. 161.
- ↑ Evans et al. (2005), p. 73.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 Merklinger (2008), p. 12-255.
- ↑ Biggins (2008), p. 8-105.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Biggins (2008), p. 8-107.
- ↑ Biggins (2008), p. 8-108.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 6-3.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. C-15.
- ↑ Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. C-9.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), pp. 3-27–3-28.
- ↑ 29.0 29.1 Lew et al. (2005), p. 175.
- ↑ Lew et al. (2005), p. 176.
- ↑ Lew et al. (2005), p. 180.
- ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2008), p. 49.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-1.
- ↑ 34.0 34.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-6.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-7.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-9.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-10.
- ↑ 38.0 38.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-13.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-8.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-11.
- ↑ Isner and Klem (1993), as cited in Bryan (2002), p. 3-335.
- ↑ Bryan (2002), p. 3-339.
- ↑ Evans et al. (2005), p. 84.
- ↑ Evans et al. (2005), p. 14.
- ↑ 45.0 45.1 45.2 Nasby and Kovacik (2008), p. 15-109.
- ↑ Watts (2002), p. 5-131.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020a), Data Sheet C6, p. 172.
References
- Australian Building Codes Board. (2020a). Data sheets: Fire Safety Verification Method (Handbook annex, Print version 1.1).
- Biggins, J. B. (2008). Stationary combustion engines and fuel cells. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-105–8-111). National Fire Protection Association.
- Bryan, J. L. (2002). Behavioral response to fire and smoke. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-315–3-341). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Chisholm, D., Sr. (2008). Emergency and standby power supplies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 10-3–10-8). National Fire Protection Association.
- Cholin, J. M. (2008b). Inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire alarm systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 14-53–14-78). National Fire Protection Association.
- Donoghue, E. A. (2008). Building transportation systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 10-57–10-68). National Fire Protection Association.
- Evans, D. D., Peacock, R. D., Kuligowski, E. D., Dols, W. S., & Grosshandler, W. L. (2005). Active fire protection systems (NIST NCSTAR 1-4). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
- Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- Lew, H. S., Bukowski, R. W., & Carino, N. J. (2005). Design, construction, and maintenance of structural and life safety systems (NIST NCSTAR 1-1). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
- Merklinger, J. M. (2008). Public emergency services alarm, dispatch, and communications systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-253–12-266). National Fire Protection Association.
- Milatovich, R. M. (2008). Electrical systems and appliances. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-127–8-173). National Fire Protection Association.
- Moore, W. D. (2008). Fire alarm systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 14-3–14-14). National Fire Protection Association.
- Nasby, J. S., & Kovacik, J. R. (2008). Fire pump controllers and power supply arrangements for motor-driven fire pumps. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 15-105–15-145). National Fire Protection Association.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2008). Final report on the collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 (NIST NCSTAR 1A).
- Nowlen, S. P., Najafi, B., Wyant, F. J., Forester, J., Kazarians, M., Kolaczkowski, A., Joglar, F., Funk, D., Hannaman, G., & Anoba, R. (2005b). EPRI/NRC-RES fire PRA methodology for nuclear power facilities: Vol. 2. Detailed methodology (NUREG/CR-6850; EPRI 1011989). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
- O'Connor, D. J. (2008). Health care occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-139–20-155). National Fire Protection Association.
- Watts, J. M., Jr. (2002). Fire risk indexing. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-125–5-142). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.