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New FSE wiki article: Liquefied petroleum gas (written by Claude Opus 5.5)
 
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NFPA wiki: fact-check corrections (written by Claude Opus 5.5)
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Lemoff classifies LP-gas as flammable, liquefied and a fuel gas, with the United Nations number UN 1075.<ref name="Lemoff-6-183" /> Under the US standard NFPA 55, as quoted in the 2008 handbook, it is a flammable liquefied gas. That is a liquefied compressed gas that is partly liquid at 20 °C under its charged pressure and is flammable. This definition matches US Department of Transportation rules and is essentially identical to United Nations shipping definitions.<ref name="Lemoff-6-166">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-166.</ref> A liquefied gas stays under pressure as long as any liquid remains in the container, and that pressure depends on the temperature of the liquid.<ref name="Lemoff-6-168">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-168.</ref>
Lemoff classifies LP-gas as flammable, liquefied and a fuel gas, with the United Nations number UN 1075.<ref name="Lemoff-6-183" /> Under the US standard NFPA 55, as quoted in the 2008 handbook, it is a flammable liquefied gas. That is a liquefied compressed gas that is partly liquid at 20 °C under its charged pressure and is flammable. This definition matches US Department of Transportation rules and is essentially identical to United Nations shipping definitions.<ref name="Lemoff-6-166">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-166.</ref> A liquefied gas stays under pressure as long as any liquid remains in the container, and that pressure depends on the temperature of the liquid.<ref name="Lemoff-6-168">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-168.</ref>


LP-gas serves as a domestic, commercial, agricultural and industrial fuel, as a feedstock in chemical processing and as a vehicle fuel.<ref name="Lemoff-6-183" /> Many gas utilities use it to supplement natural gas during short periods of peak demand in very cold weather.<ref name="Lemoff-6-186">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-186.</ref> Liquefied gas propellants in aerosol cans are typically blends of propane and butane.<ref name="Fredrickson-6-258" />
LP-gas serves as a domestic, commercial, agricultural and industrial fuel gas, in chemical processing and as a vehicle fuel.<ref name="Lemoff-6-183" /> Many gas utilities use it to supplement natural gas during short periods of peak demand in very cold weather.<ref name="Lemoff-6-186">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-186.</ref> Liquefied gas propellants in aerosol cans are typically blends of propane and butane.<ref name="Fredrickson-6-258" />


In Europe, the European Commission identified LPG in 2013 as one of the principal alternative fuels for transport, a choice later recorded in Directive 2014/94/EU.<ref name="VdG-18">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 18.</ref> LP-gas is not toxic, but it is a simple asphyxiant that can displace breathing air.<ref name="Lemoff-6-183" /> Rivkin gives it a time-weighted average exposure limit of 1000 ppm.<ref name="Rivkin-21-60">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-60.</ref>
In Europe, the European Commission identified LPG in 2013 as one of the principal alternative fuels for transport, a choice later recorded in Directive 2014/94/EU.<ref name="VdG-18">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 18.</ref> LP-gas is not toxic, but it is a simple asphyxiant that can displace breathing air.<ref name="Lemoff-6-183" /> Rivkin gives it a time-weighted average exposure limit of 1000 ppm.<ref name="Rivkin-21-60">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-60.</ref>
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Three properties dominate the hazard. The first is the large liquid-to-gas expansion. One gallon of liquid propane or butane produces about 245 to 275 gallons of gas.<ref name="Lemoff-6-183" /> Rivkin gives an expansion ratio of about 270 to 1 for propane.<ref name="Rivkin-21-67" /> The tabulated 0.271 m³ of vapour per litre of liquid propane corresponds to a ratio of about 271.
Three properties dominate the hazard. The first is the large liquid-to-gas expansion. One gallon of liquid propane or butane produces about 245 to 275 gallons of gas.<ref name="Lemoff-6-183" /> The tabulated 0.271 m³ of vapour per litre of liquid propane corresponds to a ratio of about 271.


The second property is the vapour density. LP-gas vapour is about 1.5 times as heavy as air, and vapour that has just boiled off the liquid is heavier still because it is cold.<ref name="Lemoff-6-184">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-184.</ref> The third is the low lower flammability limit. LP-gas forms a flammable mixture at lower concentrations than natural gas, although its flammable range is narrower.<ref name="Rivkin-21-58">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-58.</ref> The lower limit is 2.15 % for propane against 4.5 to 4.7 % for the natural gas types in the same table.<ref name="Lemoff-6-174" />
The second property is the vapour density. LP-gas vapour is about 1.5 times as heavy as air, and vapour that has just boiled off the liquid is heavier still because it is cold.<ref name="Lemoff-6-184">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-184.</ref> The third is the low lower flammability limit. LP-gas forms a flammable mixture at lower concentrations than natural gas, although its flammable range is narrower.<ref name="Rivkin-21-58">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-58.</ref> The lower limit is 2.15 % for propane against 4.5 to 4.7 % for the natural gas types in the same table.<ref name="Lemoff-6-174" />
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LP-gas is shipped as a liquefied gas in uninsulated cylinders built to US Department of Transportation (DOT) and Transport Canada (TC) specifications. It also travels in ASME pressure tanks, cargo trucks, railroad tank cars and marine vessels. Refrigerated LP-gas is carried near its boiling point of about −40 °C at atmospheric pressure in insulated ships. Storage is in cylinders, ASME-code tanks and insulated tanks built to American Petroleum Institute (API) standards.<ref name="Lemoff-6-183" />
LP-gas is shipped as a liquefied gas in uninsulated cylinders built to US Department of Transportation (DOT) and Transport Canada (TC) specifications. It also travels in ASME pressure tanks, cargo trucks, railroad tank cars and marine vessels. Refrigerated LP-gas is carried near its boiling point of about −40 °C at atmospheric pressure in insulated ships. Storage is in cylinders, ASME-code tanks and insulated tanks built to American Petroleum Institute (API) standards.<ref name="Lemoff-6-183" />


A liquefied gas container must never be filled so full that the liquid can fill it completely when it warms. Once the vapour space has gone, a small further rise in temperature causes a large rise in pressure. The permitted quantity is therefore fixed by codes as a filling density, either by weight or by volume. A filling density by volume is only meaningful together with the liquid temperature.<ref name="Lemoff-6-169">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-169.</ref> The handbook gives an example for LP-gas in uninsulated containers. A liquid with a specific gravity of 0.504 to 0.510 may fill 82.6 % of an aboveground container of up to 4.54 m³ (1200 US gal) at 15.6 °C. The limit rises to 88.5 % for larger aboveground containers and 90.5 % for underground containers. Larger containers absorb heat more slowly, and underground containers stay cooler in summer.<ref name="Lemoff-6-170">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-170.</ref>
A liquefied gas container must never be filled so full that the liquid can fill it completely when it warms. Once the vapour space has gone, a small further rise in temperature causes a large rise in pressure. The permitted quantity is therefore fixed by codes as a filling density, either by weight or by volume. A filling density by volume is only meaningful together with the liquid temperature.<ref name="Lemoff-6-169">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-169.</ref> The handbook gives an example for LP-gas in uninsulated containers. A liquid with a specific gravity of 0.504 to 0.510 may fill 82.6 % of an aboveground container of up to 4.54 m³ (1200 US gal) at 15.6 °C. The limit rises to 88.5 % for larger aboveground containers and 90.5 % for underground containers.<ref name="Lemoff-6-170">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-170.</ref> Larger containers absorb heat more slowly, and underground containers stay cooler in summer.<ref name="Lemoff-6-169" />


Overfilling makes relief valves open at lower temperatures. In general, fully charged containers start to relieve when the gas reaches 54 to 60 °C. Containers are checked by weighing against the marked tare weight or with fixed-tube liquid level gauges.<ref name="LR-7-41">Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-41.</ref> The relieving capacity of a relief valve is sized for fire exposure. If the container tips over and the valve discharges liquid instead of vapour, the capacity can fall by as much as 60 to 70 %.<ref name="Lemoff-6-170" />
Overfilling makes relief valves open at lower temperatures. In general, fully charged containers start to relieve when the gas reaches 54 to 60 °C. Containers are checked by weighing against the marked tare weight or with fixed-tube liquid level gauges.<ref name="LR-7-41">Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-41.</ref> In most cases, the relieving capacity of a relief valve is based on fire exposure. If the container tips over and the valve discharges liquid instead of vapour, the capacity can fall by as much as 60 to 70 %.<ref name="Lemoff-6-170" />


The quantity of gas in a container follows from three simple relations. The liquid mass is the permitted volume fraction times the container volume times the liquid density. The vapour volume is that mass times the specific vapour volume. The volume of mixture that could be formed at the lower flammability limit is the vapour volume divided by that limit.
The quantity of gas in a container follows from three simple relations. The liquid mass is the permitted volume fraction times the container volume times the liquid density. The vapour volume is that mass times the specific vapour volume. The volume of mixture that could be formed at the lower flammability limit is the vapour volume divided by that limit.
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Indoors, the main danger is a combustion explosion in the enclosure. A room full of flammable mixture would have to withstand 400 to 750 kPa to stay intact, while conventional structures resist only 3.5 to 7.0 kPa. Most combustion explosions in buildings therefore occur when less than 25 % of the enclosure holds a flammable mixture. Because liquefied gases can form large mixtures quickly, codes severely limit their handling indoors.<ref name="Lemoff-6-175">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-175.</ref>
Indoors, the main danger is a combustion explosion in the enclosure. A room full of flammable mixture would have to withstand 400 to 750 kPa to stay intact, while conventional structures resist only 3.5 to 7.0 kPa. Most combustion explosions in buildings therefore occur when less than 25 % of the enclosure holds a flammable mixture. Because liquefied gases can form large mixtures quickly, codes severely limit their handling indoors.<ref name="Lemoff-6-175">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-175.</ref>


Codes, standards and regulations require natural gas and LP-gas to be odorised, so that a person with a normal sense of smell can detect them at one-fifth of the lower flammability limit. Lemoff describes this as common practice throughout the world.<ref name="Lemoff-6-175" /> Typical odorants are ethyl mercaptan and thiophane. Odorants can fade in containers through oxidation, and the sense of smell declines with age, allergies, smoking and eating.<ref name="Rivkin-21-60" />
Lemoff (2008) states that codes, standards and regulations require natural gas and LP-gas to be odorised, detectable by a normal sense of smell at one-fifth of the lower flammability limit. He describes this as common practice throughout the world.<ref name="Lemoff-6-175" /> Typical odorants are ethyl mercaptan and thiophane. Odorants can fade in containers through oxidation, and the sense of smell declines with age, allergies, smoking and eating.<ref name="Rivkin-21-60" />


== BLEVE ==
== BLEVE ==
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On 19 November 1984, a broken fill line at an LP-gas terminal near Mexico City released a cloud that ignited at a ground flare about 20 minutes later. About 500 deaths were reported, and some 15 BLEVEs followed among four 1590 m³ spheres and 48 horizontal tanks.<ref name="Lemoff-6-172" /> In Albert City, Iowa, on 9 April 1998, a 68 m³ propane tank exploded after a broken, ignited pipe directed flame at it. Its shutoff valve, under the tank, could not be reached.<ref name="Lemoff-6-173" /> Two volunteer firefighters were killed about 30.5 m from the side of that vessel.<ref name="Zalosh-2-97" /> After several derailments with tank car BLEVEs, US DOT rules of 1977 required thermal protection and special couplers on tank cars carrying liquefied flammable gases.<ref name="LR-7-37">Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-37.</ref>
On 19 November 1984, a broken fill line at an LP-gas terminal near Mexico City released a cloud that ignited at a ground flare about 20 minutes later. About 500 deaths were reported, and some 15 BLEVEs followed among four 1590 m³ spheres and 48 horizontal tanks.<ref name="Lemoff-6-172" /> In Albert City, Iowa, on 9 April 1998, a 68 m³ propane tank exploded after a broken, ignited pipe directed flame at it. Its shutoff valve, under the tank, could not be reached.<ref name="Lemoff-6-173" /> Two volunteer firefighters were killed about 30.5 m from the side of that vessel.<ref name="Zalosh-2-97" /> After several derailments with tank car BLEVEs, US DOT rules of 1977 required thermal protection and special couplers on tank cars carrying liquefied flammable gases.<ref name="LR-7-37">Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-37.</ref>


Protection relies on keeping the unwetted shell cool with a film of water, applied by hose streams or fixed water spray systems.<ref name="Lemoff-6-172" /> In the United States, NFPA 15, as described in the 2008 handbook, requires for larger containers of liquefied flammable gases a water density above 10 (L/min)/m² (0.25 gpm/ft²) of container surface.<ref name="LR-7-40">Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-40.</ref> In the United States, NFPA 58, as described in the 2008 handbook, adds product control, meaning the ability to close container valves remotely in a fire. Larger propane containers need internal valves with excess flow protection and a remote shutoff, operable at the valve or 6 to 30 m (20 to 100 ft) away. The handbook reports internal valves on all new propane containers since 2001 and a July 2011 deadline for existing containers above 15 m³ (4000 gal).<ref name="Lemoff-6-173" />
Protection relies on keeping the unwetted shell cool with a film of water, applied by hose streams or fixed water spray systems.<ref name="Lemoff-6-172" /> In the United States, NFPA 15, as described in the 2008 handbook, requires for larger containers of liquefied flammable gases a water density above 10 (L/min)/m² (0.25 gpm/ft²) of container surface.<ref name="LR-7-40">Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-40.</ref> In the United States, NFPA 58, as described in the 2008 handbook, adds product control, meaning the ability to close container valves remotely in a fire. Larger propane containers need internal valves with excess flow protection and a remote shutoff, operable at the valve or 6 to 30 m (20 to 100 ft) away. The 2008 handbook reported that all new propane containers had needed internal valves since 2001 and that existing containers above 15 m³ (4000 gal) were to have them by July 2011.<ref name="Lemoff-6-173" />


== Estimating a BLEVE fireball ==
== Estimating a BLEVE fireball ==
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<math display="block">D = 5.8\, m^{1/3} \qquad t_d = 0.45\, m^{1/3}\ \text{(momentum)} \qquad t_d = 2.6\, m^{1/6}\ \text{(buoyancy)}</math>
<math display="block">D = 5.8\, m^{1/3} \qquad t_d = 0.45\, m^{1/3}\ \text{(momentum)} \qquad t_d = 2.6\, m^{1/6}\ \text{(buoyancy)}</math>


The radiant heat flux on a target is the surface emissive power of the fireball times the configuration factor times the atmospheric transmissivity. When the target sees the whole fireball, the configuration factor is the square of the radius-to-distance ratio times the cosine of the target angle.<ref name="Beyler-3-308">Beyler (2002a), p. 3-308.</ref>
The radiant heat flux on a target is the surface emissive power of the fireball times the configuration factor times the atmospheric transmissivity.<ref name="Beyler-3-307" /> When the target sees the whole fireball, the configuration factor is the square of the radius-to-distance ratio times the cosine of the target angle.<ref name="Beyler-3-308">Beyler (2002a), p. 3-308.</ref>


<math display="block">\dot q'' = \tau\, E\, F \qquad F = \left(\frac{r}{L}\right)^2 \cos\theta \quad \text{for } \theta < \frac{\pi}{2} - \phi</math>
<math display="block">\dot q'' = \tau\, E\, F \qquad F = \left(\frac{r}{L}\right)^2 \cos\theta \quad \text{for } \theta < \frac{\pi}{2} - \phi</math>
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== Limits and common misconceptions ==
== Limits and common misconceptions ==
A BLEVE describes what happens after a container fails, not how it fails. The failure itself can come from flame contact, corrosion, puncture or gouging.<ref name="Lemoff-6-171" /> A working relief valve is therefore no guarantee against a BLEVE. Only cooling the vapour-space shell, or keeping fire away from the container, addresses the cause.<ref name="Lemoff-6-171" /><ref name="Lemoff-6-172" /> Excess flow valves also have limits. They are sized to close on a clean break of a pipe, and they may stay open after a jagged break or in cold weather, when container pressure and flow are lower.<ref name="Lemoff-6-173" />
A BLEVE describes what happens after a container fails, not how it fails. The failure itself can come from flame contact, corrosion, puncture or gouging.<ref name="Lemoff-6-171" /> A working relief valve is therefore no guarantee against a BLEVE. The protective measures the handbook describes are a film of water on the shell above the liquid and insulation designed for fire exposure, which can delay a BLEVE significantly. Product control adds valves that stop the fuel feeding the fire.<ref name="Lemoff-6-172" /><ref name="Lemoff-6-173" /> Excess flow valves also have limits. They are sized to close on a clean break of a pipe, and they may stay open after a jagged break or in cold weather, when container pressure and flow are lower.<ref name="Lemoff-6-173" />


Rivkin warns that the setback distances in NFPA 58 are minimum requirements, not safe distances. A large continuous liquid leak can produce vapour cloud, BLEVE and fragment hazards beyond the largest setback distances.<ref name="Rivkin-21-67" /> The code values, dates and deadlines in this article are US rules as the handbook described them in 2008, and practice elsewhere differs. Some European countries, for example, fit no relief devices to liquefied gas containers used inside buildings, because an indoor gas release is judged worse than a container failure.<ref name="Lemoff-6-170" />
Rivkin warns that the setback distances in NFPA 58 are minimum requirements, not safe distances. A large continuous liquid leak can produce vapour cloud, BLEVE and fragment hazards beyond the largest setback distances.<ref name="Rivkin-21-67" /> The code values, dates and deadlines in this article are US rules as the handbook described them in 2008, and practice elsewhere differs. Some European countries, for example, fit no relief devices to liquefied gas containers used inside buildings, because an indoor gas release is judged worse than a container failure.<ref name="Lemoff-6-170" />

Revision as of 22:34, 7 November 2026

Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG, also written LP-gas) is a flammable hydrocarbon fuel, mainly propane or normal butane or a mixture of the two, that is kept liquid in closed containers under its own vapour pressure.[1] It is classed as a flammable gas and is used as a domestic, commercial and industrial fuel, as an aerosol propellant and as a vehicle fuel.[1][2] One volume of liquid gives about 245 to 275 volumes of gas, and the vapour is about 1.5 times as heavy as air.[1][3] A leak can therefore form a large, low-lying flammable cloud.

Released LP-gas can burn as a jet fire, a flash fire or a vapour cloud explosion.[4] A container heated by fire can fail in a BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion), which throws fragments and produces a fireball.[5] In the United States, storage, handling and vehicle use are covered by NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code.[6] The requirements quoted in this article are US rules and practice as the Fire Protection Handbook (2008) described them around 2007 and 2008, not current or universal rules.

Composition and classification

In commerce, LP-gas is predominantly propane or normal butane, or mixtures of these, with smaller amounts of ethane, ethylene, propylene, iso-butane and butylene.[1] LP-gas sold as a vehicle fuel is commercial propane, which is not pure but contains varying percentages of these other hydrocarbons. Propane is a gas at room temperature and becomes liquid when it is stored under a pressure equal to its vapour pressure.[7]

Lemoff classifies LP-gas as flammable, liquefied and a fuel gas, with the United Nations number UN 1075.[1] Under the US standard NFPA 55, as quoted in the 2008 handbook, it is a flammable liquefied gas. That is a liquefied compressed gas that is partly liquid at 20 °C under its charged pressure and is flammable. This definition matches US Department of Transportation rules and is essentially identical to United Nations shipping definitions.[8] A liquefied gas stays under pressure as long as any liquid remains in the container, and that pressure depends on the temperature of the liquid.[9]

LP-gas serves as a domestic, commercial, agricultural and industrial fuel gas, in chemical processing and as a vehicle fuel.[1] Many gas utilities use it to supplement natural gas during short periods of peak demand in very cold weather.[10] Liquefied gas propellants in aerosol cans are typically blends of propane and butane.[2]

In Europe, the European Commission identified LPG in 2013 as one of the principal alternative fuels for transport, a choice later recorded in Directive 2014/94/EU.[11] LP-gas is not toxic, but it is a simple asphyxiant that can displace breathing air.[1] Rivkin gives it a time-weighted average exposure limit of 1000 ppm.[12]

Physical and combustion properties

The table gives approximate properties of the two main commercial grades, taken from two handbook tables.[1][13]

Approximate properties of commercial propane and butane
Property Commercial propane Commercial butane
Vapour pressure (gauge) at 21 °C (70 °F) 876 kPa (127 psig) 117 kPa (17 psig)
Vapour pressure (gauge) at 38 °C (100 °F) 1351 kPa (196 psig) 255 kPa (37 psig)
Initial boiling point at 101 kPa −42 °C −9 °C
Liquid density at 15.5 °C 504 kg/m³ 582 kg/m³
Vapour per kilogram of liquid at 15.5 °C 0.534 m³ 0.410 m³
Vapour specific gravity (air = 1) 1.50 2.01
Flammability limits in air (% by volume) 2.15 to 9.60 1.55 to 8.60
Ignition temperature in air 493 to 604 °C (920 to 1120 °F) 482 to 538 °C
Latent heat of vaporisation at boiling point 428 kJ/kg 388 kJ/kg
Total heating value after vaporisation 49,920 kJ/kg 49,140 kJ/kg

Three properties dominate the hazard. The first is the large liquid-to-gas expansion. One gallon of liquid propane or butane produces about 245 to 275 gallons of gas.[1] The tabulated 0.271 m³ of vapour per litre of liquid propane corresponds to a ratio of about 271.

The second property is the vapour density. LP-gas vapour is about 1.5 times as heavy as air, and vapour that has just boiled off the liquid is heavier still because it is cold.[14] The third is the low lower flammability limit. LP-gas forms a flammable mixture at lower concentrations than natural gas, although its flammable range is narrower.[15] The lower limit is 2.15 % for propane against 4.5 to 4.7 % for the natural gas types in the same table.[13]

For fire calculations, Babrauskas lists LPG (mostly propane) with a heat of combustion of 46.0 MJ/kg and a large-pool burning rate of 0.099 kg/(m²·s).[16] The International Fire Engineering Guidelines give the same calorific value, 46 MJ/kg, for both propane and butane.[17]

Containers and filling density

LP-gas is shipped as a liquefied gas in uninsulated cylinders built to US Department of Transportation (DOT) and Transport Canada (TC) specifications. It also travels in ASME pressure tanks, cargo trucks, railroad tank cars and marine vessels. Refrigerated LP-gas is carried near its boiling point of about −40 °C at atmospheric pressure in insulated ships. Storage is in cylinders, ASME-code tanks and insulated tanks built to American Petroleum Institute (API) standards.[1]

A liquefied gas container must never be filled so full that the liquid can fill it completely when it warms. Once the vapour space has gone, a small further rise in temperature causes a large rise in pressure. The permitted quantity is therefore fixed by codes as a filling density, either by weight or by volume. A filling density by volume is only meaningful together with the liquid temperature.[18] The handbook gives an example for LP-gas in uninsulated containers. A liquid with a specific gravity of 0.504 to 0.510 may fill 82.6 % of an aboveground container of up to 4.54 m³ (1200 US gal) at 15.6 °C. The limit rises to 88.5 % for larger aboveground containers and 90.5 % for underground containers.[19] Larger containers absorb heat more slowly, and underground containers stay cooler in summer.[18]

Overfilling makes relief valves open at lower temperatures. In general, fully charged containers start to relieve when the gas reaches 54 to 60 °C. Containers are checked by weighing against the marked tare weight or with fixed-tube liquid level gauges.[20] In most cases, the relieving capacity of a relief valve is based on fire exposure. If the container tips over and the valve discharges liquid instead of vapour, the capacity can fall by as much as 60 to 70 %.[19]

The quantity of gas in a container follows from three simple relations. The liquid mass is the permitted volume fraction times the container volume times the liquid density. The vapour volume is that mass times the specific vapour volume. The volume of mixture that could be formed at the lower flammability limit is the vapour volume divided by that limit.

m=fVVcρlVg=mvgVmix=VgxLFL

Symbol Description Unit
m Mass of LP-gas in the container kg
fV Maximum permitted filling as a volume fraction at 15.6 °C –
Vc Water capacity of the container m³
ρl Liquid density at 15.5 °C kg/m³
Vg Volume of vapour at 15.5 °C m³
vg Vapour volume per kilogram of liquid at 15.5 °C m³/kg
Vmix Volume of gas-air mixture at the lower flammability limit m³
xLFL Lower flammability limit as a volume fraction –

As a worked example, take a propane vessel of 1000 US gallons (3.785 m³) water capacity. Rivkin gives 3.8 to 7.6 m³ as typical for public vehicle fuelling stations.[3] Propane has a specific gravity of 0.509, so the permitted filling is 82.6 %.[19] The liquid volume is 0.826 × 3.785 = 3.127 m³, and at 504 kg/m³ the mass is 3.127 × 504 = 1,576 kg. This gives 1,576 × 0.534 = 842 m³ of gas.[1] At the lower limit of 2.15 %, it could in principle form about 39,000 m³ of flammable mixture, a cube about 34 m on each side. Real clouds are not uniform, so this value only indicates the order of magnitude.

Behaviour of released LP-gas

Rivkin distinguishes two kinds of release. A vapour-phase release occurs when the container or a fitting is damaged above the liquid level. The gas then vents at high velocity, the velocity falls as boiling cools the liquid, and frost forms on the shell. A liquid-phase release occurs when the damage is below the liquid level. Liquid jets from the opening and much of it flashes to vapour, which carries small droplets as an aerosol.[4] When propane is stored at atmospheric temperatures, it seldom forms a pool except near its normal boiling point of about −40 °C. Butane and refrigerated LP-gas pool readily near about −0.5 °C.[14]

The heavy vapour spreads along the ground and follows surface contours, although wind and the momentum of a jet also move it.[4][14] Escaping liquid creates a visible fog of condensed water vapour, but ignitable mixtures reach beyond the visible cloud.[14] If the plume reaches an ignition source while it is within the flammable range, the flame may flash back to the source. If the flame front becomes fast enough, the burning cloud can develop into a vapour cloud explosion.[4]

Barry lists the fire and explosion outcomes of flammable releases as pool fire, torch fire or flame jet, BLEVE fireball, flash fire and unconfined vapour cloud explosion.[21] Impinging jet flames give far more severe exposures than pool fires. Heat fluxes of up to 250 kW/m² have been measured for two-phase LPG jets, with an average of 150 kW/m² over a fully engulfed cylindrical target.[22]

Propane is among the vapours that have been involved in large numbers of vapour cloud explosions. Damaging overpressures in nearly unconfined areas need flame speeds of the order of 100 m/s. Turbulent jet releases, partial confinement, congested equipment and delayed ignition all promote such speeds.[23] Lemoff notes that large outdoor releases of LP-gas will most likely deflagrate rather than detonate.[1]

Indoors, the main danger is a combustion explosion in the enclosure. A room full of flammable mixture would have to withstand 400 to 750 kPa to stay intact, while conventional structures resist only 3.5 to 7.0 kPa. Most combustion explosions in buildings therefore occur when less than 25 % of the enclosure holds a flammable mixture. Because liquefied gases can form large mixtures quickly, codes severely limit their handling indoors.[24]

Lemoff (2008) states that codes, standards and regulations require natural gas and LP-gas to be odorised, detectable by a normal sense of smell at one-fifth of the lower flammability limit. He describes this as common practice throughout the world.[24] Typical odorants are ethyl mercaptan and thiophane. Odorants can fade in containers through oxidation, and the sense of smell declines with age, allergies, smoking and eating.[12]

BLEVE

Liquefied gases are stored above their normal boiling points and stay liquid only because the container is closed. When the container fails and the pressure drops to atmospheric, the heat stored in the liquid turns part of it into vapour very rapidly. For many liquefied flammable gases at normal temperatures, about one-third of the liquid flashes to vapour.[19] In a fire the liquid is hotter, because relief valves only discharge above the normal operating pressure. Propane at 275 psig (1.9 MPa), the maximum relief valve setting, boils at about 57 °C. Often more than half of the liquid then flashes.[19][25] The expansion tears the shell apart, throws pieces of it and mixes vapour with air into the characteristic fireball.[25]

Most liquefied gas BLEVEs follow fire exposure. Carbon steel loses strength steadily above about 204 °C. Where the shell is wetted by liquid, the boiling liquid carries the heat away, and discharging propane stays between 49 and 60 °C. The shell above the liquid has no such cooling, so failure usually begins in the metal of the vapour space. A relief valve working exactly as designed cannot prevent a BLEVE, because it keeps the container pressurised and the overheated shell stressed.[25]

Most BLEVEs occur when containers are between slightly less than half and about three-quarters full. Pieces can be propelled up to about 0.8 km. Fragments from larger containers can kill people up to 244 m away, and fatal burns can occur up to 76 m away.[5] Zalosh, citing published correlations, states that about 80 % of fragments from LP-gas BLEVEs land within about 305 m of the vessel. One fragment in the Mexico City incident travelled about 915 m.[26]

The time to failure varies widely. Uninsulated aboveground containers without water cooling can fail within a very few minutes if small and within a few hours if very large. In fire tests on LP-gas tank cars, an insulated car failed after 93 minutes and an uninsulated car after 25 minutes. One insulated tank car survived 20½ hours of fire exposure, which Lemoff calls an extreme case.[5] Barry generally treats a BLEVE fireball as a delayed event after 8 to 15 minutes of fire exposure.[21]

On 19 November 1984, a broken fill line at an LP-gas terminal near Mexico City released a cloud that ignited at a ground flare about 20 minutes later. About 500 deaths were reported, and some 15 BLEVEs followed among four 1590 m³ spheres and 48 horizontal tanks.[5] In Albert City, Iowa, on 9 April 1998, a 68 m³ propane tank exploded after a broken, ignited pipe directed flame at it. Its shutoff valve, under the tank, could not be reached.[6] Two volunteer firefighters were killed about 30.5 m from the side of that vessel.[26] After several derailments with tank car BLEVEs, US DOT rules of 1977 required thermal protection and special couplers on tank cars carrying liquefied flammable gases.[27]

Protection relies on keeping the unwetted shell cool with a film of water, applied by hose streams or fixed water spray systems.[5] In the United States, NFPA 15, as described in the 2008 handbook, requires for larger containers of liquefied flammable gases a water density above 10 (L/min)/m² (0.25 gpm/ft²) of container surface.[28] In the United States, NFPA 58, as described in the 2008 handbook, adds product control, meaning the ability to close container valves remotely in a fire. Larger propane containers need internal valves with excess flow protection and a remote shutoff, operable at the valve or 6 to 30 m (20 to 100 ft) away. The 2008 handbook reported that all new propane containers had needed internal valves since 2001 and that existing containers above 15 m³ (4000 gal) were to have them by July 2011.[6]

Estimating a BLEVE fireball

Beyler gives simple correlations for hydrocarbon fireballs. The maximum diameter depends on the mass of fuel released, and work cited by Beyler suggests that propane at or above 20 °C turns completely to vapour. The duration depends on how the fireball grows. A pressurised release is dominated by momentum, while an atmospheric release is dominated by buoyancy. For masses above about 30,000 kg, buoyancy dominates even for pressurised releases, and a fireball should never last longer than the buoyancy value.[29][30]

D=5.8m1/3td=0.45m1/3 (momentum)td=2.6m1/6 (buoyancy)

The radiant heat flux on a target is the surface emissive power of the fireball times the configuration factor times the atmospheric transmissivity.[30] When the target sees the whole fireball, the configuration factor is the square of the radius-to-distance ratio times the cosine of the target angle.[31]

q˙″=τEFF=(rL)2cos⁡θfor θ<π2−ϕ

Symbol Description Unit
D Maximum diameter of the equivalent spherical fireball m
m Mass of fuel released kg
td Burning duration of the fireball s
q˙″ Incident radiant heat flux at the target kW/m²
τ Atmospheric transmissivity –
E Surface emissive power of the fireball kW/m²
F Configuration factor between fireball and target –
r Fireball radius, D/2 m
L Distance from the target to the centre of the fireball m
θ Angle between the target normal and the line to the fireball centre rad
ϕ Half-angle subtended by the fireball at the target rad

Measured emissive powers lie between 100 and 450 kW/m², and 350 kW/m² is widely used for large releases.[31] Continuing the worked example, assume the full 1,576 kg of propane in the 3.785 m³ vessel is released in a BLEVE. The fireball diameter is 5.8 × 15761/3 = 67.5 m, so the radius is about 34 m. The momentum duration is 0.45 × 15761/3 = 5.2 s, shorter than the buoyancy value of 8.9 s, so the fireball lasts about 5 s. For a target facing the fireball, with no credit for atmospheric absorption, the flux at 100 m from the centre is 350 × (33.8/100)² ≈ 40 kW/m². At 200 m it falls to about 10 kW/m².

As a rough check, Beyler cites an accident with a tractor-semitrailer carrying 34 m³ of LPG, where a fireball about 123 m across was observed about 2 minutes after the crash.[22] Taking the cargo as propane at 504 kg/m³ gives about 17,100 kg and a predicted diameter of about 150 m. Here the correlation overestimates the observed size by about a fifth.

Use as a vehicle fuel

LP-gas has the longest history of all the fuels used in an alternative fuel vehicle. Rivkin cites about 270,000 LP-gas vehicles in North America, not counting off-road vehicles.[32] One comparison cited by Rivkin ranked the safety of LP-gas as similar to that of gasoline, because its heavier-than-air vapours do not disperse as quickly as those of other alternative fuels.[7]

In the United States, NFPA 58, as summarised in the 2008 handbook, sets the vehicle rules that follow. Vehicle containers are built to the ASME pressure vessel code or to DOT rules. The normal minimum design pressure of 1724 kPa (250 psig) rises to 2154 kPa (312.5 psig) for containers on motor vehicles, so that relief valves open less readily in hot service. Passenger vehicles are limited to 0.75 m³ (200 gal) of aggregate water capacity and other vehicles to 1.1 m³ (300 gal).[32] Containers made after 1 January 1984 need an overfilling prevention device. Relief must be by spring-loaded valves in the vapour space, because NFPA 58 prohibits fusible plugs on vehicle containers.[33] A blue diamond label with the word "propane" identifies the vehicle to emergency responders.[34]

Rivkin states that LP-gas vehicle fuelling should be limited to outdoor locations, because of the large expansion ratio and the heavy vapour.[3] Secondary containment is not provided, because spilled propane that is not refrigerated evaporates at once.[35] In the United States, NFPA 30A, as cited in the 2008 handbook, places LP-gas dispensers at least 6.1 m (20 ft) from gasoline or diesel dispensers.[35]

At an incident, fire apparatus is placed upwind. Unlike the vapours of liquefied natural gas, which eventually become buoyant, LP-gas vapours always remain heavier than air. LP-gas is odorised, whereas LNG normally is not. Water streams can be used on LP-gas vehicles to control fire and help vapour disperse. Stopping the release, for example by closing the primary shutoff valve at the container, is critical before further fire fighting.[34] In pre-incident plans, Rivkin treats an overfilled container as a probable event and a BLEVE as a rare worst case that still has to be planned for.[36]

Limits and common misconceptions

A BLEVE describes what happens after a container fails, not how it fails. The failure itself can come from flame contact, corrosion, puncture or gouging.[25] A working relief valve is therefore no guarantee against a BLEVE. The protective measures the handbook describes are a film of water on the shell above the liquid and insulation designed for fire exposure, which can delay a BLEVE significantly. Product control adds valves that stop the fuel feeding the fire.[5][6] Excess flow valves also have limits. They are sized to close on a clean break of a pipe, and they may stay open after a jagged break or in cold weather, when container pressure and flow are lower.[6]

Rivkin warns that the setback distances in NFPA 58 are minimum requirements, not safe distances. A large continuous liquid leak can produce vapour cloud, BLEVE and fragment hazards beyond the largest setback distances.[3] The code values, dates and deadlines in this article are US rules as the handbook described them in 2008, and practice elsewhere differs. Some European countries, for example, fit no relief devices to liquefied gas containers used inside buildings, because an indoor gas release is judged worse than a container failure.[19]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-183.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-258.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-67.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-59.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-172.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-173.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-55.
  8. ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-166.
  9. ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-168.
  10. ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-186.
  11. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 18.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-60.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-174.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-184.
  15. ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-58.
  16. ↑ Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-26.
  17. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 3.3-5.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-169.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-170.
  20. ↑ Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-41.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 Barry (2002), p. 5-184.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 Beyler (2002a), p. 3-302.
  23. ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-104.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-175.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 25.3 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-171.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-97.
  27. ↑ Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-37.
  28. ↑ Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-40.
  29. ↑ Beyler (2002a), p. 3-306.
  30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 Beyler (2002a), p. 3-307.
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 Beyler (2002a), p. 3-308.
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-72.
  33. ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-73.
  34. ↑ 34.0 34.1 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-74.
  35. ↑ 35.0 35.1 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-68.
  36. ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-75.

References

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  • Barry, T. F. (2002). Quantitative risk assessment in chemical process industries. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-176–5-213). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Beyler, C. L. (2002a). Fire hazard calculations for large, open hydrocarbon fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-268–3-314). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
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  • Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association.
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