New FSE wiki article: Pyrotechnics (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
NFPA wiki: fact-check corrections (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
'''Pyrotechnics''' are materials and devices, such as fireworks, flares, smoke-generating devices and | '''Pyrotechnics''' are materials and devices, such as fireworks, flares, smoke-generating devices and the special effects used in entertainment, whose materials burn with very high flame spread and heat release.<ref name="Gagnon-16-109">Gagnon (2008), p. 16-109.</ref><ref name="Gagnon-16-116" /><ref name="Grill-20-213" /> The ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008) gives no formal definition. It groups pyrotechnic materials with propellants as materials of very high flame spread and heat release.<ref name="Gagnon-16-109" /> On stage they serve as special effects, which Grill (2008) describes as visible or audible effects for entertainment purposes.<ref name="Grill-20-214" /> In the international hazard classes for transport, fireworks are explosives: common fireworks fall in Division 1.4 and special fireworks in Division 1.3.<ref name="Wright-13-119">C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-119.</ref> | ||
Pyrotechnics matter to fire safety in two settings. In manufacturing, a delay of only a few milliseconds in suppression can mean disaster, which is why the handbook describes water spray systems that respond within 100 ms or less.<ref name="Gagnon-16-109" /><ref name="Gagnon-16-116" /> In entertainment, pyrotechnic effects are a deliberate [[Ignition source]] close to people and combustible scenery.<ref name="Grill-20-213" /> The 2003 fire at The Station nightclub in West Warwick, Rhode Island, which killed 100 people, began when pyrotechnics used by a band ignited polyurethane foam on the walls and ceiling around the stage.<ref name="MS-2-35">Madrzykowski and Stroup (2008), p. 2-35.</ref> The US rules summarised here are those described in the 2008 handbook, mainly NFPA 15, NFPA 140, NFPA 1126 and NFPA 101 as they stood around 2007–2008. | Pyrotechnics matter to fire safety in two settings. In manufacturing, a delay of only a few milliseconds in suppression can mean disaster, which is why the handbook describes water spray systems that respond within 100 ms or less.<ref name="Gagnon-16-109" /><ref name="Gagnon-16-116" /> In entertainment, pyrotechnic effects are a deliberate [[Ignition source]] close to people and combustible scenery.<ref name="Grill-20-213" /> The 2003 fire at The Station nightclub in West Warwick, Rhode Island, which killed 100 people, began when pyrotechnics used by a band ignited polyurethane foam on the walls and ceiling around the stage.<ref name="MS-2-35">Madrzykowski and Stroup (2008), p. 2-35.</ref> The US rules summarised here are those described in the 2008 handbook, mainly NFPA 15, NFPA 140, NFPA 1126 and NFPA 101 as they stood around 2007–2008. | ||
| Line 49: | Line 49: | ||
The relation assumes a constant mean water velocity and ignores the time needed for the deflagration to come into view of the detector (step 3). When no specific guidance applies, 0.914 m (36 in) is frequently used as the distance between a point hazard and the nozzles and detectors.<ref name="Gagnon-16-111" /> A blast-initiated deluge system developed by the US Air Force Research Laboratory discharged water at nearly 152.4 m/s (500 ft/s).<ref name="Gagnon-16-130">Gagnon (2008), p. 16-130.</ref> | The relation assumes a constant mean water velocity and ignores the time needed for the deflagration to come into view of the detector (step 3). When no specific guidance applies, 0.914 m (36 in) is frequently used as the distance between a point hazard and the nozzles and detectors.<ref name="Gagnon-16-111" /> A blast-initiated deluge system developed by the US Air Force Research Laboratory discharged water at nearly 152.4 m/s (500 ft/s).<ref name="Gagnon-16-130">Gagnon (2008), p. 16-130.</ref> | ||
As a worked example, water | As a worked example, the laboratory's Advanced Fire Protection Deluge System had a response time of about 8 ms (6 ms detection and 2 ms initiation). It put water on a fire 0.9 m (36 in.) from the nozzles in 18 ms.<ref name="Gagnon-16-130" /> The water travel time was therefore about 18 − 8 = 10 ms, a mean velocity of about 0.9 / 0.010 = 90 m/s. A system that just meets the NFPA 15 limit and has the same travel time puts water on the target after about 100 + 10 = 110 ms. In the same tests, backup water from solenoid-operated nozzles reached the fire in about 130 ms.<ref name="Gagnon-16-130" /> Water from the later blast-initiated deluge system, at 152.4 m/s, would cross 0.914 m in 0.914 / 152.4 = 0.0060 s, or 6.0 ms. At these distances the travel time is a large share of the total for the fastest systems.<ref name="Gagnon-16-130" /> | ||
In 100 trials of the Advanced Fire Protection Deluge System with pyrotechnic samples of 0.11 to 0.23 kg (¼ to ½ lb), most fires were put out by the first water.<ref name="Gagnon-16-130" /> Magnesium-Teflon flare material burned too fast even for that system. A new flame detector was then developed that cut the detection time from 3 to 5 ms to under 1 ms.<ref name="Gagnon-16-130" /> Explosion venting can be added to relieve pressure, but it does nothing to control continued burning. Vents must be placed where the relief blast cannot injure an operator or a passer-by.<ref name="Gagnon-16-130" /> | In 100 trials of the Advanced Fire Protection Deluge System with pyrotechnic samples of 0.11 to 0.23 kg (¼ to ½ lb), most fires were put out by the first water.<ref name="Gagnon-16-130" /> Magnesium-Teflon flare material burned too fast even for that system. A new flame detector was then developed that cut the detection time from 3 to 5 ms to under 1 ms.<ref name="Gagnon-16-130" /> Explosion venting can be added to relieve pressure, but it does nothing to control continued burning. Vents must be placed where the relief blast cannot injure an operator or a passer-by.<ref name="Gagnon-16-130" /> | ||
Revision as of 23:18, 7 November 2026
Pyrotechnics are materials and devices, such as fireworks, flares, smoke-generating devices and the special effects used in entertainment, whose materials burn with very high flame spread and heat release.[1][2][3] The Fire Protection Handbook (2008) gives no formal definition. It groups pyrotechnic materials with propellants as materials of very high flame spread and heat release.[1] On stage they serve as special effects, which Grill (2008) describes as visible or audible effects for entertainment purposes.[4] In the international hazard classes for transport, fireworks are explosives: common fireworks fall in Division 1.4 and special fireworks in Division 1.3.[5]
Pyrotechnics matter to fire safety in two settings. In manufacturing, a delay of only a few milliseconds in suppression can mean disaster, which is why the handbook describes water spray systems that respond within 100 ms or less.[1][2] In entertainment, pyrotechnic effects are a deliberate Ignition source close to people and combustible scenery.[3] The 2003 fire at The Station nightclub in West Warwick, Rhode Island, which killed 100 people, began when pyrotechnics used by a band ignited polyurethane foam on the walls and ceiling around the stage.[6] The US rules summarised here are those described in the 2008 handbook, mainly NFPA 15, NFPA 140, NFPA 1126 and NFPA 101 as they stood around 2007–2008.
Definition and classification
Neither the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering nor Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering defines pyrotechnics. The Fire Protection Handbook uses the word for a family of products rather than a single substance. Its chapter on ultra-high-speed suppression lists pyrotechnics, fireworks, magnesium-Teflon flares and smoke-generating devices among the munitions whose manufacture has been protected, next to black powder, TNT and other explosives.[2] A US nuclear guidance document describes a smoke bomb, used to test smoke detection and to train fire fighters, as "a pyrotechnic device" that generates smoke from a chemical source.[7]
Pyrotechnics are closely related to the wider class of Explosive material. Santis (2008) defines an explosive as any chemical compound, mixture or device whose primary or common purpose is to function by explosion. The term explicitly includes black powder, squibs, safety fuses and igniters, and any material classed as an explosive under US federal rules.[8] Fireworks and pyrotechnics are older than explosives in the modern sense: they were known and used many centuries before black powder became the first explosive.[9]
The United Nations system, adopted by the US Department of Transportation (DOT), places explosives in Class 1 and divides that class into six divisions.[10] Division 1.4 covers explosives with a minor explosion hazard, whose effects are largely confined to the package. An external fire must not cause a virtually instantaneous explosion of almost the entire contents.[11]
The handbook's table of hazard classes gives common fireworks as the example for Division 1.4. Propellants, rocket motors and special fireworks are its examples for Division 1.3, a fire hazard with a minor blast or projection hazard. Black powder appears in Division 1.1, the mass explosion hazard.[5]
Fire and explosion behaviour
Commercial and military explosives are usually divided into high explosives and low explosives. High explosives tend to detonate, with a reaction front faster than the speed of sound in the material. Low explosives tend to deflagrate, with a front slower than sound, at speeds from hundreds of metres per second down to millimetres per hour. Their peak pressures are orders of magnitude lower than those of high explosives.[12] Black powder and other propellants normally function by deflagration, and fire is the greatest hazard in their handling and use.[10] The distinction between Deflagration and detonation matters for protection against an Explosion, because suppression systems are designed for deflagrations.[13]
A second property limits the use of gaseous agents. Carbon dioxide or nitrogen in sufficient quantity prevents the combustion of almost anything. Yu and Newman (2008) name the exceptions: certain metals and unstable chemicals such as pyrotechnics, solid rocket propellants and hydrazine.[14] Inerting a room or container is therefore not a reliable defence against a pyrotechnic fire. Protection instead relies on preventing ignition, isolating bulk quantities, and applying heavy densities of water very quickly.[15][16]
In manufacturing, a fire starts when the material receives too much energy. In the 11-step reaction-time sequence of the handbook, the first step is that "the energetic material is subject to excessive energy input", after which deflagration begins.[17] Common hazards in screening, sawing and granulating are friction, dust and sparks. When powders are weighed, ungrounded static charges can ignite the dust. In pressing and pelletising, the main risk is ignition at the contact points of the machine and spread of flame to the bulk storage of the material.[15]
Protection in manufacturing
The handbook names pyrotechnics manufacturing, and the maintenance, renovation and demilitarisation of ordnance containing pyrotechnic materials, as applications where an Ultra-high-speed water spray system is advantageous.[13] NFPA 15, as summarised by Gagnon (2008), defines such a system as one that starts discharging water within 100 ms of detection. The time is measured from presentation of an energy source to the detector until water flows from the nozzle under test. Response times of about 10 ms are achievable, and 10 ms is mandatory for very rapidly spreading fires.[1] Both these systems and an Explosion suppression system can stop deflagrations. Neither has been found effective where a Detonation could occur.[13]
Under the UN scheme as reproduced by Gagnon (2008), most ultra-high-speed systems protect Class 1 Division 3 commodities, described as a mass fire that may be extinguished during manufacture if suppressed early. Division 4 materials, a moderate fire, can be extinguished by such a system. Division 1 materials are too energetic to be protected this way, and Division 2 materials may be.[13] The system is also unlikely to be effective for stored munitions whose manufacture has been completed.[13]
Speed comes from the detection and the piping. Optical flame detectors, using ultraviolet or infrared radiation, are placed close to the hazard and react to the flashes of light from combustion. Pressure detectors are slower. Multiple-band optical detectors (infrared/infrared and ultraviolet/infrared) were found to be as fast as ultraviolet detectors and less likely to cause false operation.[17] In a squib-actuated system, the pipework is primed with water, the nozzles are loosely capped or fitted with rupture discs, and an explosive squib opens the deluge valve. In a solenoid-actuated system, solenoid valves on pilot piping open pilot-actuated nozzles.[17]
The handbook gives the NFPA 15 minimum flows: at least 95 L/min (25 gpm) per nozzle for point protection and 20.37 L/min·m² (0.50 gpm/ft²) for area protection. Some especially volatile pyrotechnics may require densities as high as 122.24 L/min·m² (3.0 gpm/ft²).[16] Hydraulic calculations should confirm nozzle discharge pressures of at least 344.75 kPa (50 psi).[16]
Three design objectives are considered: life safety and personnel protection, protection of equipment and the facility, and total extinguishment or stopping propagation. A risk analysis of the hazard is required before the objective is chosen. Gagnon (2008) recommends combining area and point protection and always protecting the personnel.[2] Portable units can be rolled into an area to protect the clean-up of an explosive or pyrotechnic spill.[18]
Time to water on the target
The NFPA 15 limit of 100 ms covers steps 4 to 9 of the sequence, from the detector starting to react to water leaving the nozzle. It does not include the time water needs to travel to the burning material, which Gagnon (2008) recommends adding where feasible.[17] The total time until water reaches the target is the response time plus the distance divided by the mean water velocity:
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Time from the start of detection until water reaches the target | s | |
| Response time from detector reaction to water leaving the nozzle (steps 4 to 9) | s | |
| Distance from nozzle to target | m | |
| Mean velocity of the water between nozzle and target | m/s |
The relation assumes a constant mean water velocity and ignores the time needed for the deflagration to come into view of the detector (step 3). When no specific guidance applies, 0.914 m (36 in) is frequently used as the distance between a point hazard and the nozzles and detectors.[17] A blast-initiated deluge system developed by the US Air Force Research Laboratory discharged water at nearly 152.4 m/s (500 ft/s).[19]
As a worked example, the laboratory's Advanced Fire Protection Deluge System had a response time of about 8 ms (6 ms detection and 2 ms initiation). It put water on a fire 0.9 m (36 in.) from the nozzles in 18 ms.[19] The water travel time was therefore about 18 − 8 = 10 ms, a mean velocity of about 0.9 / 0.010 = 90 m/s. A system that just meets the NFPA 15 limit and has the same travel time puts water on the target after about 100 + 10 = 110 ms. In the same tests, backup water from solenoid-operated nozzles reached the fire in about 130 ms.[19] Water from the later blast-initiated deluge system, at 152.4 m/s, would cross 0.914 m in 0.914 / 152.4 = 0.0060 s, or 6.0 ms. At these distances the travel time is a large share of the total for the fastest systems.[19]
In 100 trials of the Advanced Fire Protection Deluge System with pyrotechnic samples of 0.11 to 0.23 kg (¼ to ½ lb), most fires were put out by the first water.[19] Magnesium-Teflon flare material burned too fast even for that system. A new flame detector was then developed that cut the detection time from 3 to 5 ms to under 1 ms.[19] Explosion venting can be added to relieve pressure, but it does nothing to control continued burning. Vents must be placed where the relief blast cannot injure an operator or a passer-by.[19]
Fire load of manufacture and storage
Data compiled in the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) show how dense the fuel in a fireworks store can be. Its Table 3.4.1a, taken from Swiss surveys of 1967–69, gives fire load densities per unit floor area. For storage, the tabulated value must be multiplied by the storage height in metres.[20] Fireworks storage is listed at 2,000 MJ/m² per metre of height. Fireworks manufacture is marked "special" instead of given a number, and the explosive industry is given 4,000 MJ/m².[21]
The storage fire load density follows from the tabulated value and the storage height:
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Fire load density per unit floor area | MJ/m² | |
| Tabulated storage fire load per metre of storage height | MJ/m² per m | |
| Storage height | m |
For an assumed storage height of 1.5 m, the fire load density is 2,000 × 1.5 = 3,000 MJ/m². The same table gives 300 MJ/m² for a cinema, so the store holds about ten times as much fuel per square metre.[21] The guidelines warn that data from different countries and surveys can conflict.[20] The value describes the quantity of fuel, not the speed at which it is released. The Eurocode time-equivalent method reproduced by Lane (2008) assigns a "danger of fire activation" factor of 1.66 to the manufacture of fireworks or paints. This is the highest value in its table, against 1.00 for offices, hotels and dwellings.[22]
Pyrotechnics before an audience
Film and television production uses pyrotechnics as special effects, together with open flames, theatrical smoke and fuel-powered vehicles. Their impact on safety is greater when an audience is present.[3] In a Motion picture and television soundstage, NFPA 140 as described by Grill (2008) makes pyrotechnic special effects subject to approval by the authority having jurisdiction. Their proposed use must be reviewed with that authority beforehand.[3]
NFPA 1126, Standard for the Use of Pyrotechnics Before a Proximate Audience, applies to indoor pyrotechnic effects in production only if the production takes place before a proximate audience.[3] NFPA 1126 defines a proximate audience as "an audience closer to pyrotechnic devices than allowed by NFPA 1123, Code for Fireworks Display". The standard covers storage, permits, operator qualifications, labelling of preloads and the use of pyrotechnics. NFPA 101, the Life Safety Code, requires compliance with NFPA 1126 in its chapters on assembly occupancies.[4] A list of NFPA codes in a 2004 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission report gives the 2001 edition of NFPA 1126 and the 2000 edition of NFPA 1123. It also lists the 2003 edition of NFPA 1124, the code for the manufacture, transport, storage and retail sale of fireworks.[23]
Related rules limit what an effect can ignite. NFPA 101 allows open flame on a Theatre stage or platform as a necessary part of a performance, when precautions satisfying the authority are taken. NFPA 140 requires drapes and other decorations to be kept flame-retardant. Foam plastics used for decoration, scenery or props must have a maximum heat release rate of 100 kW in the UL 1975 test.[4] US fire prevention codes can also require a certificate of fitness for those who handle pyrotechnics and explosives, showing proficiency in skills, training and testing.[24]
The Station nightclub fire
The Station nightclub fire of 20 February 2003 is described in several chapters of the handbook. A band used pyrotechnics, and the sparks ignited polyurethane foam insulation on the walls and ceiling of the platform used as a stage. Smoke was visible in the exit doorways after a little more than one minute, and flames broke through the roof in less than five minutes. Crowding at the main entrance hampered escape, and 100 people died.[6]
The room flashed over in 90 seconds.[25] More than 180 people were injured. For a brief moment some occupants watched the fire, thinking it was part of the act.[26]
Tests by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) after the fire exposed birch veneer plywood and ether-based polyurethane foam to similar pyrotechnic devices. The wall-mounted foam ignited within 10 seconds, while the sparks did not have enough energy to ignite the plywood.[6] The hazard thus came from the combination of the effect and the lining, not from the effect alone. NIST also reconstructed about 20 percent of the club at full scale to study the growth of the fire and its toxic gases.[27]
The NIST investigation, quoted by Bryan (2008), found that the first patrons recognised the danger about 24 seconds after the foam ignited. About two-thirds of the occupants appear to have tried to leave through the single main entrance, and a crowd crush occurred in the vestibule before 1½ minutes.[28] The handbook attributes the fire to the improper use of indoor pyrotechnics. Foam sound insulation that did not limit flame spread and smoke production is believed to have contributed.[29] As a result, the 2006 Life Safety Code was amended to require automatic sprinklers in all new nightclubs with an occupant load of 50 or more and all existing nightclubs with 100 or more.[30] In New Zealand, the commentary on Verification Method C/VM2 (2013) cites the Station fire among those showing how quickly fire can spread on combustible surface materials, as part of the case for controlling surface finishes.[31]
Other uses and limits
Pyrotechnic devices also appear inside fire and explosion protection itself. The ASTM E1515 test for the minimum explosible concentration of a dust uses a 2,500 J or 5,000 J pyrotechnic igniter in a 20 L vessel. Results are sensitive to the igniter, so some dusts must be tested in a 1 m³ vessel to reduce this effect.[32] Fast-acting explosion isolation valves have been closed by gas released when a rupture disc is burst by pyrotechnic (detonator) devices; in some designs, gas generators have replaced the pyrotechnics.[33] The squib in a squib-actuated deluge valve is itself an explosive device, and squibs are named in the definition of an explosive.[17][8]
The handbook material has clear limits. It describes US codes and practice around 2007–2008, and the requirements of NFPA 15, NFPA 140, NFPA 1126 and NFPA 101 summarised here may have changed since. The suppression data come mainly from US military research on munitions, not from consumer fireworks. Occupants also tend to check ambiguous cues with others before acting. In a study of a fireworks plant explosion in Houston, 85 of 139 people (61 percent) learned the source and nature of the explosion or smoke from another person, face to face or by telephone.[34]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Gagnon (2008), p. 16-109.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Gagnon (2008), pp. 16-115–16-116.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Grill (2008), p. 20-213.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Grill (2008), p. 20-214.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-119.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Madrzykowski and Stroup (2008), p. 2-35.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-51.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 Santis (2008), p. 6-248.
- ↑ Santis (2008), p. 6-247.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 Santis (2008), p. 6-249.
- ↑ Santis (2008), p. 6-250.
- ↑ Zalosh (2008), pp. 2-93–2-94.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 Gagnon (2008), p. 16-110.
- ↑ Yu and Newman (2008), p. 2-87.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 Gagnon (2008), pp. 16-116–16-117.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 Gagnon (2008), p. 16-121.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 Gagnon (2008), pp. 16-110–16-111.
- ↑ Gagnon (2008), p. 16-129.
- ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 Gagnon (2008), p. 16-130.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 3.4-2.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 3.4-4.
- ↑ Lane (2008), p. 19-83.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. E-10.
- ↑ Farr and Sawyer (2008), p. 1-88.
- ↑ Corbett (2008), p. 12-139.
- ↑ Fruin (2008), p. 4-98.
- ↑ Gann and Bryner (2008), p. 6-27.
- ↑ Bryan (2008), p. 4-31.
- ↑ Miller and Roether (2008), p. 20-93.
- ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-26.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 19.
- ↑ Zalosh (2002), p. 3-404.
- ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-162.
- ↑ Bryan (2002), p. 3-318.
References
- Bryan, J. L. (2002). Behavioral response to fire and smoke. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-315–3-341). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Bryan, J. L. (2008). Human behavior and fire. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 4-3–4-47). National Fire Protection Association.
- Corbett, G. P. (2008). Effect of building construction and fire protection systems on fire fighter safety. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-127–12-141). National Fire Protection Association.
- Farr, R. R., & Sawyer, S. F. (2008). Fire prevention and code enforcement. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 1-81–1-93). National Fire Protection Association.
- Fruin, J. J. (2008). Techniques of crowd management. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 4-93–4-102). National Fire Protection Association.
- Gagnon, R. M. (2008). Ultra-High-Speed water spray systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 16-109–16-133). National Fire Protection Association.
- Gann, R. G., & Bryner, N. P. (2008). Combustion products and their effects on life safety. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-11–6-34). National Fire Protection Association.
- Grill, R. A. (2008). Motion picture and television studios and soundstages. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-211–20-215). National Fire Protection Association.
- Hall, J. R., Jr., & Cote, A. E. (2008). An overview of the fire problem and fire protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-3–3-30). National Fire Protection Association.
- Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- Lane, B. (2008). Approaches to calculating structural fire resistance. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 19-77–19-126). National Fire Protection Association.
- Madrzykowski, D., & Stroup, D. W. (2008). Flammability hazard of materials. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-31–2-48). National Fire Protection Association.
- Miller, G., & Roether, E. (2008). Assembly occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-85–20-95). National Fire Protection Association.
- Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2013). Commentary for Building Code clauses C1–C6 and Verification Method C/VM2.
- National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
- Santis, L. D. (2008). Explosives and blasting agents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-247–6-256). National Fire Protection Association.
- Ural, E. A., & Garzia, H. W. (2008). Explosion prevention and protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-141–17-165). National Fire Protection Association.
- Wright, C. J. (2008a). Managing the response to hazardous material incidents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-117–13-144). National Fire Protection Association.
- Yu, H.-Z., & Newman, J. S. (2008). Theory of fire extinguishment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-79–2-92). National Fire Protection Association.
- Zalosh, R. (2002). Explosion protection. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-402–3-421). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.