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== Mechanisms ==
== Mechanisms ==
When a circuit that carries current is interrupted, either on purpose by a switch or by accident when a connection at a terminal becomes loose, two things can happen. Arcing occurs across the separating contacts, or heat is produced at the high-resistance connection that remains at the terminal.<ref name="Milatovich-8-127" /> The intensity of the arc and the energy it releases depend mainly on the current and the contact resistance, and also on the voltage and the inductance of the load. The resulting temperature may easily be high enough to ignite any combustible material close by.<ref name="Milatovich-8-127" />
When a circuit that carries current is interrupted, either on purpose by a switch or by accident when a connection at a terminal becomes loose, two things can happen. Arcing occurs across the separating contacts, or heat is produced at the high-resistance connection that remains at the terminal.<ref name="Milatovich-8-127" /> The intensity of the arc and the energy it releases depend mainly on the current and the contact resistance, and also on the voltage and the inductance of the load. The resulting temperature may easily be high enough to ignite any combustible material close by.<ref name="Milatovich-8-127" />
[[File:fse-electrical-ignition-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Diagram of a circuit with an arc at separating switch contacts and an overheated loose terminal or conductor, both igniting nearby combustibles|The two routes to electrical ignition: an arc at separating switch contacts and overheating at a loose terminal or overloaded conductor. Both can ignite the insulation or nearby combustibles. Based on Milatovich (2008), pp. 8-127, 8-131 and 8-148.]]
[[File:fse-electrical-ignition-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Diagram of a circuit with an arc at separating switch contacts and an overheated loose terminal or conductor, both igniting nearby combustibles|The two routes to electrical ignition: an arc at separating switch contacts and overheating at a loose terminal or overloaded conductor. Both can ignite the insulation or nearby combustibles.]]


An arc can ignite the insulation and covering of the conductor itself and can also melt the conductor metal. Burning embers and splatters of hot metal may then fall onto combustible material below and set it alight.<ref name="Milatovich-8-127" /> A nuclear-industry glossary describes arcing as the flashing that occurs at electrical terminals when a circuit is opened or closed.<ref name="IqbalSalley-F-5">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-5.</ref> The unwanted form is the [[arc fault]]: an unintentional electrical discharge with a low and erratic current that is capable of igniting combustible materials.<ref name="Milatovich-8-148" /> Because the current stays low, an arcing fault in a damaged cord or cable can continue without being detected by conventional fuses and circuit breakers.<ref name="Milatovich-8-148" />
An arc can ignite the insulation and covering of the conductor itself and can also melt the conductor metal. Burning embers and splatters of hot metal may then fall onto combustible material below and set it alight.<ref name="Milatovich-8-127" /> A nuclear-industry glossary describes arcing as the flashing that occurs at electrical terminals when a circuit is opened or closed.<ref name="IqbalSalley-F-5">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-5.</ref> The unwanted form is the [[arc fault]]: an unintentional electrical discharge with a low and erratic current that is capable of igniting combustible materials.<ref name="Milatovich-8-148" /> Because the current stays low, an arcing fault in a damaged cord or cable can continue without being detected by conventional fuses and circuit breakers.<ref name="Milatovich-8-148" />
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Flexible cords show how the two mechanisms combine. A series fault is a partly or completely severed conductor inside the cord, and a parallel fault is a line-to-neutral or ground fault, usually through damaged insulation.<ref name="Milatovich-8-149">Milatovich (2008), p. 8-149.</ref> Both lead to carbon tracking within the cord, then leakage current, arcing and finally combustion.<ref name="Milatovich-8-149" /> Where cord insulation is damaged, ground faults or short circuits may occur, and the resulting arc may ignite the insulation or nearby combustible material.<ref name="Milatovich-8-153">Milatovich (2008), p. 8-153.</ref>
Flexible cords show how the two mechanisms combine. A series fault is a partly or completely severed conductor inside the cord, and a parallel fault is a line-to-neutral or ground fault, usually through damaged insulation.<ref name="Milatovich-8-149">Milatovich (2008), p. 8-149.</ref> Both lead to carbon tracking within the cord, then leakage current, arcing and finally combustion.<ref name="Milatovich-8-149" /> Where cord insulation is damaged, ground faults or short circuits may occur, and the resulting arc may ignite the insulation or nearby combustible material.<ref name="Milatovich-8-153">Milatovich (2008), p. 8-153.</ref>
[[File:fse-electrical-ignition-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Flow diagram from series or parallel cord fault through carbon tracking, leakage current and arcing to combustion|How a cord fault develops into a fire: a series fault (severed conductor) or a parallel fault (damaged insulation) leads to carbon tracking, leakage current, arcing and combustion. Based on Milatovich (2008), pp. 8-149 and 8-153.]]
[[File:fse-electrical-ignition-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Flow diagram from series or parallel cord fault through carbon tracking, leakage current and arcing to combustion|How a cord fault develops into a fire: a series fault (severed conductor) or a parallel fault (damaged insulation) leads to carbon tracking, leakage current, arcing and combustion.]]


Not every electrical heat source is strong enough to produce flames at once. [[Smouldering]] is a slow, low-temperature, flameless form of combustion that can be started by heat sources much too weak to produce a flame directly, and it offers a pathway to later flaming.<ref name="Ohlemiller-2-200">Ohlemiller (2002), p. 2-200.</ref> The incipient phase of a compartment fire may include smouldering, electrical arcing or radiant heating of a combustible, and it may be very short or prolonged.<ref name="Budnick-3-146">Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-146.</ref> Exposure time matters as well. Wood has a normal ignition temperature of 204–260 °C (400–500 °F), yet it has ignited after four days of exposure to a heat source at 109 °C (228 °F).<ref name="Barry-5-191">Barry (2002), p. 5-191.</ref>
Not every electrical heat source is strong enough to produce flames at once. [[Smouldering]] is a slow, low-temperature, flameless form of combustion that can be started by heat sources much too weak to produce a flame directly, and it offers a pathway to later flaming.<ref name="Ohlemiller-2-200">Ohlemiller (2002), p. 2-200.</ref> The incipient phase of a compartment fire may include smouldering, electrical arcing or radiant heating of a combustible, and it may be very short or prolonged.<ref name="Budnick-3-146">Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-146.</ref> Exposure time matters as well. Wood has a normal ignition temperature of 204–260 °C (400–500 °F), yet it has ignited after four days of exposure to a heat source at 109 °C (228 °F).<ref name="Barry-5-191">Barry (2002), p. 5-191.</ref>
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Because of the square, a modest overload has a large effect: 50% more current in the same conductor produces 2.25 times the heat. The NEC specifies the ampacity of each conductor, the maximum current it can carry without overheating.<ref name="Milatovich-8-127" /> Ampacity depends on the size of the conductor, the ambient temperature, the type of insulation and the installation, such as a raceway, a cable, the earth or free air.<ref name="Milatovich-8-131" /> The 2005 NEC tables reproduced in the handbook give, for example, 25 A for a 12 AWG copper conductor with 60 °C (140 °F) insulation of type TW or UF.<ref name="Milatovich-8-128">Milatovich (2008), p. 8-128.</ref> That value applies to an ambient temperature of 30 °C (86 °F) and to no more than three current-carrying conductors in a raceway, cable or the earth. For other ambient temperatures the allowable ampacity is multiplied by a correction factor.<ref name="Milatovich-8-128" />
Because of the square, a modest overload has a large effect: 50% more current in the same conductor produces 2.25 times the heat. The NEC specifies the ampacity of each conductor, the maximum current it can carry without overheating.<ref name="Milatovich-8-127" /> Ampacity depends on the size of the conductor, the ambient temperature, the type of insulation and the installation, such as a raceway, a cable, the earth or free air.<ref name="Milatovich-8-131" /> The 2005 NEC tables reproduced in the handbook give, for example, 25 A for a 12 AWG copper conductor with 60 °C (140 °F) insulation of type TW or UF.<ref name="Milatovich-8-128">Milatovich (2008), p. 8-128.</ref> That value applies to an ambient temperature of 30 °C (86 °F) and to no more than three current-carrying conductors in a raceway, cable or the earth. For other ambient temperatures the allowable ampacity is multiplied by a correction factor.<ref name="Milatovich-8-128" />
[[File:fse-electrical-ignition-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Line chart of relative heat generation rising as the square of relative current from 1.0 to 2.0|Relative heat generation in one conductor as a function of relative current, from the rule that heat is proportional to the square of the current. Based on Milatovich (2008), pp. 8-127–8-128.]]
[[File:fse-electrical-ignition-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Line chart of relative heat generation rising as the square of relative current from 1.0 to 2.0|Relative heat generation in one conductor as a function of relative current, from the rule that heat is proportional to the square of the current.]]


'''Worked example.''' A 12 AWG copper conductor with 60 °C insulation runs through a space where the ambient temperature is 41–45 °C. The correction factor in the NEC table for this ambient and insulation rating is 0.71.<ref name="Milatovich-8-128" /> The tabular ampacity becomes 25 A × 0.71 = 17.75 A, conservatively rounded down to 17 A for this illustration. If the circuit nevertheless carries the full 25 A, the heat generated relative to the derated current is (25 / 17.75)² = 1.98, or about 2.0 times as much heat. Above the derated ampacity, the handbook warns that heat can deteriorate insulation and may ignite nearby combustibles.<ref name="Milatovich-8-131" />
'''Worked example.''' A 12 AWG copper conductor with 60 °C insulation runs through a space where the ambient temperature is 41–45 °C. The correction factor in the NEC table for this ambient and insulation rating is 0.71.<ref name="Milatovich-8-128" /> The tabular ampacity becomes 25 A × 0.71 = 17.75 A. If the circuit nevertheless carries the full 25 A, the heat generated relative to the derated current is (25 / 17.75)² = 1.98, or about 2.0 times as much heat. Above the derated ampacity, the handbook warns that heat can deteriorate insulation and may ignite nearby combustibles.<ref name="Milatovich-8-131" />


A second rule addresses long-lasting loads. Where the maximum load of a branch circuit continues for 3 hours or more, as with store or office lighting, the NEC requires the specified load to be increased by 25%.<ref name="Milatovich-8-151">Milatovich (2008), pp. 8-151–8-152.</ref> A continuous lighting load of 16 A is therefore treated as a 20 A load. The tables and factors are those of the 2005 NEC, which United States electrical installations should comply with, and they use American conductor sizes;<ref name="Milatovich-8-137">Milatovich (2008), p. 8-137.</ref> they illustrate the method and are not values for other countries. The ratio above also compares heat production only and does not by itself give the temperature of the conductor.
A second rule addresses long-lasting loads. Where the maximum load of a branch circuit continues for 3 hours or more, as with store or office lighting, the NEC requires the specified load to be increased by 25%.<ref name="Milatovich-8-151">Milatovich (2008), pp. 8-151–8-152.</ref> A continuous lighting load of 16 A is therefore treated as a 20 A load. The tables and factors are those of the 2005 NEC, which United States electrical installations should comply with, and they use American conductor sizes;<ref name="Milatovich-8-137">Milatovich (2008), p. 8-137.</ref> they illustrate the method and are not values for other countries. The ratio above also compares heat production only and does not by itself give the temperature of the conductor.
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== Equipment and circumstances ==
== Equipment and circumstances ==
In the United States in 1994–1998, an average of 81,670 structure fires a year were coded as caused by electrical failure, defined as a short circuit, a ground fault or another electrical failure.<ref name="Milatovich-8-136">Milatovich (2008), p. 8-136.</ref> Fixed wiring accounted for 15,030 of these fires, cords or plugs for 6,360, light fixtures, lampholders, ballasts or signs for 4,890, and switches, receptacles or outlets for 4,430.<ref name="Milatovich-8-136" /> Power switches and overcurrent protection devices such as fuses and circuit breakers were themselves involved in 2,520 fires a year.<ref name="Milatovich-8-136" /> A second table for the same period counts 49,700 fires a year that originated with electrical distribution equipment, including 17,800 with fixed wiring and 8,000 with cords or plugs.<ref name="Milatovich-8-136" />
In the United States in 1994–1998, an average of 81,670 structure fires a year were coded as caused by electrical failure, defined as a short circuit, a ground fault or another electrical failure.<ref name="Milatovich-8-136">Milatovich (2008), p. 8-136.</ref> Fixed wiring accounted for 15,030 of these fires, cords or plugs for 6,360, light fixtures, lampholders, ballasts or signs for 4,890, and switches, receptacles or outlets for 4,430.<ref name="Milatovich-8-136" /> Power switches and overcurrent protection devices such as fuses and circuit breakers were themselves involved in 2,520 fires a year.<ref name="Milatovich-8-136" /> A second table for the same period counts 49,700 fires a year that originated with electrical distribution equipment, including 17,800 with fixed wiring and 8,000 with cords or plugs.<ref name="Milatovich-8-136" />
[[File:fse-electrical-ignition-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Horizontal bar chart of US structure fires per year by electrical distribution equipment, 1994 to 1998, fixed wiring highest|Structure fires originating with electrical distribution equipment in the United States, annual average 1994–1998 (49,700 fires a year in total). Based on Milatovich (2008), p. 8-136, Table 8.13.10.]]
[[File:fse-electrical-ignition-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Horizontal bar chart of US structure fires per year by electrical distribution equipment, 1994 to 1998, fixed wiring highest|Structure fires originating with electrical distribution equipment in the United States, annual average 1994–1998 (49,700 fires a year in total).]]


Electrically powered equipment is involved in several times as many fires as are coded as electrical failure, for example when equipment with hot surfaces is placed too close to combustibles.<ref name="Milatovich-8-135">Milatovich (2008), p. 8-135.</ref> Even where equipment failure is the immediate cause, nearly all of these fires stem from foreseeable or avoidable human error.<ref name="Milatovich-8-135" /> Typical errors are improper installation, such as a wire gauge that does not match the wattage of the equipment or a fuse with too high a rating. Lack of maintenance is another, because insulation deteriorates over time, faster with heat, poor installation, adverse surroundings or physical damage.<ref name="Milatovich-8-135" />
Electrically powered equipment is involved in several times as many fires as are coded as electrical failure, for example when equipment with hot surfaces is placed too close to combustibles.<ref name="Milatovich-8-135">Milatovich (2008), p. 8-135.</ref> Even where equipment failure is the immediate cause, nearly all of these fires stem from foreseeable or avoidable human error.<ref name="Milatovich-8-135" /> Typical errors are improper installation, such as a wire gauge that does not match the wattage of the equipment or a fuse with too high a rating. Lack of maintenance is another, because insulation deteriorates over time, faster with heat, poor installation, adverse surroundings or physical damage.<ref name="Milatovich-8-135" />

Latest revision as of 00:45, 16 November 2026

Electrical ignition is the ignition of a combustible material by heat from an electrical installation, appliance or other electrical equipment, either through an electric arc or through overheating.[1] Arcing can occur as a current-carrying circuit opens at switch contacts; a loose terminal can overheat at its high-resistance connection, while excess current can overheat a conductor.[1][2] In both cases the electrical system is the ignition source, and the first material to burn can be the wiring insulation or a nearby combustible such as wood, paper or carpet.[1][3] In the United States in 1999–2002, electrical distribution or lighting equipment was involved in 45,700 reported structure fires a year: 9% of the fires but 13% of the direct property damage.[4] Wide use and enforcement of NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code (NEC), is probably the main reason why electrical systems are not among the leading causes of fire in the United States.[5] Even so, these fires usually involve a human error such as poor workmanship.[5]

Mechanisms

When a circuit that carries current is interrupted, either on purpose by a switch or by accident when a connection at a terminal becomes loose, two things can happen. Arcing occurs across the separating contacts, or heat is produced at the high-resistance connection that remains at the terminal.[1] The intensity of the arc and the energy it releases depend mainly on the current and the contact resistance, and also on the voltage and the inductance of the load. The resulting temperature may easily be high enough to ignite any combustible material close by.[1]

Diagram of a circuit with an arc at separating switch contacts and an overheated loose terminal or conductor, both igniting nearby combustibles
The two routes to electrical ignition: an arc at separating switch contacts and overheating at a loose terminal or overloaded conductor. Both can ignite the insulation or nearby combustibles.

An arc can ignite the insulation and covering of the conductor itself and can also melt the conductor metal. Burning embers and splatters of hot metal may then fall onto combustible material below and set it alight.[1] A nuclear-industry glossary describes arcing as the flashing that occurs at electrical terminals when a circuit is opened or closed.[6] The unwanted form is the arc fault: an unintentional electrical discharge with a low and erratic current that is capable of igniting combustible materials.[3] Because the current stays low, an arcing fault in a damaged cord or cable can continue without being detected by conventional fuses and circuit breakers.[3]

Overheating is the second mechanism. A conductor that carries current produces heat in direct proportion to its resistance and to the square of the current.[1] Under design conditions this heating is almost never a fire hazard. Where the safe current is exceeded, however, the heat degrades the insulation and may ignite combustibles in contact with or close to the conductor.[2] Equipment that uses conductors as heating elements, or uses an arc to produce heat as an arc welder does, is also a fire hazard if installed or used incorrectly.[2]

Flexible cords show how the two mechanisms combine. A series fault is a partly or completely severed conductor inside the cord, and a parallel fault is a line-to-neutral or ground fault, usually through damaged insulation.[7] Both lead to carbon tracking within the cord, then leakage current, arcing and finally combustion.[7] Where cord insulation is damaged, ground faults or short circuits may occur, and the resulting arc may ignite the insulation or nearby combustible material.[8]

Flow diagram from series or parallel cord fault through carbon tracking, leakage current and arcing to combustion
How a cord fault develops into a fire: a series fault (severed conductor) or a parallel fault (damaged insulation) leads to carbon tracking, leakage current, arcing and combustion.

Not every electrical heat source is strong enough to produce flames at once. Smouldering is a slow, low-temperature, flameless form of combustion that can be started by heat sources much too weak to produce a flame directly, and it offers a pathway to later flaming.[9] The incipient phase of a compartment fire may include smouldering, electrical arcing or radiant heating of a combustible, and it may be very short or prolonged.[10] Exposure time matters as well. Wood has a normal ignition temperature of 204–260 °C (400–500 °F), yet it has ignited after four days of exposure to a heat source at 109 °C (228 °F).[11]

Joule heating and ampacity

The handbook states the heating rule in words: a conductor generates heat in proportion to its resistance and to the square of the current.[1] In symbols:

Q˙∝I2R

For one conductor with a given resistance, the resistance cancels when two currents are compared. The heat at current I2 relative to the heat at current I1 is then:

Q˙2Q˙1=(I2I1)2

Symbol Description Unit
Q˙ Heat generated in the conductor per unit time W
I Current through the conductor A
R Electrical resistance of the conductor or connection Ω
I1,I2 Two currents to be compared in the same conductor A

Because of the square, a modest overload has a large effect: 50% more current in the same conductor produces 2.25 times the heat. The NEC specifies the ampacity of each conductor, the maximum current it can carry without overheating.[1] Ampacity depends on the size of the conductor, the ambient temperature, the type of insulation and the installation, such as a raceway, a cable, the earth or free air.[2] The 2005 NEC tables reproduced in the handbook give, for example, 25 A for a 12 AWG copper conductor with 60 °C (140 °F) insulation of type TW or UF.[12] That value applies to an ambient temperature of 30 °C (86 °F) and to no more than three current-carrying conductors in a raceway, cable or the earth. For other ambient temperatures the allowable ampacity is multiplied by a correction factor.[12]

Line chart of relative heat generation rising as the square of relative current from 1.0 to 2.0
Relative heat generation in one conductor as a function of relative current, from the rule that heat is proportional to the square of the current.

Worked example. A 12 AWG copper conductor with 60 °C insulation runs through a space where the ambient temperature is 41–45 °C. The correction factor in the NEC table for this ambient and insulation rating is 0.71.[12] The tabular ampacity becomes 25 A × 0.71 = 17.75 A. If the circuit nevertheless carries the full 25 A, the heat generated relative to the derated current is (25 / 17.75)² = 1.98, or about 2.0 times as much heat. Above the derated ampacity, the handbook warns that heat can deteriorate insulation and may ignite nearby combustibles.[2]

A second rule addresses long-lasting loads. Where the maximum load of a branch circuit continues for 3 hours or more, as with store or office lighting, the NEC requires the specified load to be increased by 25%.[13] A continuous lighting load of 16 A is therefore treated as a 20 A load. The tables and factors are those of the 2005 NEC, which United States electrical installations should comply with, and they use American conductor sizes;[14] they illustrate the method and are not values for other countries. The ratio above also compares heat production only and does not by itself give the temperature of the conductor.

Equipment and circumstances

In the United States in 1994–1998, an average of 81,670 structure fires a year were coded as caused by electrical failure, defined as a short circuit, a ground fault or another electrical failure.[15] Fixed wiring accounted for 15,030 of these fires, cords or plugs for 6,360, light fixtures, lampholders, ballasts or signs for 4,890, and switches, receptacles or outlets for 4,430.[15] Power switches and overcurrent protection devices such as fuses and circuit breakers were themselves involved in 2,520 fires a year.[15] A second table for the same period counts 49,700 fires a year that originated with electrical distribution equipment, including 17,800 with fixed wiring and 8,000 with cords or plugs.[15]

Horizontal bar chart of US structure fires per year by electrical distribution equipment, 1994 to 1998, fixed wiring highest
Structure fires originating with electrical distribution equipment in the United States, annual average 1994–1998 (49,700 fires a year in total).

Electrically powered equipment is involved in several times as many fires as are coded as electrical failure, for example when equipment with hot surfaces is placed too close to combustibles.[16] Even where equipment failure is the immediate cause, nearly all of these fires stem from foreseeable or avoidable human error.[16] Typical errors are improper installation, such as a wire gauge that does not match the wattage of the equipment or a fuse with too high a rating. Lack of maintenance is another, because insulation deteriorates over time, faster with heat, poor installation, adverse surroundings or physical damage.[16]

Improper use and carelessness complete the picture. Equipment listed for dry locations may be installed in damp or wet places, and cords in traffic areas or pinched against a wall can be damaged. Lightbulbs with a higher wattage than the fixture is rated for can overheat and ignite lampshades.[15] Space heaters left on, objects dropped into equipment and clothes draped over a lamp are examples of momentary lapses.[15] Studies by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and the International Association of Electrical Inspectors suggest that extension cords are probably overused as semi-permanent extensions of the building wiring.[15]

Cords deserve special attention. Electrical cord fires are described as a leading cause of residential fires in the United States. Consumer misuse is the most common cause: cords crushed by traffic or furniture, stapled to baseboards, run under carpet or left coiled.[7] Circuit breakers and fuses protect the fixed wiring and do not provide overload protection for an extension cord plugged into that wiring.[7]

Lighting equipment is a further source. Fluorescent luminaires with a ballast need care on low-density cellulose fibreboard of 320 kg/m³ (20 lb/ft³) or less. The handbook advises that, unless listed for such mounting, they be spaced at least 38 mm (1½ in.) from it, because the fibreboard can under some conditions ignite at relatively low temperatures.[17] High-intensity discharge lamps can exceed 288 °C (550 °F) in some sizes.[17]

Fire statistics

The national estimates for the United States can be split into homes and other structures. In 1999–2002, electrical distribution or lighting equipment caused an average of 32,400 home fires a year, with 220 civilian deaths and $679 million in direct property damage.[5] In non-home structures the same cause accounted for 13,200 fires a year and $399 million in damage.[18] Electrical distribution equipment ranks no higher than fourth among the leading causes for any measure of loss except property damage, where it ranks second. Many of these fires start in concealed spaces, where they are hard to attack.[5] The average loss per home fire from this cause was $21,000, among the highest of all causes, while the death rate was 0.7 civilian deaths per 100 fires.[19]

Other ways of sorting the same data show the role of the two mechanisms. In United States home structure fires in 1999–2002, a short circuit or other electrical malfunction was the factor contributing to ignition in 18% of the fires, and arcing was the heat source in 12%.[20] Electrical wire or cable insulation was the item first ignited in 6% of these fires.[21] Arcing was also the heat source in 8% of the 9,900 upholstered furniture fires and in 8% of the 17,500 mattress and bedding fires in United States homes over the same period.[22]

In one- and two-family dwellings in 1999–2002, electrical distribution or lighting equipment caused 27,900 fires a year (10%) and 200 civilian deaths (8%).[23] It ranked a very close fifth among the causes of fire deaths in these homes and caused 14% of the direct property damage.[24] These numbers carry the usual limits of incident data. They are national estimates of fires reported to United States municipal fire departments.[5] For its 1994–1998 tables the handbook adds that causes are determined by fire officers on the scene, so some errors of inclusion or exclusion may have occurred.[16]

Industrial, nuclear and other facilities

In risk analysis for chemical process plants, electrical ignition is one branch of the fixed-point ignition sources. It splits into ignition by electrical equipment and devices and ignition by static electricity.[25] The equipment branch lists battery banks, generators, power line connection points, transformers, switchgear, electrical panels, cable and wiring connections, service outlets, motors, pumps, fans and heaters.[25] Where flammable gases may be present, very little energy is needed: the minimum ignition energy of near-stoichiometric gas mixtures in air is of the order of a few tenths of a millijoule.[26] Low-power equipment can therefore be designed as "intrinsically safe", so that its worst fault cannot release that energy, or it can be housed in an explosion-proof enclosure.[26] In a building fire, a spark from an electrical installation can likewise ignite a premixed mixture of smoke gases and air within its flammable range, causing a smoke gas explosion.[27]

The handbook chapters on industrial processes give many examples. In woodworking plants, worn switches can start arcing, power cords become frayed and bearings overheat, all of which are possible electrically generated ignition sources.[28] At a textile mill in North Carolina in 1999, a failing electric motor arced and ignited waste stored next to it. The fire then spread along lint on piping, conduit and ducts before sprinklers could control it.[29] In wastewater plants, sustained arcing faults in switchgear and motor control centres can ignite flammable gases or vapours, including those released by pyrolysis of the insulation.[30]

The fire risk method for United States nuclear power plants assigns a generic fire frequency to each type of ignition source, and many of these sources are electrical. The generic mean frequency for all electrical cabinets of one reactor unit together is 4.5 × 10−2 per reactor year, the highest value in the table of ignition source bins.[31] Self-ignited cable fires have a generic frequency of 4.4 × 10−3, junction boxes 1.9 × 10−3 and high-energy arcing faults 1.5 × 10−3 per reactor year.[31] Common practice is to postulate self-ignited cable fires only in power cable trays, because control and instrumentation cables do not usually carry enough energy to ignite themselves.[32] At Fort Calhoun Station in December 2001, two 15 A extension cords in series fed a 2,000 W grease drum heater that drew 17.39 A. The 20 A plug of the heater had been modified without authorisation to fit a 15 A receptacle, and the underrated cords overheated overnight and started a fire.[33][34]

Electrical ignition also occurs in high-rise office buildings. In World Trade Center 1 in New York, a short circuit in November 1991 caused a reported fire and smoke condition in electrical closets on possibly four floors (93 to 96). Electrical wire or cable insulation was the first material ignited.[35] The sprinklers were in service but did not operate, and the fire department used two hose lines; damage stayed within the electrical closet.[35]

Prevention and design

In the United States, electrical installations are expected to follow the NEC, which was first issued under its present name in 1897 and is revised every three years.[14] The handbook chapter summarised here refers to the 2005 edition, and because of the three-year cycle later editions may differ.[1] The risk of an electrical fire is reduced by using the correct conductor size for the load, insulation suited to the environment and the correct size of fuse or circuit breaker.[2] Heat-producing equipment also needs enough clearance and air circulation to prevent unsafe temperatures and premature breakdown of insulation.[2][36] One benchmark study found code violations, particularly of the general workmanship provisions, in 61% of home electrical fires.[5]

Overcurrent protection opens a circuit when the current exceeds the value that would raise the conductor temperature above the rating of its insulation. In equipment it limits the effects of an internal fault by reducing arcing and the ejection of hot metal.[37] Fuses and circuit breakers are the usual devices, but some fuse types can be defeated. Renewable fuse links can be doubled, and the Type S plug fuse was designed to minimise tampering; its adapters prevent the use of pennies in fuse holders.[37] Lighting and receptacle circuits in the United States are usually rated at 15 or 20 A, far above the 20 mA that can, under certain conditions, kill a healthy adult.[38] Two further devices address hazards that fuses and breakers do not cover: a ground-fault circuit interrupter protects people against shock, and an arc-fault circuit interrupter detects the low-level arcing faults that ordinary breakers miss.[3]

Periodic inspection and maintenance are needed because insulation ages even in a correct installation.[16] International fire engineering guidance treats electrical equipment in a similar way. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) list electrical equipment among the ignition sources to consider when identifying hazards. They name electrical safety equipment and regular plant maintenance as measures for limiting fire initiation.[39] In Australia, the Fire Safety Verification Method handbook (2020) uses the unreported ignition of material within a cavity by maintenance work or an electrical fault as a typical reference scenario for concealed spaces.[40]

Investigation and misconceptions

Establishing that a fire was electrical is part of determining the fire cause. Many of the steps of the reconstruction and failure analysis used for this are outlined in NFPA 921.[41] Analysis of the ignition sequence asks for the size, nature and source of the ignition energy, the properties of the material ignited and the circumstances that brought the two together.[42] A competent ignition source is one with enough energy and temperature to raise a particular fuel to its ignition temperature within the exposure time. An electric arc may be far hotter than the ignition temperature of a fuel, yet last too briefly to deliver enough energy for ignition.[42] Investigators also examine circuits that were energised during the fire for signs of arcing, because the arc locations help to reconstruct how the fire progressed.[43]

Two misconceptions are common. The first is that electrical system fires form a large share of all fires. In fact, long-term use of the NEC has reduced them to a lower-order problem in one- and two-family dwellings in the United States, usually involving some failure to observe the code.[23] The second is that an electrical fire is purely an equipment problem, whereas most such fires involve human error, and exposed elements such as cords are especially open to abuse by occupants.[5] The term "electrical fire" in firefighting refers to something else: a fire involving energised equipment that calls for a non-conductive extinguishing agent while the equipment remains live.[44]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-127.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-131.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-148.
  4. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-14.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-15.
  6. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-5.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-149.
  8. ↑ Milatovich (2008), p. 8-153.
  9. ↑ Ohlemiller (2002), p. 2-200.
  10. ↑ Budnick et al. (2008), p. 3-146.
  11. ↑ Barry (2002), p. 5-191.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-128.
  13. ↑ Milatovich (2008), pp. 8-151–8-152.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-137.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-136.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-135.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 Milatovich (2008), pp. 8-156–8-157.
  18. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-16.
  19. ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), pp. 3-74, 3-76.
  20. ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-72.
  21. ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-73.
  22. ↑ Babrauskas (2008b), pp. 6-106–6-107.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 Lathrop (2008b), p. 20-58.
  24. ↑ Lathrop (2008b), pp. 20-58–20-59.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 Barry (2002), p. 5-192.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Beyler (2002b), p. 2-181.
  27. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.10.
  28. ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-16.
  29. ↑ Mattern (2008b), p. 11-27.
  30. ↑ Wheeler (2008), p. 9-149.
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 Nowlen et al. (2005b), pp. 6-2–6-5.
  32. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 7-2.
  33. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. H-5.
  34. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), pp. H-32–H-33.
  35. ↑ 35.0 35.1 Kuligowski et al. (2005), p. 9.
  36. ↑ Milatovich (2008), p. 8-134.
  37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 Milatovich (2008), p. 8-145.
  38. ↑ Milatovich (2008), p. 8-146.
  39. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 1.2-9–1.2-10.
  40. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 77.
  41. ↑ Custer and Sheppard (2008), p. 3-34.
  42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 Custer and Sheppard (2008), p. 3-37.
  43. ↑ Custer and Sheppard (2008), p. 3-35.
  44. ↑ Nolan (2000), as cited in Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-21.

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