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A '''cargo tank vehicle''' is a road vehicle that carries liquids or gases in bulk in a large tank that is permanently part of, or mounted on, the vehicle. The ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008) defines cargo tanks as large containers for hauling liquids and gases in bulk, and notes that they are also called "tank motor vehicles" or '''tank trucks'''.<ref name="Routhier-21-23">Routhier (2008), p. 21-23.</ref> The term '''road tanker''' appears in British test reports cited in the SFPE Handbook.<ref name="Beyler-3-312">Beyler (2002a), p. 3-312.</ref> | A '''cargo tank vehicle''' is a road vehicle that carries liquids or gases in bulk in a large tank that is permanently part of, or mounted on, the vehicle. The ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008) defines cargo tanks as large containers for hauling liquids and gases in bulk, and notes that they are also called "tank motor vehicles" or '''tank trucks'''.<ref name="Routhier-21-23">Routhier (2008), p. 21-23.</ref> The term '''road tanker''' appears in British test reports cited in the SFPE Handbook.<ref name="Beyler-3-312">Beyler (2002a), p. 3-312.</ref> | ||
Cargo tanks are the most common transport vehicles for combustible, flammable and corrosive liquids and for compressed gases, both flammable and non-flammable.<ref name="Routhier-21-23" /> A single load can be large: one gasoline tanker involved in a 1998 crash on a US interstate highway carried 8,700 gal (33,000 L).<ref name="Bendelius-21-210">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-210.</ref> When such a vehicle is in an accident, the release can feed a large [[pool fire]], and a tank of liquefied gas can fail in a [[BLEVE]].<ref name="Routhier-21-24">Routhier (2008), p. 21-24.</ref><ref name="Lemoff-6-171">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-171.</ref> Tunnel design guidance reproduced in the handbook assigns a tanker fire a peak heat release rate of 200 to 300 MW, | Cargo tanks are the most common transport vehicles for combustible, flammable and corrosive liquids and for compressed gases, both flammable and non-flammable.<ref name="Routhier-21-23" /> A single load can be large: one gasoline tanker involved in a 1998 crash on a US interstate highway carried 8,700 gal (33,000 L).<ref name="Bendelius-21-210">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-210.</ref> When such a vehicle is in an accident, the release can feed a large [[pool fire]], and a tank of liquefied gas can fail in a [[BLEVE]].<ref name="Routhier-21-24">Routhier (2008), p. 21-24.</ref><ref name="Lemoff-6-171">Lemoff (2008), p. 6-171.</ref> Tunnel design guidance reproduced in the handbook assigns a tanker fire a peak heat release rate of 200 to 300 MW, compared with 70 to 200 MW for a heavy goods truck.<ref name="Bendelius-21-204">Bendelius (2008), p. 21-204.</ref> The rules described here are US federal rules and NFPA standards as summarised in the 2008 handbook. | ||
== Types and construction == | == Types and construction == | ||
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The discharge valves are designed to keep the liquid in the tank after a crash. For all but viscous liquids, a shutoff valve inside the shell of the cargo tank is required and kept closed except during loading and unloading. The piping connected to this internal valve has a shear section. If an accident damages the piping, it breaks at the shear section and leaves the internal valve closed and intact.<ref name="Ordile-7-31" /> The valve also needs a secondary, remotely located control for use in a fire or severe spill during unloading. A fusible element that operates at not more than 250 °F (121 °C) closes the valve automatically in a fire.<ref name="Ordile-7-31" /> | The discharge valves are designed to keep the liquid in the tank after a crash. For all but viscous liquids, a shutoff valve inside the shell of the cargo tank is required and kept closed except during loading and unloading. The piping connected to this internal valve has a shear section. If an accident damages the piping, it breaks at the shear section and leaves the internal valve closed and intact.<ref name="Ordile-7-31" /> The valve also needs a secondary, remotely located control for use in a fire or severe spill during unloading. A fusible element that operates at not more than 250 °F (121 °C) closes the valve automatically in a fire.<ref name="Ordile-7-31" /> | ||
[[File:fse-cargo-tank-vehicle-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Cutaway of a tank truck compartment with internal shutoff valve, shear section in the outlet pipe, remote control cable and fusible element|Release controls on a US flammable liquid cargo tank as described in 2008: internal valve, shear section, remote control and fusible link.]] | |||
Routhier (2008) lists the major causes of unintentional releases from cargo tanks as poor maintenance and deviation from tank specifications. Leaks occur in collisions and in non-collision accidents alike.<ref name="Routhier-21-24" /> The DOT rules on cargo tanks, described in the 2008 handbook, are found in Title 49 of the US Code of Federal Regulations. Part 178 contains the specifications, Part 173 the authorised packaging for each material, and Part 180 the newer rules on maintenance, inspection, testing and repair, which aim to reduce spillage.<ref name="Routhier-21-23" /> The shipper must confirm that the tank is a proper container for the material, either from the specification marking or from carrier papers.<ref name="Routhier-21-23" /> | Routhier (2008) lists the major causes of unintentional releases from cargo tanks as poor maintenance and deviation from tank specifications. Leaks occur in collisions and in non-collision accidents alike.<ref name="Routhier-21-24" /> The DOT rules on cargo tanks, described in the 2008 handbook, are found in Title 49 of the US Code of Federal Regulations. Part 178 contains the specifications, Part 173 the authorised packaging for each material, and Part 180 the newer rules on maintenance, inspection, testing and repair, which aim to reduce spillage.<ref name="Routhier-21-23" /> The shipper must confirm that the tank is a proper container for the material, either from the specification marking or from carrier papers.<ref name="Routhier-21-23" /> | ||
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Bonding against static sparks must be provided at all stations where Class I liquids are loaded or unloaded. The bond runs between the fill pipe or piping and the tank vehicle. It is made before the dome covers are opened and stays in place until filling is complete and the covers are closed.<ref name="Ordile-7-30" /> Closed metal piping systems are bonded by their construction. Bonding is not required for Class II and Class III liquids handled at ambient temperature, or for products without a tendency to accumulate static, such as asphalts, crude oils and water-soluble liquids.<ref name="Ordile-7-30" /> | Bonding against static sparks must be provided at all stations where Class I liquids are loaded or unloaded. The bond runs between the fill pipe or piping and the tank vehicle. It is made before the dome covers are opened and stays in place until filling is complete and the covers are closed.<ref name="Ordile-7-30" /> Closed metal piping systems are bonded by their construction. Bonding is not required for Class II and Class III liquids handled at ambient temperature, or for products without a tendency to accumulate static, such as asphalts, crude oils and water-soluble liquids.<ref name="Ordile-7-30" /> | ||
[[File:fse-cargo-tank-vehicle-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Loading rack with a tank truck, a bonding cable from rack to tank, a fill pipe reaching the tank bottom and a filter upstream with a relaxation section|Static precautions in top loading of a tank vehicle with a Class I liquid.]] | |||
Switch loading is a particular hazard of tank vehicles. A compartment that last carried a Class I liquid may not be fully drained. If a Class II or Class III liquid is then loaded, a static spark can occur in a mixture within the flammable range. The handbook therefore states that such a compartment, with its piping, metering devices and hoses, must be completely drained before loading.<ref name="Ordile-7-32">Ordile (2008), p. 7-32.</ref> The liquid classes are those of [[flammable and combustible liquid classification]]. | Switch loading is a particular hazard of tank vehicles. A compartment that last carried a Class I liquid may not be fully drained. If a Class II or Class III liquid is then loaded, a static spark can occur in a mixture within the flammable range. The handbook therefore states that such a compartment, with its piping, metering devices and hoses, must be completely drained before loading.<ref name="Ordile-7-32">Ordile (2008), p. 7-32.</ref> The liquid classes are those of [[flammable and combustible liquid classification]]. | ||
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As a worked example, suppose the whole 33,000 L load of the 1998 tanker drained into a pool of 100 m², about 11 m across. The fire would release about 240 MW and, at steady burning, last about 74 minutes. If the same load spread over 200 m², the fire would double to about 480 MW but last only about 37 minutes. The example assumes steady burning in the open and complete release, and shows why the design note asks for drainage that limits pool area.<ref name="Bendelius-21-204" /> | As a worked example, suppose the whole 33,000 L load of the 1998 tanker drained into a pool of 100 m², about 11 m across. The fire would release about 240 MW and, at steady burning, last about 74 minutes. If the same load spread over 200 m², the fire would double to about 480 MW but last only about 37 minutes. The example assumes steady burning in the open and complete release, and shows why the design note asks for drainage that limits pool area.<ref name="Bendelius-21-204" /> | ||
[[File:fse-cargo-tank-vehicle-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Range bar chart of design fire heat release rates for car, bus, heavy goods truck and tanker, with gasoline pool areas marked on a second axis|Design fire peak heat release rates for road vehicles, with the gasoline pool areas that give the same values.]] | |||
== Bridges, tunnels and buildings == | == Bridges, tunnels and buildings == | ||
Latest revision as of 00:37, 16 November 2026
A cargo tank vehicle is a road vehicle that carries liquids or gases in bulk in a large tank that is permanently part of, or mounted on, the vehicle. The Fire Protection Handbook (2008) defines cargo tanks as large containers for hauling liquids and gases in bulk, and notes that they are also called "tank motor vehicles" or tank trucks.[1] The term road tanker appears in British test reports cited in the SFPE Handbook.[2]
Cargo tanks are the most common transport vehicles for combustible, flammable and corrosive liquids and for compressed gases, both flammable and non-flammable.[1] A single load can be large: one gasoline tanker involved in a 1998 crash on a US interstate highway carried 8,700 gal (33,000 L).[3] When such a vehicle is in an accident, the release can feed a large pool fire, and a tank of liquefied gas can fail in a BLEVE.[4][5] Tunnel design guidance reproduced in the handbook assigns a tanker fire a peak heat release rate of 200 to 300 MW, compared with 70 to 200 MW for a heavy goods truck.[6] The rules described here are US federal rules and NFPA standards as summarised in the 2008 handbook.
Types and construction
Cargo tanks form part of the wider group of commercial vehicles treated in commercial vehicle fire.[1] In the classification of hazardous materials containers used by emergency responders, cargo tanks are bulk transport containers, in the same group as tank cars, portable tanks and intermediate bulk containers.[7] Powders and granular hazardous materials travel in hopper-type, dump-bodied vehicles instead.[1] The handbook illustrates road trailer shapes for liquids, corrosives, dry bulk, compressed liquefied gases, cryogenic liquids and compressed gas tube trailers, and warns that many other variations exist.[8]
The handbook's tank drawings identify US tank specifications by "MC" numbers. One drawing shows a combination tank with compartments marked MC 307 at 25 psi, MC 306 at 3 psi and MC 312 at 75 psi, alongside convertible single-compartment tanks.[9] The MC 306 tank for flammable liquids is drawn with 1 psi vents and fusible devices; the MC 307 tank with pressure relief devices and rupture discs.[9] An inspection guide for the MC 306 shows the parts that responders should recognise. They include a manhole assembly, a fusible vent, overturn protection, baffles and bulkheads, and an internal shutoff valve with remote control. Rear end protection and the placard with its identification number are also marked.[10]

Tanks for compressed gases carry internal shutoff valves at both the liquid and the vapour openings, with excess flow valves and a remote control.[4] Liquefied natural gas travels as a cryogenic liquid in insulated cargo trucks built to US Department of Transportation (DOT) specifications.[11] Bobtail tanker trucks for liquefied petroleum gas, with a capacity of 2,000 to 4,000 gal (7.6 to 15.2 m³), most commonly supply LP-gas vehicle fuelling stations. The transfer pump is mounted on the truck.[12]
Safety features for flammable liquids
For tank vehicles carrying flammable and combustible liquids, Ordile (2008) summarises NFPA 385 and the DOT rules. Vehicles and tanks are built so that they present relatively little danger of fire in minor traffic accidents, and the tanks withstand all but the most violent impact without rupturing.[13] Vents are fitted so that, if the tank is exposed to fire, vapour burns at the vent and the tank does not rupture from internal pressure.[13]
The discharge valves are designed to keep the liquid in the tank after a crash. For all but viscous liquids, a shutoff valve inside the shell of the cargo tank is required and kept closed except during loading and unloading. The piping connected to this internal valve has a shear section. If an accident damages the piping, it breaks at the shear section and leaves the internal valve closed and intact.[13] The valve also needs a secondary, remotely located control for use in a fire or severe spill during unloading. A fusible element that operates at not more than 250 °F (121 °C) closes the valve automatically in a fire.[13]
Routhier (2008) lists the major causes of unintentional releases from cargo tanks as poor maintenance and deviation from tank specifications. Leaks occur in collisions and in non-collision accidents alike.[4] The DOT rules on cargo tanks, described in the 2008 handbook, are found in Title 49 of the US Code of Federal Regulations. Part 178 contains the specifications, Part 173 the authorised packaging for each material, and Part 180 the newer rules on maintenance, inspection, testing and repair, which aim to reduce spillage.[1] The shipper must confirm that the tank is a proper container for the material, either from the specification marking or from carrier papers.[1]
Loading, unloading and static electricity
Spills can occur at loading and unloading stations for tank cars and tank vehicles, and if ignited could endanger neighbouring tanks and buildings.[14] In the US practice described by Ordile (2008), loading stations for Class I liquids should be at least 25 ft (8 m) from storage tanks and other plant buildings. The same distance applies to the nearest property line that can be built on. For Class II and Class III liquids the distance is 15 ft (4.6 m).[14] Drains, diversion curbs or the natural slope of the ground keep spills from spreading.[14] Where loading racks are protected by foam, NFPA 11 formerly allowed 4.1 L/(min·m²) (0.10 gpm/ft²); Scheffey (2002) reports that the newer edition refers to NFPA 16, which requires 6.6 L/(min·m²).[15]
Static electricity is a main ignition source during transfer. Gasoline, jet fuels, toluene and light fuel oil can build up static charges on the liquid surface. Excessive turbulence, pumping dissimilar materials, free fall of liquid through the vapour space and very fine filters are among the most likely causes of static ignition in tank vehicles.[14] The handbook recommends slowing the delivery rate until the fill pipe is covered and allowing at least 30 seconds of relaxation time downstream of a filter.[16]
Bonding against static sparks must be provided at all stations where Class I liquids are loaded or unloaded. The bond runs between the fill pipe or piping and the tank vehicle. It is made before the dome covers are opened and stays in place until filling is complete and the covers are closed.[16] Closed metal piping systems are bonded by their construction. Bonding is not required for Class II and Class III liquids handled at ambient temperature, or for products without a tendency to accumulate static, such as asphalts, crude oils and water-soluble liquids.[16]
Switch loading is a particular hazard of tank vehicles. A compartment that last carried a Class I liquid may not be fully drained. If a Class II or Class III liquid is then loaded, a static spark can occur in a mixture within the flammable range. The handbook therefore states that such a compartment, with its piping, metering devices and hoses, must be completely drained before loading.[17] The liquid classes are those of flammable and combustible liquid classification.
Deliveries to fuel stations are covered by their own rules. At a motor fuel dispensing facility in the United States, as described by Rivkin (2008a), the delivery vehicle must be 25 ft (7.6 m) from any aboveground tank and wholly on the premises. In 1976 near Gadsden, Alabama, an electric pump with a missing junction box cover ignited vapour during a delivery to aboveground tanks. The fire spread to the tank truck, which exploded and killed three responding fire fighters.[18] Ordile (2008) describes a similar pattern at bulk plants where tanks stand on unprotected steel supports and are filled from tank vehicles by gravity. A fire at the vehicle can cause the supports to fail, so that the tanks fall and release their contents.[19]
Operating rules on the road
The US Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, as described by Routhier (2008), prohibit smoking while transporting flammable liquids, gases and other placarded materials. The ban also applies while driving an empty tank vehicle that last contained a flammable liquid or gas.[1] Smoking is also prohibited within 25 ft (7.6 m) of a vehicle carrying specified classes of hazardous materials.[20] Placards warn the public of vehicles carrying hazardous materials above specified quantities, as treated in hazardous materials placarding.[20] Incorrect or missing placards and shipping papers are among the hazards that fire fighters face at cargo tank incidents.[4]
Routing and parking are also regulated. Ordile (2008) recommends that tank-truck traffic avoid congested districts as far as possible, using bypass routes, because a fire there has more serious consequences. Municipalities can prohibit parking of loaded tank vehicles on city streets, and tank vehicles should not be parked in public garages.[13] For liquefied petroleum gas, NFPA 58 covers cargo tanks and the parking and garaging of LP-gas vehicles; Routhier (2008) notes that 47 states and the DOT had adopted it for regulatory purposes.[21]
Fire and explosion hazards
Routhier (2008) lists eight potential hazards to fire fighters at cargo tank incidents. They include multipurpose tanks carrying commodities they are not built for, multicompartment tanks carrying materials of several hazard classes, and defective or missing safety controls. They also include the release of large quantities, the need for extra equipment for fires and spills, and the potential for a BLEVE.[4] Responders should approach from upwind and avoid contact with spilled or leaking material.[4]
Tanks of liquefied flammable gas can fail violently. Lemoff (2008) states that most BLEVEs that involve container failure result from fire exposure, but that impact failures are particularly noticeable in transport accidents with railcars and cargo vehicles. In these cases the BLEVE generally occurs at the moment of impact.[5] Routhier (2008) advises that a burning flammable gas leak should be left to burn until the leak is controlled. A container under flame impingement must be kept cool to avoid weakening and a BLEVE. If no hose streams are available, the advice is to leave immediately.[1]
Liquid cargoes produce pool fires whose size depends on where the liquid goes. Gottuk and White (2002) note that the usual assumption of instantaneous ignition of the whole spill may not hold for extremely large spills such as tanker spills.[22] Spills also release vapour into drains and sewers: wastewater treatment plants list tank truck spills as a source of gasoline vapour.[23] Rail transport carries the same hazards at larger scale and is treated in rail tank car.
Design fire size
For road tunnels, Bendelius (2008) describes the choice of design fire as the first issue in designing the ventilation system. A design fire table in the 2008 handbook is adapted from NFPA 502 (2008 edition). Its peak heat release rates are 5 to 10 MW for a passenger car, 20 to 30 MW for a bus and 70 to 200 MW for a heavy goods truck. A tanker is given 200 to 300 MW.[6] A note to the table states that the tanker fire design should include adequate drainage to limit the area of the pool fire and its duration. In the US Memorial Tunnel fire ventilation tests, the 100 MW test fire represented a petrol tanker.[24]
The link between drainage and fire size can be shown with the pool fire equation of the NRC Fire Dynamics Tools:[25]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| heat release rate | kW | |
| mass burning rate per unit area | kg/(m²·s) | |
| heat of combustion | kJ/kg | |
| area of the burning pool | m² | |
| empirical constant | m⁻¹ | |
| equivalent pool diameter | m | |
| burning time of the released volume | s | |
| volume of liquid released | m³ | |
| liquid density | kg/m³ |
The burning time follows from dividing the mass of liquid by the mass burning rate of the whole pool, as in an SFPE spill fire example.[26] For gasoline, Babrauskas (2002b) gives 0.055 kg/(m²·s), 43.7 MJ/kg, 740 kg/m³ and = 2.1 m⁻¹.[27] For pools larger than a few metres the bracket is practically 1. A gasoline pool of about 83 to 125 m² then gives the 200 to 300 MW of the design table, and 100 MW corresponds to about 42 m².
As a worked example, suppose the whole 33,000 L load of the 1998 tanker drained into a pool of 100 m², about 11 m across. The fire would release about 240 MW and, at steady burning, last about 74 minutes. If the same load spread over 200 m², the fire would double to about 480 MW but last only about 37 minutes. The example assumes steady burning in the open and complete release, and shows why the design note asks for drainage that limits pool area.[6]
Bridges, tunnels and buildings
Cargo tank fires on highways have damaged major structures. In 1998 on Interstate 95 in Pennsylvania, a tanker loaded with 8,700 gal (33,000 L) of gasoline jumped the median barrier, struck a pickup truck and exploded. Both drivers died, and nine steel girders and 20 to 24 m (65 to 80 ft) of the bridge over Chester Creek were damaged.[3] In 2004 a tanker carrying 12,000 gal (45,500 L) of fuel oil collided with another vehicle near Bridgeport, Connecticut. The fire melted steel support beams of the bridge over Howard Avenue and closed the highway in both directions.[3]
Bendelius (2008) points out that cargo restrictions are far less strict on bridges than in tunnels, and probably absent beneath bridges, so the potential for a large fire is greater there. Fire protection for long road bridges was addressed in NFPA 502 (2004 edition) for spans over 400 ft (122 m).[3] Fires on and under bridges are treated in Bridge fire.
Building design can also face a tanker scenario. Hurley and Bukowski (2008) use the example of a gasoline tanker truck crashing into a building next to a highway that leads to a refinery. If such a scenario is excluded from the design fires, the stakeholders must understand and accept that the design goals might not be met if it happened.[28]
See also
- Emergency Response Guidebook
- U.S. Department of Transportation
- Gasoline
- Liquefied petroleum gas
- Liquefied natural gas
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 Routhier (2008), p. 21-23.
- ↑ Beyler (2002a), p. 3-312.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Bendelius (2008), p. 21-210.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Routhier (2008), p. 21-24.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-171.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Bendelius (2008), p. 21-204.
- ↑ C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-126.
- ↑ Routhier (2008), p. 21-26.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 Routhier (2008), p. 21-25.
- ↑ Routhier (2008), p. 21-27.
- ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-182.
- ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-68.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 Ordile (2008), p. 7-31.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 Ordile (2008), p. 7-29.
- ↑ Scheffey (2002), p. 4-112.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 Ordile (2008), p. 7-30.
- ↑ Ordile (2008), p. 7-32.
- ↑ Rivkin (2008a), p. 21-36.
- ↑ Ordile (2008), p. 7-22.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 Routhier (2008), p. 21-18.
- ↑ Routhier (2008), p. 21-19.
- ↑ Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-315.
- ↑ Wheeler (2008), p. 9-150.
- ↑ Bendelius (2008), p. 21-208.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 3-3.
- ↑ Gottuk and White (2002), p. 2-314.
- ↑ Babrauskas (2002b), p. 3-26.
- ↑ Hurley and Bukowski (2008), p. 3-124.
References
- Babrauskas, V. (2002b). Heat release rates. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-1–3-37). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Bendelius, A. G. (2008). Road tunnels and bridges. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-187–21-212). National Fire Protection Association.
- Beyler, C. L. (2002a). Fire hazard calculations for large, open hydrocarbon fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-268–3-314). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Gottuk, D. T., & White, D. A. (2002). Liquid fuel fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-297–2-316). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Hurley, M. J., & Bukowski, R. W. (2008). Fire hazard analysis techniques. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-121–3-134). National Fire Protection Association.
- Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association.
- Ordile, A. M. (2008). Storage of flammable and combustible liquids. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-15–7-33). National Fire Protection Association.
- Rivkin, C. H. (2008a). Automotive and marine service station operations. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-29–21-40). National Fire Protection Association.
- Rivkin, C. H. (2008b). Vehicle fueling using gaseous fuels. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-41–21-76). National Fire Protection Association.
- Routhier, B. (2008). Fire safety in commercial vehicles. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-15–21-27). National Fire Protection Association.
- Scheffey, J. L. (2002). Foam agents and AFFF system design considerations. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-88–4-122). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Wheeler, J. F. (2008). Protection of wastewater treatment plants. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-141–9-155). National Fire Protection Association.
- Wright, C. J. (2008a). Managing the response to hazardous material incidents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-117–13-144). National Fire Protection Association.