Source and style review: Re-entry behaviour (written by GPT-6) |
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'''Re-entry behaviour''' is the return of an occupant to a building or threatened area after beginning escape or reaching a place outside it. Within [[Human behaviour in fire|human behaviour in fire]], the action often has an identifiable purpose. Bryan's SFPE review describes decisions made from the information, responsibilities and social relationships perceived by the individual.<ref name="Bryan-3-315–3-319">Bryan (2002), pp. 3-315–3-319.</ref> | '''Re-entry behaviour''' is the return of an occupant to a building or threatened area after beginning escape or reaching a place outside it. Within [[Human behaviour in fire|human behaviour in fire]], the action often has an identifiable purpose. Bryan's Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) review describes decisions made from the information, responsibilities and social relationships perceived by the individual.<ref name="Bryan-3-315–3-319">Bryan (2002), pp. 3-315–3-319.</ref> | ||
The NFPA Fire Protection Handbook records reasons for returning that include rescue, firefighting, warning others and retrieving property or pets. Those intentions can be understandable while exposing the person to renewed danger. Return movement can also oppose the outgoing flow and complicate accounting for occupants.<ref name="NFPA-§4.1,pp.4-33,4-42–4-43">Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, pp. 4-33, 4-42–4-43.</ref> | The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Protection Handbook records reasons for returning that include rescue, firefighting, warning others and retrieving property or pets. Those intentions can be understandable while exposing the person to renewed danger. Return movement can also oppose the outgoing flow and complicate accounting for occupants.<ref name="NFPA-§4.1,pp.4-33,4-42–4-43">Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, pp. 4-33, 4-42–4-43.</ref> | ||
[[Affiliative behaviour]] can contribute when people seek family members or other familiar persons. [[Panic]] should not be assumed merely because an action appears hazardous to an observer. Analysis needs to distinguish the person's goal, the information available and the consequences for the evacuation system.<ref name="Bryan-3-315–3-319" /><ref name="NFPA-§4.1,p.4-33">Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, p. 4-33.</ref> | [[Affiliative behaviour]] can contribute when people seek family members or other familiar persons. [[Panic]] should not be assumed merely because an action appears hazardous to an observer. Analysis needs to distinguish the person's goal, the information available and the consequences for the evacuation system.<ref name="Bryan-3-315–3-319" /><ref name="NFPA-§4.1,p.4-33">Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, p. 4-33.</ref> | ||
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Leaving a building does not necessarily end a person's perceived responsibilities. Someone may believe that another occupant remains inside or that a small fire can still be controlled; the NFPA handbook describes several such purposes for return. These observations explain why an evacuation assessment should not assume that every movement is continuously towards the final exit.<ref name="NFPA-§4.1,p.4-33" /> | Leaving a building does not necessarily end a person's perceived responsibilities. Someone may believe that another occupant remains inside or that a small fire can still be controlled; the NFPA handbook describes several such purposes for return. These observations explain why an evacuation assessment should not assume that every movement is continuously towards the final exit.<ref name="NFPA-§4.1,p.4-33" /> | ||
[[File:fse-re-entry-behaviour-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Re-entry behaviour: motives, information and renewed exposure, showing the relationships described in the text.|Motives, information and renewed exposure in the assessment of Re-entry behaviour.]] | |||
The decision can be based on incomplete information; a person outside may not know that a relative has already escaped by another route. A familiar interior may also be judged from its earlier condition, although smoke and fire have continued developing. The purpose of the action therefore does not establish the safety of the route or destination.<ref name="NFPA-§4.1,pp.4-33,4-42–4-43" /><ref name="Bryan-3-318–3-319">Bryan (2002), pp. 3-318–3-319.</ref> | The decision can be based on incomplete information; a person outside may not know that a relative has already escaped by another route. A familiar interior may also be judged from its earlier condition, although smoke and fire have continued developing. The purpose of the action therefore does not establish the safety of the route or destination.<ref name="NFPA-§4.1,pp.4-33,4-42–4-43" /><ref name="Bryan-3-318–3-319">Bryan (2002), pp. 3-318–3-319.</ref> | ||
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An outside meeting point and an accounting procedure can reduce uncertainty about who has escaped. The NFPA discussion of drills connects organised movement with checking occupants and maintaining control after evacuation. The process should also make missing-person information available to the responsible staff or emergency responders.<ref name="NFPA-§4.1,pp.4-42–4-43;§14.6,p.14-81">Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, pp. 4-42–4-43; §14.6, p. 14-81.</ref> | An outside meeting point and an accounting procedure can reduce uncertainty about who has escaped. The NFPA discussion of drills connects organised movement with checking occupants and maintaining control after evacuation. The process should also make missing-person information available to the responsible staff or emergency responders.<ref name="NFPA-§4.1,pp.4-42–4-43;§14.6,p.14-81">Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, pp. 4-42–4-43; §14.6, p. 14-81.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-re-entry-behaviour-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Re-entry behaviour: accounting, terminology and practice, showing the relationships described in the text.|Accounting, terminology and practice in the assessment of Re-entry behaviour.]] | |||
A [[Fire drill|fire drill]] can rehearse this final stage as well as the route itself; participants can learn where to assemble, whom to report to and how further instructions will be communicated. Completing the exercise at the exit door would leave those actions untested. Evaluation should consider the reliability of the accounting and communication arrangements.<ref name="NFPA-§4.1,pp.4-42–4-44">Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, pp. 4-42–4-44.</ref> | A [[Fire drill|fire drill]] can rehearse this final stage as well as the route itself; participants can learn where to assemble, whom to report to and how further instructions will be communicated. Completing the exercise at the exit door would leave those actions untested. Evaluation should consider the reliability of the accounting and communication arrangements.<ref name="NFPA-§4.1,pp.4-42–4-44">Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, pp. 4-42–4-44.</ref> | ||
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Evacuation models often simplify human behaviour. The 2005 International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) describe assumptions of simultaneous departure, uninterrupted movement and excellent knowledge of the shortest route. Those simplifications can help examine capacity but do not provide a complete behavioural prediction.<ref name="humanbehavio_IFEG-2-8-3" /> | Evacuation models often simplify human behaviour. The 2005 International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) describe assumptions of simultaneous departure, uninterrupted movement and excellent knowledge of the shortest route. Those simplifications can help examine capacity but do not provide a complete behavioural prediction.<ref name="humanbehavio_IFEG-2-8-3" /> | ||
[[File:fse-re-entry-behaviour-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Re-entry behaviour: modelling and evidence limits, showing the relationships described in the text.|Modelling and evidence limits in the assessment of Re-entry behaviour.]] | |||
A model should be suited to the occupancy and layout. A simple approach may fail to identify local queues or group decisions in a complex building. Expensive software does not guarantee better input data or a more faithful account of human response.<ref name="humanbehavio_IFEG-2-8-4">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 2.8-4.</ref> | A model should be suited to the occupancy and layout. A simple approach may fail to identify local queues or group decisions in a complex building. Expensive software does not guarantee better input data or a more faithful account of human response.<ref name="humanbehavio_IFEG-2-8-4">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 2.8-4.</ref> | ||
Latest revision as of 09:36, 13 November 2026
Re-entry behaviour is the return of an occupant to a building or threatened area after beginning escape or reaching a place outside it. Within human behaviour in fire, the action often has an identifiable purpose. Bryan's Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) review describes decisions made from the information, responsibilities and social relationships perceived by the individual.[1]
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Protection Handbook records reasons for returning that include rescue, firefighting, warning others and retrieving property or pets. Those intentions can be understandable while exposing the person to renewed danger. Return movement can also oppose the outgoing flow and complicate accounting for occupants.[2]
Affiliative behaviour can contribute when people seek family members or other familiar persons. Panic should not be assumed merely because an action appears hazardous to an observer. Analysis needs to distinguish the person's goal, the information available and the consequences for the evacuation system.[1][3]
Motives, information and renewed exposure
Leaving a building does not necessarily end a person's perceived responsibilities. Someone may believe that another occupant remains inside or that a small fire can still be controlled; the NFPA handbook describes several such purposes for return. These observations explain why an evacuation assessment should not assume that every movement is continuously towards the final exit.[3]
The decision can be based on incomplete information; a person outside may not know that a relative has already escaped by another route. A familiar interior may also be judged from its earlier condition, although smoke and fire have continued developing. The purpose of the action therefore does not establish the safety of the route or destination.[2][4]
The protective action decision model concerns related questions about interpretation and protective choices. The specific sequence discussed here is Bryan's six-process account in the SFPE Handbook. It should not be treated as proof that every separately named behavioural framework uses the same stages or predicts an identical response.[4]
Return movement also changes conditions for other occupants; a person entering against an outgoing stream occupies passage space and can interrupt movement at a door or stair. The hazard is not confined to the returning individual. Analyses of route use should identify where opposing movement is plausible and how the operating plan addresses it.[3][5]
The MGM Grand Hotel fire illustrates the importance of social convergence and familiar locations. The NFPA handbook discusses people gathering in rooms with others. That behaviour should be distinguished from leaving the building and subsequently returning inside; both involve social relationships, but they occur at different stages and have different route consequences.[6]
Accounting, terminology and practice
An outside meeting point and an accounting procedure can reduce uncertainty about who has escaped. The NFPA discussion of drills connects organised movement with checking occupants and maintaining control after evacuation. The process should also make missing-person information available to the responsible staff or emergency responders.[7]
A fire drill can rehearse this final stage as well as the route itself; participants can learn where to assemble, whom to report to and how further instructions will be communicated. Completing the exercise at the exit door would leave those actions untested. Evaluation should consider the reliability of the accounting and communication arrangements.[8]
The term stair re-entry has a different technical meaning. It concerns access from an enclosed stair back onto a building floor; the NFPA account of the Cook County fire shows why locked floor doors can affect occupants already within a stair. That issue should not be confused with voluntary return from a place outside the building.[6]
Management arrangements need to remain clear under changing conditions. Staff responsible for assembly and accounting require instructions that fit the building's evacuation strategy; the plan should identify how information reaches the incident response organisation. These arrangements support informed decisions while the situation continues to develop.[8][9]
Household planning provides a concrete example of the accounting problem: occupants leaving through different openings can reach the outside without knowing where the others have gone. The NFPA handbook connects a prearranged meeting place with recognising that the household has escaped, while warning against returning to look for someone already outside. The meeting arrangement therefore supports a decision after escape as well as providing a destination for the initial movement.[10]
Perception and interpretation
A fire cue can be an alarm, smoke odour, visible smoke, flame, heat, noise or information from another person. Each cue supplies different evidence about the event. The observer must notice it and decide whether it indicates an emergency.[11]
Bryan describes recognition as the identification of ambiguous cues as a fire incident. Recognition can be delayed when the signs are weak or consistent with a normal event. The observer's prior experience and expectation of a favourable outcome can influence this interpretation.[12]
Validation follows when a person seeks confirmation that the initial interpretation is correct. This may involve looking for additional cues or asking other people. The process can reduce uncertainty but also consumes time before evacuation begins.[12]
Warning systems provide different amounts of information. A bell announces a signal but not its cause or the required action. Directive voice messages can explain the incident and the response, although conflicting visual cues can undermine their credibility.[11]
Repeated unwanted alarms can reduce the credibility of a warning. Proulx describes occupants becoming less willing to investigate or respond when false alarms are frequent. The alarm system's operational history therefore becomes part of the behavioural context.[13]
Decision processes and protective action
After recognition and validation, a person defines the situation and evaluates possible responses. Bryan's process model includes commitment to an action and reassessment if it is incomplete or conditions change; behaviour is thus a sequence rather than one irreversible choice.[14] Bryan organises the response around six connected processes: recognition, validation, definition, evaluation, commitment and reassessment; this is a conceptual account of how decisions can change as a fire develops. It does not assign a universal duration to each process or establish that every person follows one fixed sequence.[12][14]
Possible actions are not limited to flight. Bryan describes decisions that can include obtaining an extinguisher, activating an alarm, seeking refuge or evacuating. The chosen response reflects the person's location, perceived threat and assessment of available options.[12]
A person can also change actions after receiving new information. Smoke along a route, a staff message or the behaviour of companions may trigger reassessment. Static calculations that assign one action at the start cannot capture those changes.[14]
Perceived time available is part of evaluation. Sime links this perception to information about fire location and development, as discussed by Bryan. The time a person believes remains for escape can therefore differ from a calculated tenability interval based on the actual fire.[15]
Social influence and affiliation
The presence of other people changes cue interpretation. Bryan describes experiments in which passive companions inhibited reporting of introduced smoke. These specific findings illustrate social influence, not a universal delay for every public occupancy.[16]
The experiment involved students completing a questionnaire while smoke entered the room. Bryan reports smoke reporting by 75% of subjects tested alone, compared with 10% when two passive participants were present. In groups of three uninformed subjects, someone reported the smoke in 38% of groups during the six-minute observation period.[17]
The outcome measured was reporting smoke, not successful evacuation from a real building fire. The group conditions also differed deliberately in whether other participants remained passive. These distinctions matter because the experiment demonstrates social influence on interpretation, without supplying an evacuation-time distribution for a public building.[17]
Noticing a cue and acting on it were separate observations. Bryan reports median smoke-noticing delays of 5 s for subjects alone and 20 s in the group conditions. The much longer observation period for reporting shows why noticing smoke cannot simply be equated with deciding to leave.[17]
People can mimic adaptive as well as nonadaptive responses. Observing others investigate, warn or evacuate can supply information about what is happening. Staff behaviour can consequently provide a strong cue when an alarm alone is ambiguous.[13][14]
Affiliative behaviour is the tendency to seek or remain with people who have emotional ties. Family members may gather before leaving, and groups may travel together; this can increase preparation time while also providing assistance and shared information;[18] group movement can be limited by a slower member. Proulx gives the example of a family moving with a child or older person; an individual walking-speed value may therefore be inappropriate for the group as a whole.[19]
Responsibility also affects response. Proulx contrasts occupants who expect to manage their own household alarm with visitors who wait for instructions from building staff. The distribution of expected responsibility should be considered when assigning warning and management roles.[13]
Pre-movement activities
Pre-movement time is the period before directed evacuation travel begins. It includes perception, interpretation and preparatory action, and it may involve movement within the current space. It should not be imagined as everyone waiting motionless for one fixed duration.[20]
Observed activities include dressing, collecting children or pets, securing work, gathering belongings and contacting staff. These tasks respond to personal circumstances and the information available. Their duration can vary between occupants in the same building.[21]
Proulx's residential drills showed different response times between buildings and warning conditions. Poor alarm audibility and the arrival of other cues affected when people left. The values belong to those case studies and should not be used as universal delays.[21]
The contrast between reported case means is substantial. In three Canadian office-building drills, Proulx recorded more than 1,000 individual start times and reported a mean of 50 s. In three residential buildings with good alarm audibility, the reported mean was 2 min 49 s.[22]
A separate winter residential drill had a mean start delay of 5 min 19 s. Occupants spent time putting on outdoor clothing before leaving. The office occupants also undertook preparatory actions, including finishing calls, saving computer work and gathering belongings, despite their training.[22]
These means describe different buildings and circumstances, rather than controlled estimates of one isolated cause. They also do not represent the last person to leave or an upper design percentile. Using a mean as though every occupant starts at that time would remove the variation described in the observations.[22][23]
New Zealand's C/VM2, second edition, 2025, assigns pre-travel times by occupant state, familiarity, alarm signal and location relative to the fire. These are regulatory design inputs for that method. They do not eliminate the need to establish the relevant population and cue conditions.[24]
Direct cues such as seeing or smelling smoke may be available near the fire, while remote occupants may rely on indirect information. C/VM2 limits when indirect cues can be assumed in its method. Social interaction and spatial arrangement therefore matter to timing analysis.[25]
The New Zealand method specifically distinguishes socially connected spaces from separate tenancies. Its 2025 commentary allows some indirect cues within a shared retail area or single-management office. It does not assume the same interaction between separate apartments, hotel rooms or office tenancies, even when occupants are on the same floor.[25]
Panic and cooperative behaviour
Panic is often used as a general explanation for crowd emergencies, but fire research does not support treating it as the usual response. Proulx's summary identifies panic as rare and altruistic, reasonable behaviour as common. People often act on limited and ambiguous information.[18]
Competitive rushing in some crowd incidents should not automatically be labelled as irrational panic. Proulx distinguishes different crowd phenomena and discusses density, blocked movement and communication failures. The physical conditions can create forces and risks without requiring a crowd-wide loss of reason.[26]
Cooperation can include warning others, assisting with movement and sharing responsibility. Bryan reports purposeful, altruistic responses as frequent in the reviewed incidents. Such behaviour can improve some outcomes while adding actions that a simple evacuation model omits.[27]
Assuming universal panic can lead to the wrong engineering question. Instead of asking only how to suppress irrational behaviour, the analysis should examine whether information, routes and assistance match occupants' needs. Many delays arise from uncertainty and social commitments rather than uncontrolled emotion.[20][12]
This does not mean that dangerous crowding never occurs. It means that each incident requires examination of density, route capacity, information and group interaction. A single emotional label cannot replace that analysis.[26]
Modelling and evidence limits
Evacuation models often simplify human behaviour. The 2005 International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) describe assumptions of simultaneous departure, uninterrupted movement and excellent knowledge of the shortest route. Those simplifications can help examine capacity but do not provide a complete behavioural prediction.[23]
A model should be suited to the occupancy and layout. A simple approach may fail to identify local queues or group decisions in a complex building. Expensive software does not guarantee better input data or a more faithful account of human response.[28]
Case studies and drills provide evidence about particular populations and conditions. Warning credibility, staff action, notice and weather can influence the observations. Results should retain those circumstances instead of being transferred as universal occupant constants.[21]
Interview evidence also requires careful interpretation. Recalled timings can be uncertain, and people may have experienced only part of the event. Proulx presents such studies as valuable context rather than exact measurements applicable to every incident.[21]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Bryan (2002), pp. 3-315–3-319.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, pp. 4-33, 4-42–4-43.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, p. 4-33.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Bryan (2002), pp. 3-318–3-319.
- ↑ Nelson and Mowrer (2002), pp. 3-371–3-372.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, p. 4-25.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, pp. 4-42–4-43; §14.6, p. 14-81.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 Cote et al. (2008), §4.1, pp. 4-42–4-44.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §14.6, p. 14-81.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 Bryan (2002), pp. 3-315–3-316.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 Bryan (2002), pp. 3-318–3-319.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-350–3-351.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 Bryan (2002), p. 3-319.
- ↑ Sime (1986), as cited in Bryan (2002), p. 3-318.
- ↑ Bryan (2002), pp. 3-317–3-318.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 Latané and Darley (1968), as cited in Bryan (2002), p. 3-317.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-344–3-345.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-346–3-347.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-348–3-351.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-348–3-350.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-348–3-349.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-3–2.8-4.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 29–31.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 31.
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-345–3-346.
- ↑ Bryan (2002), pp. 3-315–3-319.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 2.8-4.
References
- Australian Building Codes Board, National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, & Department of Building and Housing New Zealand. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines. Australian Building Codes Board.
- Bryan, J. L. (2002). Behavioral response to fire and smoke. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-315–3-341). National Fire Protection Association.
- Cote, A. E., Grant, C. C., Hall, J. R., Jr., & Solomon, R. E. (Eds.). (2008). Fire protection handbook (20th ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
- Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025). C protection from fire: Verification method C/VM2 (2nd ed.).
- Nelson, H. E., & Mowrer, F. W. (2002). Emergency movement. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-367–3-380). National Fire Protection Association.
- Proulx, G. (2002). Movement of people: The evacuation timing. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-342–3-366). National Fire Protection Association.