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A '''fire escape''' is an external escape facility, commonly a stair and balcony arrangement associated with an existing building. The NFPA Fire Protection Handbook distinguishes fire escape stairs from standard interior or exterior exit stairs. The SFPE Handbook's treatment of route use and movement provides the wider context for assessing their practical function.<ref name="NFPA-§4.3,pp.4-86–4-87">Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, pp. 4-86–4-87.</ref><ref name="Proulx-3-342–3-350">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-342–3-350.</ref>
A '''fire escape''' is an external escape facility, commonly a stair and balcony arrangement associated with an existing building. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Protection Handbook distinguishes fire escape stairs from standard interior or exterior exit stairs. The Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) Handbook's treatment of route use and movement provides the wider context for assessing their practical function.<ref name="NFPA-§4.3,pp.4-86–4-87">Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, pp. 4-86–4-87.</ref><ref name="Proulx-3-342–3-350">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-342–3-350.</ref>


The arrangement must connect accessible starting points to a usable [[Exit discharge|exit discharge]]. Its location outside the building does not remove exposure from flames emerging through windows, weather or structural deterioration. Access through a locked room or an unusable window can interrupt the [[Means of escape|means of escape]] before the stair is reached.<ref name="NFPA-§4.3,p.4-87">Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, p. 4-87.</ref>
The arrangement must connect accessible starting points to a usable [[Exit discharge|exit discharge]]. Its location outside the building does not remove exposure from flames emerging through windows, weather or structural deterioration. Access through a locked room or an unusable window can interrupt the [[Means of escape|means of escape]] before the stair is reached.<ref name="NFPA-§4.3,p.4-87">Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, p. 4-87.</ref>
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The preferred approach described by the NFPA handbook is through a door from the main building area or a corridor. A route through a room that can be locked creates a dependence on that room's availability. An [[Apartment building|apartment building]] can have a different arrangement where individual apartments have their own access; the actual connection must be traced for each population served.<ref name="NFPA-§4.3,p.4-87" />
The preferred approach described by the NFPA handbook is through a door from the main building area or a corridor. A route through a room that can be locked creates a dependence on that room's availability. An [[Apartment building|apartment building]] can have a different arrangement where individual apartments have their own access; the actual connection must be traced for each population served.<ref name="NFPA-§4.3,p.4-87" />
[[File:fse-fire-escape-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Fire escape: access, descent and a complete discharge, showing the relationships described in the text.|Access, descent and a complete discharge in the assessment of Fire escape.]]


Where access is through a window, the opening and sill affect the task of reaching the balcony. Screens or security bars can obstruct that movement; the handbook discusses opening size, sill height and easy operation as part of the access arrangement. The presence of an external platform does not establish that occupants can reach it.<ref name="NFPA-§4.3,p.4-87" />
Where access is through a window, the opening and sill affect the task of reaching the balcony. Screens or security bars can obstruct that movement; the handbook discusses opening size, sill height and easy operation as part of the access arrangement. The presence of an external platform does not establish that occupants can reach it.<ref name="NFPA-§4.3,p.4-87" />
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Flames issuing from windows below a fire escape can expose people on the stair or balcony; the NFPA handbook identifies this as a significant weakness of some arrangements. It favours locations on suitable external walls without exposing openings and discusses protected access. Outdoor placement is therefore not equivalent to protection from the building's fire.<ref name="NFPA-§4.3,p.4-87" />
Flames issuing from windows below a fire escape can expose people on the stair or balcony; the NFPA handbook identifies this as a significant weakness of some arrangements. It favours locations on suitable external walls without exposing openings and discusses protected access. Outdoor placement is therefore not equivalent to protection from the building's fire.<ref name="NFPA-§4.3,p.4-87" />
[[File:fse-fire-escape-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Fire escape: exposure, condition and existing-building context, showing the relationships described in the text.|Exposure, condition and existing-building context in the assessment of Fire escape.]]


The structure must remain adequately anchored and maintained; the handbook connects protective painting with limiting rust and identifies weather obstruction by snow and ice. These concerns affect both support and safe movement. A visual outline on an evacuation plan cannot demonstrate the physical condition of the external facility.<ref name="NFPA-§4.3,pp.4-87,4-90">Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, pp. 4-87, 4-90.</ref>
The structure must remain adequately anchored and maintained; the handbook connects protective painting with limiting rust and identifies weather obstruction by snow and ice. These concerns affect both support and safe movement. A visual outline on an evacuation plan cannot demonstrate the physical condition of the external facility.<ref name="NFPA-§4.3,pp.4-87,4-90">Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, pp. 4-87, 4-90.</ref>
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The users' capabilities also matter. A steep exposed route or window access can pose tasks unlike ordinary corridor walking. Proulx distinguishes level movement, stair movement and door negotiation; those differences should be retained when evaluating whether the intended occupants can use the route independently or need assistance.<ref name="Proulx-3-360–3-361">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-360–3-361.</ref>
The users' capabilities also matter. A steep exposed route or window access can pose tasks unlike ordinary corridor walking. Proulx distinguishes level movement, stair movement and door negotiation; those differences should be retained when evaluating whether the intended occupants can use the route independently or need assistance.<ref name="Proulx-3-360–3-361">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-360–3-361.</ref>


IFEG divides evacuation measures into physical provisions and emergency organisation. Routes, corridors, exits and signs need an organisation that maintains procedures, education, training and testing. The two groups must reflect the same fire-safety assumptions.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.</ref>
International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) divides evacuation measures into physical provisions and emergency organisation. Routes, corridors, exits and signs need an organisation that maintains procedures, education, training and testing. The two groups must reflect the same fire-safety assumptions.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.</ref>


Commissioning should examine both the constructed route and the procedures for using it. Differences between design and construction can require adjustments to the emergency plan. A documented plan that assumes an unavailable route would not provide the intended function.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14" />
Commissioning should examine both the constructed route and the procedures for using it. Differences between design and construction can require adjustments to the emergency plan. A documented plan that assumes an unavailable route would not provide the intended function.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14" />
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== Purpose and route continuity ==
== Purpose and route continuity ==


The central purpose is timely movement away from a threat; a route begins where occupants may be present and continues through the connected spaces and components leading to safety. Every link must be usable, because a failure near the destination can defeat an otherwise adequate path.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-2-18">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.2-18.</ref><ref name="meansofescap_CVM2-33">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 32–33.</ref> The threatened end deserves particular attention; Proulx distinguishes an emphasis on exit capacity from an emphasis on the decisions and conditions facing occupants at the start. A route with a safe discharge does not help if occupants cannot recognise or reach it in time.<ref name="meansofescap_Proulx-3-342">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-342–3-343.</ref>
The central purpose is timely movement away from a threat. A route begins where occupants may be present and continues through the connected spaces and components leading to safety. Every link must be usable, because a failure near the destination can defeat an otherwise adequate path.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-2-18">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.2-18.</ref><ref name="meansofescap_CVM2-33">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 32–33.</ref> The threatened end deserves particular attention; Proulx distinguishes an emphasis on exit capacity from an emphasis on the decisions and conditions facing occupants at the start. A route with a safe discharge does not help if occupants cannot recognise or reach it in time.<ref name="meansofescap_Proulx-3-342">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-342–3-343.</ref>


A place of safety must suit the intended occupants; the 2005 International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) give an example performance framework for this destination. It describes protection from untenable conditions, suitable communication and enough space for those expected to use it. The destination is therefore part of the escape provision, not an undefined endpoint beyond the exit.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-2-15">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.2-15.</ref>
A place of safety must suit the intended occupants; the 2005 International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) give an example performance framework for this destination. It describes protection from untenable conditions, suitable communication and enough space for those expected to use it. The destination is therefore part of the escape provision, not an undefined endpoint beyond the exit.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-2-15">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.2-15.</ref>
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Occupant characteristics affect route length, preparation, speed and assistance. A route suitable for awake, familiar and independently mobile adults may not serve sleeping occupants or people needing support. The design population should be defined explicitly.<ref name="meansofescap_Proulx-3-350">Proulx (2002), p. 3-350.</ref>
Occupant characteristics affect route length, preparation, speed and assistance. A route suitable for awake, familiar and independently mobile adults may not serve sleeping occupants or people needing support. The design population should be defined explicitly.<ref name="meansofescap_Proulx-3-350">Proulx (2002), p. 3-350.</ref>
[[File:fse-fire-escape-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Fire escape: occupants and regulatory context, showing the relationships described in the text.|Occupants and regulatory context in the assessment of Fire escape.]]


Building regulations establish jurisdiction-specific objectives and performance criteria for escape. They can address route number, size, obstruction, protection, illumination and signage. These requirements must be read with the relevant edition and building type.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-2-18" />
Building regulations establish jurisdiction-specific objectives and performance criteria for escape. They can address route number, size, obstruction, protection, illumination and signage. These requirements must be read with the relevant edition and building type.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-2-18" />
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The applicable safety systems can change the escape analysis. Suppression, smoke control and compartmentation may limit exposure, but their required operation must be supported. A design should not rely on an ideal system state while ignoring failure or maintenance.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14" /><ref name="meansofescap_ABCB-131">Australian Building Codes Board (2020), pp. 131–132.</ref>
The applicable safety systems can change the escape analysis. Suppression, smoke control and compartmentation may limit exposure, but their required operation must be supported. A design should not rely on an ideal system state while ignoring failure or maintenance.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14" /><ref name="meansofescap_ABCB-131">Australian Building Codes Board (2020), pp. 131–132.</ref>
== See also ==


== Notes ==
== Notes ==

Latest revision as of 00:44, 16 November 2026

A fire escape is an external escape facility, commonly a stair and balcony arrangement associated with an existing building. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Protection Handbook distinguishes fire escape stairs from standard interior or exterior exit stairs. The Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) Handbook's treatment of route use and movement provides the wider context for assessing their practical function.[1][2]

The arrangement must connect accessible starting points to a usable exit discharge. Its location outside the building does not remove exposure from flames emerging through windows, weather or structural deterioration. Access through a locked room or an unusable window can interrupt the means of escape before the stair is reached.[3]

The handbook's discussion concerns historical provisions for existing buildings, including particular permissions and restrictions. A fire escape should therefore be evaluated against the applicable building and code context. Its age or continued presence alone does not establish that it provides the required protected escape route.[4]

Access, descent and a complete discharge

The preferred approach described by the NFPA handbook is through a door from the main building area or a corridor. A route through a room that can be locked creates a dependence on that room's availability. An apartment building can have a different arrangement where individual apartments have their own access; the actual connection must be traced for each population served.[3]

Fire escape: access, descent and a complete discharge, showing the relationships described in the text.
Access, descent and a complete discharge in the assessment of Fire escape.

Where access is through a window, the opening and sill affect the task of reaching the balcony. Screens or security bars can obstruct that movement; the handbook discusses opening size, sill height and easy operation as part of the access arrangement. The presence of an external platform does not establish that occupants can reach it.[3]

The lower connection is equally important. The handbook favours stairs continuing to street or ground level and discusses swinging lower flights where permanent stairs would obstruct a sidewalk. The area beneath such a flight must remain clear for its operation; a balcony ending above ground without a practical descent is not a complete escape route.[3]

Egress stair design remains relevant even where the historical fire-escape provisions permit different dimensions. Footing, railings and a usable passage remain necessary for movement. People who fear heights may also hesitate to use an exposed arrangement; the handbook considers the sense of security alongside the physical support provided.[5]

The discharge must allow occupants to move away from the building. A fenced yard, courtyard or narrow alley can introduce another restriction after descent. The handbook's general discharge discussion therefore applies to the final connection; inspection should follow the route beyond the last tread and through the space receiving the occupants.[6]

Exposure, condition and existing-building context

Flames issuing from windows below a fire escape can expose people on the stair or balcony; the NFPA handbook identifies this as a significant weakness of some arrangements. It favours locations on suitable external walls without exposing openings and discusses protected access. Outdoor placement is therefore not equivalent to protection from the building's fire.[3]

Fire escape: exposure, condition and existing-building context, showing the relationships described in the text.
Exposure, condition and existing-building context in the assessment of Fire escape.

The structure must remain adequately anchored and maintained; the handbook connects protective painting with limiting rust and identifies weather obstruction by snow and ice. These concerns affect both support and safe movement. A visual outline on an evacuation plan cannot demonstrate the physical condition of the external facility.[7]

Retroactive code requirements can affect the continued use of an existing escape arrangement. The handbook describes limited acceptance of existing fire escapes and restrictions on adding new ones within its NFPA framework; the International Fire Engineering Guidelines also reproduce a historical Canadian existing-building exception. Both examples require their original conditions to remain attached.[3][8]

Those examples do not establish a blanket permission for an old installation. The relevant review concerns the occupancy, the available alternatives, the applicable provisions and the condition of the complete route; a building alteration can change the population or obstruct the access. The existing arrangement then needs comparison with the changed use.[7][8]

The users' capabilities also matter. A steep exposed route or window access can pose tasks unlike ordinary corridor walking. Proulx distinguishes level movement, stair movement and door negotiation; those differences should be retained when evaluating whether the intended occupants can use the route independently or need assistance.[9]

International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) divides evacuation measures into physical provisions and emergency organisation. Routes, corridors, exits and signs need an organisation that maintains procedures, education, training and testing. The two groups must reflect the same fire-safety assumptions.[10]

Commissioning should examine both the constructed route and the procedures for using it. Differences between design and construction can require adjustments to the emergency plan. A documented plan that assumes an unavailable route would not provide the intended function.[10]

Regular checks should keep paths clear, doors operating and signage in good condition. Lighting and emergency-power functions also need appropriate testing. These checks preserve the physical chain on which the evacuation analysis depends;[10][11] staff positions and training need to be maintained as well. Procedures should be reviewed, exercises conducted and records kept. Changes in staffing or occupancy can undermine assumptions about directions and assistance.[10]

Alterations should trigger comparison with the original escape design. New partitions, furniture, storage or changed room use can alter distance, capacity and wayfinding. A previously acceptable route may no longer serve the building in its altered form.[12][10]

Purpose and route continuity

The central purpose is timely movement away from a threat. A route begins where occupants may be present and continues through the connected spaces and components leading to safety. Every link must be usable, because a failure near the destination can defeat an otherwise adequate path.[13][14] The threatened end deserves particular attention; Proulx distinguishes an emphasis on exit capacity from an emphasis on the decisions and conditions facing occupants at the start. A route with a safe discharge does not help if occupants cannot recognise or reach it in time.[15]

A place of safety must suit the intended occupants; the 2005 International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) give an example performance framework for this destination. It describes protection from untenable conditions, suitable communication and enough space for those expected to use it. The destination is therefore part of the escape provision, not an undefined endpoint beyond the exit.[16]

Evacuation uses these provisions within a timed human response. Warning, interpretation and preparation occur before directed travel, and queues can occur along the way. The physical route must be assessed together with those stages rather than in isolation.[17][18]

Route continuity also includes doors and other operating elements. A door that cannot open in the required condition interrupts the path just as a physical obstruction would. Management and maintenance must preserve the route's intended operation.[10]

Definition and measurement

Measurement starts with an occupant location and ends at the destination specified by the escape method. The path must be one that can actually be walked. Measuring diagonally through furniture, partitions or other fixed obstacles would misrepresent that route.[19]

C/VM2, second edition, 2025, uses orthogonal path segments for horizontal travel to the nearest exit; where fixed obstructions are known, the path is measured around them. This is a measurement convention within New Zealand's verification method.[19] An orthogonal path follows the directional geometry of the space rather than a diagonal shortcut. It can represent movement along aisles and around room features; the relevant segments should be traced on the actual layout rather than inferred only from room area.[19]

The nearest exit is not necessarily the exit used by every occupant. Familiarity, signage, crowd flow or smoke can lead people to another route. A design based on nearest-exit distance should be checked against the intended evacuation strategy and plausible route choices.[20][21]

The measurement should also use the correct destination. A protected doorway, an adjacent safe compartment and the final outside exit are different endpoints. Extending or shortening the path without stating that endpoint changes the meaning of the distance.[22]

Queues and route capacity

Travel along a route differs from passing through a restriction; Proulx distinguishes movement time to a destination from flow time through part of the circulation system. A complete assessment needs both forms of time.[23] Exit capacity can govern how quickly a group leaves even where travel distance is short. If arrival demand exceeds the flow through a doorway or stair, a queue develops. The delay depends on the number of people and the effective flow through that restriction.[23]

C/VM2 compares the time to reach a doorway with the time required for occupants to flow through it. The greater governs evacuation from the space in that method. This procedure identifies two distinct time components rather than treating distance as always dominant.[19]

Downstream restrictions can be more important than the nearest exit. C/VM2 calls for the entire escape route to be checked, because occupants can encounter another limitation closer to the final exit. Measuring only distance to the first door would miss that constraint.[24]

Effective width can be smaller than measured width. Boundary layers near walls, rails and obstacles reduce the stream width used in flow calculations. Travel distance and effective width are therefore separate geometric inputs with different effects on the result.[24][23]

Protected routes and boundaries

A protected escape route uses construction and closures to limit fire and smoke exposure along the path. The level of protection must support the time for which occupants rely on it. Open stairs and protected exit facilities should not be treated as equivalent without examining the applicable requirements;[25] fire-resistant boundaries can help preserve the route while fire develops elsewhere. Doors and other openings require suitable operation because an open or damaged boundary can compromise that function; the whole assembly matters, not only the wall material.[10][25]

New Zealand's C/VM2 includes a design scenario in which fire in an escape route can block an exit. It asks for a viable route or multiple routes where necessary under the relevant performance criteria. This scenario illustrates why route protection and alternative paths are assessed together.[26]

Radiation can also affect an escape route without direct flame contact. C/VM2 includes an analysis for occupants passing particular window openings, with conditions and limitations specific to that method. Those provisions should not be converted into a universal radiation limit.[27]

A safe place within the building can rely on separation and smoke control. This makes its boundary and ventilation conditions part of the escape system. The occupants must be able to reach and remain in that place for the intended period.[16][17]

Prescriptive and performance-based use

Prescriptive design can specify maximum distances for defined occupancies and arrangements. Such limits are part of a wider set of provisions, not independent measures of safety. The building type, protection and measurement convention must match the rule being applied.[28]

The IFEG examples show that escape requirements can address travel distance alongside occupant numbers, building height, hazards and installed systems. These relationships are expressed differently across codes. A number from one document cannot be assumed to transfer to another.[29][28]

Performance-based analysis can evaluate the time associated with a route instead of relying only on a distance limit. It must then include appropriate speeds, queues, response times and environmental conditions. This is a broader analysis, not permission to use any preferred speed.[30]

A regulatory verification method may prescribe the exact inputs to be used. C/VM2's speed, flow and boundary-layer provisions apply within its own second-edition framework. They should not be mixed casually with values from another method without a documented basis.[24]

Extending a distance in a design requires review of the consequences for the complete escape system. Additional protection or management may alter exposure or movement, but their performance must be demonstrated. Distance cannot be assessed as an isolated concession.[28][31]

Occupants and regulatory context

Occupant characteristics affect route length, preparation, speed and assistance. A route suitable for awake, familiar and independently mobile adults may not serve sleeping occupants or people needing support. The design population should be defined explicitly.[32]

Fire escape: occupants and regulatory context, showing the relationships described in the text.
Occupants and regulatory context in the assessment of Fire escape.

Building regulations establish jurisdiction-specific objectives and performance criteria for escape. They can address route number, size, obstruction, protection, illumination and signage. These requirements must be read with the relevant edition and building type.[13]

IFEG reproduces historical New Zealand performance criteria for escape routes. These address route size, obstruction, length, fire-spread resistance, findability, illumination and safe use. They illustrate related design functions; the excerpt is not presented as the current text of New Zealand law.[13]

C/VM2 provides one verification method within the New Zealand context. Its 2025 travel and flow procedures include particular inputs and restrictions, such as door-flow provisions. Those values belong to the method and should not be treated as international defaults.[14]

The applicable safety systems can change the escape analysis. Suppression, smoke control and compartmentation may limit exposure, but their required operation must be supported. A design should not rely on an ideal system state while ignoring failure or maintenance.[10][33]

Notes

  1. ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, pp. 4-86–4-87.
  2. ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-342–3-350.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, p. 4-87.
  4. ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, pp. 4-86–4-90.
  5. ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, pp. 4-85–4-87.
  6. ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, pp. 4-82, 4-87.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Cote et al. (2008), §4.3, pp. 4-87, 4-90.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.2-16–1.2-17.
  9. ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-360–3-361.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.
  11. ↑ Razza and Grill (2005), pp. 3–4.
  12. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 32.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.2-18.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 32–33.
  15. ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-342–3-343.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.2-15.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-1–2.8-2.
  18. ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-347–3-348.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 32.
  20. ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-342–3-343.
  21. ↑ Proulx (2002), p. 3-350.
  22. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-1–2.8-2.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 23.2 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-347–3-348.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 33.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.2-16–1.2-17.
  26. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 37.
  27. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 34–36.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 28.2 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.2-18.
  29. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.2-15.
  30. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-3–2.8-4.
  31. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.
  32. ↑ Proulx (2002), p. 3-350.
  33. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020), pp. 131–132.

References

  • Australian Building Codes Board, National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, & Department of Building and Housing New Zealand. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines. Australian Building Codes Board.
  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2020). Fire safety verification method: Data sheets (Handbook annex, Print version 1.1).
  • Cote, A. E., Grant, C. C., Hall, J. R., Jr., & Solomon, R. E. (Eds.). (2008). Fire protection handbook (20th ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025). C protection from fire: Verification method C/VM2 (2nd ed.).
  • Proulx, G. (2002). Movement of people: The evacuation timing. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-342–3-366). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Razza, J. C., & Grill, R. A. (2005). Comparison of the 1968 and current (2003) New York City building code provisions (NIST NCSTAR 1-1F). National Institute of Standards and Technology.