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A '''smoke compartment''' is a part of a building separated from adjoining areas to restrict smoke movement and support the chosen fire-safety strategy. The SFPE Handbook explains the importance of matching protection and evacuation arrangements to occupants' capabilities. In care settings, the compartment can provide a receiving area for people moved away from the fire.<ref name="Proulx-3-359–3-361">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-359–3-361.</ref><ref name="NFPA-§20.15,pp.20-147–20-150">Cote et al. (2008), §20.15, pp. 20-147–20-150.</ref> | A '''smoke compartment''' is a part of a building separated from adjoining areas to restrict smoke movement and support the chosen fire-safety strategy. The Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) Handbook explains the importance of matching protection and evacuation arrangements to occupants' capabilities. In care settings, the compartment can provide a receiving area for people moved away from the fire.<ref name="Proulx-3-359–3-361">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-359–3-361.</ref><ref name="NFPA-§20.15,pp.20-147–20-150">Cote et al. (2008), §20.15, pp. 20-147–20-150.</ref> | ||
A [[Smoke barrier|smoke barrier]] defines part of the boundary, while doors, service openings and ventilation paths affect its continuity. The compartment is therefore a protected volume, not merely a line dividing a floor plan. Its ability to receive occupants depends on the available space and the conditions maintained within it.<ref name="NFPA-§20.15,pp.20-147–20-148">Cote et al. (2008), §20.15, pp. 20-147–20-148.</ref> | A [[Smoke barrier|smoke barrier]] defines part of the boundary, while doors, service openings and ventilation paths affect its continuity. The compartment is therefore a protected volume, not merely a line dividing a floor plan. Its ability to receive occupants depends on the available space and the conditions maintained within it.<ref name="NFPA-§20.15,pp.20-147–20-148">Cote et al. (2008), §20.15, pp. 20-147–20-148.</ref> | ||
The NFPA Fire Protection Handbook gives smoke compartments particular attention in [[Health care occupancy|health care occupancy]] and [[Detention and correctional occupancy|detention and correctional occupancy]]. In both settings, immediate movement to the street may be difficult or inappropriate. The enclosure, staff response and onward movement arrangements must therefore support the same intended sequence.<ref name="NFPA-§20.14,p.20-130;§20.15,pp.20-147–20-150">Cote et al. (2008), §20.14, p. 20-130; §20.15, pp. 20-147–20-150.</ref> | The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Protection Handbook gives smoke compartments particular attention in [[Health care occupancy|health care occupancy]] and [[Detention and correctional occupancy|detention and correctional occupancy]]. In both settings, immediate movement to the street may be difficult or inappropriate. The enclosure, staff response and onward movement arrangements must therefore support the same intended sequence.<ref name="NFPA-§20.14,p.20-130;§20.15,pp.20-147–20-150">Cote et al. (2008), §20.14, p. 20-130; §20.15, pp. 20-147–20-150.</ref> | ||
== Subdivision and the receiving compartment == | == Subdivision and the receiving compartment == | ||
Subdividing a care floor limits the number of people exposed to one fire and provides a nearby destination for relocation. The NFPA handbook describes moving occupants horizontally across a smoke barrier; the receiving side then accommodates its original population together with those arriving from the threatened compartment. Its usable space is part of the arrangement.<ref name="NFPA-§20.15,pp.20-147–20-148" /> | Subdividing a care floor limits the number of people exposed to one fire and provides a nearby destination for relocation. The NFPA handbook describes moving occupants horizontally across a smoke barrier; the receiving side then accommodates its original population together with those arriving from the threatened compartment. Its usable space is part of the arrangement.<ref name="NFPA-§20.15,pp.20-147–20-148" /> | ||
[[File:fse-smoke-compartment-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Smoke compartment: subdivision and the receiving compartment, showing the relationships described in the text.|Subdivision and the receiving compartment in the assessment of Smoke compartment.]] | |||
The boundary must remain continuous through the construction. The handbook's illustrations show the separation extending through concealed spaces and joining the outside walls; doors and penetrations need the protective characteristics associated with that boundary. A suspended ceiling or an unprotected service path can otherwise connect the spaces above or around the visible barrier.<ref name="NFPA-§20.15,pp.20-147–20-148" /> | The boundary must remain continuous through the construction. The handbook's illustrations show the separation extending through concealed spaces and joining the outside walls; doors and penetrations need the protective characteristics associated with that boundary. A suspended ceiling or an unprotected service path can otherwise connect the spaces above or around the visible barrier.<ref name="NFPA-§20.15,pp.20-147–20-148" /> | ||
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[[Progressive horizontal evacuation]] uses successive protected destinations when the developing incident requires further movement. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines describe an initial transfer of patients to an adjacent smoke zone or fire compartment. Further evacuation follows if the threat continues. The first receiving area is consequently one stage in a defined response.<ref name="IFEG-2.8-1–2.8-4">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-1–2.8-4.</ref> | [[Progressive horizontal evacuation]] uses successive protected destinations when the developing incident requires further movement. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines describe an initial transfer of patients to an adjacent smoke zone or fire compartment. Further evacuation follows if the threat continues. The first receiving area is consequently one stage in a defined response.<ref name="IFEG-2.8-1–2.8-4">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-1–2.8-4.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-smoke-compartment-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Smoke compartment: relocation, security and continued protection, showing the relationships described in the text.|Relocation, security and continued protection in the assessment of Smoke compartment.]] | |||
A [[Stay-put strategy|stay-put strategy]] uses protected accommodation differently, by retaining occupants where the strategy expects adequate separation. It should not be inferred merely from the presence of compartment walls. The NFPA handbook discusses defend-in-place and relocation as related strategies whose suitability depends on building protection and occupant characteristics.<ref name="NFPA-§4.5,pp.4-103–4-107">Cote et al. (2008), §4.5, pp. 4-103–4-107.</ref> | A [[Stay-put strategy|stay-put strategy]] uses protected accommodation differently, by retaining occupants where the strategy expects adequate separation. It should not be inferred merely from the presence of compartment walls. The NFPA handbook discusses defend-in-place and relocation as related strategies whose suitability depends on building protection and occupant characteristics.<ref name="NFPA-§4.5,pp.4-103–4-107">Cote et al. (2008), §4.5, pp. 4-103–4-107.</ref> | ||
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Care settings add treatment and handling needs. Moving a patient may require preparation and more than one member of staff; the receiving area must support the expected occupants after transfer, while the onward route remains available if conditions worsen. These dependencies should be included when assessing the compartment's role in the overall strategy.<ref name="NFPA-§4.5,pp.4-104–4-107">Cote et al. (2008), §4.5, pp. 4-104–4-107.</ref><ref name="IFEG-2.8-2–2.8-4">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-2–2.8-4.</ref> | Care settings add treatment and handling needs. Moving a patient may require preparation and more than one member of staff; the receiving area must support the expected occupants after transfer, while the onward route remains available if conditions worsen. These dependencies should be included when assessing the compartment's role in the overall strategy.<ref name="NFPA-§4.5,pp.4-104–4-107">Cote et al. (2008), §4.5, pp. 4-104–4-107.</ref><ref name="IFEG-2.8-2–2.8-4">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-2–2.8-4.</ref> | ||
Continued protection also depends on door and ventilation operation. A route opened for relocation can become a smoke path during that movement; the boundary's protective purpose must therefore be reconciled with the passage of people and equipment. Inspection and operational planning concern the complete compartment rather than only its fixed walls.<ref name="NFPA-§20.15,pp.20-147–20-150" /><ref name="IFEG-1.8-13–1.8-14">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.</ref> | Continued protection also depends on door and ventilation operation. A route opened for relocation can become a smoke path during that movement; the boundary's protective purpose must therefore be reconciled with the passage of people and equipment. Inspection and operational planning concern the complete compartment rather than only its fixed walls.<ref name="NFPA-§20.15,pp.20-147–20-150" /><ref name="IFEG-1.8-13–1.8-14">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.</ref> The receiving side must remain available during ordinary building use. Storage or altered room layouts can reduce the space assumed for relocation, even though the separating wall remains intact.<ref name="NFPA-extra-assistance">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.8-14.</ref> | ||
The receiving side must remain available during ordinary building use. Storage or altered room layouts can reduce the space assumed for relocation, even though the separating wall remains intact.<ref name="NFPA-extra-assistance">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.8-14.</ref> | |||
== Occupant capabilities and assistance == | == Occupant capabilities and assistance == | ||
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Level walking and stair movement are different activities; a person who moves independently on a floor may need rest, a handrail or assistance on stairs. Proulx's reviewed experiments included selected participants who could negotiate stairs; their observations do not describe everyone with a mobility limitation. Applying an average speed without that population definition loses an essential condition.<ref name="Proulx-3-360–3-361">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-360–3-361.</ref> | Level walking and stair movement are different activities; a person who moves independently on a floor may need rest, a handrail or assistance on stairs. Proulx's reviewed experiments included selected participants who could negotiate stairs; their observations do not describe everyone with a mobility limitation. Applying an average speed without that population definition loses an essential condition.<ref name="Proulx-3-360–3-361">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-360–3-361.</ref> | ||
Doors create another task. Opening a leaf, maintaining balance and moving an aid through the opening can take additional time. The research reviewed by Proulx relates performance to the aid used, strength and dexterity; a clear opening width alone does not establish whether the complete manoeuvre is practicable.<ref name="Proulx-3-361">Proulx (2002), | Doors create another task. Opening a leaf, maintaining balance and moving an aid through the opening can take additional time. The research reviewed by Proulx relates performance to the aid used, strength and dexterity; a clear opening width alone does not establish whether the complete manoeuvre is practicable.<ref name="Proulx-3-361">Proulx (2002), p. 3-361.</ref> | ||
Assistance arrangements have their own dependencies. A nominated helper must be present and able to carry out the intended task; an evacuation device needs an accessible storage location and trained operators. A register of people needing assistance can become incomplete or outdated. These are operational conditions that affect whether the planned support is available.<ref name="Proulx-3-360">Proulx (2002), | Assistance arrangements have their own dependencies. A nominated helper must be present and able to carry out the intended task; an evacuation device needs an accessible storage location and trained operators. A register of people needing assistance can become incomplete or outdated. These are operational conditions that affect whether the planned support is available.<ref name="Proulx-3-360">Proulx (2002), p. 3-360.</ref> | ||
Warning also needs to reach the intended population. Visual signals can assist people who cannot hear an audible alarm, while clear instructions can support interpretation. The appropriate arrangement depends on the person's needs and the building context; Proulx treats accessible evacuation as a combination of measures rather than one universally sufficient device.<ref name="Proulx-3-360–3-362">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-360–3-362.</ref> | Warning also needs to reach the intended population. Visual signals can assist people who cannot hear an audible alarm, while clear instructions can support interpretation. The appropriate arrangement depends on the person's needs and the building context; Proulx treats accessible evacuation as a combination of measures rather than one universally sufficient device.<ref name="Proulx-3-360–3-362">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-360–3-362.</ref> | ||
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The International Fire Engineering Guidelines connect movement analysis with the design occupant group; the selected speeds and assistance conditions should represent the group controlling the movement process. The scope also needs an explicit destination, whether a protected internal area or the outside. That decision determines which tasks the occupants must complete.<ref name="IFEG-2.8-2–2.8-4" /> | The International Fire Engineering Guidelines connect movement analysis with the design occupant group; the selected speeds and assistance conditions should represent the group controlling the movement process. The scope also needs an explicit destination, whether a protected internal area or the outside. That decision determines which tasks the occupants must complete.<ref name="IFEG-2.8-2–2.8-4" /> | ||
IFEG | The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) divide evacuation measures into physical provisions and emergency organisation. Routes, corridors, exits and signs need an organisation that maintains procedures, education, training and testing. The two groups must reflect the same fire-safety assumptions.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.</ref> | ||
Commissioning should examine both the constructed route and the procedures for using it. Differences between design and construction can require adjustments to the emergency plan. A documented plan that assumes an unavailable route would not provide the intended function.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14" /> | Commissioning should examine both the constructed route and the procedures for using it. Differences between design and construction can require adjustments to the emergency plan. A documented plan that assumes an unavailable route would not provide the intended function.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14" /> | ||
Regular checks should keep paths clear, doors operating and signage in good condition. Lighting and emergency-power functions also need appropriate testing. These checks preserve the physical chain on which the evacuation analysis depends | Regular checks should keep paths clear, doors operating and signage in good condition. Lighting and emergency-power functions also need appropriate testing. These checks preserve the physical chain on which the evacuation analysis depends.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14" /><ref name="meansofescap_Razza-3">Razza and Grill (2005), pp. 3–4.</ref> | ||
Staff positions and training need to be maintained as well. Procedures should be reviewed, exercises conducted and records kept. Changes in staffing or occupancy can undermine assumptions about directions and assistance.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14" /> | |||
Alterations should trigger comparison with the original escape design. New partitions, furniture, storage or changed room use can alter distance, capacity and wayfinding. A previously acceptable route may no longer serve the building in its altered form.<ref name="meansofescap_CVM2-32">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 32.</ref><ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14" /> | Alterations should trigger comparison with the original escape design. New partitions, furniture, storage or changed room use can alter distance, capacity and wayfinding. A previously acceptable route may no longer serve the building in its altered form.<ref name="meansofescap_CVM2-32">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 32.</ref><ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-8-14" /> | ||
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Occupant characteristics affect route length, preparation, speed and assistance. A route suitable for awake, familiar and independently mobile adults may not serve sleeping occupants or people needing support. The design population should be defined explicitly.<ref name="meansofescap_Proulx-3-350">Proulx (2002), p. 3-350.</ref> | Occupant characteristics affect route length, preparation, speed and assistance. A route suitable for awake, familiar and independently mobile adults may not serve sleeping occupants or people needing support. The design population should be defined explicitly.<ref name="meansofescap_Proulx-3-350">Proulx (2002), p. 3-350.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-smoke-compartment-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Smoke compartment: occupants and regulatory context, showing the relationships described in the text.|Occupants and regulatory context in the assessment of Smoke compartment.]] | |||
Building regulations establish jurisdiction-specific objectives and performance criteria for escape. They can address route number, size, obstruction, protection, illumination and signage. These requirements must be read with the relevant edition and building type.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-2-18" /> | Building regulations establish jurisdiction-specific objectives and performance criteria for escape. They can address route number, size, obstruction, protection, illumination and signage. These requirements must be read with the relevant edition and building type.<ref name="meansofescap_IFEG-1-2-18" /> | ||
Latest revision as of 00:38, 16 November 2026
A smoke compartment is a part of a building separated from adjoining areas to restrict smoke movement and support the chosen fire-safety strategy. The Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) Handbook explains the importance of matching protection and evacuation arrangements to occupants' capabilities. In care settings, the compartment can provide a receiving area for people moved away from the fire.[1][2]
A smoke barrier defines part of the boundary, while doors, service openings and ventilation paths affect its continuity. The compartment is therefore a protected volume, not merely a line dividing a floor plan. Its ability to receive occupants depends on the available space and the conditions maintained within it.[3]
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Protection Handbook gives smoke compartments particular attention in health care occupancy and detention and correctional occupancy. In both settings, immediate movement to the street may be difficult or inappropriate. The enclosure, staff response and onward movement arrangements must therefore support the same intended sequence.[4]
Subdivision and the receiving compartment
Subdividing a care floor limits the number of people exposed to one fire and provides a nearby destination for relocation. The NFPA handbook describes moving occupants horizontally across a smoke barrier; the receiving side then accommodates its original population together with those arriving from the threatened compartment. Its usable space is part of the arrangement.[3]
The boundary must remain continuous through the construction. The handbook's illustrations show the separation extending through concealed spaces and joining the outside walls; doors and penetrations need the protective characteristics associated with that boundary. A suspended ceiling or an unprotected service path can otherwise connect the spaces above or around the visible barrier.[3]
A horizontal exit can provide a related arrangement, but the two terms are not interchangeable. The handbook describes a horizontal exit as an alternative when it also satisfies the additional smoke-barrier criteria; the exit function and the smoke-separation function therefore require their own supporting details. The name applied to a door does not demonstrate both.[5]
Travel to the barrier is also distinct from travel to the final outside exit. The handbook places particular attention on the distance patients must travel before reaching the receiving compartment; this reflects the initial protective step in the strategy. Measuring only the total distance to the street would obscure that intermediate destination.[2]
The dimensional examples in the 2008 handbook describe its contemporary NFPA framework. They distinguish new and existing care facilities and include particular exceptions; their engineering purpose is to control the scale of a compartment and the effort required to reach its boundary. Project limits still depend on the applicable edition and classification.[3]
Relocation, security and continued protection
Progressive horizontal evacuation uses successive protected destinations when the developing incident requires further movement. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines describe an initial transfer of patients to an adjacent smoke zone or fire compartment. Further evacuation follows if the threat continues. The first receiving area is consequently one stage in a defined response.[6]
A stay-put strategy uses protected accommodation differently, by retaining occupants where the strategy expects adequate separation. It should not be inferred merely from the presence of compartment walls. The NFPA handbook discusses defend-in-place and relocation as related strategies whose suitability depends on building protection and occupant characteristics.[7]
Detention settings add controlled movement and locking; the NFPA handbook distinguishes use conditions in which people can move freely between smoke compartments from arrangements requiring remote or manual release. The physical boundary alone does not determine relocation time. Staff availability, authority and the unlocking sequence can delay access to the receiving area.[8]
Care settings add treatment and handling needs. Moving a patient may require preparation and more than one member of staff; the receiving area must support the expected occupants after transfer, while the onward route remains available if conditions worsen. These dependencies should be included when assessing the compartment's role in the overall strategy.[9][10]
Continued protection also depends on door and ventilation operation. A route opened for relocation can become a smoke path during that movement; the boundary's protective purpose must therefore be reconciled with the passage of people and equipment. Inspection and operational planning concern the complete compartment rather than only its fixed walls.[2][11] The receiving side must remain available during ordinary building use. Storage or altered room layouts can reduce the space assumed for relocation, even though the separating wall remains intact.[12]
Occupant capabilities and assistance
Occupants do not form a single mobility group. Proulx describes people who walk independently, use a technical aid or require another person's assistance; some limitations are temporary, while others affect strength, balance, hearing, vision or interpretation. The relevant assessment therefore concerns the activities required along the proposed route.[1]
Level walking and stair movement are different activities; a person who moves independently on a floor may need rest, a handrail or assistance on stairs. Proulx's reviewed experiments included selected participants who could negotiate stairs; their observations do not describe everyone with a mobility limitation. Applying an average speed without that population definition loses an essential condition.[13]
Doors create another task. Opening a leaf, maintaining balance and moving an aid through the opening can take additional time. The research reviewed by Proulx relates performance to the aid used, strength and dexterity; a clear opening width alone does not establish whether the complete manoeuvre is practicable.[14]
Assistance arrangements have their own dependencies. A nominated helper must be present and able to carry out the intended task; an evacuation device needs an accessible storage location and trained operators. A register of people needing assistance can become incomplete or outdated. These are operational conditions that affect whether the planned support is available.[15]
Warning also needs to reach the intended population. Visual signals can assist people who cannot hear an audible alarm, while clear instructions can support interpretation. The appropriate arrangement depends on the person's needs and the building context; Proulx treats accessible evacuation as a combination of measures rather than one universally sufficient device.[16]
The International Fire Engineering Guidelines connect movement analysis with the design occupant group; the selected speeds and assistance conditions should represent the group controlling the movement process. The scope also needs an explicit destination, whether a protected internal area or the outside. That decision determines which tasks the occupants must complete.[10]
The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) divide evacuation measures into physical provisions and emergency organisation. Routes, corridors, exits and signs need an organisation that maintains procedures, education, training and testing. The two groups must reflect the same fire-safety assumptions.[17]
Commissioning should examine both the constructed route and the procedures for using it. Differences between design and construction can require adjustments to the emergency plan. A documented plan that assumes an unavailable route would not provide the intended function.[17]
Regular checks should keep paths clear, doors operating and signage in good condition. Lighting and emergency-power functions also need appropriate testing. These checks preserve the physical chain on which the evacuation analysis depends.[17][18] Staff positions and training need to be maintained as well. Procedures should be reviewed, exercises conducted and records kept. Changes in staffing or occupancy can undermine assumptions about directions and assistance.[17]
Alterations should trigger comparison with the original escape design. New partitions, furniture, storage or changed room use can alter distance, capacity and wayfinding. A previously acceptable route may no longer serve the building in its altered form.[19][17]
Purpose and route continuity
The central purpose is timely movement away from a threat. A route begins where occupants may be present and continues through the connected spaces and components leading to safety. Every link must be usable, because a failure near the destination can defeat an otherwise adequate path.[20][21] The threatened end deserves particular attention; Proulx distinguishes an emphasis on exit capacity from an emphasis on the decisions and conditions facing occupants at the start. A route with a safe discharge does not help if occupants cannot recognise or reach it in time.[22]
A place of safety must suit the intended occupants; the 2005 International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) give an example performance framework for this destination. It describes protection from untenable conditions, suitable communication and enough space for those expected to use it. The destination is therefore part of the escape provision, not an undefined endpoint beyond the exit.[23]
Evacuation uses these provisions within a timed human response. Warning, interpretation and preparation occur before directed travel, and queues can occur along the way. The physical route must be assessed together with those stages rather than in isolation.[24][25]
Route continuity also includes doors and other operating elements. A door that cannot open in the required condition interrupts the path just as a physical obstruction would. Management and maintenance must preserve the route's intended operation.[17]
Protected routes and boundaries
A protected escape route uses construction and closures to limit fire and smoke exposure along the path. The level of protection must support the time for which occupants rely on it. Open stairs and protected exit facilities should not be treated as equivalent without examining the applicable requirements;[26] fire-resistant boundaries can help preserve the route while fire develops elsewhere. Doors and other openings require suitable operation because an open or damaged boundary can compromise that function. The whole assembly matters, not only the wall material.[17][26]
New Zealand's C/VM2 includes a design scenario in which fire in an escape route can block an exit. It asks for a viable route or multiple routes where necessary under the relevant performance criteria. This scenario illustrates why route protection and alternative paths are assessed together.[27]
Radiation can also affect an escape route without direct flame contact. C/VM2 includes an analysis for occupants passing particular window openings, with conditions and limitations specific to that method. Those provisions should not be converted into a universal radiation limit.[28]
A safe place within the building can rely on separation and smoke control. This makes its boundary and ventilation conditions part of the escape system. The occupants must be able to reach and remain in that place for the intended period.[23][24]
Queues and route capacity
Travel along a route differs from passing through a restriction; Proulx distinguishes movement time to a destination from flow time through part of the circulation system. A complete assessment needs both forms of time.[29] Exit capacity can govern how quickly a group leaves even where travel distance is short. If arrival demand exceeds the flow through a doorway or stair, a queue develops. The delay depends on the number of people and the effective flow through that restriction.[29]
C/VM2 compares the time to reach a doorway with the time required for occupants to flow through it. The greater governs evacuation from the space in that method. This procedure identifies two distinct time components rather than treating distance as always dominant.[30]
Downstream restrictions can be more important than the nearest exit. C/VM2 calls for the entire escape route to be checked, because occupants can encounter another limitation closer to the final exit. Measuring only distance to the first door would miss that constraint.[31]
Effective width can be smaller than measured width. Boundary layers near walls, rails and obstacles reduce the stream width used in flow calculations. Travel distance and effective width are therefore separate geometric inputs with different effects on the result.[31][29]
Occupants and regulatory context
Occupant characteristics affect route length, preparation, speed and assistance. A route suitable for awake, familiar and independently mobile adults may not serve sleeping occupants or people needing support. The design population should be defined explicitly.[32]
Building regulations establish jurisdiction-specific objectives and performance criteria for escape. They can address route number, size, obstruction, protection, illumination and signage. These requirements must be read with the relevant edition and building type.[20]
IFEG reproduces historical New Zealand performance criteria for escape routes. These address route size, obstruction, length, fire-spread resistance, findability, illumination and safe use. They illustrate related design functions; the excerpt is not presented as the current text of New Zealand law.[20]
C/VM2 provides one verification method within the New Zealand context. Its 2025 travel and flow procedures include particular inputs and restrictions, such as door-flow provisions. Those values belong to the method and should not be treated as international defaults.[21]
The applicable safety systems can change the escape analysis. Suppression, smoke control and compartmentation may limit exposure, but their required operation must be supported. A design should not rely on an ideal system state while ignoring failure or maintenance.[17][33]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-359–3-361.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Cote et al. (2008), §20.15, pp. 20-147–20-150.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Cote et al. (2008), §20.15, pp. 20-147–20-148.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.14, p. 20-130; §20.15, pp. 20-147–20-150.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.15, p. 20-147.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-1–2.8-4.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.5, pp. 4-103–4-107.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §20.14, p. 20-130.
- ↑ Cote et al. (2008), §4.5, pp. 4-104–4-107.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-2–2.8-4.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.8-14.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-360–3-361.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), p. 3-361.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), p. 3-360.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-360–3-362.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.
- ↑ Razza and Grill (2005), pp. 3–4.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 32.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.2-18.
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 32–33.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-342–3-343.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 1.2-15.
- ↑ 24.0 24.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 2.8-1–2.8-2.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), pp. 3-347–3-348.
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.2-16–1.2-17.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 37.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 34–36.
- ↑ 29.0 29.1 29.2 Proulx (2002), pp. 3-347–3-348.
- ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 32.
- ↑ 31.0 31.1 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 33.
- ↑ Proulx (2002), p. 3-350.
- ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020), pp. 131–132.
References
- Australian Building Codes Board, National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, & Department of Building and Housing New Zealand. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines. Australian Building Codes Board.
- Australian Building Codes Board. (2020). Fire safety verification method: Data sheets (Handbook annex, Print version 1.1).
- Cote, A. E., Grant, C. C., Hall, J. R., Jr., & Solomon, R. E. (Eds.). (2008). Fire protection handbook (20th ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
- Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025). C protection from fire: Verification method C/VM2 (2nd ed.).
- Proulx, G. (2002). Movement of people: The evacuation timing. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-342–3-366). National Fire Protection Association.
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