NFPA wiki: fact-check corrections (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
Add SVG figures fse-compressed-natural-gas-v1.svg, fse-compressed-natural-gas-v2.svg, fse-compressed-natural-gas-v3.svg, fse-compressed-natural-gas-v4.svg (list-2 visual plan) |
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== Fuelling stations == | == Fuelling stations == | ||
Rivkin describes two kinds of CNG fuelling station. A slow-fill station connects to an ordinary natural gas service line and uses a small compressor without storage vessels. Filling a car or van takes about 4 to 8 hours, so slow fill suits overnight fuelling of small fleets of fewer than 30 vehicles. Small units of this kind can also be installed at private homes where local rules allow.<ref name="Rivkin-21-60" /><ref name="Rivkin-21-62" /> A fast-fill station fills a passenger vehicle in less than 5 minutes. It compresses gas from the distribution system at 413 to 689 kPa (60 to 100 psi) to about 17,200 to 31,000 kPa (2500 to 4500 psi) and stores it in a cascade of pressure vessels.<ref name="Rivkin-21-62" /> | Rivkin describes two kinds of CNG fuelling station. A slow-fill station connects to an ordinary natural gas service line and uses a small compressor without storage vessels. Filling a car or van takes about 4 to 8 hours, so slow fill suits overnight fuelling of small fleets of fewer than 30 vehicles. Small units of this kind can also be installed at private homes where local rules allow.<ref name="Rivkin-21-60" /><ref name="Rivkin-21-62" /> A fast-fill station fills a passenger vehicle in less than 5 minutes. It compresses gas from the distribution system at 413 to 689 kPa (60 to 100 psi) to about 17,200 to 31,000 kPa (2500 to 4500 psi) and stores it in a cascade of pressure vessels.<ref name="Rivkin-21-62" /> | ||
[[File:fse-compressed-natural-gas-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Flow diagram of a fast-fill CNG station from gas main through compressor and three storage banks to a dispenser and vehicle|Main parts of a fast-fill CNG fuelling station]] | |||
Compressor capacities range from about 0.14 to 0.28 m³/min (5 to 10 SCF/min) for residential units to about 142 m³/min (5000 SCF/min) at 24,804 kPa (3600 psi) for large industrial sets.<ref name="Rivkin-21-62" /><ref name="Rivkin-21-63">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-63.</ref> In US practice as described in the 2008 handbook, each compression stage needs its own relief device. A four-stage compressor might have relief valves set at 1724, 8618, 9652 and 28,610 kPa. Compressors must also shut down automatically on high discharge or low suction pressure.<ref name="Rivkin-21-63" /> A cascade usually has three banks of vessels. Filling starts from the lowest-pressure bank and switches to higher banks as pressures equalise. Each storage vessel needs its own pressure-relief device, vented vertically and protected from the weather.<ref name="Rivkin-21-63" /> | Compressor capacities range from about 0.14 to 0.28 m³/min (5 to 10 SCF/min) for residential units to about 142 m³/min (5000 SCF/min) at 24,804 kPa (3600 psi) for large industrial sets.<ref name="Rivkin-21-62" /><ref name="Rivkin-21-63">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-63.</ref> In US practice as described in the 2008 handbook, each compression stage needs its own relief device. A four-stage compressor might have relief valves set at 1724, 8618, 9652 and 28,610 kPa. Compressors must also shut down automatically on high discharge or low suction pressure.<ref name="Rivkin-21-63" /> A cascade usually has three banks of vessels. Filling starts from the lowest-pressure bank and switches to higher banks as pressures equalise. Each storage vessel needs its own pressure-relief device, vented vertically and protected from the weather.<ref name="Rivkin-21-63" /> | ||
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In the United States, as described in the 2008 handbook, every vehicle container must have at least one [[pressure relief device]] to protect it from bursting when a fire raises its pressure. The devices can be rupture disks, fusible plugs, a combination of the two, or pressure-relief valves.<ref name="Rivkin-21-69" /><ref name="Rivkin-21-70">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-70.</ref> A rupture disk bursts at a set pressure and vents the whole contents, because it cannot reclose. A fusible plug is also nonreclosing and melts at a nominal 74 or 100 °C, depending on its alloy. A relief valve recloses once the pressure has fallen. No shutoff valve may sit between the relief device and the cylinder, and devices inside a vehicle must vent to the outside.<ref name="Rivkin-21-70" /> Scheffler and Collins note that by venting fuel in a fire, these devices depressurise the tanks and avoid a container burst.<ref name="SC-21-88">Scheffler and Collins (2008), p. 21-88.</ref> | In the United States, as described in the 2008 handbook, every vehicle container must have at least one [[pressure relief device]] to protect it from bursting when a fire raises its pressure. The devices can be rupture disks, fusible plugs, a combination of the two, or pressure-relief valves.<ref name="Rivkin-21-69" /><ref name="Rivkin-21-70">Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-70.</ref> A rupture disk bursts at a set pressure and vents the whole contents, because it cannot reclose. A fusible plug is also nonreclosing and melts at a nominal 74 or 100 °C, depending on its alloy. A relief valve recloses once the pressure has fallen. No shutoff valve may sit between the relief device and the cylinder, and devices inside a vehicle must vent to the outside.<ref name="Rivkin-21-70" /> Scheffler and Collins note that by venting fuel in a fire, these devices depressurise the tanks and avoid a container burst.<ref name="SC-21-88">Scheffler and Collins (2008), p. 21-88.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-compressed-natural-gas-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Plan view of a vehicle chassis with a CNG cylinder, relief device venting outside, valves along the frame rail and a regulator at the engine|CNG vehicle fuel system]] | |||
The fuel system has three key valves. They are a container valve, a manual shutoff valve on the frame rail and an automatic valve that stops the gas when the engine is not running. The manual valve needs no more than a quarter turn from open to closed. Piping between the container and the frame-rail valve must withstand at least four times the service pressure, which in practice means stainless steel tubing. Plastic and galvanised piping are prohibited.<ref name="Rivkin-21-70" /> | The fuel system has three key valves. They are a container valve, a manual shutoff valve on the frame rail and an automatic valve that stops the gas when the engine is not running. The manual valve needs no more than a quarter turn from open to closed. Piping between the container and the frame-rail valve must withstand at least four times the service pressure, which in practice means stainless steel tubing. Plastic and galvanised piping are prohibited.<ref name="Rivkin-21-70" /> | ||
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The characteristic hazard is the jet. Gas escaping from a relief device or pipe forms a jet in the direction the hole faces and mixes continuously with air. If ignited, it forms a flame jet of considerable length.<ref name="Rivkin-21-58" /> At fuelling stations such jet fires can extend 3 to 9 m (10 to 30 ft), depending on leak size and pressure, so the orientation of cylinders and relief valves matters in site design.<ref name="Rivkin-21-62" /> Flame jets that impinge on adjacent containers can open further relief devices and increase the fire.<ref name="Rivkin-21-58" /> In large-scale tests, sonic natural gas jets produced heat fluxes of up to 300 kW/m² on engulfed targets, with an average of 200 kW/m² over the impingement area.<ref name="Beyler-3-302">Beyler (2002a), p. 3-302.</ref> Barry classes this outcome as a torch fire, usually the result of immediate ignition, with mainly near-field damage.<ref name="Barry-5-184">Barry (2002), p. 5-184.</ref> | The characteristic hazard is the jet. Gas escaping from a relief device or pipe forms a jet in the direction the hole faces and mixes continuously with air. If ignited, it forms a flame jet of considerable length.<ref name="Rivkin-21-58" /> At fuelling stations such jet fires can extend 3 to 9 m (10 to 30 ft), depending on leak size and pressure, so the orientation of cylinders and relief valves matters in site design.<ref name="Rivkin-21-62" /> Flame jets that impinge on adjacent containers can open further relief devices and increase the fire.<ref name="Rivkin-21-58" /> In large-scale tests, sonic natural gas jets produced heat fluxes of up to 300 kW/m² on engulfed targets, with an average of 200 kW/m² over the impingement area.<ref name="Beyler-3-302">Beyler (2002a), p. 3-302.</ref> Barry classes this outcome as a torch fire, usually the result of immediate ignition, with mainly near-field damage.<ref name="Barry-5-184">Barry (2002), p. 5-184.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-compressed-natural-gas-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Two panels: outdoors a CNG jet rising and a 3 to 9 m flame jet; indoors gas pooling under a ceiling near a light fixture|CNG releases outdoors and indoors]] | |||
An incident in Austin, Texas, in March 1993 shows the hazard. A mechanic depressurised a CNG vehicle container without electrically bonding the tool to the vehicle frame. Static electricity ignited the high-pressure gas jet, and arriving firefighters saw a flame jet about 4.6 m (15 ft) long. Nobody was injured, but the vehicle was destroyed and the flux from the jet damaged a neighbouring vehicle.<ref name="Rivkin-21-70" /> | An incident in Austin, Texas, in March 1993 shows the hazard. A mechanic depressurised a CNG vehicle container without electrically bonding the tool to the vehicle frame. Static electricity ignited the high-pressure gas jet, and arriving firefighters saw a flame jet about 4.6 m (15 ft) long. Nobody was injured, but the vehicle was destroyed and the flux from the jet damaged a neighbouring vehicle.<ref name="Rivkin-21-70" /> | ||
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As a worked example, take a CNG container filled to 24,821 kPa gauge (3600 psig) at 21 °C, the upper end of the dispensing pressures that Lemoff gives.<ref name="Lemoff-6-186" /> In absolute terms this is P<sub>1</sub> = 24,821 + 101 = 24,922 kPa at T<sub>1</sub> = 294 K. If the container is warmed to 82 °C, the upper limit of the NGV2 material range, then T<sub>2</sub> = 355 K.<ref name="Rivkin-21-69" /> The new pressure is 24,922 × 355/294 = 30,093 kPa absolute, or about 30,000 kPa gauge (4350 psig). This equals the highest NGV2 service pressure of 4350 psi, although NGV2 service pressures are defined at 21 °C.<ref name="Rivkin-21-69" /> | As a worked example, take a CNG container filled to 24,821 kPa gauge (3600 psig) at 21 °C, the upper end of the dispensing pressures that Lemoff gives.<ref name="Lemoff-6-186" /> In absolute terms this is P<sub>1</sub> = 24,821 + 101 = 24,922 kPa at T<sub>1</sub> = 294 K. If the container is warmed to 82 °C, the upper limit of the NGV2 material range, then T<sub>2</sub> = 355 K.<ref name="Rivkin-21-69" /> The new pressure is 24,922 × 355/294 = 30,093 kPa absolute, or about 30,000 kPa gauge (4350 psig). This equals the highest NGV2 service pressure of 4350 psi, although NGV2 service pressures are defined at 21 °C.<ref name="Rivkin-21-69" /> | ||
[[File:fse-compressed-natural-gas-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Straight line of container pressure rising from about 19.7 MPa at minus 40 °C to about 31.5 MPa at 100 °C, with reference lines|Gauge pressure of a CNG container filled to 24.8 MPa at 21 °C, against gas temperature]] | |||
If a fire heats the gas to 100 °C, the melting temperature of the higher-rated fusible plugs, the pressure rises to 24,922 × 373/294 = 31,619 kPa absolute, or about 31,500 kPa gauge.<ref name="Rivkin-21-70" /> The same law gives the quantity of fuel. At constant temperature, a 1.0 m³ container at 24,922 kPa absolute holds about 24,922/101 × 1.0 ≈ 247 m³ of gas at 101 kPa. With a gross heating value of 37.6 to 39.9 MJ/m³, that is about 9.3 to 9.9 GJ.<ref name="Lemoff-6-174" /> Because no real gas follows these laws exactly, the results are estimates.<ref name="Lemoff-6-168" /> | If a fire heats the gas to 100 °C, the melting temperature of the higher-rated fusible plugs, the pressure rises to 24,922 × 373/294 = 31,619 kPa absolute, or about 31,500 kPa gauge.<ref name="Rivkin-21-70" /> The same law gives the quantity of fuel. At constant temperature, a 1.0 m³ container at 24,922 kPa absolute holds about 24,922/101 × 1.0 ≈ 247 m³ of gas at 101 kPa. With a gross heating value of 37.6 to 39.9 MJ/m³, that is about 9.3 to 9.9 GJ.<ref name="Lemoff-6-174" /> Because no real gas follows these laws exactly, the results are estimates.<ref name="Lemoff-6-168" /> | ||
Latest revision as of 08:51, 9 November 2026
Compressed natural gas (CNG) is natural gas compressed to a high pressure, typically 16.5 to 24.8 MPa (2400 to 3600 psi), so that a vehicle can carry enough of it in cylinders.[1] It consists mainly of methane and stays entirely in the gas phase inside its container, which makes it a compressed gas rather than a liquefied gas.[2][3] The gas is usually taken from a utility distribution main, compressed at a fuelling station and dispensed into vehicle containers at the same pressure.[1]
Natural gas is lighter than air, so an outdoor release rises and disperses quickly.[4] The main fire hazard is a jet fire from a leak or a relief device, which can reach 3 to 9 m in length.[5] Indoors, gas collecting under a ceiling can cause a deflagration.[4] CNG containers cannot suffer a BLEVE, but they can fail explosively in a fire, which is why every vehicle container must have a pressure relief device.[6][7] In the United States, CNG vehicles and fuelling systems are covered by NFPA 52, Vehicular Fuel Systems Code.[8] The requirements in this article are US rules and practice as described in the Fire Protection Handbook (2008), not current or universal rules.
Composition and properties
In commerce, most of the nonflammable gases in raw natural gas are removed before distribution. The remaining gas consists of about 70 to 90 % methane, with the rest mostly ethane.[1] Automotive-grade natural gas is purer, at 95 to 99 % methane. It also contains small amounts of ethane, propane and butane and traces of nitrogen, carbon dioxide, water, helium, hydrogen sulphide and metal oxides.[2] Natural gas is not toxic but is a simple asphyxiant. It has no odour of its own and is odorised when it is distributed.[1]
Lemoff explains the difference between the two main ways of storing a gas. A compressed gas exists solely in the gaseous state under pressure at all normal temperatures. Its pressure depends on how it was charged, how much gas remains and the gas temperature. In the United States the upper limit is set only by the economics of container construction and usually lies between 1800 and 3600 psi, about 12,400 to 24,800 kPa gauge.[3] A liquefied gas such as propane, by contrast, is partly liquid at 20 °C and holds much more gas in the same volume.[3] Eberly makes the same point for boats: CNG does not liquefy at ambient temperatures and is stored in cylinders at about 13,790 kPa (2000 psig).[9]
The handbook lists combustion properties for three types of natural gas. For the high-methane type, the flammability limits in air are 4.7 and 15.0 % by volume and the specific gravity is 0.590 to 0.614 relative to air. Its gross heating value is 37.6 to 39.9 MJ/m³, and its ignition temperature is 482 to 632 °C.[10] Burning 1 m³ of this gas requires 10.2 m³ of air.[10] Rivkin notes that these flammability limits and the autoignition temperature are the same whether natural gas is stored as CNG or as liquefied natural gas.[4] Natural gas has a narrow flammable range and a high autoignition temperature. LP-gas, by comparison, becomes flammable at lower concentrations but has a narrower range.[4]
Utility natural gas is odorised so that a person with a normal sense of smell can detect it at concentrations not exceeding one-fifth of the lower flammability limit.[11] Rivkin states that natural gas is normally odorised at a level that allows detection at 20 to 25 % of the lower flammable limit of methane. CNG compressed from a distribution line keeps these odorants. Odorants can fade, however, and the sense of smell varies between people.[8]
Fuelling stations
Rivkin describes two kinds of CNG fuelling station. A slow-fill station connects to an ordinary natural gas service line and uses a small compressor without storage vessels. Filling a car or van takes about 4 to 8 hours, so slow fill suits overnight fuelling of small fleets of fewer than 30 vehicles. Small units of this kind can also be installed at private homes where local rules allow.[8][5] A fast-fill station fills a passenger vehicle in less than 5 minutes. It compresses gas from the distribution system at 413 to 689 kPa (60 to 100 psi) to about 17,200 to 31,000 kPa (2500 to 4500 psi) and stores it in a cascade of pressure vessels.[5]
Compressor capacities range from about 0.14 to 0.28 m³/min (5 to 10 SCF/min) for residential units to about 142 m³/min (5000 SCF/min) at 24,804 kPa (3600 psi) for large industrial sets.[5][12] In US practice as described in the 2008 handbook, each compression stage needs its own relief device. A four-stage compressor might have relief valves set at 1724, 8618, 9652 and 28,610 kPa. Compressors must also shut down automatically on high discharge or low suction pressure.[12] A cascade usually has three banks of vessels. Filling starts from the lowest-pressure bank and switches to higher banks as pressures equalise. Each storage vessel needs its own pressure-relief device, vented vertically and protected from the weather.[12]
CNG dispensers at a motor fuel dispensing facility can look like gasoline pumps or can be a simple hose and nozzle on a post.[12] The dispenser stops the flow automatically when the vehicle container reaches its fill pressure, with settings that depend on the outside temperature. A breakaway device closes the hose if a vehicle drives away while still connected. The hose is nonconductive, at most 7.6 m (25 ft) long, and includes a second line that vents the gas from the connection before the nozzle can be released.[13] Nozzles and vehicle receptacles follow the US standard ANSI/AGA NGV 1, with ratings between 2400 and 3600 psig (16.5 to 24.8 MPa).[13] In 2006 the United States had 754 CNG refuelling sites, and Alaska and Hawaii had none.[8]
Rivkin states that CNG fuelling is typically done outdoors. Canopies over the equipment should be noncombustible and shaped so that the buoyant gas cannot collect in pockets.[5] In the United States, as described in the 2008 handbook, indoor fuelling is possible only in dedicated structures or in rooms separated by walls of at least 2 hours fire resistance. It then needs explosion venting and continuous or gas-detector-activated mechanical ventilation. The detectors should start the ventilation and sound an alarm at no more than 20 % of the lower flammable limit, and they must shut down compression and dispensing. Some building and fire codes require sprinklers, although NFPA 52 does not. Public parking garages are commonly unacceptable as fuelling locations.[5]
Vehicle fuel systems
A CNG alternative fuel vehicle is either a conversion that keeps its original gasoline or diesel system or a vehicle designed for CNG only.[7] CNG vehicles store natural gas at 17,235 to 27,576 kPa (2500 to 4000 psig). A regulator reduces this pressure before the gas is mixed with air and fed to the engine.[7] The handbook describes container design under the US standard ANSI/AGA NGV2. Containers have service pressures of 16,546 to 29,989 kPa (2400 to 4350 psi) at 21 °C, a capacity of no more than 35.4 ft³ (1.0 m³) and a service life of 15 years.[7]
NGV2 recognises four constructions: all-metal, a metal liner with hoop-wrapped composite, a metal liner fully wrapped with composite, and a fully wrapped composite with a nonmetallic liner. All materials must work between −40 and 82 °C. Certification includes drop, fire exposure, gunfire, gas permeation, pressure cycling and burst tests. Each container carries a "CNG ONLY" label.[7] In US practice as described in the handbook, containers may not sit ahead of the front axle or behind the rear bumper. Their mountings must withstand eight times the weight of a full cylinder in six directions, and unshielded containers need 20.3 cm (8 in.) clearance from the exhaust.[7] At federal level, the US motor vehicle safety standards FMVSS 303 and FMVSS 304 cover the integrity of CNG fuel systems and fuel containers.[14]
In the United States, as described in the 2008 handbook, every vehicle container must have at least one pressure relief device to protect it from bursting when a fire raises its pressure. The devices can be rupture disks, fusible plugs, a combination of the two, or pressure-relief valves.[7][15] A rupture disk bursts at a set pressure and vents the whole contents, because it cannot reclose. A fusible plug is also nonreclosing and melts at a nominal 74 or 100 °C, depending on its alloy. A relief valve recloses once the pressure has fallen. No shutoff valve may sit between the relief device and the cylinder, and devices inside a vehicle must vent to the outside.[15] Scheffler and Collins note that by venting fuel in a fire, these devices depressurise the tanks and avoid a container burst.[16]
The fuel system has three key valves. They are a container valve, a manual shutoff valve on the frame rail and an automatic valve that stops the gas when the engine is not running. The manual valve needs no more than a quarter turn from open to closed. Piping between the container and the frame-rail valve must withstand at least four times the service pressure, which in practice means stainless steel tubing. Plastic and galvanised piping are prohibited.[15]
Fire and explosion hazards
Natural gas has a vapour density below 1 and, because of its very low boiling point, stays lighter than air under most conditions. CNG released outdoors therefore rises rapidly and disperses.[4] Rivkin notes that methane mixtures in unconfined conditions dilute rapidly to below the lower flammable limit. The same quick mixing makes a leak hazardous in a confined area without significant ventilation.[2] Because the gas is stored at high pressure, a release from a relief valve or a broken fuel line is short.[4] Typical unintentional releases at fuelling stations are over in seconds, and together with the buoyancy of the gas this limits the risk of an open-air vapour cloud ignition.[5]
The characteristic hazard is the jet. Gas escaping from a relief device or pipe forms a jet in the direction the hole faces and mixes continuously with air. If ignited, it forms a flame jet of considerable length.[4] At fuelling stations such jet fires can extend 3 to 9 m (10 to 30 ft), depending on leak size and pressure, so the orientation of cylinders and relief valves matters in site design.[5] Flame jets that impinge on adjacent containers can open further relief devices and increase the fire.[4] In large-scale tests, sonic natural gas jets produced heat fluxes of up to 300 kW/m² on engulfed targets, with an average of 200 kW/m² over the impingement area.[17] Barry classes this outcome as a torch fire, usually the result of immediate ignition, with mainly near-field damage.[18]
An incident in Austin, Texas, in March 1993 shows the hazard. A mechanic depressurised a CNG vehicle container without electrically bonding the tool to the vehicle frame. Static electricity ignited the high-pressure gas jet, and arriving firefighters saw a flame jet about 4.6 m (15 ft) long. Nobody was injured, but the vehicle was destroyed and the flux from the jet damaged a neighbouring vehicle.[15]
Indoors the picture changes. A CNG release in an enclosed space carries a higher risk of a deflagration, because the gas cannot diffuse freely. With a vapour density of 0.6, methane rises and pools under a ceiling, where light fixtures and air-handling equipment can ignite it.[4]
Rivkin summarises two studies. In a partly open public parking garage, a fuel line leak produced no flammable concentrations beyond the immediate vicinity. Operation of a container relief valve produced a brief flammable puff that diffusion and the exhaust system removed. The study judged the risk of a CNG vehicle equal to or less than that of a gasoline vehicle.[4] In ventilated and unventilated tunnels, a hypothetical CNG van produced a smaller and shorter-lived flammable region than an equivalent gasoline van.[4] In the Netherlands, Van der Graaf and colleagues list the effect of fires in vehicles with alternative fuels such as hydrogen or CNG on car park structures as a subject needing further research.[19]
A compressed gas is by definition not subject to a BLEVE, because no liquid is stored above its boiling point. A compressed gas container can still fail explosively from fire exposure.[6] Lemoff adds that failures of compressed gas containers are distinguished more by the flying missile hazard than by the gas released, because such containers hold less gas.[20] If the valve breaks off a smaller portable cylinder, the reaction of the escaping gas can propel the cylinder violently.[21]
Pressure in a heated container
For a gas that stays entirely in the gas phase, Lemoff uses the combined laws of Boyle and Charles. No real gas follows them exactly, but he considers them sufficiently accurate for commonly encountered conditions.[3] Pressure and temperature must be absolute values. Absolute pressure is gauge pressure plus about 101 kPa at sea level, and absolute temperature in kelvin is the Celsius temperature plus 273.[3][20]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Absolute pressure before and after the change | kPa | |
| Volume of the gas before and after the change | m³ | |
| Absolute temperature before and after the change | K |
As a worked example, take a CNG container filled to 24,821 kPa gauge (3600 psig) at 21 °C, the upper end of the dispensing pressures that Lemoff gives.[1] In absolute terms this is P1 = 24,821 + 101 = 24,922 kPa at T1 = 294 K. If the container is warmed to 82 °C, the upper limit of the NGV2 material range, then T2 = 355 K.[7] The new pressure is 24,922 × 355/294 = 30,093 kPa absolute, or about 30,000 kPa gauge (4350 psig). This equals the highest NGV2 service pressure of 4350 psi, although NGV2 service pressures are defined at 21 °C.[7]
If a fire heats the gas to 100 °C, the melting temperature of the higher-rated fusible plugs, the pressure rises to 24,922 × 373/294 = 31,619 kPa absolute, or about 31,500 kPa gauge.[15] The same law gives the quantity of fuel. At constant temperature, a 1.0 m³ container at 24,922 kPa absolute holds about 24,922/101 × 1.0 ≈ 247 m³ of gas at 101 kPa. With a gross heating value of 37.6 to 39.9 MJ/m³, that is about 9.3 to 9.9 GJ.[10] Because no real gas follows these laws exactly, the results are estimates.[3]
Emergency response
Rivkin lists three plausible emergency scenarios for alternative fuel vehicles: fuelling, an accident and repair work.[22] In the United States, NFPA 52, as described in the 2008 handbook, requires CNG vehicles to carry a blue diamond label with white or silver letters "CNG" on the lower right rear of the vehicle.[23] Scheffler and Collins note that this label has historically identified natural gas vehicles to emergency responders.[24]
For CNG and LP-gas vehicles, water from attack streams can be used to control the fire and help the vapour disperse. The fuel system is stabilised by closing the primary shutoff valve at the containers. CNG vehicles normally also have a second isolation valve along the frame rail, whose location NFPA 52 requires to be marked. The firefighter who closes the valve should also check that the container vent line is not blocked.[23] In pre-incident planning, Rivkin treats the operation of a relief valve on a vessel of compressed methane as an event that is not uncommon over the life of a facility. Every fuelling station must have emergency shutoff devices, and their location and operation should be known.[25]
Other uses
CNG also powers industrial trucks. NFPA 505, the US standard on powered industrial trucks summarised by Bouchard, designates CNG trucks as Type CN. It considers them comparable in fire hazard to gasoline, diesel and LP-gas trucks of the same class.[26][27] On boats, CNG is used for galley cooking. Because the gas is lighter than air, the US boat standard NFPA 302, as described by Eberly, requires CNG lockers to be vented at a level above the cylinders and regulator. The gas reaches the appliance at about 1.5 kPa gauge. Copper tubing used with CNG must be internally tinned.[9] Fuel cell power plants have also been designed to run on CNG.[28]
Limits and common misconceptions
The buoyancy of CNG has two opposite effects. Outdoors, this buoyancy does limit the size and duration of flammable clouds.[4] Under a roof or ceiling, however, the same buoyancy concentrates the gas where ignition sources are often located.[4] The high pressure also turns even small leaks into jets that can burn as long flames.[5]
The public often judges natural gas by the low pressures used for cooking and heating, which Rivkin contrasts with the high pressures of CNG fuelling.[5] A container without a working relief device is a stored-energy hazard in a fire, even though no BLEVE can occur.[6] The values and requirements in this article are those of US standards as the 2008 handbook described them. The gas-law example is general, but the NGV2, NFPA 52 and FMVSS values are US rules of that time.
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-186.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-55.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-168.
- ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-58.
- ↑ 5.00 5.01 5.02 5.03 5.04 5.05 5.06 5.07 5.08 5.09 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-62.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-38.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-69.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-60.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 Eberly (2008), p. 21-157.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-174.
- ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-175.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-63.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-64.
- ↑ Long et al. (2008), p. 21-5.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-70.
- ↑ Scheffler and Collins (2008), p. 21-88.
- ↑ Beyler (2002a), p. 3-302.
- ↑ Barry (2002), p. 5-184.
- ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 55.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 Lemoff (2008), p. 6-169.
- ↑ Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-40.
- ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-73.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-74.
- ↑ Scheffler and Collins (2008), p. 21-85.
- ↑ Rivkin (2008b), p. 21-75.
- ↑ Bouchard (2008), p. 8-31.
- ↑ Bouchard (2008), p. 8-33.
- ↑ Biggins (2008), p. 8-110.
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