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The '''incident command system''' ('''ICS''') is a standard, on-scene, all-hazards system for managing emergency incidents, used by fire fighters, hazardous materials teams, rescuers and emergency medical teams.<ref name="Loflin-12-121">Loflin (2008), p. 12-121.</ref> It sets out the roles, organisational structure and procedures through which one incident commander directs the facilities, equipment, personnel and communications at an incident.<ref name="Schmidt-1-143">Schmidt (2008), p. 1-143.</ref> The organisation grows from the incident commander downwards as an incident becomes larger and more complex, and shrinks again as resources are released.<ref name="Schmidt-1-143" /><ref name="LV-A">Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A.</ref>
The '''incident command system''' ('''ICS''') is a standard, on-scene, all-hazards system for managing emergency incidents, used by fire fighters, hazardous materials teams, rescuers and emergency medical teams.<ref name="Loflin-12-121">Loflin (2008), p. 12-121.</ref> It sets out the roles, organisational structure and procedures through which one incident commander directs the facilities, equipment, personnel and communications at an incident.<ref name="Schmidt-1-143">Schmidt (2008), p. 1-143.</ref> The organisation grows from the incident commander downwards as an incident becomes larger and more complex, and shrinks again as resources are released.<ref name="Schmidt-1-143" /><ref name="LV-A">Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A.</ref>


ICS was developed in California in the 1970s, in the FIRESCOPE programme that followed a devastating series of wildland fires in 1970.<ref name="Loflin-12-120">Loflin (2008), p. 12-120.</ref> It spread from wildland [[Firefighting]] to structural fire fighting and other emergencies. In the United States it became part of the [[National Incident Management System]] (NIMS), issued in March 2004, as the standard structure for managing all incidents.<ref name="Loflin-12-121" /> NFPA 1561, first issued in 1990, sets requirements for an emergency services incident management system.<ref name="Loflin-12-110">Loflin (2008), p. 12-110.</ref> The Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) applied its own ICS at the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. NIST found that the procedures were largely followed, but that they were seriously challenged by the scale of the event.<ref name="LV-118">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 118.</ref>
ICS was developed in California in the 1970s, in the FIRESCOPE programme that followed a devastating series of wildland fires in 1970.<ref name="Loflin-12-120">Loflin (2008), p. 12-120.</ref> It spread from wildland [[firefighting]] to structural fire fighting and other emergencies. In the United States it became part of the [[National Incident Management System]] (NIMS), issued in March 2004, as the standard structure for managing all incidents.<ref name="Loflin-12-121" /> NFPA 1561, first issued in 1990, sets requirements for an emergency services incident management system.<ref name="Loflin-12-110">Loflin (2008), p. 12-110.</ref> The Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) applied its own ICS at the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. NIST found that the procedures were largely followed, but that they were seriously challenged by the scale of the event.<ref name="LV-118">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 118.</ref>


== Definition and purpose ==
== Definition and purpose ==
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== History ==
== History ==


The system grew out of a California wildfire disaster. During 13 days in 1970, 16 lives were lost, 700 structures were destroyed and more than 1.5 million acres burned, at a cost and loss of $18 million per day.<ref name="Loflin-12-120" /> The responding agencies cooperated as well as they could, but problems with communication and coordination hampered their effectiveness. Congress then mandated the United States Forest Service to design a system that would "make a quantum jump" in the agencies' ability to coordinate interagency action and allocate resources in multiple-fire situations. The Forest Service worked with the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, the Governor's Office of Emergency Services and several county and city fire departments. Their project became known as FIRESCOPE, short for Fire Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies.<ref name="Loflin-12-120" /><ref name="Loflin-12-119">Loflin (2008), p. 12-119.</ref>
The system grew out of a California wildfire disaster. During 13 days in 1970, 16 lives were lost, 700 structures were destroyed and over one-half million acres burned, at a cost and loss of $18 million per day.<ref name="Loflin-12-120" /> The responding agencies cooperated as well as they could, but problems with communication and coordination hampered their effectiveness. Congress then mandated the United States Forest Service to design a system that would "make a quantum jump" in the agencies' ability to coordinate interagency action and allocate resources in multiple-fire situations. The Forest Service worked with the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, the Governor's Office of Emergency Services and several county and city fire departments. Their project became known as FIRESCOPE, short for Fire Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies.<ref name="Loflin-12-120" /><ref name="Loflin-12-119">Loflin (2008), p. 12-119.</ref>


The first FIRESCOPE Technical Team was set up in 1973, and its work produced two components: ICS and the Multi-Agency Coordination System.<ref name="Loflin-12-120" /> By the mid-1970s the FIRESCOPE agencies had agreed on common ICS terminology and procedures, and by 1980 parts of ICS had been used successfully at several major wildland and urban fires. The National Fire Academy adopted the FIRESCOPE ICS in 1980. By 1981 the major fire agencies of southern California used it widely, and its use for nonfire incidents was growing; it was soon seen as suitable for floods, hazardous materials accidents, earthquakes and aircraft crashes. In 1982 the FIRESCOPE documents were revised and adopted as the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS), the wildland community's common system for local, state and federal agencies.<ref name="Loflin-12-120" /><ref name="Loflin-12-119" /> The Federal Emergency Management Agency formally adopted the FIRESCOPE ICS for any federal response it required.<ref name="Loflin-12-120" />
The first FIRESCOPE Technical Team was set up in 1973, and its work produced two components: ICS and the Multi-Agency Coordination System.<ref name="Loflin-12-120" /> By the mid-1970s the FIRESCOPE agencies had agreed on common ICS terminology and procedures, and by 1980 parts of ICS had been used successfully at several major wildland and urban fires. The National Fire Academy adopted the FIRESCOPE ICS in 1980. By 1981 the major fire agencies of southern California used it widely, and its use for nonfire incidents was growing; it was soon seen as suitable for floods, hazardous materials accidents, earthquakes and aircraft crashes. In 1982 the FIRESCOPE documents were revised and adopted as the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS), the wildland community's common system for local, state and federal agencies.<ref name="Loflin-12-120" /><ref name="Loflin-12-119" /> The Federal Emergency Management Agency formally adopted the FIRESCOPE ICS for any federal response it required.<ref name="Loflin-12-120" />
[[File:fse-incident-command-system-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Time line from 1970 to 2004 with the main steps in the development of the incident command system|Main steps in the development of the incident command system in the United States, 1970–2004.]]


Difficulties in applying the system brought variation. Inconsistencies and hybrid systems developed, moving the fire service away from a common approach.<ref name="Loflin-12-119" /> In 1987 NFPA began work on NFPA 1561, whose committee found that most systems then in use were similar and differed mainly in terminology.<ref name="Loflin-12-121" /> The standard was first issued in 1990 to support the NFPA 1500 requirement that fire departments conduct emergency operations within an effective incident management system. Later editions covered accountability, rapid intervention crews and interagency cooperation (1995), all emergency services (2000), and incident management teams and unified command (2005).<ref name="Loflin-12-110" /> A National Fire Service Incident Management System Consortium, formed in 1990, published the ''Model Procedures Guide for Structural Firefighting'' in 1993, which FIRESCOPE incorporated into its system.<ref name="Loflin-12-121" />
Difficulties in applying the system brought variation. Inconsistencies and hybrid systems developed, moving the fire service away from a common approach.<ref name="Loflin-12-119" /> In 1987 NFPA began work on NFPA 1561, whose committee found that most systems then in use were similar and differed mainly in terminology.<ref name="Loflin-12-121" /> The standard was first issued in 1990 to support the NFPA 1500 requirement that fire departments conduct emergency operations within an effective incident management system. Later editions covered accountability, rapid intervention crews and interagency cooperation (1995), all emergency services (2000), and incident management teams and unified command (2005).<ref name="Loflin-12-110" /> A National Fire Service Incident Management System Consortium, formed in 1990, published the ''Model Procedures Guide for Structural Firefighting'' in 1993, which FIRESCOPE incorporated into its system.<ref name="Loflin-12-121" />
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ICS divides incident management into five major functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics and finance/administration.<ref name="Schmidt-1-143" /> The incident commander fills the command function and is supported by a command staff of a public information officer, a safety officer and a liaison officer.<ref name="Schmidt-1-143" /><ref name="Schmidt-1-144">Schmidt (2008), p. 1-144.</ref> In the FDNY manual, operations manages all tactical operations, planning gathers and evaluates information on the incident and the status of resources, logistics provides supplies, services and facilities, and finance records costs.<ref name="LV-A" /> The liaison officer is the point of contact for agency representatives, and the safety officer monitors unsafe conditions and acts to protect personnel. The public information officer gathers factual information and, with the incident commander's approval, deals with the media.<ref name="LV-A" /> Adair (2008) describes this officer as a member of the command staff reporting directly to the incident commander.<ref name="Adair-5-58">Adair (2008), p. 5-58.</ref>
ICS divides incident management into five major functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics and finance/administration.<ref name="Schmidt-1-143" /> The incident commander fills the command function and is supported by a command staff of a public information officer, a safety officer and a liaison officer.<ref name="Schmidt-1-143" /><ref name="Schmidt-1-144">Schmidt (2008), p. 1-144.</ref> In the FDNY manual, operations manages all tactical operations, planning gathers and evaluates information on the incident and the status of resources, logistics provides supplies, services and facilities, and finance records costs.<ref name="LV-A" /> The liaison officer is the point of contact for agency representatives, and the safety officer monitors unsafe conditions and acts to protect personnel. The public information officer gathers factual information and, with the incident commander's approval, deals with the media.<ref name="LV-A" /> Adair (2008) describes this officer as a member of the command staff reporting directly to the incident commander.<ref name="Adair-5-58">Adair (2008), p. 5-58.</ref>
[[File:fse-incident-command-system-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Organisation chart with incident commander, command staff of three officers and four sections: operations, planning, logistics, finance and administration|Basic incident command system organisation with the five functions and the command staff.]]


The incident commander keeps responsibility for every function that has not been delegated.<ref name="LV-A" /> At most incidents the incident commander handles all the major functions personally. As an incident grows or more alarms are transmitted, some of the authority must be delegated to other officers, and the FDNY manual calls delegation the key to its system. Each section can then concentrate on one assignment, which gives functional clarity and fixes accountability.<ref name="LV-A" />
The incident commander keeps responsibility for every function that has not been delegated.<ref name="LV-A" /> At most incidents the incident commander handles all the major functions personally. As an incident grows or more alarms are transmitted, some of the authority must be delegated to other officers, and the FDNY manual calls delegation the key to its system. Each section can then concentrate on one assignment, which gives functional clarity and fixes accountability.<ref name="LV-A" />


The structure is modular. A routine incident has a simple structure, a complex one a larger structure, and the organisation is reduced as the incident is brought under control.<ref name="LV-A" /> The FDNY manual combines single companies into sectors, which cover a geographical area such as an exposure, and groups, which carry out a function such as searching floors of a high-rise building. Strike teams combine resources of the same kind and type with common communications, while task forces combine any resources for a temporary assignment and should be limited to five resources. Branches are created when the span of control over sectors and groups becomes excessive, or when resources from other agencies are committed.<ref name="LV-A" /> Klaene and Sanders (2008) describe the same step at a structure fire: the incident commander assigns sections, branches, divisions, groups, strike teams and task forces as needed to reduce the span of control.<ref name="KS-13-7">Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-7.</ref>
The structure is modular. A routine incident has a simple structure, a complex one a larger structure, and the organisation is reduced as the incident is brought under control.<ref name="LV-A" /> The FDNY manual combines single companies into sectors, which cover a geographical area such as an exposure, and groups, which carry out a function such as searching floors of a high-rise building. Strike teams combine resources of the same kind and type with common communications, while task forces combine any resources for a temporary assignment and should be limited to five resources. Branches are created when the span of control over sectors and groups becomes excessive, or when resources from other agencies are committed.<ref name="LV-A" /> Klaene and Sanders (2008) describe the same step at a structure fire: the incident commander assigns sections, branches, divisions, groups, strike teams and task forces as needed to reduce the span of control.<ref name="KS-13-7">Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-7.</ref>
[[File:fse-incident-command-system-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Three organisation charts side by side showing an incident command structure growing from a few companies to sectors, groups and branches|Modular growth of an incident command organisation: companies are combined into sectors and groups, and these into branches, to keep span of control manageable.]]


Span of control is the number of subordinates one person supervises. The FDNY manual gives a range of three to seven, with five as the ideal.<ref name="LV-A" /> One officer may supervise up to seven where tasks are simple, the area is small, communications are good and the incident is stable. Where tasks are demanding, the area is large and the incident is escalating, the span might be reduced to three or four.<ref name="LV-A" /> Denlinger (2008) gives five to seven subordinates per supervisor as the ideal span for fire department management in general.<ref name="Denlinger-12-61">Denlinger (2008), p. 12-61.</ref>
Span of control is the number of subordinates one person supervises. The FDNY manual gives a range of three to seven, with five as the ideal.<ref name="LV-A" /> One officer may supervise up to seven where tasks are simple, the area is small, communications are good and the incident is stable. Where tasks are demanding, the area is large and the incident is escalating, the span might be reduced to three or four.<ref name="LV-A" /> Denlinger (2008) gives five to seven subordinates per supervisor as the ideal span for fire department management in general.<ref name="Denlinger-12-61">Denlinger (2008), p. 12-61.</ref>


ICS also names the places and states of an incident. The command post is the location from which the incident commander manages the incident, and the FDNY manual specifies that there should be only one.<ref name="LV-A" /> Staging is the area where resources wait for assignment, and recuperation and care is the area where personnel rest. Every resource has one of three states: available, assigned, or out of service.<ref name="LV-A" /> Larger emergencies may also be managed from an [[Emergency operations centre]], on site or at a distance, and Schmidt notes that "virtual" centres can be created by conference call.<ref name="Schmidt-1-144" />
ICS also names the places and states of an incident. The command post is the location from which the incident commander manages the incident, and the FDNY manual specifies that there should be only one.<ref name="LV-A" /> Staging is the area where resources wait for assignment, and recuperation and care is the area where personnel rest. Every resource has one of three states: available, assigned, or out of service.<ref name="LV-A" /> Larger emergencies may also be managed from an [[emergency operations centre]], on site or at a distance, and Schmidt notes that "virtual" centres can be created by conference call.<ref name="Schmidt-1-144" />


== Common terminology and planning ==
== Common terminology and planning ==
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The FDNY manual lists eight characteristics of its system: common terminology, a manageable span of control, modular organisation, integrated communications, a unified command structure, incident action planning, designated incident facilities and resource management.<ref name="LV-A" /><ref name="LV-118" /> C. J. Wright (2008a) lists the NIMS elements as common terminology, modular organisations, integrated communications, a unified command structure, consolidated action plans, a manageable span of control, predesignated incident facilities and the management of all resources.<ref name="CJWright-13-142" /> Van Helden and Stewart (2008) name some of the core values of NIMS as span of control, unity of command, accountability, resource tracking and the operation of incident action plans.<ref name="VHS-12-200">Van Helden and Stewart (2008), p. 12-200.</ref> Common terminology lets members of different agencies communicate effectively, because the same words are used for functions, resources and facilities.<ref name="LV-A" />
The FDNY manual lists eight characteristics of its system: common terminology, a manageable span of control, modular organisation, integrated communications, a unified command structure, incident action planning, designated incident facilities and resource management.<ref name="LV-A" /><ref name="LV-118" /> C. J. Wright (2008a) lists the NIMS elements as common terminology, modular organisations, integrated communications, a unified command structure, consolidated action plans, a manageable span of control, predesignated incident facilities and the management of all resources.<ref name="CJWright-13-142" /> Van Helden and Stewart (2008) name some of the core values of NIMS as span of control, unity of command, accountability, resource tracking and the operation of incident action plans.<ref name="VHS-12-200">Van Helden and Stewart (2008), p. 12-200.</ref> Common terminology lets members of different agencies communicate effectively, because the same words are used for functions, resources and facilities.<ref name="LV-A" />


The incident action plan states what is to be done. At a structure fire the incident commander combines standard operating procedures, the pre-incident plan and the [[Size-up]] into a plan that should be a straightforward strategy built on the major tactical objectives.<ref name="KS-13-5">Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-5.</ref> The plan is dynamic and is revised as size-up shows changing conditions. In structural fire fighting, the choice between offensive and defensive operations is often the most critical factor in the risk-benefit analysis, and so forms the foundation of the plan.<ref name="KS-13-6">Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-6.</ref> For routine incidents the FDNY treats its standard operating procedures as the plan. At complex incidents involving several agencies, such as hazardous materials or mass casualty incidents, a written plan of action developed at the scene replaces them.<ref name="LV-A" />
The incident action plan states what is to be done. At a structure fire the incident commander combines standard operating procedures, the pre-incident plan and the [[size-up]] into a plan that should be a straightforward strategy built on the major tactical objectives.<ref name="KS-13-5">Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-5.</ref> The plan is dynamic and is revised as size-up shows changing conditions. In structural fire fighting, the choice between offensive and defensive operations is often the most critical factor in the risk-benefit analysis, and so forms the foundation of the plan.<ref name="KS-13-6">Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-6.</ref> For routine incidents the FDNY treats its standard operating procedures as the plan. At complex incidents involving several agencies, such as hazardous materials or mass casualty incidents, a written plan of action developed at the scene replaces them.<ref name="LV-A" />


== Command, transfer and unified command ==
== Command, transfer and unified command ==
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When resources from several departments, functions or jurisdictions arrive, command must be unified.<ref name="Schmidt-1-144" /> A unified command lets all parties identify the incident objectives, set resource objectives and develop one consolidated incident action plan.<ref name="Schmidt-1-144" /> The FDNY manual describes unified command as a way to organise agencies with statutory authority into one coordinated effort and to minimise "turf battles".<ref name="LV-A" /> Each agency keeps control of its own personnel, but the senior officials meet at one command post and prepare a single plan. A plane crash, for example, may involve the fire and police departments, aviation and transport safety authorities and the Port Authority.<ref name="LV-A" />
When resources from several departments, functions or jurisdictions arrive, command must be unified.<ref name="Schmidt-1-144" /> A unified command lets all parties identify the incident objectives, set resource objectives and develop one consolidated incident action plan.<ref name="Schmidt-1-144" /> The FDNY manual describes unified command as a way to organise agencies with statutory authority into one coordinated effort and to minimise "turf battles".<ref name="LV-A" /> Each agency keeps control of its own personnel, but the senior officials meet at one command post and prepare a single plan. A plane crash, for example, may involve the fire and police departments, aviation and transport safety authorities and the Port Authority.<ref name="LV-A" />
[[File:fse-incident-command-system-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Diagram of fire, police and other agency officials meeting at one command post and producing one incident action plan|Unified command: agency officials meet at one command post and agree one incident action plan, while each agency directs its own personnel.]]


Rules on who commands depend on the incident. At an aircraft accident, according to Kreckie (2008), ICS and NIMS protocol puts the fire department in charge until rescue is complete, the fire is out and the scene is safe. The site is considered a crime scene until proven otherwise, and command then passes to law enforcement.<ref name="Kreckie-13-112">Kreckie (2008), p. 13-112.</ref> Where an industrial fire brigade works with a municipal fire department, Snyder (2008) advises making sure that their incident management systems can be integrated and deciding beforehand who will have overall command.<ref name="Snyder-12-196">Snyder (2008), p. 12-196.</ref>
Rules on who commands depend on the incident. At an aircraft accident, according to Kreckie (2008), ICS and NIMS protocol puts the fire department in charge until rescue is complete, the fire is out and the scene is safe. The site is considered a crime scene until proven otherwise, and command then passes to law enforcement.<ref name="Kreckie-13-112">Kreckie (2008), p. 13-112.</ref> Where an industrial fire brigade works with a municipal fire department, Snyder (2008) advises making sure that their incident management systems can be integrated and deciding beforehand who will have overall command.<ref name="Snyder-12-196">Snyder (2008), p. 12-196.</ref>
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== Safety and accountability ==
== Safety and accountability ==


ICS is closely linked to fire fighter safety. Loflin (2008) lists ways to reduce the risks to members at an incident, many of which fall to the incident commander.<ref name="Loflin-12-113">Loflin (2008), p. 12-113.</ref> The incident commander is responsible for overall responder accountability, starts an accountability worksheet at the beginning of the incident and keeps track of the location and function of all companies. Branch directors and division, group or sector supervisors are appointed when needed to reduce the span of control, and they supervise and account for the companies under them. All members are responsible for taking part in the department's [[Personnel accountability system]]. After any change in conditions that could make operations unsafe, the incident commander should obtain a personnel accountability report from each supervisor.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" />
ICS is closely linked to fire fighter safety. Loflin (2008) lists ways to reduce the risks to members at an incident, many of which fall to the incident commander.<ref name="Loflin-12-113">Loflin (2008), p. 12-113.</ref> The incident commander is responsible for overall responder accountability, starts an accountability worksheet at the beginning of the incident and keeps track of the location and function of all companies. Branch directors and division, group or sector supervisors are appointed when needed to reduce the span of control, and they supervise and account for the companies under them. All members are responsible for taking part in the department's [[personnel accountability system]]. After any change in conditions that could make operations unsafe, the incident commander should obtain a personnel accountability report from each supervisor.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" />


The safety officer is one of the command staff positions.<ref name="Schmidt-1-143" /> An [[Incident safety officer]] should be designated whenever the incident commander cannot perform this function personally because of the size or complexity of the incident.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Where the officer finds activities unsafe or an imminent hazard, the officer may alter, suspend or terminate them and should inform the incident commander immediately.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Loflin also lists the components that operational risk management needs within ICS. They include standard operating procedures, effective incident management and communications, an incident safety officer, rapid intervention crews and adequate resources.<ref name="Loflin-12-112" /> Loflin adds that communication problems are continually cited as one of the four contributing factors in incidents in which fire fighters are killed or injured.<ref name="Loflin-12-122" />
The safety officer is one of the command staff positions.<ref name="Schmidt-1-143" /> An [[incident safety officer]] should be designated whenever the incident commander cannot perform this function personally because of the size or complexity of the incident.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Where the officer finds activities unsafe or an imminent hazard, the officer may alter, suspend or terminate them and should inform the incident commander immediately.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Loflin also lists the components that operational risk management needs within ICS. They include standard operating procedures, effective incident management and communications, an incident safety officer, rapid intervention crews and adequate resources.<ref name="Loflin-12-112" /> Loflin adds that communication problems are continually cited as one of the four contributing factors in incidents in which fire fighters are killed or injured.<ref name="Loflin-12-122" />


== The World Trade Center, 1993 and 2001 ==
== The World Trade Center, 1993 and 2001 ==

Latest revision as of 00:44, 16 November 2026

The incident command system (ICS) is a standard, on-scene, all-hazards system for managing emergency incidents, used by fire fighters, hazardous materials teams, rescuers and emergency medical teams.[1] It sets out the roles, organisational structure and procedures through which one incident commander directs the facilities, equipment, personnel and communications at an incident.[2] The organisation grows from the incident commander downwards as an incident becomes larger and more complex, and shrinks again as resources are released.[2][3]

ICS was developed in California in the 1970s, in the FIRESCOPE programme that followed a devastating series of wildland fires in 1970.[4] It spread from wildland firefighting to structural fire fighting and other emergencies. In the United States it became part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), issued in March 2004, as the standard structure for managing all incidents.[1] NFPA 1561, first issued in 1990, sets requirements for an emergency services incident management system.[5] The Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) applied its own ICS at the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. NIST found that the procedures were largely followed, but that they were seriously challenged by the scale of the event.[6]

Definition and purpose

Loflin (2008) describes ICS as "a standard, on-scene, all-hazards incident management system", which NIMS established as the standardised organisational structure for managing all incidents.[1] Schmidt (2008) defines it by its content: ICS sets the operating characteristics, interactive management components and structure of incident management over the whole life of an incident.[2] It combines facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures and communications within one common organisational structure.[2] Loflin adds that ICS is, at its core, a management system designed to integrate resources to attack a common problem, and that its hallmark is flexibility.[7]

The more general term "incident management system" (IMS) is used for the same idea. C. J. Wright (2008a) defines an IMS as an organised approach to controlling and managing operations at an emergency through a system of roles, responsibilities and standard operating procedures.[8] One individual is in charge and may delegate tasks by location or by function, and all communications are routed through the command post. In his words, the system reduces confusion, improves safety, organises and coordinates actions, and facilitates the effective management of the incident.[8] The FDNY incident command system manual gives a safety purpose as well: better accountability of personnel and better use of resources.[3]

ICS is also tied to regulation. Granito (2008) notes that government agencies in the United States and certain other countries have issued regulations and advisories on this. They concern the need for certain emergency operations to have trained incident commanders, standby safety and rescue crews, and a defined incident command system.[9] In the United States, the federal Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response rule (29 CFR 1910.120) applies to organisations that respond to hazardous materials or hazardous waste emergencies. It requires emergency response procedures that include an incident management system and a safety officer.[10]

History

The system grew out of a California wildfire disaster. During 13 days in 1970, 16 lives were lost, 700 structures were destroyed and over one-half million acres burned, at a cost and loss of $18 million per day.[4] The responding agencies cooperated as well as they could, but problems with communication and coordination hampered their effectiveness. Congress then mandated the United States Forest Service to design a system that would "make a quantum jump" in the agencies' ability to coordinate interagency action and allocate resources in multiple-fire situations. The Forest Service worked with the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, the Governor's Office of Emergency Services and several county and city fire departments. Their project became known as FIRESCOPE, short for Fire Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies.[4][11]

The first FIRESCOPE Technical Team was set up in 1973, and its work produced two components: ICS and the Multi-Agency Coordination System.[4] By the mid-1970s the FIRESCOPE agencies had agreed on common ICS terminology and procedures, and by 1980 parts of ICS had been used successfully at several major wildland and urban fires. The National Fire Academy adopted the FIRESCOPE ICS in 1980. By 1981 the major fire agencies of southern California used it widely, and its use for nonfire incidents was growing; it was soon seen as suitable for floods, hazardous materials accidents, earthquakes and aircraft crashes. In 1982 the FIRESCOPE documents were revised and adopted as the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS), the wildland community's common system for local, state and federal agencies.[4][11] The Federal Emergency Management Agency formally adopted the FIRESCOPE ICS for any federal response it required.[4]

Time line from 1970 to 2004 with the main steps in the development of the incident command system
Main steps in the development of the incident command system in the United States, 1970–2004.

Difficulties in applying the system brought variation. Inconsistencies and hybrid systems developed, moving the fire service away from a common approach.[11] In 1987 NFPA began work on NFPA 1561, whose committee found that most systems then in use were similar and differed mainly in terminology.[1] The standard was first issued in 1990 to support the NFPA 1500 requirement that fire departments conduct emergency operations within an effective incident management system. Later editions covered accountability, rapid intervention crews and interagency cooperation (1995), all emergency services (2000), and incident management teams and unified command (2005).[5] A National Fire Service Incident Management System Consortium, formed in 1990, published the Model Procedures Guide for Structural Firefighting in 1993, which FIRESCOPE incorporated into its system.[1]

The latest step described in the handbook is NIMS. The Department of Homeland Security issued it on 1 March 2004, and NIMS took ICS as one of its most important best practices.[1] The report of the 9/11 Commission had recommended national adoption of ICS to improve command, control and communications.[1] Loflin notes that law enforcement, public works and public health had regarded ICS as a fire service system. NIMS was to end this discrepancy, because Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 made state and local adoption of NIMS a condition for federal preparedness funding.[7] Denlinger (2008) describes ICS as a staple of fire service training for decades that had been incorporated into NIMS, which was taught across the United States.[12]

Organisation and functions

ICS divides incident management into five major functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics and finance/administration.[2] The incident commander fills the command function and is supported by a command staff of a public information officer, a safety officer and a liaison officer.[2][13] In the FDNY manual, operations manages all tactical operations, planning gathers and evaluates information on the incident and the status of resources, logistics provides supplies, services and facilities, and finance records costs.[3] The liaison officer is the point of contact for agency representatives, and the safety officer monitors unsafe conditions and acts to protect personnel. The public information officer gathers factual information and, with the incident commander's approval, deals with the media.[3] Adair (2008) describes this officer as a member of the command staff reporting directly to the incident commander.[14]

Organisation chart with incident commander, command staff of three officers and four sections: operations, planning, logistics, finance and administration
Basic incident command system organisation with the five functions and the command staff.

The incident commander keeps responsibility for every function that has not been delegated.[3] At most incidents the incident commander handles all the major functions personally. As an incident grows or more alarms are transmitted, some of the authority must be delegated to other officers, and the FDNY manual calls delegation the key to its system. Each section can then concentrate on one assignment, which gives functional clarity and fixes accountability.[3]

The structure is modular. A routine incident has a simple structure, a complex one a larger structure, and the organisation is reduced as the incident is brought under control.[3] The FDNY manual combines single companies into sectors, which cover a geographical area such as an exposure, and groups, which carry out a function such as searching floors of a high-rise building. Strike teams combine resources of the same kind and type with common communications, while task forces combine any resources for a temporary assignment and should be limited to five resources. Branches are created when the span of control over sectors and groups becomes excessive, or when resources from other agencies are committed.[3] Klaene and Sanders (2008) describe the same step at a structure fire: the incident commander assigns sections, branches, divisions, groups, strike teams and task forces as needed to reduce the span of control.[15]

Three organisation charts side by side showing an incident command structure growing from a few companies to sectors, groups and branches
Modular growth of an incident command organisation: companies are combined into sectors and groups, and these into branches, to keep span of control manageable.

Span of control is the number of subordinates one person supervises. The FDNY manual gives a range of three to seven, with five as the ideal.[3] One officer may supervise up to seven where tasks are simple, the area is small, communications are good and the incident is stable. Where tasks are demanding, the area is large and the incident is escalating, the span might be reduced to three or four.[3] Denlinger (2008) gives five to seven subordinates per supervisor as the ideal span for fire department management in general.[16]

ICS also names the places and states of an incident. The command post is the location from which the incident commander manages the incident, and the FDNY manual specifies that there should be only one.[3] Staging is the area where resources wait for assignment, and recuperation and care is the area where personnel rest. Every resource has one of three states: available, assigned, or out of service.[3] Larger emergencies may also be managed from an emergency operations centre, on site or at a distance, and Schmidt notes that "virtual" centres can be created by conference call.[13]

Common terminology and planning

The FDNY manual lists eight characteristics of its system: common terminology, a manageable span of control, modular organisation, integrated communications, a unified command structure, incident action planning, designated incident facilities and resource management.[3][6] C. J. Wright (2008a) lists the NIMS elements as common terminology, modular organisations, integrated communications, a unified command structure, consolidated action plans, a manageable span of control, predesignated incident facilities and the management of all resources.[8] Van Helden and Stewart (2008) name some of the core values of NIMS as span of control, unity of command, accountability, resource tracking and the operation of incident action plans.[17] Common terminology lets members of different agencies communicate effectively, because the same words are used for functions, resources and facilities.[3]

The incident action plan states what is to be done. At a structure fire the incident commander combines standard operating procedures, the pre-incident plan and the size-up into a plan that should be a straightforward strategy built on the major tactical objectives.[18] The plan is dynamic and is revised as size-up shows changing conditions. In structural fire fighting, the choice between offensive and defensive operations is often the most critical factor in the risk-benefit analysis, and so forms the foundation of the plan.[19] For routine incidents the FDNY treats its standard operating procedures as the plan. At complex incidents involving several agencies, such as hazardous materials or mass casualty incidents, a written plan of action developed at the scene replaces them.[3]

Command, transfer and unified command

ICS starts with the arrival of the first fire department company, which builds risk management into the routine functions of incident command.[20] In a private facility, the authority to warn occupants to take protective action, such as evacuating, must rest with the leader of the emergency response team, who also serves as incident commander.[13] Command then transfers to the first arriving fire department or law enforcement officer and later to the highest-ranking officer in charge. This keeps a clear, properly briefed authority able to command all resources.[13] In the FDNY system, command passes to succeeding officers as the incident grows, and the structure is expanded at each step.[3]

When resources from several departments, functions or jurisdictions arrive, command must be unified.[13] A unified command lets all parties identify the incident objectives, set resource objectives and develop one consolidated incident action plan.[13] The FDNY manual describes unified command as a way to organise agencies with statutory authority into one coordinated effort and to minimise "turf battles".[3] Each agency keeps control of its own personnel, but the senior officials meet at one command post and prepare a single plan. A plane crash, for example, may involve the fire and police departments, aviation and transport safety authorities and the Port Authority.[3]

Diagram of fire, police and other agency officials meeting at one command post and producing one incident action plan
Unified command: agency officials meet at one command post and agree one incident action plan, while each agency directs its own personnel.

Rules on who commands depend on the incident. At an aircraft accident, according to Kreckie (2008), ICS and NIMS protocol puts the fire department in charge until rescue is complete, the fire is out and the scene is safe. The site is considered a crime scene until proven otherwise, and command then passes to law enforcement.[21] Where an industrial fire brigade works with a municipal fire department, Snyder (2008) advises making sure that their incident management systems can be integrated and deciding beforehand who will have overall command.[22]

In a disaster the incident commander may be the police chief, the fire chief, the health department director or someone else. Van Helden and Stewart warn that a chief executive's wish to control events can lead to conflict.[23] Denlinger (2008) advises that written mutual-aid plans settle command responsibility and specify that NIMS and ICS will be used at all incidents.[24]

Safety and accountability

ICS is closely linked to fire fighter safety. Loflin (2008) lists ways to reduce the risks to members at an incident, many of which fall to the incident commander.[25] The incident commander is responsible for overall responder accountability, starts an accountability worksheet at the beginning of the incident and keeps track of the location and function of all companies. Branch directors and division, group or sector supervisors are appointed when needed to reduce the span of control, and they supervise and account for the companies under them. All members are responsible for taking part in the department's personnel accountability system. After any change in conditions that could make operations unsafe, the incident commander should obtain a personnel accountability report from each supervisor.[25]

The safety officer is one of the command staff positions.[2] An incident safety officer should be designated whenever the incident commander cannot perform this function personally because of the size or complexity of the incident.[25] Where the officer finds activities unsafe or an imminent hazard, the officer may alter, suspend or terminate them and should inform the incident commander immediately.[25] Loflin also lists the components that operational risk management needs within ICS. They include standard operating procedures, effective incident management and communications, an incident safety officer, rapid intervention crews and adequate resources.[20] Loflin adds that communication problems are continually cited as one of the four contributing factors in incidents in which fire fighters are killed or injured.[7]

The World Trade Center, 1993 and 2001

The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center was beyond anything FDNY had experienced, and information overload occurred at the incident command level.[26] FDNY upgraded its ICS afterwards, and its ICS manual of May 1997 had been in use for about four years by 11 September 2001.[26] A lesson from 1993 was that each agency should have a representative at the command post to make coordination easier.[27] On 11 September 2001, FDNY set up three lobby command posts within one hour, in WTC 1, WTC 2 and the Marriott Hotel. It added a fourth command post on the street and an incident command post near West and Vesey Streets.[6] NIST found that the ICS procedures were to a great extent being followed in this extremely large and complex operation, although all were seriously challenged.[6]

Tracking resources was one of the hardest tasks. In the course of the day roughly 1,000 firefighters were on the scene, about ten times the number that might respond to a two-alarm fire.[28] Their positions were kept on three magnetic command boards, which became overwhelmed while the towers were still burning and were lost when the buildings collapsed.[28] NIST also found no formal structure of unified command between departments below the commissioner level. FDNY and NYPD chiefs did not work at the same command post and did not issue unified orders.[29][30] The collapse of WTC 2 totally disrupted the ICS operations of FDNY, NYPD and the Port Authority Police.[31]

NIST's Recommendation 24 drew conclusions for command and control in large building emergencies. It recommended that state, local and federal jurisdictions implement NIMS, and that each supporting agency assign an individual to coordinate with the lead agency at each incident command post.[32] Command posts should be set up outside the potential collapse footprint of any building with large multi-floor fires or serious structural damage. An effective command system should be operating before large numbers of responders and apparatus are dispatched, and responders and ambulances should await dispatch requests from the incident command system rather than self-dispatch.[32]

Limits and decision making

ICS is not a rigid formula. The FDNY manual states that experience, common sense and imagination are the guiding principles in using its options.[3] Loflin (2008) writes that ICS need not be approached "with the same mathematical precision used by an engineer". As long as implementation is consistent with the basic principles of NIMS, progress is made, and refinements can follow from experience.[7] Application has also varied. According to Loflin, difficulties in understanding ICS led to inconsistencies and hybrid systems, although a single system is critical at major incidents where one department works with local, state and federal agencies.[11] Like most of the handbook sources, these accounts describe US practice up to 2008.

Research on the decisions of fire officers is summarised in the SFPE Handbook. Bryan (2002) describes the recognition-primed decision model developed by Klein from studies of fire department officers.[33] He also cites Chubb's model of the decision processes used in incident command, based on naturalistic decision-making. The critical variables of that model include ill-defined goals, uncertainty and missing data, shifting goals, continually changing conditions, time stress, high stakes and experienced decision-makers.[33]

At the World Trade Center, NIST found that responders inside the buildings without reliable communications felt that their situational awareness was poor. Some senior officers inside WTC 1 felt the same, even though they were in radio contact with officers outside. One of them said that he would have known more had he been at home watching the event on television.[34]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 Loflin (2008), p. 12-121.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 Schmidt (2008), p. 1-143.
  3. ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17 3.18 Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Loflin (2008), p. 12-120.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Loflin (2008), p. 12-110.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 118.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 Loflin (2008), p. 12-122.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 C. J. Wright (2008a), p. 13-142.
  9. ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-8.
  10. ↑ Hildebrand and Noll (2008), p. 13-88.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 Loflin (2008), p. 12-119.
  12. ↑ Denlinger (2008), p. 12-54.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 Schmidt (2008), p. 1-144.
  14. ↑ Adair (2008), p. 5-58.
  15. ↑ Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-7.
  16. ↑ Denlinger (2008), p. 12-61.
  17. ↑ Van Helden and Stewart (2008), p. 12-200.
  18. ↑ Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-5.
  19. ↑ Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-6.
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 Loflin (2008), p. 12-112.
  21. ↑ Kreckie (2008), p. 13-112.
  22. ↑ Snyder (2008), p. 12-196.
  23. ↑ Van Helden and Stewart (2008), p. 12-213.
  24. ↑ Denlinger (2008), p. 12-65.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 25.3 Loflin (2008), p. 12-113.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 18.
  27. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 19.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 McAllister et al. (2008), p. 294.
  29. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 175.
  30. ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 191.
  31. ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 193.
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 220.
  33. ↑ 33.0 33.1 Bryan (2002), p. 3-322.
  34. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. xliv.

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