New FSE wiki article: Chemical incompatibility (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
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The idea extends beyond pairs of stored chemicals. Containers for chemicals are designed to be compatible with their contents, and damage to them releases the chemical and can increase fire and explosion hazards.<ref name="Dav-7-44" /> In oxygen systems, an oxygen compatibility assessment identifies the fire hazards of a component, starting from the most severe operating conditions, the flammability of its materials and the possible ignition mechanisms.<ref name="RS-9-237">Rosales and Stoltzfus (2008), p. 9-237.</ref> Pre-incident plans record any incompatibility with water or other materials, together with the quantity and location of hazardous materials.<ref name="No-12-303" /> In the transport classification of explosives, the divisions of Class 1 are further divided into compatibility groups.<ref name="San-6-249">Santis (2008), p. 6-249.</ref> | The idea extends beyond pairs of stored chemicals. Containers for chemicals are designed to be compatible with their contents, and damage to them releases the chemical and can increase fire and explosion hazards.<ref name="Dav-7-44" /> In oxygen systems, an oxygen compatibility assessment identifies the fire hazards of a component, starting from the most severe operating conditions, the flammability of its materials and the possible ignition mechanisms.<ref name="RS-9-237">Rosales and Stoltzfus (2008), p. 9-237.</ref> Pre-incident plans record any incompatibility with water or other materials, together with the quantity and location of hazardous materials.<ref name="No-12-303" /> In the transport classification of explosives, the divisions of Class 1 are further divided into compatibility groups.<ref name="San-6-249">Santis (2008), p. 6-249.</ref> | ||
The underlying chemistry links back to the fire triangle. ''Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering'' describes combustion as mainly exothermic reactions between a fuel and an oxidiser, usually oxygen gas.<ref name="VR-4.1">Van Rossum (2027), §4.1.</ref> Mixing a strong oxidiser with a fuel brings two sides of the fire triangle together in one place, and such mixtures can be easier to ignite and burn more intensely.<ref name="VR-4.2">Van Rossum (2027), §4.2.</ref><ref name="Dav-7-54" /> | The underlying chemistry links back to the fire triangle. ''Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering'' describes combustion as mainly exothermic reactions between a fuel and an oxidiser, usually oxygen gas.<ref name="VR-4.1">Van Rossum (2027), §4.1.</ref> Mixing a strong oxidiser with a fuel brings two sides of the fire triangle together in one place, and such mixtures can be easier to ignite and burn more intensely.<ref name="VR-4.2">Van Rossum (2027), §4.2.</ref><ref name="Dav-7-54" /> Some other incompatible pairs need no air, because the dangerous reaction takes place between the two substances directly.<ref name="Dav-7-52">Davenport (2008), p. 7-52.</ref> | ||
== Types of incompatible reactions == | == Types of incompatible reactions == | ||
The handbook describes the dangerous combinations chemical by chemical. They fall into a few recurring types, summarised in the table. Most involve an oxidiser, an acid, water or a catalyst as one of the partners. | The handbook describes the dangerous combinations chemical by chemical. They fall into a few recurring types, summarised in the table. Most involve an oxidiser, an acid, water or a catalyst as one of the partners. | ||
[[File:fse-chemical-incompatibility-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Matrix of seven material groups with marked cells for cited dangerous pairs, such as oxidisers with combustibles and acids with cyanides or sulfides.|Each marked cell represents at least one specific incompatible pair reported in the Fire Protection Handbook, not every combination of those groups. An empty cell does not mean compatible.]] | |||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
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| Cyanides or sulfides with acids || toxic hydrogen cyanide or hydrogen sulfide<ref name="Dav-7-49" /><ref name="Dav-7-48">Davenport (2008), p. 7-48.</ref> | | Cyanides or sulfides with acids || toxic hydrogen cyanide or hydrogen sulfide<ref name="Dav-7-49" /><ref name="Dav-7-48">Davenport (2008), p. 7-48.</ref> | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | Water-reactive carbides or metal hydrides with water || flammable acetylene or hydrogen and heat<ref name="Dav-7-51">Davenport (2008), p. 7-51.</ref> | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Strong oxidisers with hydrochloric acid | | Strong oxidisers with hydrochloric acid, including nitric acid || chlorine gas<ref name="Dav-7-52" /> | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Chlorine with acetylene, ammonia, turpentine, hydrocarbons or powdered metals || fire or explosion<ref name="Dav-7-52" /> | | Chlorine with acetylene, ammonia, turpentine, hydrocarbons or powdered metals || fire or explosion<ref name="Dav-7-52" /> | ||
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== Contamination, heat and runaway reactions == | == Contamination, heat and runaway reactions == | ||
Not every incompatibility is a simple reaction between two partners. In some cases one substance acts as a catalyst. Ethylene oxide can polymerise violently when catalysed by anhydrous chlorides of iron, tin or aluminium, by iron rust or aluminium oxide, or by alkali metal hydroxides.<ref name="Dav-7-49" /> It also reacts with alcohols, acids, ammonia and many other compounds, and the heat of these reactions can start polymerisation of the remaining ethylene oxide.<ref name="Dav-7-49" /> Hydrogen cyanide polymerises under the catalytic effect of alkaline materials. Because one product of the reaction, ammonia, is itself alkaline, the reaction feeds itself until an explosion eventually occurs; adding an acid keeps the rate at a safe level.<ref name="Dav-7-49" /> | Not every incompatibility is a simple reaction between two partners. In some cases one substance acts as a catalyst. Ethylene oxide can polymerise violently when catalysed by anhydrous chlorides of iron, tin or aluminium, by iron rust or aluminium oxide, or by alkali metal hydroxides.<ref name="Dav-7-49" /> It also reacts with alcohols, acids, ammonia and many other compounds, and the heat of these reactions can start polymerisation of the remaining ethylene oxide.<ref name="Dav-7-49" /> Hydrogen cyanide polymerises under the catalytic effect of alkaline materials. Because one product of the reaction, ammonia, is itself alkaline, the reaction feeds itself until an explosion eventually occurs; adding an acid keeps the rate at a safe level.<ref name="Dav-7-49" /> | ||
[[File:fse-chemical-incompatibility-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Two feedback loops: hydrogen cyanide polymerisation producing alkaline ammonia that speeds it up, and styrene polymerisation heating itself.|Two self-accelerating reactions described in the Fire Protection Handbook: alkaline ammonia from hydrogen cyanide polymerisation catalyses further polymerisation unless acid is added, and the heat of styrene polymerisation speeds up the reaction unless an inhibitor is present.]] | |||
Reactions that are accelerated by their own heat can end in [[thermal runaway]]. Styrene, for example, polymerises slowly at ordinary temperatures, but the exothermic reaction eventually becomes violent as its own heat speeds it up, so inhibitors are added.<ref name="Dav-7-50" /> In the SFPE Handbook, Gray (2002) treats thermal runaway and runaway reaction as synonyms for the supercritical behaviour of a chemical reactor. The reaction rate grows almost exponentially with temperature, while heat loss grows only linearly.<ref name="Gray-2-212">Gray (2002), p. 2-212.</ref> | Reactions that are accelerated by their own heat can end in [[thermal runaway]]. Styrene, for example, polymerises slowly at ordinary temperatures, but the exothermic reaction eventually becomes violent as its own heat speeds it up, so inhibitors are added.<ref name="Dav-7-50" /> In the SFPE Handbook, Gray (2002) treats thermal runaway and runaway reaction as synonyms for the supercritical behaviour of a chemical reactor. The reaction rate grows almost exponentially with temperature, while heat loss grows only linearly.<ref name="Gray-2-212">Gray (2002), p. 2-212.</ref> | ||
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== Sources of compatibility information == | == Sources of compatibility information == | ||
Davenport (2008) describes a United States requirement for manufacturers to prepare material safety data sheets for their products. These [[safety data sheet|safety data sheets]] give information on toxicity, flammability, reactivity and stability and on safe handling and storage.<ref name="Dav-7-43" /> The NFPA ''Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous Materials'' contains the former NFPA 49, NFPA 325 and NFPA 491, the last of which collects the reported dangerous reactions.<ref name="Dav-7-43" /><ref name="Dav-7-54" /> Davenport also described the United States Coast Guard's Chemical and Hazardous Response Information System as a searchable CD-ROM. A Chemical Reactivity Worksheet developed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency shows the hazards of mixing chemicals chosen by the user.<ref name="Dav-7-43" /><ref name="Dav-7-44" /> | |||
Published data have limits. In the SFPE Handbook, Barry (2002) notes that most data in material safety data sheets refer to atmospheric temperature and pressure, so experimental data for the actual process conditions are sometimes needed.<ref name="Bar-5-178">Barry (2002), p. 5-178.</ref> The checklist for hazard identification in the same chapter includes the general process chemistry, with side reactions under normal and abnormal conditions, and the effect of contaminants.<ref name="Bar-5-178" /> Zalosh (2008) summarises guidelines of the Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. They combine lists of unstable materials and dangerous combinations, software to identify incompatible chemicals, laboratory screening tests of onset temperatures and sensitivities, and expert review.<ref name="Zal-2-102" /> Calorimetric screening has limits too: Gray (2002) notes that differential scanning calorimetry and differential thermal analysis give only very general information, although they can show whether a material can react exothermically at all.<ref name="Gray-2-212" /> | Published data have limits. In the SFPE Handbook, Barry (2002) notes that most data in material safety data sheets refer to atmospheric temperature and pressure, so experimental data for the actual process conditions are sometimes needed.<ref name="Bar-5-178">Barry (2002), p. 5-178.</ref> The checklist for hazard identification in the same chapter includes the general process chemistry, with side reactions under normal and abnormal conditions, and the effect of contaminants.<ref name="Bar-5-178" /> Zalosh (2008) summarises guidelines of the Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. They combine lists of unstable materials and dangerous combinations, software to identify incompatible chemicals, laboratory screening tests of onset temperatures and sensitivities, and expert review.<ref name="Zal-2-102" /> Calorimetric screening has limits too: Gray (2002) notes that differential scanning calorimetry and differential thermal analysis give only very general information, although they can show whether a material can react exothermically at all.<ref name="Gray-2-212" /> | ||
[[File:fse-chemical-incompatibility-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Flowchart from safety data sheets and reaction lists, via software and laboratory screening tests, to expert review of storage and process conditions.|Recognising incompatibility and reaction hazards: data sheets and collections of reported reactions, software, laboratory screening tests and expert review.]] | |||
Transport markings are not a full guide. The label required for interstate shipment classifies a chemical by hazard for transport purposes only, so storage arrangements rely on a thorough knowledge of its fire, health and reactivity hazards.<ref name="Dav-7-45" /> For pesticides, Whitford (2008) suggests the Department of Transportation tables for co-shipment of incompatible materials in highway cargo vans as an initial guide.<ref name="Wh-6-238">Whitford (2008), p. 6-238.</ref> | Transport markings are not a full guide. The label required for interstate shipment classifies a chemical by hazard for transport purposes only, so storage arrangements rely on a thorough knowledge of its fire, health and reactivity hazards.<ref name="Dav-7-45" /> For pesticides, Whitford (2008) suggests the Department of Transportation tables for co-shipment of incompatible materials in highway cargo vans as an initial guide.<ref name="Wh-6-238">Whitford (2008), p. 6-238.</ref> | ||
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== Segregation in storage and transport == | == Segregation in storage and transport == | ||
The extent of segregation depends on the quantity stored, the physical state of the chemicals and their degree of incompatibility. The known behaviour of the materials in a fire also counts, because vessels can rupture and incompatible materials can mix under fire conditions.<ref name="Dav-7-44" /> Segregation can take the form of a separate detached building, isolation within the same building by fire walls and drainage, or separation by an empty area or by intervening storage of inert materials.<ref name="Dav-7-44" /> For pesticides, products that are not chemically compatible are stored in separate rooms or buildings. Noncombustible walls or partitions are considered where incompatible materials must be segregated within a building.<ref name="Wh-6-239">Whitford (2008), p. 6-239.</ref> The same chapter observes that small businesses generally do not segregate their inventory, because they lack the space.<ref name="Wh-6-239" /> | The extent of segregation depends on the quantity stored, the physical state of the chemicals and their degree of incompatibility. The known behaviour of the materials in a fire also counts, because vessels can rupture and incompatible materials can mix under fire conditions.<ref name="Dav-7-44" /> Segregation can take the form of a separate detached building, isolation within the same building by fire walls and drainage, or separation by an empty area or by intervening storage of inert materials.<ref name="Dav-7-44" /> For pesticides, products that are not chemically compatible are stored in separate rooms or buildings. Noncombustible walls or partitions are considered where incompatible materials must be segregated within a building.<ref name="Wh-6-239">Whitford (2008), p. 6-239.</ref> The same chapter observes that small businesses generally do not segregate their inventory, because they lack the space.<ref name="Wh-6-239" /> | ||
[[File:fse-chemical-incompatibility-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Four plan views: detached building, fire wall with drainage in one building, empty space between stacks, and inert goods stored between two incompatible stacks.|Four forms of segregation of incompatible chemicals: a detached building, isolation within the building by a fire wall and drainage, an intervening empty area, or intervening storage of inert or nonhazardous materials.]] | |||
Gas cylinders follow a similar rule. | Gas cylinders follow a similar rule. NFPA 55, as described by Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), requires separation of several gas hazard classes in the United States. They include flammable, oxidising, corrosive, toxic or highly toxic, and pyrophoric gases, as well as unstable reactive gases of classes 2, 3 and 4. The distance is 6.1 m (20 ft). It can be reduced without limit by a noncombustible barrier at least 1.5 m (5 ft) high with a fire resistance rating of at least half an hour. Gases of the class "other gas" need no separation.<ref name="LR-7-38">Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-38.</ref> | ||
In laboratories, the handbook states that for all storage incompatible materials must be segregated.<ref name="And-9-164">Anderson (2008a), p. 9-164.</ref> For [[hazardous waste]], Severson (2008) warns that mixing two discarded substances can cause a chemical reaction with severe and unexpected consequences. The prevention measures listed start with segregating chemically incompatible wastes, for example keeping combustible waste away from self-heating or oxidising materials.<ref name="Sev-7-60">Severson (2008), p. 7-60.</ref><ref name="Sev-7-65">Severson (2008), p. 7-65.</ref> Waste handling systems may need special precautions to keep incompatible wastes apart.<ref name="DG-11-17">Doucet and Gilyeat (2008), p. 11-17.</ref> Poor housekeeping is another route: mixing oxidising substances with flammable liquids is named as one of its undesired outcomes, and staff should know what is already in a rubbish receptacle before adding to it.<ref name="Riv-21-37">Rivkin (2008a), p. 21-37.</ref> | In laboratories, the handbook states that for all storage incompatible materials must be segregated.<ref name="And-9-164">Anderson (2008a), p. 9-164.</ref> For [[hazardous waste]], Severson (2008) warns that mixing two discarded substances can cause a chemical reaction with severe and unexpected consequences. The prevention measures listed start with segregating chemically incompatible wastes, for example keeping combustible waste away from self-heating or oxidising materials.<ref name="Sev-7-60">Severson (2008), p. 7-60.</ref><ref name="Sev-7-65">Severson (2008), p. 7-65.</ref> Waste handling systems may need special precautions to keep incompatible wastes apart.<ref name="DG-11-17">Doucet and Gilyeat (2008), p. 11-17.</ref> Poor housekeeping is another route: mixing oxidising substances with flammable liquids is named as one of its undesired outcomes, and staff should know what is already in a rubbish receptacle before adding to it.<ref name="Riv-21-37">Rivkin (2008a), p. 21-37.</ref> | ||
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Water is normally used as the extinguishing agent for stored chemicals, except on those that are dangerously water-reactive.<ref name="Dav-7-44" /> Yu and Newman (2008) name the carbides, which form acetylene, the hydrides, which form hydrogen, and the peroxides of sodium, potassium, barium and strontium, which react exothermically. Cyanide salts form hydrogen cyanide gas with acidified water.<ref name="YN-2-91" /> Frank (2008) gives the general rule that water should not be used on materials that react with it and may release oxygen, flammable gases and heat.<ref name="Fra-17-41">Frank (2008), p. 17-41.</ref> Foam is water-based, so its hazards include reaction with incompatible materials.<ref name="IS-B-60">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-60.</ref> Medium- and high-expansion foam is not used on water-reactive metals such as sodium and potassium, or on materials such as triethylaluminium and phosphorus pentoxide, unless tests show it to be acceptable.<ref name="SH-4-129">Scheffey and Hickey (2002), p. 4-129.</ref> | Water is normally used as the extinguishing agent for stored chemicals, except on those that are dangerously water-reactive.<ref name="Dav-7-44" /> Yu and Newman (2008) name the carbides, which form acetylene, the hydrides, which form hydrogen, and the peroxides of sodium, potassium, barium and strontium, which react exothermically. Cyanide salts form hydrogen cyanide gas with acidified water.<ref name="YN-2-91" /> Frank (2008) gives the general rule that water should not be used on materials that react with it and may release oxygen, flammable gases and heat.<ref name="Fra-17-41">Frank (2008), p. 17-41.</ref> Foam is water-based, so its hazards include reaction with incompatible materials.<ref name="IS-B-60">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-60.</ref> Medium- and high-expansion foam is not used on water-reactive metals such as sodium and potassium, or on materials such as triethylaluminium and phosphorus pentoxide, unless tests show it to be acceptable.<ref name="SH-4-129">Scheffey and Hickey (2002), p. 4-129.</ref> | ||
Emergency planning reflects this. The hazardous materials emergency response plan of the Fire Department of the City of New York of 30 September 1994 is reproduced in NIST NCSTAR 1-8. It tells the first engine company to stretch a hose line | Emergency planning reflects this. The hazardous materials emergency response plan of the Fire Department of the City of New York of 30 September 1994 is reproduced in NIST NCSTAR 1-8. It tells the first arriving engine company to establish a water supply and, depending on conditions, to stretch a hose line without operating it until ordered by the incident commander after the initial hazard assessment. It warns that the premature, unnecessary or incompatible use of water can compound the hazard.<ref name="LV-A">Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A.</ref> For burning hazardous waste, the first question in Severson's list is whether the extinguishing agent is compatible with the waste.<ref name="Sev-7-65" /> Pre-incident plans record any incompatibility with water or other materials and any need for special extinguishing agents.<ref name="No-12-303" /> | ||
== Limits and misconceptions == | == Limits and misconceptions == | ||
Latest revision as of 08:23, 13 November 2026
Chemical incompatibility is the property of two or more materials that react dangerously when they come into contact, for example by igniting, exploding, releasing heat or giving off toxic or flammable gases. Such materials are called incompatible materials or incompatible chemicals.[1] Examples are an oxidiser and a fuel, an acid and a chlorate or cyanide, and a water-reactive material and water.[2][3][4] Some contaminants act as catalysts, starting a decomposition or polymerisation that then accelerates itself.[3] The number of possible combinations is very large: NFPA 491, as described in the 2008 edition of the Fire Protection Handbook, lists more than 3,400 dangerous reactions reported in the chemical literature.[1]
The usual safeguard is segregation, which the handbook calls the first principle of good storage practice for chemicals. It means keeping incompatible materials apart by separate buildings, fire walls, empty space or intervening inert storage.[5] Fires matter twice in this context. A fire can rupture containers and mix chemicals that were safely separated, and an extinguishing agent, especially water, can itself be incompatible with the stored material.[5][6] Information on incompatibilities comes from safety data sheets, reference collections such as NFPA 491, software tools and, where needed, laboratory tests.[7][8]
Definition and scope
The Fire Protection Handbook uses the term without a formal definition. Its chapter on chemicals by Davenport (2008) uses "so-called incompatible chemicals" for combinations that react dangerously when mixed. These include chemicals that increase the ease of ignition or the intensity of burning of the combustible materials with which they are mixed.[1] Recognising them requires knowledge of the potentially dangerous reactions of each individual chemical, because the combinations are too many to list in any other way.[1]
The idea extends beyond pairs of stored chemicals. Containers for chemicals are designed to be compatible with their contents, and damage to them releases the chemical and can increase fire and explosion hazards.[5] In oxygen systems, an oxygen compatibility assessment identifies the fire hazards of a component, starting from the most severe operating conditions, the flammability of its materials and the possible ignition mechanisms.[9] Pre-incident plans record any incompatibility with water or other materials, together with the quantity and location of hazardous materials.[6] In the transport classification of explosives, the divisions of Class 1 are further divided into compatibility groups.[10]
The underlying chemistry links back to the fire triangle. Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering describes combustion as mainly exothermic reactions between a fuel and an oxidiser, usually oxygen gas.[11] Mixing a strong oxidiser with a fuel brings two sides of the fire triangle together in one place, and such mixtures can be easier to ignite and burn more intensely.[12][1] Some other incompatible pairs need no air, because the dangerous reaction takes place between the two substances directly.[13]
Types of incompatible reactions
The handbook describes the dangerous combinations chemical by chemical. They fall into a few recurring types, summarised in the table. Most involve an oxidiser, an acid, water or a catalyst as one of the partners.
| Combination | Result |
|---|---|
| Oxidisers with combustible materials or flammable liquids | more intense burning; some mixtures ignite or explode[2] |
| Chlorates with acids; sodium chlorite with strong acids | dangerous reactions; sodium chlorite releases explosive chlorine dioxide[2][14] |
| Potassium permanganate with sulfuric acid or hydrogen peroxide | explosive[14] |
| Cyanides or sulfides with acids | toxic hydrogen cyanide or hydrogen sulfide[3][15] |
| Water-reactive carbides or metal hydrides with water | flammable acetylene or hydrogen and heat[16] |
| Strong oxidisers with hydrochloric acid, including nitric acid | chlorine gas[13] |
| Chlorine with acetylene, ammonia, turpentine, hydrocarbons or powdered metals | fire or explosion[13] |
| Sulfur with chlorates or perchlorates | highly explosive, easily detonated mixtures[15] |
| Ethylene oxide with iron chlorides, rust or alkali hydroxides | violent polymerisation[3] |
The first type is the oxidiser and fuel pair. Oxidising chemicals are usually not combustible themselves, but they provide oxygen that accelerates the burning of combustible materials, so combustibles and flammable liquids are kept out of oxidiser stores.[2] Mixed with combustible material such as floor sweepings, potassium chlorate might ignite or explode spontaneously.[14] Sulfur forms highly explosive mixtures with chlorates and perchlorates, and gunpowder is a mixture of sulfur, potassium nitrate and charcoal.[15]
A second type involves acids. Concentrated inorganic acids do not burn, and their chief hazard lies in leakage and mixing with other chemicals or combustible material stored nearby.[13] Hydrochloric acid forms hydrogen with metals such as tin, iron, zinc, aluminium and magnesium, and releases chlorine when strong oxidisers are added.[13] Potassium and sodium cyanide release poisonous and flammable hydrogen cyanide on contact with acids.[3] Strong dehydrating agents such as concentrated sulfuric acid convert perchloric acid solution into anhydrous perchloric acid, which decomposes even at room temperature and explodes with great violence.[13]
A third type is the reaction with water or air. Anhydrides, carbides, hydrides and alkali metals are stored in dry areas, in waterproof and airtight containers kept off the floor, in rooms without combustible material or incompatible chemicals.[17] When one-third of its weight of water is added to a water-reactive carbide, the temperature can rise enough to ignite the acetylene formed.[16] Caustic soda and caustic potash generate heat when mixed with water, and their solutions give off hydrogen on contact with zinc, galvanised metals or aluminium.[17] Triethylaluminium, which ignites spontaneously in air, reacts violently or detonates when mixed with strong oxidising agents or halogenated hydrocarbons.[17]
Contamination, heat and runaway reactions
Not every incompatibility is a simple reaction between two partners. In some cases one substance acts as a catalyst. Ethylene oxide can polymerise violently when catalysed by anhydrous chlorides of iron, tin or aluminium, by iron rust or aluminium oxide, or by alkali metal hydroxides.[3] It also reacts with alcohols, acids, ammonia and many other compounds, and the heat of these reactions can start polymerisation of the remaining ethylene oxide.[3] Hydrogen cyanide polymerises under the catalytic effect of alkaline materials. Because one product of the reaction, ammonia, is itself alkaline, the reaction feeds itself until an explosion eventually occurs; adding an acid keeps the rate at a safe level.[3]
Reactions that are accelerated by their own heat can end in thermal runaway. Styrene, for example, polymerises slowly at ordinary temperatures, but the exothermic reaction eventually becomes violent as its own heat speeds it up, so inhibitors are added.[17] In the SFPE Handbook, Gray (2002) treats thermal runaway and runaway reaction as synonyms for the supercritical behaviour of a chemical reactor. The reaction rate grows almost exponentially with temperature, while heat loss grows only linearly.[18]
Contamination can also start self-heating in stored materials. Carbon black does not heat spontaneously after thorough cooling and airing, but it might generate heat in the presence of oxidisable oils, and lamp black heats in contact with drying oils.[15] Hydrogen peroxide decomposes when contaminated with iron, copper, chromium and many other metals except aluminium, with combustible dust or by contact with a rough surface.[19][14]
Several of the chemical reaction explosions listed by Zalosh (2008) involved contamination, wrong proportions or mixing. At Tokai, Japan, on 11 March 1997, an excessive concentration of sodium bicarbonate in a mixture of asphalt and sodium salts lowered the reaction onset temperature. Thirty-seven people received some radioactive contamination.[8]
At Haskell, Oklahoma, on 26 March 1997, the mixing of incompatible printing ink solvents and oxidisers caused one death and two injuries.[8] In two hydroxylamine explosions, at Hanover Township, Pennsylvania, in 1999 and at Gunma, Japan, in 2000, the concentration was well above the recommended practice of less than 50 %. In the second case a high iron concentration from a coated steel tube was also present. Laboratory tests have shown that such concentrations, together with trace contaminants, can lead to particularly violent decomposition, often a detonation.[8]
A historical case shows how hard the cause can be to prove. Nitromethane detonated in railway tank cars at Niagara Falls, New York, and Mount Pulaski, Illinois, in 1958. The causes were not definitely determined, and contamination by material previously carried in the tanks was one possible explanation.[3] For ammonium nitrate, Davenport (2008) notes that certain mixtures with ammonium sulfate or calcium carbonate are not explosive under practical conditions, but that the contamination problem had not been thoroughly investigated.[19]
Sources of compatibility information
Davenport (2008) describes a United States requirement for manufacturers to prepare material safety data sheets for their products. These safety data sheets give information on toxicity, flammability, reactivity and stability and on safe handling and storage.[7] The NFPA Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous Materials contains the former NFPA 49, NFPA 325 and NFPA 491, the last of which collects the reported dangerous reactions.[7][1] Davenport also described the United States Coast Guard's Chemical and Hazardous Response Information System as a searchable CD-ROM. A Chemical Reactivity Worksheet developed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency shows the hazards of mixing chemicals chosen by the user.[7][5]
Published data have limits. In the SFPE Handbook, Barry (2002) notes that most data in material safety data sheets refer to atmospheric temperature and pressure, so experimental data for the actual process conditions are sometimes needed.[20] The checklist for hazard identification in the same chapter includes the general process chemistry, with side reactions under normal and abnormal conditions, and the effect of contaminants.[20] Zalosh (2008) summarises guidelines of the Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. They combine lists of unstable materials and dangerous combinations, software to identify incompatible chemicals, laboratory screening tests of onset temperatures and sensitivities, and expert review.[8] Calorimetric screening has limits too: Gray (2002) notes that differential scanning calorimetry and differential thermal analysis give only very general information, although they can show whether a material can react exothermically at all.[18]
Transport markings are not a full guide. The label required for interstate shipment classifies a chemical by hazard for transport purposes only, so storage arrangements rely on a thorough knowledge of its fire, health and reactivity hazards.[2] For pesticides, Whitford (2008) suggests the Department of Transportation tables for co-shipment of incompatible materials in highway cargo vans as an initial guide.[21]
Segregation in storage and transport
The extent of segregation depends on the quantity stored, the physical state of the chemicals and their degree of incompatibility. The known behaviour of the materials in a fire also counts, because vessels can rupture and incompatible materials can mix under fire conditions.[5] Segregation can take the form of a separate detached building, isolation within the same building by fire walls and drainage, or separation by an empty area or by intervening storage of inert materials.[5] For pesticides, products that are not chemically compatible are stored in separate rooms or buildings. Noncombustible walls or partitions are considered where incompatible materials must be segregated within a building.[22] The same chapter observes that small businesses generally do not segregate their inventory, because they lack the space.[22]
Gas cylinders follow a similar rule. NFPA 55, as described by Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), requires separation of several gas hazard classes in the United States. They include flammable, oxidising, corrosive, toxic or highly toxic, and pyrophoric gases, as well as unstable reactive gases of classes 2, 3 and 4. The distance is 6.1 m (20 ft). It can be reduced without limit by a noncombustible barrier at least 1.5 m (5 ft) high with a fire resistance rating of at least half an hour. Gases of the class "other gas" need no separation.[23]
In laboratories, the handbook states that for all storage incompatible materials must be segregated.[24] For hazardous waste, Severson (2008) warns that mixing two discarded substances can cause a chemical reaction with severe and unexpected consequences. The prevention measures listed start with segregating chemically incompatible wastes, for example keeping combustible waste away from self-heating or oxidising materials.[25][26] Waste handling systems may need special precautions to keep incompatible wastes apart.[27] Poor housekeeping is another route: mixing oxidising substances with flammable liquids is named as one of its undesired outcomes, and staff should know what is already in a rubbish receptacle before adding to it.[28]
Transport applies the same principle at a smaller scale. Chemicals that can react dangerously with each other are excluded from the same outside container, and the container material must not react with the chemical.[1] On cargo ships, the segregation and stowage of incompatible materials is carefully controlled. The United States regulations in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations and the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code of the International Maritime Organization give detailed packaging, stowage, ventilation and segregation requirements.[29]
Incompatibility with extinguishing agents
Water is normally used as the extinguishing agent for stored chemicals, except on those that are dangerously water-reactive.[5] Yu and Newman (2008) name the carbides, which form acetylene, the hydrides, which form hydrogen, and the peroxides of sodium, potassium, barium and strontium, which react exothermically. Cyanide salts form hydrogen cyanide gas with acidified water.[4] Frank (2008) gives the general rule that water should not be used on materials that react with it and may release oxygen, flammable gases and heat.[30] Foam is water-based, so its hazards include reaction with incompatible materials.[31] Medium- and high-expansion foam is not used on water-reactive metals such as sodium and potassium, or on materials such as triethylaluminium and phosphorus pentoxide, unless tests show it to be acceptable.[32]
Emergency planning reflects this. The hazardous materials emergency response plan of the Fire Department of the City of New York of 30 September 1994 is reproduced in NIST NCSTAR 1-8. It tells the first arriving engine company to establish a water supply and, depending on conditions, to stretch a hose line without operating it until ordered by the incident commander after the initial hazard assessment. It warns that the premature, unnecessary or incompatible use of water can compound the hazard.[33] For burning hazardous waste, the first question in Severson's list is whether the extinguishing agent is compatible with the waste.[26] Pre-incident plans record any incompatibility with water or other materials and any need for special extinguishing agents.[6]
Limits and misconceptions
One misconception is that noncombustible chemicals can be stored anywhere. Oxidisers, inorganic acids and some water-reactive chemicals do not burn, yet they can cause fires or explosions when they meet the wrong partner.[2][17][13] Another is to infer from the class of a chemical that it lacks the hazards of other classes. Davenport (2008) stresses that a chemical placed in one class can still have the hazards of another; caustics, for example, are listed as water-reactive but are also corrosive.[13]
Lists of incompatibilities are never complete. NFPA 491 collects reported reactions, but the combinations are innumerable, and the properties of a waste mixture usually cannot be defined with any accuracy.[1][25] Minor components can dominate the hazard: in a waste that is mostly harmless, small amounts of highly toxic, radioactive or disease-causing components determine the hazard.[25] The handbook names segregation as one of several principles of good storage, together with protection of containers against physical damage, a hazard identification system and fire protection based on the specific hazard.[34]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 Davenport (2008), p. 7-54.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Davenport (2008), p. 7-45.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 Davenport (2008), p. 7-49.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Yu and Newman (2008), p. 2-91.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 Davenport (2008), p. 7-44.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Norman (2008), p. 12-303.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 Davenport (2008), p. 7-43.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-102.
- ↑ Rosales and Stoltzfus (2008), p. 9-237.
- ↑ Santis (2008), p. 6-249.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.1.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.2.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 Davenport (2008), p. 7-52.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 Davenport (2008), p. 7-47.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 Davenport (2008), p. 7-48.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 Davenport (2008), p. 7-51.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 Davenport (2008), p. 7-50.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 Gray (2002), p. 2-212.
- ↑ 19.0 19.1 Davenport (2008), p. 7-46.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 Barry (2002), p. 5-178.
- ↑ Whitford (2008), p. 6-238.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 Whitford (2008), p. 6-239.
- ↑ Lemoff and Rivkin (2008), p. 7-38.
- ↑ Anderson (2008a), p. 9-164.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 Severson (2008), p. 7-60.
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 Severson (2008), p. 7-65.
- ↑ Doucet and Gilyeat (2008), p. 11-17.
- ↑ Rivkin (2008a), p. 21-37.
- ↑ Eberly (2008), p. 21-167.
- ↑ Frank (2008), p. 17-41.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-60.
- ↑ Scheffey and Hickey (2002), p. 4-129.
- ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A.
- ↑ Davenport (2008), p. 7-55.
References
- Anderson, R. R. (2008a). Fire protection of laboratories using chemicals. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-157–9-166). National Fire Protection Association.
- Barry, T. F. (2002). Quantitative risk assessment in chemical process industries. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 5-176–5-213). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Davenport, J. A. (2008). Storage and handling of chemicals. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-43–7-55). National Fire Protection Association.
- Doucet, L. G., & Gilyeat, S. S. (2008). Waste handling and control. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 11-3–11-25). National Fire Protection Association.
- Eberly, R. (2008). Marine vessels. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-151–21-185). National Fire Protection Association.
- Frank, J. A. (2008). Characteristics and hazards of water and water additives for fire suppression. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-31–17-43). National Fire Protection Association.
- Gray, B. (2002). Spontaneous combustion and self-heating. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-211–2-228). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- Lawson, J. R., & Vettori, R. L. (2005). The emergency response operations (NIST NCSTAR 1-8). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
- Lemoff, T. C., & Rivkin, C. H. (2008). Storage of gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-35–7-42). National Fire Protection Association.
- Norman, J. (2008). Pre-Incident planning for emergency response. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-299–12-308). National Fire Protection Association.
- Rivkin, C. H. (2008a). Automotive and marine service station operations. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 21-29–21-40). National Fire Protection Association.
- Rosales, K., & Stoltzfus, J. M. (2008). Oxygen-Enriched atmospheres. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-225–9-243). National Fire Protection Association.
- Santis, L. D. (2008). Explosives and blasting agents. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-247–6-256). National Fire Protection Association.
- Scheffey, J. L., & Hickey, H. E. (2002). Foam system calculations. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-123–4-148). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Severson, P. R. (2008). Hazardous waste control. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 7-57–7-69). National Fire Protection Association.
- Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.
- Whitford, F. (2008). Pesticides in the workplace. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-233–6-245). National Fire Protection Association.
- Yu, H.-Z., & Newman, J. S. (2008). Theory of fire extinguishment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-79–2-92). National Fire Protection Association.
- Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.