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== Numbers and trends in the United States == | == Numbers and trends in the United States == | ||
Loflin's table of NFPA data for 1977–2006 shows a high of 173 deaths in 1978 and a low of 75 in 1992.<ref name="Loflin-12-107" /> Hall and Cote (2008) describe the trend in two phases: deaths fell from the early 1980s to the early 1990s and then stayed at around 100 a year. They write that career fire fighters led the high totals up to the early 1980s and that volunteers have dominated since.<ref name="HallCote-3-29" /> Loflin's table shows more volunteer than career deaths in every year except 1979 and 1983. As an illustration from that table, the career share fell from about 42 percent of deaths in 1977–1986 to about 29 percent in 1997–2006. The volunteer share rose from about 50 to about 58 percent.<ref name="Loflin-12-108" /> | Loflin's table of NFPA data for 1977–2006 shows a high of 173 deaths in 1978 and a low of 75 in 1992.<ref name="Loflin-12-107" /> Hall and Cote (2008) describe the trend in two phases: deaths fell from the early 1980s to the early 1990s and then stayed at around 100 a year. They write that career fire fighters led the high totals up to the early 1980s and that volunteers have dominated since.<ref name="HallCote-3-29" /> Loflin's table shows more volunteer than career deaths in every year except 1979 and 1983. As an illustration from that table, the career share fell from about 42 percent of deaths in 1977–1986 to about 29 percent in 1997–2006. The volunteer share rose from about 50 to about 58 percent.<ref name="Loflin-12-108" /> | ||
[[File:fse-firefighter-injuries-and-fatalities-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Line chart of US fire fighter deaths per year 1977 to 2006, total, career and volunteer|US on-duty fire fighter deaths per year, 1977 to 2006, total and by career and volunteer status, without the deaths of 11 September 2001.]] | |||
For 2001 the table lists the attack on the World Trade Center separately. It gives 103 deaths for the year without the attack and 443 with it.<ref name="Loflin-12-108" /> The NIST investigation of the emergency response counts 343 personnel of the Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) lost that morning. It also lists 37 Port Authority police officers and 23 New York City police personnel. About 160 of the 343 FDNY members were lost outside the towers, and about 2,000 emergency responders were injured.<ref name="LawsonVettori-1">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 1.</ref> Hall and Cote's trend chart instead excludes 330 fire fighter deaths at the World Trade Center.<ref name="HallCote-3-30" /> | For 2001 the table lists the attack on the World Trade Center separately. It gives 103 deaths for the year without the attack and 443 with it.<ref name="Loflin-12-108" /> The NIST investigation of the emergency response counts 343 personnel of the Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) lost that morning. It also lists 37 Port Authority police officers and 23 New York City police personnel. About 160 of the 343 FDNY members were lost outside the towers, and about 2,000 emergency responders were injured.<ref name="LawsonVettori-1">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 1.</ref> Hall and Cote's trend chart instead excludes 330 fire fighter deaths at the World Trade Center.<ref name="HallCote-3-30" /> | ||
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Injuries followed a different path. They stayed at about 100,000 a year until the mid-1990s and then declined, to below 76,000 in 2004.<ref name="HallCote-3-30" /> Loflin's table gives 103,340 injuries for 1981, 75,840 for 2004 and 83,400 for 2006.<ref name="Loflin-12-108" /> Injuries at the scene of a fire fell from 65 percent of the total in 1981 to 49 percent in 2004. Injuries at non-fire emergencies rose from 9 to 17 percent over the same period, which Hall and Cote give as one reason why the total had not fallen further.<ref name="HallCote-3-30" /> | Injuries followed a different path. They stayed at about 100,000 a year until the mid-1990s and then declined, to below 76,000 in 2004.<ref name="HallCote-3-30" /> Loflin's table gives 103,340 injuries for 1981, 75,840 for 2004 and 83,400 for 2006.<ref name="Loflin-12-108" /> Injuries at the scene of a fire fell from 65 percent of the total in 1981 to 49 percent in 2004. Injuries at non-fire emergencies rose from 9 to 17 percent over the same period, which Hall and Cote give as one reason why the total had not fallen further.<ref name="HallCote-3-30" /> | ||
The chapters of the handbook do not always agree. Smalley (2008) counts 999 on-duty deaths for 1996–2005 | The chapters of the handbook do not always agree. Smalley (2008) counts 999 on-duty deaths for 1996–2005.<ref name="Smalley-13-74">Smalley (2008), p. 13-74.</ref> As an arithmetic check, Loflin's annual totals for the same period sum to 999 when the 2001 attack is excluded.<ref name="Loflin-12-108" /> Denlinger (2008) gives an average of 135 deaths and roughly 58,000 injuries a year for the same ten years, citing NFPA reports from 2004.<ref name="Denlinger-12-60">Denlinger (2008), p. 12-60.</ref> The handbook does not explain the difference, so values are best taken with their source and period. | ||
== Measuring change == | == Measuring change == | ||
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As a worked example, FDNY recorded 406 burn injuries to the neck in 1993 and 72 in 2005, after it had made full protective clothing compulsory.<ref name="Teele-12-148">Teele (2008), p. 12-148.</ref> The relative change is (72 − 406)/406 × 100 % = −82.3 %, which matches the −82.27 % printed in the source. | As a worked example, FDNY recorded 406 burn injuries to the neck in 1993 and 72 in 2005, after it had made full protective clothing compulsory.<ref name="Teele-12-148">Teele (2008), p. 12-148.</ref> The relative change is (72 − 406)/406 × 100 % = −82.3 %, which matches the −82.27 % printed in the source.<ref name="Teele-12-148" /> As a second illustration, Smalley (2008) counts 159 wildland fire deaths among 999 on-duty deaths in 1996–2005, so <math>p</math> = 159/999 × 100 % = 15.9 %.<ref name="Smalley-13-74" /> Such percentages compare like with like only when the total and the period are the same. A falling count can also reflect fewer incidents rather than safer work: Laughlin (2008) links the lower number of fireground deaths to the decreasing number of fires.<ref name="Laughlin-12-162">Laughlin (2008), p. 12-162.</ref> | ||
== Causes and circumstances of death == | == Causes and circumstances of death == | ||
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In 2004, heart attacks caused two-thirds of the deaths in the two oldest age groups but only a small share among those aged 35 or younger.<ref name="Ahrens-3-71">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-71.</ref> Laughlin (2008) states that most heart attacks among fire service personnel are preventable. The risk factors that training, diet and exercise can influence are smoking, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, inactivity, overweight and diabetes.<ref name="Laughlin-12-162" /> | In 2004, heart attacks caused two-thirds of the deaths in the two oldest age groups but only a small share among those aged 35 or younger.<ref name="Ahrens-3-71">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-71.</ref> Laughlin (2008) states that most heart attacks among fire service personnel are preventable. The risk factors that training, diet and exercise can influence are smoking, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, inactivity, overweight and diabetes.<ref name="Laughlin-12-162" /> | ||
[[File:fse-firefighter-injuries-and-fatalities-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Stacked bar chart of US on-duty fire fighter deaths in 2004 by age group, split into heart attack and other causes|US on-duty fire fighter deaths in 2004 by age group, heart attack and other causes.]] | |||
Travel is another major source. Laughlin quotes the NFPA finding that fire fighters were more likely to die travelling to or from a fire than fighting one, and that less than a third of deaths occurred on the fireground.<ref name="Laughlin-12-162" /> Vehicle collisions, heart attacks while driving and falls from vehicles were major causes.<ref name="HallCote-3-30" /> In 2003 more fire fighters died responding to or returning from incidents than at the scenes.<ref name="Tutterow-12-271">Tutterow (2008), p. 12-271.</ref> Mobile water supply apparatus (tankers) had the highest rollover rate per mile of any apparatus type, and therefore the highest rate of deaths from apparatus accidents.<ref name="Tutterow-12-268">Tutterow (2008), p. 12-268.</ref> | Travel is another major source. Laughlin quotes the NFPA finding that fire fighters were more likely to die travelling to or from a fire than fighting one, and that less than a third of deaths occurred on the fireground.<ref name="Laughlin-12-162" /> Vehicle collisions, heart attacks while driving and falls from vehicles were major causes.<ref name="HallCote-3-30" /> In 2003 more fire fighters died responding to or returning from incidents than at the scenes.<ref name="Tutterow-12-271">Tutterow (2008), p. 12-271.</ref> Mobile water supply apparatus (tankers) had the highest rollover rate per mile of any apparatus type, and therefore the highest rate of deaths from apparatus accidents.<ref name="Tutterow-12-268">Tutterow (2008), p. 12-268.</ref> | ||
The breakdown by type of duty in 2004 shows the full spread. Responding to or returning from alarms accounted for 34 percent of deaths,<ref name="Ahrens-3-70">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-70.</ref> operating at the fireground for 28 percent, other on-duty activities for 17 percent, training for 12 percent and non-fire emergencies for 9 percent. Wildland fires form a separate group. Of the 999 on-duty deaths in 1996–2005, 159 (15.9 percent) resulted from wildland fires or control burns. Between 8 and 26 died in any one year, and wildland fires and control burns accounted for 25.5 percent of all fireground deaths.<ref name="Smalley-13-74" /> Of the wildland fireground deaths, 30 were due to overexertion or stress, 27 to motor vehicle crashes and 19 to being caught or trapped.<ref name="Smalley-13-75">Smalley (2008), p. 13-75.</ref> | The breakdown by type of duty in 2004 shows the full spread. Responding to or returning from alarms accounted for 34 percent of deaths,<ref name="Ahrens-3-70">Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-70.</ref> operating at the fireground for 28 percent, other on-duty activities for 17 percent, training for 12 percent and non-fire emergencies for 9 percent. Wildland fires form a separate group. Of the 999 on-duty deaths in 1996–2005, 159 (15.9 percent) resulted from wildland fires or control burns. Between 8 and 26 died in any one year, and wildland fires and control burns accounted for 25.5 percent of all fireground deaths.<ref name="Smalley-13-74" /> Of the wildland fireground deaths, 30 were due to overexertion or stress, 27 to motor vehicle crashes and 19 to being caught or trapped.<ref name="Smalley-13-75">Smalley (2008), p. 13-75.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-firefighter-injuries-and-fatalities-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Horizontal bar chart of US fire fighter deaths in 2004 by type of duty, largest bar for responding to or returning from alarms|US fire fighter deaths in 2004 by type of duty, in percent of all on-duty deaths.]] | |||
Training is meant to be controlled, yet fire fighters have died in it. In 1982, two died during [[live fire training]] in an abandoned wood-frame building in Boulder, Colorado. Rapid fire spread over a fibreboard ceiling, an inadequate water supply, inadequate exits and a lack of planning contributed. Numerous training deaths, this case in particular, led to NFPA 1403 on live fire training, first issued in 1986.<ref name="Laughlin-12-172">Laughlin (2008), p. 12-172.</ref> Three more died in Milford, Michigan, in 1987, when a flashover occurred with fire fighters still inside a house set alight with accelerants.<ref name="Laughlin-12-172" /> In a Florida exercise in 2002, a lieutenant and a fire fighter died | Training is meant to be controlled, yet fire fighters have died in it. In 1982, two died during [[live fire training]] in an abandoned wood-frame building in Boulder, Colorado. Rapid fire spread over a fibreboard ceiling, an inadequate water supply, inadequate exits and a lack of planning contributed. Numerous training deaths, this case in particular, led to NFPA 1403 on live fire training, first issued in 1986.<ref name="Laughlin-12-172">Laughlin (2008), p. 12-172.</ref> Three more died in Milford, Michigan, in 1987, when a flashover occurred with fire fighters still inside a house set alight with accelerants.<ref name="Laughlin-12-172" /> In a Florida exercise in 2002, a lieutenant and a fire fighter died after a flashover, although designated safety officers and a rapid intervention team were present.<ref name="Laughlin-12-173">Laughlin (2008), p. 12-173.</ref> | ||
== Fireground hazards == | == Fireground hazards == | ||
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The thermal classes behind US structural protective clothing place the ignition of fire gases, a backdraft or a flashover in Class IV. That class covers 251 to 815 °C and 0.175 to 4.2 W/cm² (1.75 to 42 kW/m²) for about 10 seconds, against up to 30 minutes at 40 °C in Class I.<ref name="Teele-12-148" /> Unprotected skin begins to burn at about 57 °C after a short exposure.<ref name="Teele-12-147">Teele (2008), p. 12-147.</ref> | The thermal classes behind US structural protective clothing place the ignition of fire gases, a backdraft or a flashover in Class IV. That class covers 251 to 815 °C and 0.175 to 4.2 W/cm² (1.75 to 42 kW/m²) for about 10 seconds, against up to 30 minutes at 40 °C in Class I.<ref name="Teele-12-148" /> Unprotected skin begins to burn at about 57 °C after a short exposure.<ref name="Teele-12-147">Teele (2008), p. 12-147.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-firefighter-injuries-and-fatalities-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Four stacked bands from Class I to Class IV with temperature, radiant heat flux and exposure time, Class IV marked flashover or backdraft|Thermal classes of structural fires, with environmental temperature, radiant heat flux and maximum exposure duration.]] | |||
[[Building collapse during firefighting]] may leave only seconds between the moment the need to evacuate is recognised and the failure.<ref name="Corbett-12-128" /> Corbett (2008) warns that a fire resistance rating of 2 hours does not guarantee 2 hours of safety. Corbett calls the accepted signs of imminent collapse grossly inadequate even for older buildings, and relying on them alone in lighter modern buildings can lead to disaster.<ref name="Corbett-12-129">Corbett (2008), p. 12-129.</ref> Fire in the voids of lightweight wood truss floors makes early collapse highly likely.<ref name="Corbett-12-132">Corbett (2008), p. 12-132.</ref> | [[Building collapse during firefighting]] may leave only seconds between the moment the need to evacuate is recognised and the failure.<ref name="Corbett-12-128" /> Corbett (2008) warns that a fire resistance rating of 2 hours does not guarantee 2 hours of safety. Corbett calls the accepted signs of imminent collapse grossly inadequate even for older buildings, and relying on them alone in lighter modern buildings can lead to disaster.<ref name="Corbett-12-129">Corbett (2008), p. 12-129.</ref> Fire in the voids of lightweight wood truss floors makes early collapse highly likely.<ref name="Corbett-12-132">Corbett (2008), p. 12-132.</ref> | ||
The handbook records many cases. Nine fire fighters died in 1972 when a beam-column support failed in the Vendome Hotel in Boston. Two died in Memphis in 2003 when a combustible metal deck roof collapsed on them.<ref name="Corbett-12-134-138">Corbett (2008), pp. 12-134, 12-138.</ref> An NFPA review of 69 incidents from 1985 to 1997 with deaths or injuries from roof or floor collapses in wood-frame buildings found that a number involved fires in attic spaces. The data were anecdotal rather than statistically representative.<ref name="Pessiki-19-68">Pessiki (2008), p. 19-68.</ref> | The handbook records many cases. Nine fire fighters died in 1972 when a beam-column support failed in the Vendome Hotel in Boston. Two died in Memphis in 2003 when a combustible metal deck roof collapsed on them.<ref name="Corbett-12-134-138">Corbett (2008), pp. 12-134, 12-138.</ref> An NFPA review of 69 incidents from 1985 to 1997 with deaths or injuries from roof or floor collapses in wood-frame buildings found that a number involved fires in attic spaces. The data were anecdotal rather than statistically representative.<ref name="Pessiki-19-68">Pessiki (2008), p. 19-68.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-firefighter-injuries-and-fatalities-v5.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=a lightweight wooden roof truss with metal nail plates at the joints|Lightweight wood truss held together by metal nail plates. Fire that reaches the truss voids can release the plates and cause early collapse.]] | |||
Becoming lost is a third hazard. Six fire fighters died in Worcester, Massachusetts, in a former cold storage warehouse, where a complicated layout and smoke from cork and plastic insulation caused them to become lost.<ref name="Corbett-12-133">Corbett (2008), p. 12-133.</ref> Personal alert safety system (PASS) devices sound an alarm signal to call for help. In many fatal cases of entrapped or disoriented fire fighters, the victims wore PASS devices but had not switched them on. Tests by NIST also showed that the alarm signal weakened at 150 to 260 °C.<ref name="Teele-12-155">Teele (2008), p. 12-155.</ref> | Becoming lost is a third hazard. Six fire fighters died in Worcester, Massachusetts, in a former cold storage warehouse, where a complicated layout and smoke from cork and plastic insulation caused them to become lost.<ref name="Corbett-12-133">Corbett (2008), p. 12-133.</ref> Personal alert safety system (PASS) devices sound an alarm signal to call for help. In many fatal cases of entrapped or disoriented fire fighters, the victims wore PASS devices but had not switched them on. Tests by NIST also showed that the alarm signal weakened at 150 to 260 °C.<ref name="Teele-12-155">Teele (2008), p. 12-155.</ref> | ||
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Long-term illness lies outside the annual death counts but is part of the occupational risk. Loflin (2008) reports a high incidence of cancer among fire fighters, especially of the liver, kidney, colon, prostate and lung; screening for such diseases is part of an occupational medical programme.<ref name="Loflin-12-116">Loflin (2008), p. 12-116.</ref> Emergency medical work brings exposure to communicable and infectious disease.<ref name="Loflin-12-114-115">Loflin (2008), pp. 12-114–12-115.</ref> Respiratory protection has its own history of fatal failure. NFPA 19B, adopted in 1971, prohibited filter-type canister masks for fire fighters and allowed only self-contained breathing apparatus, as a direct result of deaths among fire fighters wearing such masks.<ref name="Teele-12-144">Teele (2008), p. 12-144.</ref> For wildland smoke, which was not treated as immediately dangerous to life and health, air samples showed a potential for hazardous exposure to particulates, carbon monoxide, formaldehyde and acrolein.<ref name="Teele-12-154">Teele (2008), p. 12-154.</ref> | Long-term illness lies outside the annual death counts but is part of the occupational risk. Loflin (2008) reports a high incidence of cancer among fire fighters, especially of the liver, kidney, colon, prostate and lung; screening for such diseases is part of an occupational medical programme.<ref name="Loflin-12-116">Loflin (2008), p. 12-116.</ref> Emergency medical work brings exposure to communicable and infectious disease.<ref name="Loflin-12-114-115">Loflin (2008), pp. 12-114–12-115.</ref> Respiratory protection has its own history of fatal failure. NFPA 19B, adopted in 1971, prohibited filter-type canister masks for fire fighters and allowed only self-contained breathing apparatus, as a direct result of deaths among fire fighters wearing such masks.<ref name="Teele-12-144">Teele (2008), p. 12-144.</ref> For wildland smoke, which was not treated as immediately dangerous to life and health, air samples showed a potential for hazardous exposure to particulates, carbon monoxide, formaldehyde and acrolein.<ref name="Teele-12-154">Teele (2008), p. 12-154.</ref> | ||
Modern vehicle fires present difficult conditions in indoor car parks. Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023) describe heat, poor visibility, long hose distances and poor orientation as risks for firefighters confronting modern vehicles, regardless of powertrain.<ref name="VanderGraaf-11">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 11.</ref> Both electric and conventional vehicle fires release toxic combustion products; in the cited comparison tests, the electric vehicle produced about 1.8 times as much hydrogen fluoride.<ref name="VanderGraaf-26">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 26.</ref> The report calls for decontamination of firefighters’ clothing after an attack involving an electric vehicle.<ref name="VanderGraaf-30">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 30.</ref> | |||
== Prevention == | == Prevention == | ||
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Protective equipment has a measurable effect. In February 1995, FDNY required all its 11,228 fire fighters to wear protective trousers as well as coats at all fires, and in 1996 it added protective hoods. Between 1993 and 2005 its recorded burn injuries fell by about three quarters, and the time lost from burn injuries fell by a similar proportion (−77.68 %).<ref name="Teele-12-148" /> Training addresses many of the failures found in investigations. NIOSH reports repeatedly list warnings that point to insufficient training, such as calling a Mayday when lost or trapped, recognising the danger of operating above a fire, and a risk-versus-gain analysis before committing crews inside.<ref name="Laughlin-12-164">Laughlin (2008), p. 12-164.</ref> For live fire training in acquired structures, NFPA 1403 limits fuel loads, forbids flammable liquids and calls for adequate water supplies and enough instructors.<ref name="Laughlin-12-173" /> | Protective equipment has a measurable effect. In February 1995, FDNY required all its 11,228 fire fighters to wear protective trousers as well as coats at all fires, and in 1996 it added protective hoods. Between 1993 and 2005 its recorded burn injuries fell by about three quarters, and the time lost from burn injuries fell by a similar proportion (−77.68 %).<ref name="Teele-12-148" /> Training addresses many of the failures found in investigations. NIOSH reports repeatedly list warnings that point to insufficient training, such as calling a Mayday when lost or trapped, recognising the danger of operating above a fire, and a risk-versus-gain analysis before committing crews inside.<ref name="Laughlin-12-164">Laughlin (2008), p. 12-164.</ref> For live fire training in acquired structures, NFPA 1403 limits fuel loads, forbids flammable liquids and calls for adequate water supplies and enough instructors.<ref name="Laughlin-12-173" /> | ||
Building design can also protect fire fighters. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines describe the AFAC fire brigade intervention model. One of its prioritised outcomes is that fire fighters get a reasonable time to search for trapped occupants before conditions become hazardous to them.<ref name="NRCC-2.9-3">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 2.9-3.</ref> In the Netherlands, the standard NEN 6093 on smoke and heat exhaust systems gives limits for a fire service attack in a space with such a system. These include a visibility of at least 100 m up to 1.8 m height and a radiant heat flux of no more than 3.5 kW/m² at 1.8 m. The calculated smoke layer temperature may not exceed 200 °C where goods are in the layer and 500 °C otherwise.<ref name="VR-9.3">Van Rossum (2027), §9.3.</ref> | Building design can also protect fire fighters. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines describe the AFAC fire brigade intervention model. One of its prioritised outcomes is that fire fighters get a reasonable time to search for trapped occupants before conditions become hazardous to them.<ref name="NRCC-2.9-3">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 2.9-3.</ref> In the Netherlands, the standard NEN 6093 on smoke and heat exhaust systems gives limits for a fire service attack in a space with such a system. These include a visibility of at least 100 m up to 1.8 m height and a radiant heat flux of no more than 3.5 kW/m² at 1.8 m. The calculated smoke layer temperature may not exceed 200 °C where goods are in the layer and 500 °C otherwise, and must stay below the critical temperature for the load-bearing structure.<ref name="VR-9.3">Van Rossum (2027), §9.3.</ref> Meeting these design criteria does not mean the fire service will make an interior attack; firefighters on scene decide whether to enter.<ref name="VR-9.3" /> | ||
== See also == | == See also == | ||
Latest revision as of 18:28, 14 November 2026
Firefighter injuries and fatalities are the deaths, injuries and illnesses that fire fighters suffer on duty: at fires and other emergencies, while travelling to and from them, during training and at the station. Fire departments collect data on them to find causes and to decide on training, equipment and operational changes.[1] The data in this article come mainly from the 2008 NFPA Fire Protection Handbook and describe the United States. There, on-duty deaths ranged from 173 in 1978 to a low of 75 in 1992 and averaged about 100 a year over the 15 to 20 years before 2008.[2] The 340 deaths of 11 September 2001 are counted separately.[3]
Injuries numbered about 100,000 a year until the mid-1990s and fell below 76,000 in 2004.[4] In a typical year nearly half of all deaths involved heart attacks, and a quarter to a third occurred while responding to or returning from a call.[4] Fireground hazards include rapid fire development, building collapse, disorientation, heat and poor communication.[5][6] For prevention, Loflin (2008) names training, protective equipment, safe vehicle operations, incident management, health maintenance and facility safety.[7]
Definitions and data sources
US fire fighter death counts cover both the immediate and the delayed effects of acute injuries or illnesses suffered on duty. They do not include deaths from long-term chronic illnesses such as cancer.[8] The NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) and the US Fire Administration track fire fighter fatalities individually and place no time limit on the death.[9] The NFPA's annual fire department survey asks for civilian and fire fighter deaths and injuries. Because every effort is made to trace each fire fighter fatality, Ahrens and Stewart (2008) are confident that the NFPA's incident database is complete for them.[10]
Investigations explain why individual deaths happened. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) runs a Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, and its reports describe the lessons learned from fatal incidents.[11] The US Fire Administration also investigates fire fighter fatalities and major fires.[12] NIOSH reports, together with NFPA data and fire investigation reports, fed into the 2002 edition of NFPA 1500, the US standard on fire department occupational safety and health.[13] Injury records serve similar purposes. Data on the cause and circumstances of an injury support decisions on training, equipment redesign and operations, and also on workers' compensation and staffing.[1]
Numbers and trends in the United States
Loflin's table of NFPA data for 1977–2006 shows a high of 173 deaths in 1978 and a low of 75 in 1992.[2] Hall and Cote (2008) describe the trend in two phases: deaths fell from the early 1980s to the early 1990s and then stayed at around 100 a year. They write that career fire fighters led the high totals up to the early 1980s and that volunteers have dominated since.[8] Loflin's table shows more volunteer than career deaths in every year except 1979 and 1983. As an illustration from that table, the career share fell from about 42 percent of deaths in 1977–1986 to about 29 percent in 1997–2006. The volunteer share rose from about 50 to about 58 percent.[3]
For 2001 the table lists the attack on the World Trade Center separately. It gives 103 deaths for the year without the attack and 443 with it.[3] The NIST investigation of the emergency response counts 343 personnel of the Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) lost that morning. It also lists 37 Port Authority police officers and 23 New York City police personnel. About 160 of the 343 FDNY members were lost outside the towers, and about 2,000 emergency responders were injured.[14] Hall and Cote's trend chart instead excludes 330 fire fighter deaths at the World Trade Center.[4]
Injuries followed a different path. They stayed at about 100,000 a year until the mid-1990s and then declined, to below 76,000 in 2004.[4] Loflin's table gives 103,340 injuries for 1981, 75,840 for 2004 and 83,400 for 2006.[3] Injuries at the scene of a fire fell from 65 percent of the total in 1981 to 49 percent in 2004. Injuries at non-fire emergencies rose from 9 to 17 percent over the same period, which Hall and Cote give as one reason why the total had not fallen further.[4]
The chapters of the handbook do not always agree. Smalley (2008) counts 999 on-duty deaths for 1996–2005.[15] As an arithmetic check, Loflin's annual totals for the same period sum to 999 when the 2001 attack is excluded.[3] Denlinger (2008) gives an average of 135 deaths and roughly 58,000 injuries a year for the same ten years, citing NFPA reports from 2004.[16] The handbook does not explain the difference, so values are best taken with their source and period.
Measuring change
Two simple relations describe most of these statistics. The share of one category is its count divided by the total. The relative change between two years is the difference between the counts divided by the earlier count. Both are expressed in percent:
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| share of category i (for example, deaths during response) | % | |
| number of deaths or injuries in category i | – | |
| total number of deaths or injuries in the same period | – | |
| relative change; negative values mean a reduction | % | |
| , | count in the earlier and in the later year | – |
As a worked example, FDNY recorded 406 burn injuries to the neck in 1993 and 72 in 2005, after it had made full protective clothing compulsory.[17] The relative change is (72 − 406)/406 × 100 % = −82.3 %, which matches the −82.27 % printed in the source.[17] As a second illustration, Smalley (2008) counts 159 wildland fire deaths among 999 on-duty deaths in 1996–2005, so = 159/999 × 100 % = 15.9 %.[15] Such percentages compare like with like only when the total and the period are the same. A falling count can also reflect fewer incidents rather than safer work: Laughlin (2008) links the lower number of fireground deaths to the decreasing number of fires.[18]
Causes and circumstances of death
Heart attacks are the largest single cause. In a typical year they account for nearly half of all line-of-duty deaths, nearly always among fire fighters aged at least 38. They are particularly common in volunteer departments, where older fire fighters are more likely to serve, and many victims had serious pre-existing conditions.[4] From 1995 through 2004, sudden cardiac death caused 44 percent of on-duty deaths on average. Of these victims, 44 percent had a history of heart conditions and another 31 percent had arteriosclerotic heart disease of which they may not have been aware. The median age was 52.[19]
In 2004, heart attacks caused two-thirds of the deaths in the two oldest age groups but only a small share among those aged 35 or younger.[20] Laughlin (2008) states that most heart attacks among fire service personnel are preventable. The risk factors that training, diet and exercise can influence are smoking, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, inactivity, overweight and diabetes.[18]
Travel is another major source. Laughlin quotes the NFPA finding that fire fighters were more likely to die travelling to or from a fire than fighting one, and that less than a third of deaths occurred on the fireground.[18] Vehicle collisions, heart attacks while driving and falls from vehicles were major causes.[4] In 2003 more fire fighters died responding to or returning from incidents than at the scenes.[21] Mobile water supply apparatus (tankers) had the highest rollover rate per mile of any apparatus type, and therefore the highest rate of deaths from apparatus accidents.[22]
The breakdown by type of duty in 2004 shows the full spread. Responding to or returning from alarms accounted for 34 percent of deaths,[23] operating at the fireground for 28 percent, other on-duty activities for 17 percent, training for 12 percent and non-fire emergencies for 9 percent. Wildland fires form a separate group. Of the 999 on-duty deaths in 1996–2005, 159 (15.9 percent) resulted from wildland fires or control burns. Between 8 and 26 died in any one year, and wildland fires and control burns accounted for 25.5 percent of all fireground deaths.[15] Of the wildland fireground deaths, 30 were due to overexertion or stress, 27 to motor vehicle crashes and 19 to being caught or trapped.[24]
Training is meant to be controlled, yet fire fighters have died in it. In 1982, two died during live fire training in an abandoned wood-frame building in Boulder, Colorado. Rapid fire spread over a fibreboard ceiling, an inadequate water supply, inadequate exits and a lack of planning contributed. Numerous training deaths, this case in particular, led to NFPA 1403 on live fire training, first issued in 1986.[25] Three more died in Milford, Michigan, in 1987, when a flashover occurred with fire fighters still inside a house set alight with accelerants.[25] In a Florida exercise in 2002, a lieutenant and a fire fighter died after a flashover, although designated safety officers and a rapid intervention team were present.[26]
Fireground hazards
The incident safety officer watches smoke and fire conditions for signs of flashover, backdraft or other sudden fire events that could threaten crews.[27] A flashover is the sudden transition to a room fully involved in fire. Van Rossum (2027) names conditions of which at least one precedes it. One is a hot smoke layer above 500 °C, which radiates about 20 kW/m² to the floor; another is materials at floor level heated to 300 to 350 °C.[28] A backdraft is the explosive ignition of accumulated pyrolysis gases when fresh air suddenly enters, for example through an opened door; Van Rossum calls it a dangerous phenomenon for the fire service.[29]
The thermal classes behind US structural protective clothing place the ignition of fire gases, a backdraft or a flashover in Class IV. That class covers 251 to 815 °C and 0.175 to 4.2 W/cm² (1.75 to 42 kW/m²) for about 10 seconds, against up to 30 minutes at 40 °C in Class I.[17] Unprotected skin begins to burn at about 57 °C after a short exposure.[30]
Building collapse during firefighting may leave only seconds between the moment the need to evacuate is recognised and the failure.[5] Corbett (2008) warns that a fire resistance rating of 2 hours does not guarantee 2 hours of safety. Corbett calls the accepted signs of imminent collapse grossly inadequate even for older buildings, and relying on them alone in lighter modern buildings can lead to disaster.[31] Fire in the voids of lightweight wood truss floors makes early collapse highly likely.[32]
The handbook records many cases. Nine fire fighters died in 1972 when a beam-column support failed in the Vendome Hotel in Boston. Two died in Memphis in 2003 when a combustible metal deck roof collapsed on them.[33] An NFPA review of 69 incidents from 1985 to 1997 with deaths or injuries from roof or floor collapses in wood-frame buildings found that a number involved fires in attic spaces. The data were anecdotal rather than statistically representative.[34]

Becoming lost is a third hazard. Six fire fighters died in Worcester, Massachusetts, in a former cold storage warehouse, where a complicated layout and smoke from cork and plastic insulation caused them to become lost.[35] Personal alert safety system (PASS) devices sound an alarm signal to call for help. In many fatal cases of entrapped or disoriented fire fighters, the victims wore PASS devices but had not switched them on. Tests by NIST also showed that the alarm signal weakened at 150 to 260 °C.[36]
Poor visibility can injure without heat: in one atrium fire, a fire fighter fell from an upper balcony because he could not see its edge.[37] Inadequate fireground communication is repeatedly cited as one of four contributing factors in deaths and injuries. Loflin (2008) adds that a culture of bravery can make fire fighters reluctant to ask for help quickly enough.[6]
Heat and exertion act more slowly. Purser (2002) notes that temperatures below 120 °C are unlikely to cause burns. A fire fighter exposed to them may still suffer heat stroke after more than 15 minutes, especially in humid air and during hard work. A body core temperature of 40 °C makes a person seriously ill, and above 42.5 °C it is fatal unless treated within minutes.[38] At the World Trade Center, several fire fighters suffered chest pains or heart attacks while climbing the stairs with their equipment.[39]
Illness and exposure
Long-term illness lies outside the annual death counts but is part of the occupational risk. Loflin (2008) reports a high incidence of cancer among fire fighters, especially of the liver, kidney, colon, prostate and lung; screening for such diseases is part of an occupational medical programme.[40] Emergency medical work brings exposure to communicable and infectious disease.[41] Respiratory protection has its own history of fatal failure. NFPA 19B, adopted in 1971, prohibited filter-type canister masks for fire fighters and allowed only self-contained breathing apparatus, as a direct result of deaths among fire fighters wearing such masks.[42] For wildland smoke, which was not treated as immediately dangerous to life and health, air samples showed a potential for hazardous exposure to particulates, carbon monoxide, formaldehyde and acrolein.[43]
Modern vehicle fires present difficult conditions in indoor car parks. Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023) describe heat, poor visibility, long hose distances and poor orientation as risks for firefighters confronting modern vehicles, regardless of powertrain.[44] Both electric and conventional vehicle fires release toxic combustion products; in the cited comparison tests, the electric vehicle produced about 1.8 times as much hydrogen fluoride.[45] The report calls for decontamination of firefighters’ clothing after an attack involving an electric vehicle.[46]
Prevention
In the United States, the main framework is the fire department occupational safety and health programme of NFPA 1500. Its operational risk management includes an incident safety officer, rapid intervention crews and incident scene rehabilitation.[27] Loflin (2008) treats fatality and injury statistics as one way to gauge the effect of such programmes. Loflin also notes that tradition still kept many fire service personnel from accepting the safety and health philosophy.[2] Since nearly half of all deaths involve heart attacks, Hall and Cote call physical fitness one of the most important elements of such a programme. They add driver training, safe passenger practices and careful vehicle maintenance to prevent deaths on the road.[4]
Protective equipment has a measurable effect. In February 1995, FDNY required all its 11,228 fire fighters to wear protective trousers as well as coats at all fires, and in 1996 it added protective hoods. Between 1993 and 2005 its recorded burn injuries fell by about three quarters, and the time lost from burn injuries fell by a similar proportion (−77.68 %).[17] Training addresses many of the failures found in investigations. NIOSH reports repeatedly list warnings that point to insufficient training, such as calling a Mayday when lost or trapped, recognising the danger of operating above a fire, and a risk-versus-gain analysis before committing crews inside.[47] For live fire training in acquired structures, NFPA 1403 limits fuel loads, forbids flammable liquids and calls for adequate water supplies and enough instructors.[26]
Building design can also protect fire fighters. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines describe the AFAC fire brigade intervention model. One of its prioritised outcomes is that fire fighters get a reasonable time to search for trapped occupants before conditions become hazardous to them.[48] In the Netherlands, the standard NEN 6093 on smoke and heat exhaust systems gives limits for a fire service attack in a space with such a system. These include a visibility of at least 100 m up to 1.8 m height and a radiant heat flux of no more than 3.5 kW/m² at 1.8 m. The calculated smoke layer temperature may not exceed 200 °C where goods are in the layer and 500 °C otherwise, and must stay below the critical temperature for the load-bearing structure.[49] Meeting these design criteria does not mean the fire service will make an interior attack; firefighters on scene decide whether to enter.[49]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Duggan (2008), p. 12-93.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Loflin (2008), p. 12-107.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Loflin (2008), p. 12-108.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-30.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Corbett (2008), p. 12-128.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Loflin (2008), pp. 12-122–12-123.
- ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-124.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-29.
- ↑ Ahrens and Stewart (2008), p. 3-49.
- ↑ Ahrens and Stewart (2008), pp. 3-55, 3-57.
- ↑ Laughlin (2008), pp. 12-164, 12-174.
- ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-122.
- ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-110.
- ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 1.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 Smalley (2008), p. 13-74.
- ↑ Denlinger (2008), p. 12-60.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 Teele (2008), p. 12-148.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 Laughlin (2008), p. 12-162.
- ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-64.
- ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-71.
- ↑ Tutterow (2008), p. 12-271.
- ↑ Tutterow (2008), p. 12-268.
- ↑ Ahrens et al. (2008), p. 3-70.
- ↑ Smalley (2008), p. 13-75.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 Laughlin (2008), p. 12-172.
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 Laughlin (2008), p. 12-173.
- ↑ 27.0 27.1 Loflin (2008), p. 12-112.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.7.
- ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §4.9.
- ↑ Teele (2008), p. 12-147.
- ↑ Corbett (2008), p. 12-129.
- ↑ Corbett (2008), p. 12-132.
- ↑ Corbett (2008), pp. 12-134, 12-138.
- ↑ Pessiki (2008), p. 19-68.
- ↑ Corbett (2008), p. 12-133.
- ↑ Teele (2008), p. 12-155.
- ↑ Milke (2002b), p. 4-293.
- ↑ Purser (2002), pp. 2-125–2-126.
- ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 90.
- ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-116.
- ↑ Loflin (2008), pp. 12-114–12-115.
- ↑ Teele (2008), p. 12-144.
- ↑ Teele (2008), p. 12-154.
- ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 11.
- ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 26.
- ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 30.
- ↑ Laughlin (2008), p. 12-164.
- ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 2.9-3.
- ↑ 49.0 49.1 Van Rossum (2027), §9.3.
References
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- Ahrens, M., Frazier, P., & Kelch, G. (2008). Use of fire incident data and statistics. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 3-61–3-92). National Fire Protection Association.
- Corbett, G. P. (2008). Effect of building construction and fire protection systems on fire fighter safety. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-127–12-141). National Fire Protection Association.
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- Milke, J. A. (2002b). Smoke management in covered malls and atria. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 4-292–4-310). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). International fire engineering guidelines (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
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- Purser, D. A. (2002). Toxicity assessment of combustion products. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-83–2-171). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Smalley, J. C. (2008). Wildland fire management. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-53–13-79). National Fire Protection Association.
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- Tutterow, R. (2008). Fire department apparatus and equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-267–12-287). National Fire Protection Association.
- Van der Graaf, J., Hessels, T., & Rosmuller, N. (2023). Fire safety of indoor car parks accommodating electrically powered vehicles. Nederlands Instituut Publieke Veiligheid. (Original work published 2021)
- Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.