New FSE wiki article: Personnel accountability system (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
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A '''personnel accountability system''' is the set of procedures, responsibilities and tools with which a fire department identifies and tracks every member operating at an emergency incident.<ref name="Loflin-12-113">Loflin (2008), p. 12-113.</ref> Its aim is that the incident commander knows at all times who is on the scene, where each member is working and what each member is doing.<ref name="LV-54">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 54.</ref><ref name="Teele-12-155">Teele (2008), p. 12-155.</ref> In the emergency responder community, accountability covers the assignment, dispatch, checking in, tracking, locating and checking out of responders.<ref name="LV-53">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 53.</ref> Failures of accountability on the fireground have often been associated with the injury or death of firefighters. In the words of the NIST report on the World Trade Center response, a firefighter whose accountability is lost "becomes lost at the incident".<ref name="LV-54" /> | A '''personnel accountability system''' is the set of procedures, responsibilities and tools with which a fire department identifies and tracks every member operating at an emergency incident.<ref name="Loflin-12-113">Loflin (2008), p. 12-113.</ref> Its aim is that the incident commander knows at all times who is on the scene, where each member is working and what each member is doing.<ref name="LV-54">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 54.</ref><ref name="Teele-12-155">Teele (2008), p. 12-155.</ref> In the emergency responder community, accountability covers the assignment, dispatch, checking in, tracking, locating and checking out of responders.<ref name="LV-53">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 53.</ref> Failures of accountability on the fireground have often been associated with the injury or death of firefighters. In the words of the NIST report on the World Trade Center response, a firefighter whose accountability is lost "becomes lost at the incident".<ref name="LV-54" /> | ||
In United States practice as described in the NFPA ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008), the incident commander is responsible for overall accountability. Company officers account for their crews, and every member must take part in the system.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Its elements include a standard responder identification system, an accountability worksheet, personnel accountability reports (PAR) after changes in conditions and radio procedures for evacuating crews.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> The World Trade Center attack of 11 September 2001 showed the limits of such systems. They worked well during the first 30 minutes, but the system of the New York fire department became overwhelmed, and its records were lost when the WTC 2 tower collapsed.<ref name="LV-63">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 63.</ref><ref name="LV-69">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 69.</ref> | In United States practice as described in the NFPA ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008), the incident commander is responsible for overall accountability. Company officers account for their crews, and every member must take part in the system.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Its elements include a standard responder identification system, an accountability worksheet, personnel accountability reports (PAR) after changes in conditions and radio procedures for evacuating crews.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> The World Trade Center attack of 11 September 2001 showed the limits of such systems. They generally worked well during the first 30 minutes, but the system of the New York fire department became overwhelmed, and its records were lost when the WTC 2 tower collapsed.<ref name="LV-63">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 63.</ref><ref name="LV-69">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 69.</ref> | ||
== Definition and purpose == | == Definition and purpose == | ||
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Loflin (2008) sets out the responsibilities as part of reducing risks to members at emergency incidents. Written guidelines should provide for the tracking and inventory of all members at an incident, and all members are responsible for actively participating in the department's system.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> The incident commander should be responsible for overall responder accountability, should start an accountability worksheet at the beginning of the incident and should maintain the system throughout. The commander should also remain aware of the location and function of all companies and should control access to the incident scene.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> | Loflin (2008) sets out the responsibilities as part of reducing risks to members at emergency incidents. Written guidelines should provide for the tracking and inventory of all members at an incident, and all members are responsible for actively participating in the department's system.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> The incident commander should be responsible for overall responder accountability, should start an accountability worksheet at the beginning of the incident and should maintain the system throughout. The commander should also remain aware of the location and function of all companies and should control access to the incident scene.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> | ||
Accountability follows the chain of command. When needed, the incident commander should appoint branch directors and division, group or sector supervisors to reduce the commander's span of control. These supervisors should directly supervise and account for the companies under their command.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Company officers are accountable for all members of their company, and members are responsible for remaining under the supervision of their assigned company officer. The incident command system should also provide additional accountability responders where the size, complexity or needs of an incident require them.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> | Accountability follows the chain of command. When needed, the incident commander should appoint branch directors and division, group or sector supervisors to reduce the commander's span of control. These supervisors should directly supervise and account for the companies under their command.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Company officers are accountable for all members of their company, and members are responsible for remaining under the supervision of their assigned company officer. The incident command system should also provide additional accountability responders where the size, complexity or needs of an incident require them.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> The 1997 incident command manual of the Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) says that command options such as sectors and groups "fix personnel accountability".<ref name="LV-AppA">Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-personnel-accountability-system-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Hierarchy from members to company officers to division supervisors to the incident commander, with the safety officer checking the system|Accountability follows the chain of command: members stay with their company officer, supervisors account for their companies and the incident commander keeps the accountability worksheet.]] | |||
Teele (2008) states that firefighters who operate alone, without direct supervision or outside the incident command system, a practice called "freelancing" in the United States, cannot be permitted if safety is to be achieved.<ref name="Teele-12-147">Teele (2008), p. 12-147.</ref> The FDNY manual describes staging, the area where resources wait before deployment, as a checkpoint that provides accountability and prevents freelancing.<ref name="LV-54" /> Klaene and Sanders (2008) note that when an unsuccessful offensive attack becomes a defensive operation, there are often more firefighters on the scene than needed. The incident commander must then keep strict control and accountability, keep the number of people in the fire zone to a minimum and disconnect attack lines that are no longer needed.<ref name="KS-13-10">Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-10.</ref> | Teele (2008) states that firefighters who operate alone, without direct supervision or outside the incident command system, a practice called "freelancing" in the United States, cannot be permitted if safety is to be achieved.<ref name="Teele-12-147">Teele (2008), p. 12-147.</ref> The FDNY manual describes staging, the area where resources wait before deployment, as a checkpoint that provides accountability and prevents freelancing.<ref name="LV-54" /> Klaene and Sanders (2008) note that when an unsuccessful offensive attack becomes a defensive operation, there are often more firefighters on the scene than needed. The incident commander must then keep strict control and accountability, keep the number of people in the fire zone to a minimum and disconnect attack lines that are no longer needed.<ref name="KS-13-10">Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-10.</ref> | ||
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== Tracking members from station to scene == | == Tracking members from station to scene == | ||
A department should adopt and routinely use a standard responder identification system to maintain accountability for each member assigned to an incident. Loflin (2008) notes that several such systems were used in structural firefighting.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Whatever the system, it should give an account of the members actually responding on each company or apparatus.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> The NIST report describes how this began in the FDNY firehouse. An officer ensured that the company roster had a full complement for the shift, firefighters were checked in and a riding list identified each person and his or her job assignment.<ref name="LV-55">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 55.</ref> | A department should adopt and routinely use a standard responder identification system to maintain accountability for each member assigned to an incident. Loflin (2008) notes that several such systems were used in structural firefighting.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Whatever the system, it should give an account of the members actually responding on each company or apparatus.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> The NIST report describes how this began in the FDNY firehouse. An officer ensured that the company roster had a full complement for the shift, firefighters were checked in and a riding list identified each person and his or her job assignment.<ref name="LV-55">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 55.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-personnel-accountability-system-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Six-step flow from station roster and riding list, response, check-in, assignment and entry, PAR, to check-out|Stages of accountability at an incident, as described for US fire departments in 2005–2008: assignment, dispatch, check-in, tracking, locating and check-out.]] | |||
The 2001 attack came just before a shift change, so in some firehouses two crews were available to fill one riding list. FDNY policy allowed a company officer to add extra volunteer members to the list, and officers typically limited their number to the riding positions on the apparatus.<ref name="LV-55" /> Once on the scene, accountability depends on units reporting to a command post or staging area, keeping unit cohesion and discipline, and keeping the command post informed of their locations and operations.<ref name="LV-56">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 56.</ref> FDNY recorded this on a portable command board, an aluminium case of about 457 mm × 711 mm × 203 mm. Units were shown by colour-coded magnetic identifiers: black for engines, red for ladders, gold for battalions, blue for special units and purple for sectors.<ref name="LV-56" /> | The 2001 attack came just before a shift change, so in some firehouses two crews were available to fill one riding list. FDNY policy allowed a company officer to add extra volunteer members to the list, and officers typically limited their number to the riding positions on the apparatus.<ref name="LV-55" /> Once on the scene, accountability depends on units reporting to a command post or staging area, keeping unit cohesion and discipline, and keeping the command post informed of their locations and operations.<ref name="LV-56">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 56.</ref> FDNY recorded this on a portable command board, an aluminium case of about 457 mm × 711 mm × 203 mm. Units were shown by colour-coded magnetic identifiers: black for engines, red for ladders, gold for battalions, blue for special units and purple for sectors.<ref name="LV-56" /> | ||
[[File:fse-personnel-accountability-system-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Schematic magnetic command board with columns for sectors and coloured unit tags: black engines, red ladders, gold battalions, blue special units|Schematic of the FDNY portable command board of 2001, about 457 mm × 711 mm, with colour-coded magnetic unit identifiers.]] | |||
Tighter rules apply inside the hazard area. Members operating in hazardous areas at emergency incidents should work in crews of two or more.<ref name="Loflin-12-114">Loflin (2008), p. 12-114.</ref> In the initial stage of a structure fire, the two standby members outside the hazard area should keep track of the number and identity of the members inside. They should also know their location, function and time of entry. The standby members should stay in radio, visual, voice or signal line contact with the crew.<ref name="Loflin-12-114" /> Once a second crew is assigned to or operating in the hazardous area, at least one [[Rapid intervention crew]] should be available for the rescue of members.<ref name="Loflin-12-114" /> | Tighter rules apply inside the hazard area. Members operating in hazardous areas at emergency incidents should work in crews of two or more.<ref name="Loflin-12-114">Loflin (2008), p. 12-114.</ref> In the initial stage of a structure fire, the two standby members outside the hazard area should keep track of the number and identity of the members inside. They should also know their location, function and time of entry. The standby members should stay in radio, visual, voice or signal line contact with the crew.<ref name="Loflin-12-114" /> Once a second crew is assigned to or operating in the hazardous area, at least one [[Rapid intervention crew]] should be available for the rescue of members.<ref name="Loflin-12-114" /> | ||
Time is tracked as well as location. According to Loflin (2008), the communications centre should report the elapsed time on scene to the incident commander at fixed intervals until the commander ends the reports.<ref name="Loflin-12-114" /> The chapter gives 15-minute intervals in one passage and 10-minute intervals in its summary of the radio procedures of NFPA 1561.<ref name="Loflin-12-114" /><ref name="Loflin-12-124" /> As an illustration, at an incident lasting one hour this is the difference between four and six reports. | Time is tracked as well as location. According to Loflin (2008), the communications centre should report the elapsed time on scene to the incident commander at fixed intervals until the commander ends the reports.<ref name="Loflin-12-114" /> The chapter gives 15-minute intervals in one passage and 10-minute intervals in its summary of the radio procedures of NFPA 1561.<ref name="Loflin-12-114" /><ref name="Loflin-12-124" /> As an illustration, at an incident lasting one hour this is the difference between four and six reports.<ref name="Loflin-12-114" /><ref name="Loflin-12-124" /> | ||
== Personnel accountability reports and emergency communications == | == Personnel accountability reports and emergency communications == | ||
A personnel accountability report (PAR) is a report on the accountability of the companies or members working in one area of the incident. The incident commander should obtain a PAR from each division or group supervisor whenever a change in conditions has been announced that could create an unsafe operation.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> The supervisor is then responsible for reporting on the accountability of all companies or members within his or her area. Loflin (2008) refers to a position description for incident safety and accountability published by FIRESCOPE in its ICS 910 publication.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> | A personnel accountability report (PAR) is a report on the accountability of the companies or members working in one area of the incident. The incident commander should obtain a PAR from each division or group supervisor whenever a change in conditions has been announced that could create an unsafe operation.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> The supervisor is then responsible for reporting on the accountability of all companies or members within his or her area. Loflin (2008) refers to a position description for incident safety and accountability published by FIRESCOPE in its ICS 910 publication.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> | ||
[[File:fse-personnel-accountability-system-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Sequence diagram: emergency traffic declared, PAR requested from each supervisor, supervisors report, all clear|Radio sequence after a change in conditions: emergency traffic, personnel accountability reports from each division or group, and the closing message.]] | |||
The incident command system should also include standard operating guidelines that use "emergency traffic" to evacuate responders from an area of imminent hazard and to account for their safety.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Emergency traffic is the designator that clears the radio channel. It can be declared by the incident commander, a division or group supervisor, or a member in trouble, who then describes the emergency in clear text. Examples in the handbook include "fire fighter down", "fire fighter missing", "fire fighter trapped" and "all members evacuate the building". The member who declared the emergency ends it by transmitting "all clear, resume radio traffic".<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> | The incident command system should also include standard operating guidelines that use "emergency traffic" to evacuate responders from an area of imminent hazard and to account for their safety.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Emergency traffic is the designator that clears the radio channel. It can be declared by the incident commander, a division or group supervisor, or a member in trouble, who then describes the emergency in clear text. Examples in the handbook include "fire fighter down", "fire fighter missing", "fire fighter trapped" and "all members evacuate the building". The member who declared the emergency ends it by transmitting "all clear, resume radio traffic".<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> | ||
A fire department should have an operational retreat policy. Besides the radio message, a department could use a second signal such as an apparatus air horn. Some departments used a series of three 10-second short blasts with a 10-second silence between each series.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> The incident commander should then choose apparatus away from the command post, so that radio messages are not missed while the horns sound. Corbett (2008) adds that all units should acknowledge the radio announcement of an evacuation and that evacuation drills should be part of routine training.<ref name="Corbett-12-129">Corbett (2008), p. 12-129.</ref> | A fire department should have an operational retreat policy. Besides the radio message, a department could use a second signal such as an apparatus air horn. Some departments used a series of three 10-second short blasts with a 10-second silence between each series.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> The incident commander should then choose apparatus away from the command post, so that radio messages are not missed while the horns sound.<ref name="Loflin-12-113" /> Corbett (2008) adds that all units should acknowledge the radio announcement of an evacuation and that evacuation drills should be part of routine training.<ref name="Corbett-12-129">Corbett (2008), p. 12-129.</ref> | ||
All of these procedures rely on [[Fire service radio communications]]. Under NFPA 1561, as described by Loflin (2008), a department should provide a dispatch channel and a separate tactical channel, and a command channel once divisions or groups are set up.<ref name="Loflin-12-123">Loflin (2008), p. 12-123.</ref> Loflin's table of communication issues states that portable radios should be considered a critical item of personal protective equipment. Ideally, every firefighter working in an atmosphere immediately dangerous to life and health would carry a portable radio with an emergency distress feature.<ref name="Loflin-12-123" /> The same table notes that "Mayday" signals a life-or-death situation, and that a culture of bravery can make firefighters reluctant to call for help quickly enough.<ref name="Loflin-12-123" /> | All of these procedures rely on [[Fire service radio communications]]. Under NFPA 1561, as described by Loflin (2008), a department should provide a dispatch channel and a separate tactical channel, and a command channel once divisions or groups are set up.<ref name="Loflin-12-123">Loflin (2008), p. 12-123.</ref> Loflin's table of communication issues states that portable radios should be considered a critical item of personal protective equipment. Ideally, every firefighter working in an atmosphere immediately dangerous to life and health would carry a portable radio with an emergency distress feature.<ref name="Loflin-12-123" /> The same table notes that "Mayday" signals a life-or-death situation, and that a culture of bravery can make firefighters reluctant to call for help quickly enough.<ref name="Loflin-12-123" /> | ||
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Duggan (2008) calls the need to track personnel at an emergency scene a basic principle of safe operations. Technologies such as bar code scanning, coded data chips, radio signal transmissions and personal digital assistant databases help command and safety personnel with this task.<ref name="Duggan-12-87">Duggan (2008), p. 12-87.</ref> By 2008, automated personnel accountability systems could track assignments and duration of entry, project air consumption, and automatically prompt and record periodic personnel accountability reports. Other systems could direct rescue crews towards a lost or injured firefighter, and location systems with a directional pointer could assist a rapid intervention team.<ref name="Duggan-12-87" /> Duggan described the technology as emerging and becoming easier to use and more cost-effective, with the challenge of giving a timely and accurate picture of operations.<ref name="Duggan-12-87" /> | Duggan (2008) calls the need to track personnel at an emergency scene a basic principle of safe operations. Technologies such as bar code scanning, coded data chips, radio signal transmissions and personal digital assistant databases help command and safety personnel with this task.<ref name="Duggan-12-87">Duggan (2008), p. 12-87.</ref> By 2008, automated personnel accountability systems could track assignments and duration of entry, project air consumption, and automatically prompt and record periodic personnel accountability reports. Other systems could direct rescue crews towards a lost or injured firefighter, and location systems with a directional pointer could assist a rapid intervention team.<ref name="Duggan-12-87" /> Duggan described the technology as emerging and becoming easier to use and more cost-effective, with the challenge of giving a timely and accurate picture of operations.<ref name="Duggan-12-87" /> | ||
A personal alert safety system (PASS) is a related but different device. It sounds an alarm when activated manually or when its sensor detects that the wearer has stopped moving.<ref name="Teele-12-154">Teele (2008), p. 12-154.</ref> NFPA 1982, in the edition described by Teele (2008), required automatic activation, for example by integrating the PASS with the [[Self-contained breathing apparatus]] so that it is activated when the air supply is turned on.<ref name="Teele-12-155" /> Teele reports that in too many fatal incidents firefighters had worn PASS devices but had failed to turn them on.<ref name="Teele-12-155" /> NIST tests also found that PASS alarms became quieter at high temperatures. The reduction could begin at about 150 °C, and all evaluated devices showed significant degradation between 150 °C and 260 °C.<ref name="Teele-12-155" /> | A personal alert safety system (PASS) is a related but different device. It sounds an alarm when activated manually or when its sensor detects that the wearer has stopped moving.<ref name="Teele-12-154">Teele (2008), p. 12-154.</ref> NFPA 1982, in the edition described by Teele (2008), required automatic activation, for example by integrating the PASS with the [[Self-contained breathing apparatus]] so that it is activated when the air supply is turned on.<ref name="Teele-12-155" /> Teele reports that in too many fatal incidents, firefighters became trapped, lost or disoriented, and many of them had worn PASS devices but had failed to turn them on.<ref name="Teele-12-155" /> NIST tests also found that PASS alarms became quieter at high temperatures. The reduction could begin at about 150 °C, and all evaluated devices showed significant degradation between 150 °C and 260 °C.<ref name="Teele-12-155" /> | ||
Teele (2008) concludes that a PASS cannot substitute for an active incident management system, close supervision of crews, communications, and a functional and adequate personnel accountability system. It is the accountability system that ensures that the assignment and location of each member are known at all times.<ref name="Teele-12-155" /> After the World Trade Center investigation, NIST recommended in 2005 that emergency communications systems and protocols be able to identify, locate and track emergency responders inside buildings and in the field.<ref name="NIST-219">National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 219.</ref> | Teele (2008) concludes that a PASS cannot substitute for an active incident management system, close supervision of crews, communications, and a functional and adequate personnel accountability system. It is the accountability system that ensures that the assignment and location of each member are known at all times.<ref name="Teele-12-155" /> After the World Trade Center investigation, NIST recommended in 2005 that emergency communications systems and protocols be able to identify, locate and track emergency responders inside buildings and in the field.<ref name="NIST-219">National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 219.</ref> | ||
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Once responders had reported in and left for their tasks, there was no positive means of locating or tracking them. Radio was the only means, and the FDNY radio system and procedures proved inadequate for locating and tracking that many people.<ref name="LV-69" /> When WTC 2 collapsed, all three FDNY command posts were lost with their data. The information on the command boards disappeared into the rubble, and there was no backup on the site or elsewhere, which made it difficult to locate missing personnel.<ref name="LV-63" /><ref name="LV-70">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 70.</ref> | Once responders had reported in and left for their tasks, there was no positive means of locating or tracking them. Radio was the only means, and the FDNY radio system and procedures proved inadequate for locating and tracking that many people.<ref name="LV-69" /> When WTC 2 collapsed, all three FDNY command posts were lost with their data. The information on the command boards disappeared into the rubble, and there was no backup on the site or elsewhere, which made it difficult to locate missing personnel.<ref name="LV-63" /><ref name="LV-70">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 70.</ref> | ||
The smaller police operations show the effect of scale. The NYPD sent only six Emergency Service Unit teams of about five people each into the towers, recorded on paper on a clipboard. When those records were lost, the managers could easily reconstruct them because so few people were involved.<ref name="LV-68">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 68.</ref> | The smaller police operations show the effect of scale. The NYPD sent only six Emergency Service Unit teams of about five people each into the towers, recorded on paper on a clipboard. When those records were lost, the managers could easily reconstruct them because so few people were involved.<ref name="LV-68">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 68.</ref> As an illustration, six teams of about five people make about 30 people, compared with roughly 1,000 responders on the site as a whole.<ref name="LV-68" /><ref name="NIST-192" /> The PAPD police desk had begun a roll call of its officers immediately after the first impact.<ref name="LV-69" /> Emergency medical services faced their own accountability obstacles: the size of the event, the self-dispatch and freelancing of some non-FDNY ambulances, and the inability of FDNY emergency medical supervisors to communicate with some of them.<ref name="LV-65">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 65.</ref> | ||
Among the key issues of command and control, NIST listed the ability of the assignment and tracking (accountability) system to cope with large-scale emergencies.<ref name="LV-li">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. li.</ref> Its findings state that personnel accountability and tracking are a vital part of command and control in any large emergency response.<ref name="LV-172">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 172.</ref> Klaene and Sanders (2008) make a related point for mutual-aid operations. Accountability system procedures are especially important at large incidents that need more resources than one department can provide, so responding departments should use the same procedures and train together.<ref name="KS-13-4" /> | Among the key issues of command and control, NIST listed the ability of the assignment and tracking (accountability) system to cope with large-scale emergencies.<ref name="LV-li">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. li.</ref> Its findings state that personnel accountability and tracking are a vital part of command and control in any large emergency response.<ref name="LV-172">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 172.</ref> Klaene and Sanders (2008) make a related point for mutual-aid operations. Accountability system procedures are especially important at large incidents that need more resources than one department can provide, so responding departments should use the same procedures and train together.<ref name="KS-13-4" /> | ||
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A personnel accountability system depends on the discipline of every member. Freelancing and self-dispatch bypass it, as the World Trade Center response showed.<ref name="LV-62" /><ref name="Teele-12-147" /> Loflin (2008) also notes that the culture of bravery in the fire service can make firefighters reluctant to communicate quickly enough when they need help.<ref name="Loflin-12-123" /> | A personnel accountability system depends on the discipline of every member. Freelancing and self-dispatch bypass it, as the World Trade Center response showed.<ref name="LV-62" /><ref name="Teele-12-147" /> Loflin (2008) also notes that the culture of bravery in the fire service can make firefighters reluctant to communicate quickly enough when they need help.<ref name="Loflin-12-123" /> | ||
At the World Trade Center, the manual systems proved limited in scale and vulnerable to the loss of their records. The FDNY command boards could not cope with the numbers, and both their magnetic records and the paper records of the NYPD were lost in the collapse of WTC 2.<ref name="LV-61" /><ref name="LV-63" /><ref name="LV-68" /> Laughlin (2008) records that the response to Hurricane Katrina also taught the importance of backup communications, basic supplies such as batteries, and personnel accountability.<ref name="Laughlin-12-168">Laughlin (2008), p. 12-168.</ref> | |||
Technical aids have their own weaknesses. Radio-based tracking proved inadequate when so many people were using the FDNY radio system. PASS alarms could be muffled, weakened by heat or affected by water ingress, and automated tracking was still an emerging technology in 2008.<ref name="LV-69" /><ref name="Teele-12-155" /><ref name="Duggan-12-87" /> The handbook itself is not fully consistent, giving both 15-minute and 10-minute intervals for elapsed-time reports.<ref name="Loflin-12-114" /><ref name="Loflin-12-124" /> | Technical aids have their own weaknesses. Radio-based tracking proved inadequate when so many people were using the FDNY radio system. PASS alarms could be muffled, weakened by heat or affected by water ingress, and automated tracking was still an emerging technology in 2008.<ref name="LV-69" /><ref name="Teele-12-155" /><ref name="Duggan-12-87" /> The handbook itself is not fully consistent, giving both 15-minute and 10-minute intervals for elapsed-time reports.<ref name="Loflin-12-114" /><ref name="Loflin-12-124" /> | ||
Latest revision as of 18:50, 14 November 2026
A personnel accountability system is the set of procedures, responsibilities and tools with which a fire department identifies and tracks every member operating at an emergency incident.[1] Its aim is that the incident commander knows at all times who is on the scene, where each member is working and what each member is doing.[2][3] In the emergency responder community, accountability covers the assignment, dispatch, checking in, tracking, locating and checking out of responders.[4] Failures of accountability on the fireground have often been associated with the injury or death of firefighters. In the words of the NIST report on the World Trade Center response, a firefighter whose accountability is lost "becomes lost at the incident".[2]
In United States practice as described in the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook (2008), the incident commander is responsible for overall accountability. Company officers account for their crews, and every member must take part in the system.[1] Its elements include a standard responder identification system, an accountability worksheet, personnel accountability reports (PAR) after changes in conditions and radio procedures for evacuating crews.[1] The World Trade Center attack of 11 September 2001 showed the limits of such systems. They generally worked well during the first 30 minutes, but the system of the New York fire department became overwhelmed, and its records were lost when the WTC 2 tower collapsed.[5][6]
Definition and purpose
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report on the emergency response at the World Trade Center describes accountability as the policies and practices for controlling people at an emergency scene. The control of people becomes more important as operations grow and the number of units and responders increases.[4] At the World Trade Center it also involved the recall of off-duty responders.[4] The same report defines firefighter accountability as the means of identifying, and keeping a time-based record of, where individual firefighters are located and working and what each is doing. It calls this a critical part of the Incident command system for managing human resources and protecting individuals.[2]
NIST quotes the fourth edition (2000) of the training manual Essentials of Fire Fighting on the purpose of such a system. Each department must develop its own system that identifies and tracks all personnel working at an incident, and the system should be standardised so that it is used at every incident.[7] All personnel must be familiar with it and take part, and it must also account for people who reach the scene in vehicles other than fire department apparatus. The manual stresses that accountability is vital after a serious accident or structural collapse. If the incident commander does not know who is on the fireground and where, it is impossible to determine who and how many may be trapped or injured.[7]
The NFPA handbook places the system within a wider set of safety measures for firefighting. Granito (2008) describes protocols from OSHA, NFPA and other bodies, prompted by continuing line-of-duty deaths, that call for on-scene safety officers, rapid intervention teams and personnel accountability systems.[8] Loflin (2008) lists accountability among the typical control measures against fireground injuries, together with full protective clothing, respiratory protection, training and standard operating procedures.[9] Klaene and Sanders (2008) name accountability systems among the subjects on which every department should have standard operating procedures.[10] Loflin's chapter ends by stating that specific emphasis is needed on, among other issues, incident scene communications and the personnel accountability of firefighters.[11]
Responsibilities in the incident command system
Loflin (2008) sets out the responsibilities as part of reducing risks to members at emergency incidents. Written guidelines should provide for the tracking and inventory of all members at an incident, and all members are responsible for actively participating in the department's system.[1] The incident commander should be responsible for overall responder accountability, should start an accountability worksheet at the beginning of the incident and should maintain the system throughout. The commander should also remain aware of the location and function of all companies and should control access to the incident scene.[1]
Accountability follows the chain of command. When needed, the incident commander should appoint branch directors and division, group or sector supervisors to reduce the commander's span of control. These supervisors should directly supervise and account for the companies under their command.[1] Company officers are accountable for all members of their company, and members are responsible for remaining under the supervision of their assigned company officer. The incident command system should also provide additional accountability responders where the size, complexity or needs of an incident require them.[1] The 1997 incident command manual of the Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) says that command options such as sectors and groups "fix personnel accountability".[12]
Teele (2008) states that firefighters who operate alone, without direct supervision or outside the incident command system, a practice called "freelancing" in the United States, cannot be permitted if safety is to be achieved.[13] The FDNY manual describes staging, the area where resources wait before deployment, as a checkpoint that provides accountability and prevents freelancing.[2] Klaene and Sanders (2008) note that when an unsuccessful offensive attack becomes a defensive operation, there are often more firefighters on the scene than needed. The incident commander must then keep strict control and accountability, keep the number of people in the fire zone to a minimum and disconnect attack lines that are no longer needed.[14]
The Incident safety officer checks that the system is in use. One of the officer's functions is to ensure that the department's personnel accountability system is being used.[15] At hazardous materials incidents the safety officer meets the incident commander to determine accountability needs. After special operations incidents the officer's written report for the post-incident analysis includes issues relating to the accountability system.[16] Van Helden and Stewart (2008) list accountability and resource tracking among the core values of the National Incident Management System.[17]
Tracking members from station to scene
A department should adopt and routinely use a standard responder identification system to maintain accountability for each member assigned to an incident. Loflin (2008) notes that several such systems were used in structural firefighting.[1] Whatever the system, it should give an account of the members actually responding on each company or apparatus.[1] The NIST report describes how this began in the FDNY firehouse. An officer ensured that the company roster had a full complement for the shift, firefighters were checked in and a riding list identified each person and his or her job assignment.[18]
The 2001 attack came just before a shift change, so in some firehouses two crews were available to fill one riding list. FDNY policy allowed a company officer to add extra volunteer members to the list, and officers typically limited their number to the riding positions on the apparatus.[18] Once on the scene, accountability depends on units reporting to a command post or staging area, keeping unit cohesion and discipline, and keeping the command post informed of their locations and operations.[19] FDNY recorded this on a portable command board, an aluminium case of about 457 mm × 711 mm × 203 mm. Units were shown by colour-coded magnetic identifiers: black for engines, red for ladders, gold for battalions, blue for special units and purple for sectors.[19]
Tighter rules apply inside the hazard area. Members operating in hazardous areas at emergency incidents should work in crews of two or more.[20] In the initial stage of a structure fire, the two standby members outside the hazard area should keep track of the number and identity of the members inside. They should also know their location, function and time of entry. The standby members should stay in radio, visual, voice or signal line contact with the crew.[20] Once a second crew is assigned to or operating in the hazardous area, at least one Rapid intervention crew should be available for the rescue of members.[20]
Time is tracked as well as location. According to Loflin (2008), the communications centre should report the elapsed time on scene to the incident commander at fixed intervals until the commander ends the reports.[20] The chapter gives 15-minute intervals in one passage and 10-minute intervals in its summary of the radio procedures of NFPA 1561.[20][11] As an illustration, at an incident lasting one hour this is the difference between four and six reports.[20][11]
Personnel accountability reports and emergency communications
A personnel accountability report (PAR) is a report on the accountability of the companies or members working in one area of the incident. The incident commander should obtain a PAR from each division or group supervisor whenever a change in conditions has been announced that could create an unsafe operation.[1] The supervisor is then responsible for reporting on the accountability of all companies or members within his or her area. Loflin (2008) refers to a position description for incident safety and accountability published by FIRESCOPE in its ICS 910 publication.[1]
The incident command system should also include standard operating guidelines that use "emergency traffic" to evacuate responders from an area of imminent hazard and to account for their safety.[1] Emergency traffic is the designator that clears the radio channel. It can be declared by the incident commander, a division or group supervisor, or a member in trouble, who then describes the emergency in clear text. Examples in the handbook include "fire fighter down", "fire fighter missing", "fire fighter trapped" and "all members evacuate the building". The member who declared the emergency ends it by transmitting "all clear, resume radio traffic".[1]
A fire department should have an operational retreat policy. Besides the radio message, a department could use a second signal such as an apparatus air horn. Some departments used a series of three 10-second short blasts with a 10-second silence between each series.[1] The incident commander should then choose apparatus away from the command post, so that radio messages are not missed while the horns sound.[1] Corbett (2008) adds that all units should acknowledge the radio announcement of an evacuation and that evacuation drills should be part of routine training.[21]
All of these procedures rely on Fire service radio communications. Under NFPA 1561, as described by Loflin (2008), a department should provide a dispatch channel and a separate tactical channel, and a command channel once divisions or groups are set up.[22] Loflin's table of communication issues states that portable radios should be considered a critical item of personal protective equipment. Ideally, every firefighter working in an atmosphere immediately dangerous to life and health would carry a portable radio with an emergency distress feature.[22] The same table notes that "Mayday" signals a life-or-death situation, and that a culture of bravery can make firefighters reluctant to call for help quickly enough.[22]
Electronic tracking and personal alarms
Duggan (2008) calls the need to track personnel at an emergency scene a basic principle of safe operations. Technologies such as bar code scanning, coded data chips, radio signal transmissions and personal digital assistant databases help command and safety personnel with this task.[23] By 2008, automated personnel accountability systems could track assignments and duration of entry, project air consumption, and automatically prompt and record periodic personnel accountability reports. Other systems could direct rescue crews towards a lost or injured firefighter, and location systems with a directional pointer could assist a rapid intervention team.[23] Duggan described the technology as emerging and becoming easier to use and more cost-effective, with the challenge of giving a timely and accurate picture of operations.[23]
A personal alert safety system (PASS) is a related but different device. It sounds an alarm when activated manually or when its sensor detects that the wearer has stopped moving.[24] NFPA 1982, in the edition described by Teele (2008), required automatic activation, for example by integrating the PASS with the Self-contained breathing apparatus so that it is activated when the air supply is turned on.[3] Teele reports that in too many fatal incidents, firefighters became trapped, lost or disoriented, and many of them had worn PASS devices but had failed to turn them on.[3] NIST tests also found that PASS alarms became quieter at high temperatures. The reduction could begin at about 150 °C, and all evaluated devices showed significant degradation between 150 °C and 260 °C.[3]
Teele (2008) concludes that a PASS cannot substitute for an active incident management system, close supervision of crews, communications, and a functional and adequate personnel accountability system. It is the accountability system that ensures that the assignment and location of each member are known at all times.[3] After the World Trade Center investigation, NIST recommended in 2005 that emergency communications systems and protocols be able to identify, locate and track emergency responders inside buildings and in the field.[25]
The World Trade Center response (2001)
The NIST analysis of the emergency response to the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 gives a detailed account of accountability and tracking. FDNY lost 343 personnel that day, and roughly 1,000 emergency responders were on the site.[26][27] All responding organisations had accountability, location and tracking plans in place, and these generally worked well during the first 30 minutes. The FDNY system, however, became overwhelmed by the large number of units and personnel arriving.[6] An FDNY interviewee reported that not all personnel were logged in on the command board. NIST attributes this partly to the size of the operation and partly to personnel not always reporting to the command post.[28]
Several factors added to the problem. As the recall of off-duty personnel took effect, some responders went to the site instead of their assigned locations.[4][2] Some FDNY personnel came to the site without unit approval. Teams of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) entered the towers without reporting to the FDNY command posts.[29] The towers were not well marked, and some units from other parts of the city did not know which tower was which.[28] NIST states that the entries without check-in created accountability problems for FDNY.[5]
The report explains why this matters. At times a command post must make immediate decisions on the life safety of all personnel. In some cases responders have died because the incident commander did not know they were in the path of changed conditions. The incident command needs to know where all personnel are to carry out a successful and safer operation.[5]
Once responders had reported in and left for their tasks, there was no positive means of locating or tracking them. Radio was the only means, and the FDNY radio system and procedures proved inadequate for locating and tracking that many people.[6] When WTC 2 collapsed, all three FDNY command posts were lost with their data. The information on the command boards disappeared into the rubble, and there was no backup on the site or elsewhere, which made it difficult to locate missing personnel.[5][30]
The smaller police operations show the effect of scale. The NYPD sent only six Emergency Service Unit teams of about five people each into the towers, recorded on paper on a clipboard. When those records were lost, the managers could easily reconstruct them because so few people were involved.[31] As an illustration, six teams of about five people make about 30 people, compared with roughly 1,000 responders on the site as a whole.[31][27] The PAPD police desk had begun a roll call of its officers immediately after the first impact.[6] Emergency medical services faced their own accountability obstacles: the size of the event, the self-dispatch and freelancing of some non-FDNY ambulances, and the inability of FDNY emergency medical supervisors to communicate with some of them.[32]
Among the key issues of command and control, NIST listed the ability of the assignment and tracking (accountability) system to cope with large-scale emergencies.[33] Its findings state that personnel accountability and tracking are a vital part of command and control in any large emergency response.[34] Klaene and Sanders (2008) make a related point for mutual-aid operations. Accountability system procedures are especially important at large incidents that need more resources than one department can provide, so responding departments should use the same procedures and train together.[10]
Limitations
A personnel accountability system depends on the discipline of every member. Freelancing and self-dispatch bypass it, as the World Trade Center response showed.[29][13] Loflin (2008) also notes that the culture of bravery in the fire service can make firefighters reluctant to communicate quickly enough when they need help.[22]
At the World Trade Center, the manual systems proved limited in scale and vulnerable to the loss of their records. The FDNY command boards could not cope with the numbers, and both their magnetic records and the paper records of the NYPD were lost in the collapse of WTC 2.[28][5][31] Laughlin (2008) records that the response to Hurricane Katrina also taught the importance of backup communications, basic supplies such as batteries, and personnel accountability.[35]
Technical aids have their own weaknesses. Radio-based tracking proved inadequate when so many people were using the FDNY radio system. PASS alarms could be muffled, weakened by heat or affected by water ingress, and automated tracking was still an emerging technology in 2008.[6][3][23] The handbook itself is not fully consistent, giving both 15-minute and 10-minute intervals for elapsed-time reports.[20][11]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 Loflin (2008), p. 12-113.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 54.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Teele (2008), p. 12-155.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 53.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 63.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 69.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 Hall and Adams (2000), as cited in Lawson and Vettori (2005), pp. 54–55.
- ↑ Granito (2008), p. 12-11.
- ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-119.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-4.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 Loflin (2008), p. 12-124.
- ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), Appendix A.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 Teele (2008), p. 12-147.
- ↑ Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-10.
- ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-111.
- ↑ Loflin (2008), p. 12-112.
- ↑ Van Helden and Stewart (2008), p. 12-200.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 55.
- ↑ 19.0 19.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 56.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 20.3 20.4 20.5 20.6 Loflin (2008), p. 12-114.
- ↑ Corbett (2008), p. 12-129.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 22.3 Loflin (2008), p. 12-123.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 23.2 23.3 Duggan (2008), p. 12-87.
- ↑ Teele (2008), p. 12-154.
- ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 219.
- ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 1.
- ↑ 27.0 27.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 192.
- ↑ 28.0 28.1 28.2 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 61.
- ↑ 29.0 29.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 62.
- ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 70.
- ↑ 31.0 31.1 31.2 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 68.
- ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 65.
- ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. li.
- ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. 172.
- ↑ Laughlin (2008), p. 12-168.
References
- Corbett, G. P. (2008). Effect of building construction and fire protection systems on fire fighter safety. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-127–12-141). National Fire Protection Association.
- Duggan, B. P. (2008). Information management and computer technology. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-79–12-97). National Fire Protection Association.
- Granito, J. A. (2008). Planning for public fire-rescue protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-3–12-22). National Fire Protection Association.
- Klaene, B. J., & Sanders, R. (2008). Fireground operations. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 13-3–13-11). National Fire Protection Association.
- Laughlin, J. W. (2008). Training programs for fire and emergency service personnel. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-161–12-175). National Fire Protection Association.
- Lawson, J. R., & Vettori, R. L. (2005). The emergency response operations (NIST NCSTAR 1-8). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
- Loflin, M. E. (2008). Safety, medical, and health issues and programs. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-107–12-125). National Fire Protection Association.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2005). Final report on the collapse of the World Trade Center towers (NIST NCSTAR 1).
- Teele, B. W. (2008). Fire and emergency services protective clothing and protective equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-143–12-160). National Fire Protection Association.
- Van Helden, W., & Stewart, T. (2008). Disaster planning and response services. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 12-199–12-214). National Fire Protection Association.