New FSE wiki article: Explosion suppression system (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
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The overall response time is therefore one of the key design parameters. It is made up of the detection time, the response time of the suppressors, their discharge time and the travel time of the agent through the enclosure.<ref name="UG-17-155" /> The system reduces the peak pressure in the protected enclosure to a reduced pressure, ''P''<sub>red</sub>. This is the sum of the pressure rise from partial burning before extinguishment and the pressure rise caused by injecting the agent. Suppression is considered successful if ''P''<sub>red</sub> is less than the pressure strength of the equipment.<ref name="UG-17-155" /><ref name="UG-17-156" /> | The overall response time is therefore one of the key design parameters. It is made up of the detection time, the response time of the suppressors, their discharge time and the travel time of the agent through the enclosure.<ref name="UG-17-155" /> The system reduces the peak pressure in the protected enclosure to a reduced pressure, ''P''<sub>red</sub>. This is the sum of the pressure rise from partial burning before extinguishment and the pressure rise caused by injecting the agent. Suppression is considered successful if ''P''<sub>red</sub> is less than the pressure strength of the equipment.<ref name="UG-17-155" /><ref name="UG-17-156" /> | ||
[[File:fse-explosion-suppression-system-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Schematic pressure-time curves of an unsuppressed deflagration rising to Pmax and a suppressed one levelling off at Pred|Schematic pressure-time course of an unsuppressed and a suppressed deflagration in a closed vessel. Pa is the activation pressure, Pred the reduced pressure.]] | |||
Suppression differs from the other protection methods in what remains afterwards. Because the combustion is stopped early, an explosive fuel-air mixture may still exist in the enclosure after a successful operation, if the suppressant can settle out or condense.<ref name="UG-17-155" /> Venting, by contrast, ejects the burning contents to a safe place, and containment lets the whole mixture burn inside a strong vessel.<ref name="UG-17-155" /> | Suppression differs from the other protection methods in what remains afterwards. Because the combustion is stopped early, an explosive fuel-air mixture may still exist in the enclosure after a successful operation, if the suppressant can settle out or condense.<ref name="UG-17-155" /> Venting, by contrast, ejects the burning contents to a safe place, and containment lets the whole mixture burn inside a strong vessel.<ref name="UG-17-155" /> | ||
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The extinguishers are of the high-rate-discharge (HRD) type. Each is charged with agent and a propelling gas, usually nitrogen, at 300 to 900 psig (about 20 to 60 bar) depending on the manufacturer. Explosively or electrically operated high-speed valves give the very high rate of agent delivery that suppression needs.<ref name="UG-17-157" /> Nozzles help to distribute the agent. They may be fixed, or of a "pop-out" type that stays recessed until the discharging agent pushes it into the process volume.<ref name="UG-17-157" /> Gagnon (2008) notes that explosion suppression systems can usually be recognised by the absence of piping and by their uniquely shaped agent containers.<ref name="Gagnon-16-130">Gagnon (2008), p. 16-130.</ref> | The extinguishers are of the high-rate-discharge (HRD) type. Each is charged with agent and a propelling gas, usually nitrogen, at 300 to 900 psig (about 20 to 60 bar) depending on the manufacturer. Explosively or electrically operated high-speed valves give the very high rate of agent delivery that suppression needs.<ref name="UG-17-157" /> Nozzles help to distribute the agent. They may be fixed, or of a "pop-out" type that stays recessed until the discharging agent pushes it into the process volume.<ref name="UG-17-157" /> Gagnon (2008) notes that explosion suppression systems can usually be recognised by the absence of piping and by their uniquely shaped agent containers.<ref name="Gagnon-16-130">Gagnon (2008), p. 16-130.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-explosion-suppression-system-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Four panels of a vessel with detector and two agent containers: ignition, detection, agent discharge, flame quenched|Explosion suppression system on a closed vessel: a pressure detector senses the incipient deflagration, high-rate-discharge containers inject agent, and the agent quenches the flame ball.]] | |||
The control unit is an electronic power supply with battery backup. It supervises the system circuitry and supplies the current to the valve actuators. Normally the protected process equipment is shut off automatically when an incipient deflagration is detected.<ref name="UG-17-157" /> Zalosh (2002) adds interlocks for self-monitoring and for triggering alarms when the system activates.<ref name="Zalosh2002-3-417" /> Because these are active systems, they require periodic inspection and maintenance.<ref name="UG-17-157" /> | The control unit is an electronic power supply with battery backup. It supervises the system circuitry and supplies the current to the valve actuators. Normally the protected process equipment is shut off automatically when an incipient deflagration is detected.<ref name="UG-17-157" /> Zalosh (2002) adds interlocks for self-monitoring and for triggering alarms when the system activates.<ref name="Zalosh2002-3-417" /> Because these are active systems, they require periodic inspection and maintenance.<ref name="UG-17-157" /> | ||
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Suppressing a deflagration needs much more agent than extinguishing a steady flame. Explosion suppression systems use significantly higher agent quantities than flame suppression or inerting, delivered at higher rates.<ref name="DT-17-97" /> The table compares typical concentrations for one test series. DiNenno and Taylor (2008) stress that these values are for comparison only and must not be used for design.<ref name="DT-17-97" /> | Suppressing a deflagration needs much more agent than extinguishing a steady flame. Explosion suppression systems use significantly higher agent quantities than flame suppression or inerting, delivered at higher rates.<ref name="DT-17-97" /> The table compares typical concentrations for one test series. DiNenno and Taylor (2008) stress that these values are for comparison only and must not be used for design.<ref name="DT-17-97" /> | ||
[[File:fse-explosion-suppression-system-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Grouped bar chart of agent concentrations for five agents: flame suppression, inerting in propane and diesel droplet deflagration suppression|Typical concentrations of five agents for flame suppression, inerting of propane and suppression of diesel fuel droplet deflagrations, for comparison only.]] | |||
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Assume the vessel can withstand 0.3 bar gauge (30 kPa), a load that Ural and Garzia (2008) describe as not uncommon for suppression applications.<ref name="UG-17-154" /> Discharging one 2.5 L container pressurised to 900 psig with nitrogen into a 1 m³ vessel adds 1.4 psig, or about 9.7 kPa.<ref name="Zalosh2002-3-418" /> The combustion may therefore raise the pressure to at most 30 − 9.7 = 20.3 kPa. The equation reaches this pressure about 138 ms after ignition, so the agent must stop the flame within about 61 ms of detection. If turbulence doubles the effective burning velocity (χ = 2), every time halves and the margin falls to about 31 ms. Because the approximation underestimates the pressure above about 14 kPa, the real margin is somewhat shorter still.<ref name="Zalosh2002-3-408" /> | Assume the vessel can withstand 0.3 bar gauge (30 kPa), a load that Ural and Garzia (2008) describe as not uncommon for suppression applications.<ref name="UG-17-154" /> Discharging one 2.5 L container pressurised to 900 psig with nitrogen into a 1 m³ vessel adds 1.4 psig, or about 9.7 kPa.<ref name="Zalosh2002-3-418" /> The combustion may therefore raise the pressure to at most 30 − 9.7 = 20.3 kPa. The equation reaches this pressure about 138 ms after ignition, so the agent must stop the flame within about 61 ms of detection. If turbulence doubles the effective burning velocity (χ = 2), every time halves and the margin falls to about 31 ms. Because the approximation underestimates the pressure above about 14 kPa, the real margin is somewhat shorter still.<ref name="Zalosh2002-3-408" /> | ||
[[File:fse-explosion-suppression-system-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Line chart of pressure rise against time for a 1 m3 vessel with detection at 3.5 kPa after 77 ms and the 20.3 kPa limit after 138 ms|Early pressure rise in a closed 1 m³ sphere for a quiescent hydrocarbon-air mixture (chi = 1) and with doubled burning velocity (chi = 2), with detection at 3.5 kPa and the combustion limit of 20.3 kPa.]] | |||
The example shows why suppression is a race measured in milliseconds, and why it becomes harder for fast-burning fuels. All times scale with ''a''/(χ''S''<sub>u</sub>). A 10 m³ sphere has a radius 2.15 times larger and would give about 2.15 times more time for the same mixture, while a dust with a high ''K''<sub>St</sub> shortens it. This is consistent with test results: the total suppressed pressure is usually below 5 percent of ''P''<sub>max</sub> for organic fuels, but 10 to 20 percent of ''P''<sub>max</sub> for aluminium dust.<ref name="Zalosh2002-3-418" /> | The example shows why suppression is a race measured in milliseconds, and why it becomes harder for fast-burning fuels. All times scale with ''a''/(χ''S''<sub>u</sub>). A 10 m³ sphere has a radius 2.15 times larger and would give about 2.15 times more time for the same mixture, while a dust with a high ''K''<sub>St</sub> shortens it. This is consistent with test results: the total suppressed pressure is usually below 5 percent of ''P''<sub>max</sub> for organic fuels, but 10 to 20 percent of ''P''<sub>max</sub> for aluminium dust.<ref name="Zalosh2002-3-418" /> | ||
Latest revision as of 09:05, 9 November 2026
An explosion suppression system, also called a deflagration suppression system, is an active protection system that stops a deflagration inside an enclosure, usually a process vessel. It detects the deflagration at its very first stage and extinguishes it by rapidly injecting a suppressing agent, before the pressure rises high enough to damage the enclosure.[1][2] A typical system consists of pressure or optical detectors, a control panel and several pressurised containers of agent mounted on the protected equipment.[2] The agent is usually a dry chemical powder, water or a halocarbon.[3]
Suppression is one of four explosion protection strategies, next to pressure containment, explosion venting and explosion isolation.[4] It is the only one of the four that stops the combustion before most of the fuel-air mixture has burned.[2] Because no flame or fuel is discharged, it can protect indoor equipment and vessels with toxic contents where venting is not acceptable.[1] The total agent delivery time is on the order of 100 milliseconds.[5] In the United States, the design of such systems is covered by NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems, as described in the 2008 handbook.[6]
Principle of operation
A deflagration in a closed vessel starts slowly. At first the flame is a small, growing ball around the ignition point, and most of the pressure rise only occurs when the flame approaches the vessel walls. Zalosh (2002) shows this with a calculated example. When the pressure has risen by 2 psig (about 14 kPa), the flame radius is already half the vessel radius, although the final pressure in that example is 93 psig.[7] An explosion suppression system uses this delay. A pressure or flame radiation detector senses the incipient explosion while only a small fraction of the flammable gas or dust has burned, and the signal triggers the discharge of agent into the enclosure. When the agent reaches the expanding flame front, it quenches the flame.[1]
Ural and Garzia (2008) describe suppression as a special case of fire extinguishment. It is a competition between the rapidly rising heat release rate of the combustion zone and the rate at which agent is delivered.[8] At the moment of ignition, a small uniform agent concentration, the inerting concentration, would make the whole space noncombustible. As the deflagration grows, more and more agent is needed, because the unburned mixture must be inerted and the burning volume must be quenched.[8] If delivery is delayed too long, the deflagration passes beyond the point of suppressibility. The result may then be the full unprotected deflagration pressure, or even higher pressures.[8]
The overall response time is therefore one of the key design parameters. It is made up of the detection time, the response time of the suppressors, their discharge time and the travel time of the agent through the enclosure.[2] The system reduces the peak pressure in the protected enclosure to a reduced pressure, Pred. This is the sum of the pressure rise from partial burning before extinguishment and the pressure rise caused by injecting the agent. Suppression is considered successful if Pred is less than the pressure strength of the equipment.[2][8]
Suppression differs from the other protection methods in what remains afterwards. Because the combustion is stopped early, an explosive fuel-air mixture may still exist in the enclosure after a successful operation, if the suppressant can settle out or condense.[2] Venting, by contrast, ejects the burning contents to a safe place, and containment lets the whole mixture burn inside a strong vessel.[2]
Components
A deflagration suppression system consists of components for detection, extinguishment, and control and supervision.[8] Detection must take place when the burning volume is still much smaller than the protected volume. Pressure detectors, rate-of-pressure-rise detectors and optical flame detectors are used. Optical detectors with ultraviolet (UV) or combined UV and infrared sensors are preferred in unenclosed spaces whose atmosphere does not absorb UV, such as solvent storage rooms, pump rooms and aerosol can filling rooms. Pressure detectors are used in closed process equipment, particularly where the atmosphere is dusty.[3]
Zalosh (2002) notes that UV detectors give the fastest response, but that spurious activation and optical shielding of the detectors must also be considered.[1] Multiple detectors and appropriate detection logic are essential to avoid false actuations.[3]
The extinguishers are of the high-rate-discharge (HRD) type. Each is charged with agent and a propelling gas, usually nitrogen, at 300 to 900 psig (about 20 to 60 bar) depending on the manufacturer. Explosively or electrically operated high-speed valves give the very high rate of agent delivery that suppression needs.[3] Nozzles help to distribute the agent. They may be fixed, or of a "pop-out" type that stays recessed until the discharging agent pushes it into the process volume.[3] Gagnon (2008) notes that explosion suppression systems can usually be recognised by the absence of piping and by their uniquely shaped agent containers.[9]
The control unit is an electronic power supply with battery backup. It supervises the system circuitry and supplies the current to the valve actuators. Normally the protected process equipment is shut off automatically when an incipient deflagration is detected.[3] Zalosh (2002) adds interlocks for self-monitoring and for triggering alarms when the system activates.[1] Because these are active systems, they require periodic inspection and maintenance.[3]
Suppressing agents
The 2008 handbook lists three groups of agents: water with or without additives, dry chemical formulations, and halocarbons. The dry chemicals are usually based on sodium bicarbonate or monoammonium phosphate, and dry chemical agents are the most commonly specified in deflagration suppression.[3] Each agent works by a combination of thermal quenching and chemical inhibition; water acts entirely by thermal quenching.[3] Zalosh (2002) calls the heat sink effect the most clearly understood mechanism. Some agents also remove free radicals from the flame, but the size of that effect depends on the flame speed and on the chemistry of fuel and agent.[10] The choice of agent is usually based on effectiveness, toxicity, compatibility with the product, residual inerting and volatility.[3]
Halogenated agents have a regulatory history. The first explosion suppression systems were introduced by the British in the late 1940s for aircraft and were later extended to industrial use. Halon, once a common agent, was scheduled for elimination under the Montreal Protocol, and a halocarbon clean agent in accordance with NFPA 2001 may be required for a new system.[9] Ural and Garzia (2008) note that Halon 1301 is no longer manufactured but remains available for systems that meet critical-use criteria. Chlorobromomethane (Halon 1011) was used widely but, as an ozone-depleting substance, could no longer be used in the United States without special permission from the EPA.[3] The halon phase-out also renewed interest in water and aqueous salt solutions for potentially occupied facilities, such as aerosol propellant filling rooms and gas compressor stations.[10]
Suppressing a deflagration needs much more agent than extinguishing a steady flame. Explosion suppression systems use significantly higher agent quantities than flame suppression or inerting, delivered at higher rates.[5] The table compares typical concentrations for one test series. DiNenno and Taylor (2008) stress that these values are for comparison only and must not be used for design.[5]
| Agent | Flame suppression (typical) | Inerting concentration in propane | Diesel fuel droplet deflagration suppression |
|---|---|---|---|
| Halon 1301 | 3.0 | 6–7 | 12 |
| FC-3-1-10 | 5.5 | 10.3 | 8 |
| HFC-227ea | 5.8 | about 12 | 11 |
| HFC-23 | 12.0 | 20.2 | not given |
| IG-541 | 29.0 | 49.0 | not given |
Source: DiNenno and Taylor (2008), Table 17.6.9.[11]
In one test series for aerosol filling rooms, 20 kg of HFC-227ea, FC-3-1-10 or HFC-236fa, or 10 kg of water, suppressed the deflagration of a 90 g propane release in an 80 m³ room. The flame front extended about 1.2 m before it was stopped.[5]
Pressure development and timing
The time available for suppression can be estimated from the early growth of a deflagration in a closed spherical vessel. Zalosh (2002) gives an approximate solution for the pressure rise early in the deflagration, while it is still small compared with the initial pressure. In this solution the relative pressure rise grows with the cube of time, because the flame ball grows in all three directions:[7]
The pressure that the protected equipment sees is the total suppressed pressure (TSP). Chatrathi and Going, as cited in Zalosh (2002), split it into three parts:[10]
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Pressure in the vessel at time t | kPa (absolute) | |
| Initial pressure | kPa (absolute) | |
| Maximum closed-vessel deflagration pressure | kPa (absolute) | |
| Ratio of specific heats of the unburned gas (1.4 for most hydrocarbon-air mixtures) | – | |
| Augmentation factor for turbulent burning (1 for a quiescent mixture) | – | |
| Burning velocity of the mixture | m/s | |
| Time from ignition | s | |
| Radius of the spherical vessel | m | |
| Total suppressed pressure | kPa (gauge) | |
| Deflagration pressure when agent discharge is actuated | kPa (gauge) | |
| Pressure added by the propellant gas and any gaseous agent | kPa | |
| Pressure added by combustion while the agent travels to the flame front | kPa |
The first equation is valid only while the pressure rise is small. Zalosh (2002) reports that it is virtually identical to a full numerical solution below 2 psig (about 14 kPa). Up to 8 psig (about 55 kPa) it differs by about 20 percent, and it underestimates the pressure.[7] In the TSP equation, the first term is reduced by fast detectors and very fast-opening agent containers. The second term mainly matters in small enclosures. The third is the hardest to predict, because it depends on how the agent disperses and reacts with the flame. It increases with the deflagration index of the fuel and with turbulence.[10]
Worked example
A closed 1 m³ spherical vessel, the minimum test vessel size named in the ISO and Factory Mutual standards, contains a quiescent hydrocarbon-air mixture.[10] The input values are those of the example by Zalosh (2002): burning velocity Su = 45.5 cm/s, Pm = 640 kPa gauge, γ = 1.4 and χ = 1.[7] The vessel radius is a = 0.620 m and the initial pressure is 101.3 kPa. With these values, the factor in front of the last bracket in the first equation is about 192.
Suppose the system is set to detect at a pressure rise of 35 mbar (3.5 kPa), the detection pressure used in a test reported by Ural and Garzia (2008).[8] The equation then gives a detection time of about 77 ms after ignition. At that moment only about 0.55 percent of the mixture has burned, but the flame ball already fills about 3 percent of the vessel volume and has reached about 31 percent of the vessel radius. These two values follow from the pressure-mass and flame-radius relations of Zalosh (2002), which also reproduce his statement that the flame radius is half the vessel radius at 2 psig.[7]
Assume the vessel can withstand 0.3 bar gauge (30 kPa), a load that Ural and Garzia (2008) describe as not uncommon for suppression applications.[4] Discharging one 2.5 L container pressurised to 900 psig with nitrogen into a 1 m³ vessel adds 1.4 psig, or about 9.7 kPa.[10] The combustion may therefore raise the pressure to at most 30 − 9.7 = 20.3 kPa. The equation reaches this pressure about 138 ms after ignition, so the agent must stop the flame within about 61 ms of detection. If turbulence doubles the effective burning velocity (χ = 2), every time halves and the margin falls to about 31 ms. Because the approximation underestimates the pressure above about 14 kPa, the real margin is somewhat shorter still.[7]
The example shows why suppression is a race measured in milliseconds, and why it becomes harder for fast-burning fuels. All times scale with a/(χSu). A 10 m³ sphere has a radius 2.15 times larger and would give about 2.15 times more time for the same mixture, while a dust with a high KSt shortens it. This is consistent with test results: the total suppressed pressure is usually below 5 percent of Pmax for organic fuels, but 10 to 20 percent of Pmax for aluminium dust.[10]
Design basis and testing
There is no simple public design method. Ural and Garzia (2008) state that suppression designers use proprietary calculation procedures to control the agent delivery time, nominal concentration and dispersion uniformity. They do this by specifying the number of suppressors, their volumes and their discharge cross-sections.[2] More suppressors give a larger total discharge area, a shorter delivery time, a lower reduced pressure and a more uniform agent distribution.[2][8] Tests by Moore confirmed that many well-distributed small containers are better than fewer large ones, as cited in Zalosh (2002).[10] DiNenno and Taylor (2008) note that no generic design requirements or standards were available for such systems, so each system must be designed specifically for its application.[5]
The protection that a system gives depends on the size and shape of the protected volume, the explosibility of the material and the initial turbulence. It also depends on the number, size and location of the HRD extinguishers and on the type, sensitivity and location of the detectors.[3] The explosibility is characterised by the deflagration index KSt for dusts and KG for gases. KSt can be related to an effective burning velocity, which can then be compared with the agent delivery characteristics of the system. It should be measured in a vessel of at least 20 L.[8]
Testing is done at large scale. Programmes summarised by Zalosh (2002) range from laboratory vessels to a 500 m³ tanker pump room and a 250 m³ test vessel. The ISO and Factory Mutual standards require tests in a vessel of at least 1 m³, with and without agent.[10] Bartknecht found that the quantity of dry chemical agent needed is proportional to the enclosure volume below about 5 m³, but proportional to the volume to the power two-thirds above 9 m³. This suggests that the agent works by inerting the unburned mixture ahead of the flame in small vessels, and by quenching the flame front itself in large ones.[10]
A test reported in the Fire Protection Handbook illustrates the result. A cellulosic dust with a KSt of 310 bar·m/s was ignited in a 1.9 m³ vessel and suppressed with a sodium bicarbonate agent. The suppression would count as successful only if the equipment could tolerate an overpressure of 8 psig (0.55 bar).[8]
Applications and selection
Suppression may be the preferred approach when the consequences of the other options are unacceptable. The equipment may be too large to build economically for pressure containment, or venting may be impossible because of the location or contents of the vessel. Mechanical isolation may also have unacceptable consequences in a complex plant.[2] Venting is inappropriate where toxic or noxious materials are involved or where vents cannot discharge to a safe place. Isolation protects adjacent units, not the unit where the ignition occurred, and containment requires a vessel strong enough for the full pressure.[2] Against these advantages stand the high cost of a complex installation and of refilling and resetting the system after a discharge.[1]
The handbook describes uses in many industries. For dust explosion hazards, Schwab (2008c) names suppression as an option where enough vent area cannot be provided.[12] In woodworking plants, rupture of a dust collector is usually prevented either by venting to NFPA 68 or by deflagration suppression designed to NFPA 69.[13]
In mining and mineral processing, suppression is used where venting is impractical, where explosions are frequent, as in coal pulverisers, or where very valuable equipment is exposed.[14] In the grain industry, it is an alternative to venting for fixed equipment, and self-contained suppression devices had been developed.[15][16] For aerosol filling rooms, Fredrickson (2008) recommends an explosion suppression system in case prevention fails, together with wet-pipe sprinklers and interlocks that shut down production.[17] Lemoff (2008) describes suppression for indoor flammable gas hazards as a system that allows ignition but arrests the combustion before an explosion pressure develops.[18]
Explosion suppression systems should not be confused with ultra-high-speed water spray systems. Gagnon (2008) explains that in the United States suppression systems are designed to NFPA 69 for enclosed vessels and conveyances where overpressure or rupture is the main concern. Ultra-high-speed water spray systems are designed to NFPA 15 for rooms and open areas where rupture is not the main concern. Explosion suppression systems are not normally used in ordnance operations, because their response is slower for the volume to be protected.[6] NFPA 15 requires such water spray systems to start discharging within 100 milliseconds of detection.[19] Gagnon (2008) notes that the two names are sometimes used interchangeably, although the systems differ.[20]
Limits and misconceptions
Suppression only works against deflagrations, in which the flame travels slower than the speed of sound. Neither explosion suppression nor ultra-high-speed water spray has been found effective where a detonation can occur.[6] Zalosh (2008) explains that the sudden, spatially nonuniform pressure rise of a detonation or quasi-detonation precludes both venting and suppression.[21] Very fast-burning materials are also a problem. Lataille (2008) notes that suppression is limited to materials and enclosures that can be protected successfully, and that efforts to suppress explosions of some metal dusts had not been successful.[22] Even where suppression of aluminium dust succeeds, the suppressed pressure is several times higher than for organic dusts.[10]
A common misconception is that an inerting concentration of agent is enough. DiNenno and Taylor (2008) state that inerting concentrations are not appropriate for use in deflagration or detonation suppression. Suppression systems use significantly higher agent quantities, delivered at higher rates.[5] A second misconception is that the vessel is safe after a successful suppression. The flammable mixture may remain once the agent has settled or condensed, and ignition sources may still be present.[2] Zalosh (2002) therefore lists agent retention time as a selection criterion where repeated ignitions are possible.[10]
A suppression system also depends on its weakest component. Detection that is too slow, a delayed valve, too few suppressors or poor agent distribution can each let the deflagration pass the point of suppressibility.[8] Because the protected process is normally shut down when the system detects a deflagration, multiple detectors and appropriate detection logic are needed to avoid false actuations.[3] Like other active systems, a suppression system only gives its design protection if it is inspected and maintained periodically.[3]
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Zalosh (2002), p. 3-417.
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-155.
- ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-157.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-154.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 DiNenno and Taylor (2008), p. 17-97.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Gagnon (2008), p. 16-110.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 Zalosh (2002), p. 3-408.
- ↑ 8.00 8.01 8.02 8.03 8.04 8.05 8.06 8.07 8.08 8.09 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-156.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 Gagnon (2008), p. 16-130.
- ↑ 10.00 10.01 10.02 10.03 10.04 10.05 10.06 10.07 10.08 10.09 10.10 10.11 Zalosh (2002), p. 3-418.
- ↑ DiNenno and Taylor (2008), p. 17-99.
- ↑ Schwab (2008c), p. 6-148.
- ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-23.
- ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-220.
- ↑ Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-98.
- ↑ Maness and Sargent (2008), p. 9-102.
- ↑ Fredrickson (2008), p. 6-261.
- ↑ Lemoff (2008), p. 6-176.
- ↑ Gagnon (2008), p. 16-109.
- ↑ Gagnon (2008), p. 16-131.
- ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-99.
- ↑ Lataille (2008), p. 8-13.
References
- Cholin, J. M. (2008d). Woodworking facilities and processes. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-3–9-25). National Fire Protection Association.
- DiNenno, P. J., & Taylor, G. M. (2008). Halon and halon replacement agents and systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-93–17-121). National Fire Protection Association.
- Fredrickson, D. L. (2008). Manufacture and storage of aerosol products. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-257–6-267). National Fire Protection Association.
- Gagnon, R. M. (2008). Ultra-High-Speed water spray systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 16-109–16-133). National Fire Protection Association.
- Lataille, J. I. (2008). Air-Moving equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-3–8-15). National Fire Protection Association.
- Lemoff, T. C. (2008). Gases. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-165–6-186). National Fire Protection Association.
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