New FSE wiki article: Oilseed solvent extraction plant (written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
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An '''oilseed solvent extraction plant''' is an industrial facility that removes vegetable oil from prepared oilseeds by washing them with a flammable solvent, in practice commercial hexane. The solvent is then recovered from the oil and from the extracted meal and reused.<ref name="KB-9- | An '''oilseed solvent extraction plant''' is an industrial facility that removes vegetable oil from prepared oilseeds by washing them with a flammable solvent, in practice commercial hexane.<ref name="KB-9-131">Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-131.</ref> The solvent is then recovered from the oil and from the extracted meal and reused.<ref name="KB-9-134" /><ref name="KB-9-135" /> Soybeans and other seeds with about 20 % oil by weight are usually extracted directly. Seeds richer in oil, such as cottonseed, rapeseed, sunflower, peanuts and copra, are usually prepressed to 10–20 % oil first.<ref name="KB-9-131" /> | ||
The main fire hazards are the highly flammable solvent and the combustible dusts from storing and handling the seeds.<ref name="KB-9-135">Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-135.</ref> Hexane vapour is about three times heavier than air and is ignitable between about 1.2 and 6.9 % by volume, as stated in the ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008).<ref name="KB-9-135" /> In the United States, these plants are covered by NFPA 36, ''Standard for Solvent Extraction Plants''. The handbook describes its 2004 edition, which requires alarms, shutdowns and relief valves on key parts of the process.<ref name="KB-9-137">Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-137.</ref> Safe operation rests on keeping solvent inside a closed, slightly evacuated system and on separating the extraction area from ignition sources. | The main fire hazards are the highly flammable solvent and the combustible dusts from storing and handling the seeds.<ref name="KB-9-135">Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-135.</ref> Hexane vapour is about three times heavier than air and is ignitable between about 1.2 and 6.9 % by volume, as stated in the ''Fire Protection Handbook'' (2008).<ref name="KB-9-135" /> In the United States, these plants are covered by NFPA 36, ''Standard for Solvent Extraction Plants''. The handbook describes its 2004 edition, which requires alarms, shutdowns and relief valves on key parts of the process.<ref name="KB-9-137">Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-137.</ref> Safe operation rests on keeping solvent inside a closed, slightly evacuated system and on separating the extraction area from ignition sources.<ref name="KB-9-135" /><ref name="KB-9-138" /> | ||
== Process and equipment == | == Process and equipment == | ||
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The extractor is usually of the continuous percolation type with six or more stages. Liquid solvent enters above the flake bed, drains through it and is pumped to the next stage.<ref name="KB-9-133">Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-133.</ref> Fresh hexane at about 60 °C (140 °F) meets the flakes near the discharge end and moves counter to them, becoming richer in oil at each stage.<ref name="KB-9-133" /> The resulting mixture of oil and hexane, called miscella, usually leaves with 25–30 % oil by weight.<ref name="KB-9-133" /> About one part of solvent is added per part of flakes by weight, and the extractor runs at about 60 °C at atmospheric pressure or a slight vacuum of 124 Pa (½ in. water gauge).<ref name="KB-9-133" /> | The extractor is usually of the continuous percolation type with six or more stages. Liquid solvent enters above the flake bed, drains through it and is pumped to the next stage.<ref name="KB-9-133">Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-133.</ref> Fresh hexane at about 60 °C (140 °F) meets the flakes near the discharge end and moves counter to them, becoming richer in oil at each stage.<ref name="KB-9-133" /> The resulting mixture of oil and hexane, called miscella, usually leaves with 25–30 % oil by weight.<ref name="KB-9-133" /> About one part of solvent is added per part of flakes by weight, and the extractor runs at about 60 °C at atmospheric pressure or a slight vacuum of 124 Pa (½ in. water gauge).<ref name="KB-9-133" /> | ||
[[File:fse-oilseed-solvent-extraction-plant-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Flow diagram of an oilseed solvent extraction plant: preparation, extractor, desolventiser-toaster, oil and solvent recovery, vent recovery|Main process stages and the hexane loop of a soybean solvent extraction plant.]] | |||
The extracted flakes still hold solvent. In modern plants they pass through a single vertical unit, the desolventiser-toaster-dryer-cooler (D-T-D-C), with eight trays.<ref name="KB-9-133" /> Open (sparge) steam in the upper trays strips the hexane. The outlet of tray 5 must reach at least 105 °C (221 °F), because a lower temperature shows that not all solvent has been removed.<ref name="KB-9-133" /> | The extracted flakes still hold solvent. In modern plants they pass through a single vertical unit, the desolventiser-toaster-dryer-cooler (D-T-D-C), with eight trays.<ref name="KB-9-133" /> Open (sparge) steam in the upper trays strips the hexane. The outlet of tray 5 must reach at least 105 °C (221 °F), because a lower temperature shows that not all solvent has been removed.<ref name="KB-9-133" /> | ||
A rotary valve with variable speed seals tray 5 from the drying trays below. The handbook calls it a safety device that keeps explosive hexane-air mixtures from forming in the top five trays.<ref name="KB-9-133" /> Steam purges the valve pockets so that dryer air cannot enter the desolventising zone.<ref name="KB-9-134">Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-134.</ref> The dried meal leaves at about 12 % moisture and 46–49 °C (115–120 °F).<ref name="KB-9-134" /> | A rotary valve with variable speed seals tray 5 from the drying trays below. The handbook calls it a safety device that keeps explosive hexane-air mixtures from forming in the top five trays.<ref name="KB-9-133" /> Steam purges the valve pockets so that dryer air cannot enter the desolventising zone.<ref name="KB-9-134">Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-134.</ref> The dried meal leaves at about 12 % moisture and 46–49 °C (115–120 °F).<ref name="KB-9-134" /> | ||
[[File:fse-oilseed-solvent-extraction-plant-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Vertical section of a desolventiser-toaster-dryer-cooler with eight trays, rotary valve under tray 5 and temperature alarm points|Desolventiser-toaster-dryer-cooler with the rotary valve seal and the low-temperature alarm and shutdown on the tray 5 outlet.]] | |||
Oil is freed of solvent in two rising-film evaporators and a stripping column under vacuum.<ref name="KB-9-134" /> All recovered solvent is condensed and returned through a solvent-water separator with a holding time of 15 minutes. The separated water is heated with open steam to at least 93 °C (200 °F) to drive off entrained solvent before it leaves the plant.<ref name="KB-9-134" /><ref name="KB-9-135" /> | Oil is freed of solvent in two rising-film evaporators and a stripping column under vacuum.<ref name="KB-9-134" /> All recovered solvent is condensed and returned through a solvent-water separator with a holding time of 15 minutes. The separated water is heated with open steam to at least 93 °C (200 °F) to drive off entrained solvent before it leaves the plant.<ref name="KB-9-134" /><ref name="KB-9-135" /> | ||
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! Symbol !! Description !! Unit | ! Symbol !! Description !! Unit | ||
|- | |- | ||
| <math>V_\mathrm{v}</math> || Volume of vapour formed by 1 L of liquid | | <math>V_\mathrm{v}</math> || Volume of vapour formed by 1 L of liquid || m³/L | ||
|- | |- | ||
| SG || Specific gravity of the liquid (water = 1) || – | | SG || Specific gravity of the liquid (water = 1) || – | ||
| Line 40: | Line 42: | ||
|} | |} | ||
For commercial hexane, with a specific gravity of 0.68 and a vapour density of about 3, the formula gives 0.83 × 0.68/3 = 0.19 m³ of vapour per litre.<ref name="KB-9-136" /> The tabulated 25.5 ft³ per US gallon converts to the same 0.19 m³ per litre. With an LFL of 1.2 %, this vapour can bring about 0.19 × 100/1.2 = 16 m³ of air-vapour mixture to the lower limit. One litre of leaked hexane can thus form an ignitable cloud the size of a small room if the vapour gathers at floor level. The estimate assumes complete evaporation and even mixing | For commercial hexane, with a specific gravity of 0.68 and a vapour density of about 3, the formula gives 0.83 × 0.68/3 = 0.19 m³ of vapour per litre.<ref name="KB-9-136" /> The tabulated 25.5 ft³ per US gallon converts to the same 0.19 m³ per litre. With an LFL of 1.2 %, this vapour can bring about 0.19 × 100/1.2 = 16 m³ of air-vapour mixture to the lower limit. One litre of leaked hexane can thus form an ignitable cloud the size of a small room if the vapour gathers at floor level. The estimate assumes complete evaporation and even mixing at about 15.6 °C (60 °F), the reference condition of the property table, which real releases do not achieve.<ref name="KB-9-136" /> | ||
=== Ignition sources and dust === | === Ignition sources and dust === | ||
Ignition sources named in the handbook are arcing electrical equipment, static electricity and open flame. Ignition can occur in normal operation, during maintenance or in an emergency, and running a plant beyond its design capacity adds hazards of abnormal operation.<ref name="KB-9-135" /> The heavy vapour can travel to areas where an ignition source is present if it is not dispersed.<ref name="KB-9-135" /> The greatest concern is solvent left in the flakes when they return to the preparation building for grinding and finishing. That building's equipment is not explosionproof, so ignition there "could occur with disastrous results".<ref name="KB-9-136" /> | Ignition sources named in the handbook are arcing electrical equipment, static electricity and open flame. Ignition can occur in normal operation, during maintenance or in an emergency, and running a plant beyond its design capacity adds hazards of abnormal operation.<ref name="KB-9-135" /> The heavy vapour can travel to areas where an ignition source is present if it is not dispersed.<ref name="KB-9-135" /> The greatest concern is solvent left in the flakes when they return to the preparation building for grinding and finishing. That building's equipment is not explosionproof, so ignition there "could occur with disastrous results".<ref name="KB-9-136" /> | ||
Storing and handling the seeds and meal brings combustible dust hazards of the kind found in a [[Grain elevator|grain elevator]].<ref name="KB-9-135" /> For that part of the hazard, the handbook refers to its chapter on grain mill products.<ref name="KB-9-131" /> Where combustible dust is present, the handbook calls for suitable electrical equipment, a dust collecting system and protection against static discharges.<ref name="KB-9-138">Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-138.</ref> If hexane vapour escapes outdoors in large amounts, the broader hazard is a [[Vapour cloud explosion|vapour cloud explosion]]. Zalosh (2008) describes this as a combustion explosion after a large release of flammable gas or vapour outdoors. Partial confinement, congested equipment and delayed ignition all raise its flame speed.<ref name="Zalosh-2-104">Zalosh (2008), p. 2-104.</ref> | |||
== Solvent loss as a safety indicator == | == Solvent loss as a safety indicator == | ||
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The handbook breaks the 0.200 gal/ton of a conventional soybean plant into its sources.<ref name="KB-9-136" /> More than half of the loss (0.110 of 0.200 gal/ton, or 55 %) leaves in the meal, the stream that returns to the preparation building. Leaks account for most of the rest.<ref name="KB-9-136" /> | The handbook breaks the 0.200 gal/ton of a conventional soybean plant into its sources.<ref name="KB-9-136" /> More than half of the loss (0.110 of 0.200 gal/ton, or 55 %) leaves in the meal, the stream that returns to the preparation building. Leaks account for most of the rest.<ref name="KB-9-136" /> | ||
[[File:fse-oilseed-solvent-extraction-plant-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Bar chart of hexane loss sources in a soybean plant: meal 0.110, leaks 0.056, vent gas 0.020, oil 0.014 US gallons per ton|Sources of hexane loss in a conventional soybean extraction plant, total 0.200 US gal per ton processed.]] | |||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
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== Layout, construction and fire protection == | == Layout, construction and fire protection == | ||
Plant layout uses separation distances to isolate or dissipate solvent vapour before it reaches ignition sources.<ref name="KB-9-138" /> A typical layout described in the handbook places the extraction process area inside a fenced restricted area within a wider controlled area. Separation dimensions range from 1.25 m (4 ft) to 30.5 m (100 ft) between the process area, solvent tanks, other buildings, a boiler or other ignition source and the property line.<ref name="KB-9-138" /> The conveyor that carries prepared material to the extractor has an air-break vent opening at its highest point. Rules for such vent openings in conveying systems were added in the 2004 edition of NFPA 36.<ref name="KB-9-138" /><ref name="KB-9-139">Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-139.</ref> | Plant layout uses separation distances to isolate or dissipate solvent vapour before it reaches ignition sources.<ref name="KB-9-138" /> A typical layout described in the handbook places the extraction process area inside a fenced restricted area within a wider controlled area. Separation dimensions range from 1.25 m (4 ft) to 30.5 m (100 ft) between the process area, solvent tanks, other buildings, a boiler or other ignition source and the property line.<ref name="KB-9-138" /> The conveyor that carries prepared material to the extractor has an air-break vent opening at its highest point. Rules for such vent openings in conveying systems were added in the 2004 edition of NFPA 36.<ref name="KB-9-138" /><ref name="KB-9-139">Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-139.</ref> | ||
[[File:fse-oilseed-solvent-extraction-plant-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Site plan with the extraction process area inside a fenced restricted area and a wider controlled area, separated from a boiler and the property line|Zoning of a solvent extraction plant site.]] | |||
Vapour-proof slide gates around the extractor and water seals on the flake connections to the preparation building act as barriers between the extraction and preparation areas.<ref name="KB-9-137" /> They resemble the chokes that Lataille (2008) describes for conveying systems, which help stop a flash fire from spreading.<ref name="Lataille-8-11">Lataille (2008), p. 8-11.</ref> Measures that stop a flame front in connected equipment are treated more generally under [[Explosion isolation|explosion isolation]]. | |||
The extraction and preparation buildings should be of fire-resistive or noncombustible construction with some form of explosion relief.<ref name="KB-9-138" /> Electrical wiring and equipment must suit the presence of flammable vapours, which is a matter of [[Hazardous area classification|hazardous area classification]] | The extraction and preparation buildings should be of fire-resistive or noncombustible construction with some form of explosion relief.<ref name="KB-9-138" /> Electrical wiring and equipment must suit the presence of flammable vapours, which is a matter of [[Hazardous area classification|hazardous area classification]].<ref name="KB-9-138" /> All vessels, pipes, tubes and hoses that hold solvent are bonded and grounded against static charge, and portable flammable gas detectors are kept available.<ref name="KB-9-138" /> Programmable logic controllers in the extraction building control room are not built for Class I, Groups C and D, Division 1 locations. The control room is therefore designed as a [[Purged and pressurised enclosure|purged and pressurised enclosure]] to NFPA 496, using Type X purging. This reduces the classification inside the room from Division 1 to nonhazardous.<ref name="KB-9-138" /> | ||
For fire protection, the handbook considers water spray, deluge or foam-water systems suitable for extractor buildings, alone or combined. Automatic sprinklers suit preparation buildings.<ref name="KB-9-138" /> Portable extinguishers may protect the solvent unloading and storage area if it is isolated from exposures. Standpipes with combination nozzles and a yard hydrant system complete the protection, with a water supply adequate for both.<ref name="KB-9-138" /><ref name="KB-9-139" /> | For fire protection, the handbook considers water spray, deluge or foam-water systems suitable for extractor buildings, alone or combined. Automatic sprinklers suit preparation buildings.<ref name="KB-9-138" /> Portable extinguishers may protect the solvent unloading and storage area if it is isolated from exposures. Standpipes with combination nozzles and a yard hydrant system complete the protection, with a water supply adequate for both.<ref name="KB-9-138" /><ref name="KB-9-139" /> | ||
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The description above reflects US practice and NFPA 36 (2004 edition) as presented in the 2008 handbook, and later editions may differ. The handbook itself notes that some rules of the 2004 edition were unchanged since 1959. They were written for plants of about 250 tons per day, whereas plants of up to 14,000 tonnes per day now operate in Argentina, Brazil and the United States. It states that the NFPA 36 committee would need to review whether these large plants are adequately covered.<ref name="KB-9-136" /> The EPA solvent loss limits are US rules, and the handbook only expects similar limits to be adopted elsewhere in time.<ref name="KB-9-136" /> | The description above reflects US practice and NFPA 36 (2004 edition) as presented in the 2008 handbook, and later editions may differ. The handbook itself notes that some rules of the 2004 edition were unchanged since 1959. They were written for plants of about 250 tons per day, whereas plants of up to 14,000 tonnes per day now operate in Argentina, Brazil and the United States. It states that the NFPA 36 committee would need to review whether these large plants are adequately covered.<ref name="KB-9-136" /> The EPA solvent loss limits are US rules, and the handbook only expects similar limits to be adopted elsewhere in time.<ref name="KB-9-136" /> | ||
Some values in the sources do not agree. The handbook text gives the flammable range of hexane as 1.2–6.9 %, its property table gives 1.2–7.7 % for commercial hexane, and the SFPE Handbook gives 1.2–7.4 % for ''n''-hexane.<ref name="KB-9-135" /><ref name="KB-9-136" /><ref name="Beyler-2-176" /> The lower limit of 1.2 % is the same in all three, and it is the value that matters for dilution and purging. The purging criterion after a breakdown is also written in two ways on the same page | Some values in the sources do not agree. The handbook text gives the flammable range of hexane as 1.2–6.9 %, its property table gives 1.2–7.7 % for commercial hexane, and the SFPE Handbook gives 1.2–7.4 % for ''n''-hexane.<ref name="KB-9-135" /><ref name="KB-9-136" /><ref name="Beyler-2-176" /> The lower limit of 1.2 % is the same in all three, and it is the value that matters for dilution and purging. | ||
The purging criterion after a breakdown is also written in two ways on the same page. One reads "0.25 percent or less of the lower explosive limit (LEL) of hexane in air by volume", the other "below 0.25 LEL of hexane".<ref name="KB-9-137" /> Read literally, the first is about 0.003 % hexane by volume and the second, a quarter of the LEL, about 0.3 % by volume, so the handbook alone does not settle the value. The vapour estimate in this article assumes complete evaporation and uniform mixing, so it shows scale but cannot replace gas detection in the plant. | |||
== See also == | == See also == | ||
Latest revision as of 09:03, 9 November 2026
An oilseed solvent extraction plant is an industrial facility that removes vegetable oil from prepared oilseeds by washing them with a flammable solvent, in practice commercial hexane.[1] The solvent is then recovered from the oil and from the extracted meal and reused.[2][3] Soybeans and other seeds with about 20 % oil by weight are usually extracted directly. Seeds richer in oil, such as cottonseed, rapeseed, sunflower, peanuts and copra, are usually prepressed to 10–20 % oil first.[1]
The main fire hazards are the highly flammable solvent and the combustible dusts from storing and handling the seeds.[3] Hexane vapour is about three times heavier than air and is ignitable between about 1.2 and 6.9 % by volume, as stated in the Fire Protection Handbook (2008).[3] In the United States, these plants are covered by NFPA 36, Standard for Solvent Extraction Plants. The handbook describes its 2004 edition, which requires alarms, shutdowns and relief valves on key parts of the process.[4] Safe operation rests on keeping solvent inside a closed, slightly evacuated system and on separating the extraction area from ignition sources.[3][5]
Process and equipment
The extraction process is continuous. Seeds are cleaned to remove trash, dirt and foreign material before drying, which removes fire hazards from the dryer and the preparation step.[1] They are dried in a flue-gas dryer to about 10–11 % moisture, cracked, dehulled, conditioned in a rotary steam-tube conditioner and flaked between rollers.[1] In the conditioner the seeds are heated to between 60 and 74 °C (140 and 165 °F).[6] Many plants also pass part of the flakes through an expander that forms pellets. The pellets drain solvent better, so less solvent is carried out of the extractor.[6]
The extractor is usually of the continuous percolation type with six or more stages. Liquid solvent enters above the flake bed, drains through it and is pumped to the next stage.[7] Fresh hexane at about 60 °C (140 °F) meets the flakes near the discharge end and moves counter to them, becoming richer in oil at each stage.[7] The resulting mixture of oil and hexane, called miscella, usually leaves with 25–30 % oil by weight.[7] About one part of solvent is added per part of flakes by weight, and the extractor runs at about 60 °C at atmospheric pressure or a slight vacuum of 124 Pa (½ in. water gauge).[7]
The extracted flakes still hold solvent. In modern plants they pass through a single vertical unit, the desolventiser-toaster-dryer-cooler (D-T-D-C), with eight trays.[7] Open (sparge) steam in the upper trays strips the hexane. The outlet of tray 5 must reach at least 105 °C (221 °F), because a lower temperature shows that not all solvent has been removed.[7]
A rotary valve with variable speed seals tray 5 from the drying trays below. The handbook calls it a safety device that keeps explosive hexane-air mixtures from forming in the top five trays.[7] Steam purges the valve pockets so that dryer air cannot enter the desolventising zone.[2] The dried meal leaves at about 12 % moisture and 46–49 °C (115–120 °F).[2]
Oil is freed of solvent in two rising-film evaporators and a stripping column under vacuum.[2] All recovered solvent is condensed and returned through a solvent-water separator with a holding time of 15 minutes. The separated water is heated with open steam to at least 93 °C (200 °F) to drive off entrained solvent before it leaves the plant.[2][3]
The extractor and all other tanks and condensers are vented to a separate header and a vent recovery system. There, cool mineral oil absorbs the hexane vapour, and steam later strips it from the oil.[3] A blower on the absorber discharges the remaining air and water vapour through a flame arrester. It also keeps the whole extraction system at a slight vacuum, so that solvent vapour cannot escape into the extraction building.[3]
Commercial hexane and its hazards
Commercial hexane is used almost exclusively because it is easy to remove from meal and oil, which are then nontoxic. It is also essentially immiscible with water and cheap to produce from petroleum.[1] It is a mixture: normal hexane makes up about 53 to 85 % by weight, with 60 % a normal average, and the rest is mainly methylpentanes, methylcyclopentane and a little dimethylbutane.[1] The handbook names the danger of fire and explosion as its major disadvantage.[1]
The handbook reproduces property data from Annex B of NFPA 36 (2004 edition). For commercial hexane these give an ignition temperature of 225 °C, a closed-cup flash point of −26 °C, a boiling range of 67–69 °C and a specific gravity of 0.68.[8] The vapour density is about 3 relative to air, and 1 US gallon of liquid gives 25.5 ft³ of vapour at 15.6 °C.[8] The SFPE Handbook lists n-hexane with a lower flammability limit of 1.2 % and an upper limit of 7.4 % by volume, and an autoignition temperature of 225 °C.[9] A US nuclear regulatory guide gives the same flash point of −26 °C (−15 °F) and lists n-hexane as a Class I flammable liquid.[10] The flammability limits quoted for hexane differ slightly between sources, as discussed below.
Vapour volume from a hexane release
A spill or leak shows how quickly hexane can fill a space with an ignitable mixture. Slye (2008) gives a simple way to find the vapour volume formed by one litre of a liquid. The specific gravity of the liquid is divided by the vapour density and multiplied by 0.83.[11] Dividing that vapour volume by the LFL, expressed as a fraction, gives the volume of mixture that the vapour can bring to the lower limit.
| Symbol | Description | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Volume of vapour formed by 1 L of liquid | m³/L | |
| SG | Specific gravity of the liquid (water = 1) | – |
| VD | Vapour density relative to air (air = 1) | – |
| LFL | Lower flammable limit in air | % by volume |
| Volume of air-vapour mixture at the LFL formed by 1 L of liquid | m³/L |
For commercial hexane, with a specific gravity of 0.68 and a vapour density of about 3, the formula gives 0.83 × 0.68/3 = 0.19 m³ of vapour per litre.[8] The tabulated 25.5 ft³ per US gallon converts to the same 0.19 m³ per litre. With an LFL of 1.2 %, this vapour can bring about 0.19 × 100/1.2 = 16 m³ of air-vapour mixture to the lower limit. One litre of leaked hexane can thus form an ignitable cloud the size of a small room if the vapour gathers at floor level. The estimate assumes complete evaporation and even mixing at about 15.6 °C (60 °F), the reference condition of the property table, which real releases do not achieve.[8]
Ignition sources and dust
Ignition sources named in the handbook are arcing electrical equipment, static electricity and open flame. Ignition can occur in normal operation, during maintenance or in an emergency, and running a plant beyond its design capacity adds hazards of abnormal operation.[3] The heavy vapour can travel to areas where an ignition source is present if it is not dispersed.[3] The greatest concern is solvent left in the flakes when they return to the preparation building for grinding and finishing. That building's equipment is not explosionproof, so ignition there "could occur with disastrous results".[8]
Storing and handling the seeds and meal brings combustible dust hazards of the kind found in a grain elevator.[3] For that part of the hazard, the handbook refers to its chapter on grain mill products.[1] Where combustible dust is present, the handbook calls for suitable electrical equipment, a dust collecting system and protection against static discharges.[5] If hexane vapour escapes outdoors in large amounts, the broader hazard is a vapour cloud explosion. Zalosh (2008) describes this as a combustion explosion after a large release of flammable gas or vapour outdoors. Partial confinement, congested equipment and delayed ignition all raise its flame speed.[12]
Solvent loss as a safety indicator
In the handbook, solvent loss is a key indicator of possible hazards during normal operation. A loss of 0.055 % of the weight of material processed counts as efficient operation. Above 0.10 %, the reasons must be found and corrected.[8] Typical design guarantees for soybean plants correspond to 0.20 US gallons per US ton of beans, or 0.83 L per tonne.[3] Company policy should provide for shutdown on excessive loss. A loss of 0.35 to 0.50 US gal/ton (1.5 to 2.1 L per tonne) is described as an abnormal hazard that requires preventive action.[13]
The handbook breaks the 0.200 gal/ton of a conventional soybean plant into its sources.[8] More than half of the loss (0.110 of 0.200 gal/ton, or 55 %) leaves in the meal, the stream that returns to the preparation building. Leaks account for most of the rest.[8]
| Source of loss | Loss (US gal/ton) | Loss (% by weight) |
|---|---|---|
| Flakes leaving the desolventiser-toaster | 0.110 | 0.0304 |
| Leaks | 0.056 | 0.0155 |
| Vent gas from the vent system | 0.020 | 0.0055 |
| Oil from the oil stripper | 0.014 | 0.0038 |
| Effluent from process wastewater | – | 0.0001 |
| Total | 0.200 | 0.0553 |
US environmental rules have pushed these numbers down. The handbook reports that the US Environmental Protection Agency issued emission standards for vegetable oil solvent extraction in 2000. They apply to plants that can emit 10 tons per year or more of n-hexane, which the agency classifies as a hazardous air pollutant.[3] The permitted loss factors range from 0.2 US gal/ton for conventional soybean processing to 0.7 US gal/ton for peanuts. A loss of about 0.35 gal/ton, once acceptable for soybeans, must now fall to 0.20 gal/ton.[3] The handbook notes that plants with low solvent losses are inherently safer.[8]
As a worked example, a plant processing 1,000 US tons of soybeans per day for 330 days a year, at 0.2 gal/ton, loses 66,000 US gallons, about 250 m³ of liquid hexane, per year. With 5.63 lb per gallon from the property table, this is about 186 US tons (169 t). The handbook gives "about 180 U.S. tons (162 tonnes)" for the same case.[8] Plant sizes have grown sharply. A plant of 250 tons per day was a normal size when NFPA 36 was first published in 1959, while recent plants process 5,000 to 14,000 tonnes per day.[8]
Startup, shutdown and breakdowns
Startup is a transient hazard. Before startup the extractor is full of air, so the vapour-air mixture inside passes through the flammable range as hexane is added.[4] The handbook describes two methods that avoid ignition by static electricity when hot liquid is used to purge the air. In the first, hot vapours from the second-stage evaporator heat the extractor to 40 °C (104 °F) and displace the air, cutting heat-up from about 4 hours to about ½ hour. In the second, the air is replaced with carbon dioxide or nitrogen before hot hexane is added.[4]
Yu and Newman (2008) give the minimum inert gas needed to prevent burning of n-hexane vapour at 25 °C. This is 0.40 volumes of carbon dioxide per volume of air (15.0 % oxygen), or 0.72 extra volumes of nitrogen (12.2 % oxygen).[14] Vapour-proof slide gates upstream and downstream of the extractor stay closed during warm-up, so that vapour cannot flow back to the preparation building.[4]
A controlled shutdown empties the plant of flakes and liquid, then purges the empty extractor or desolventiser-toaster with air until it cools. Steam purging is used when maintenance inside the extractor is needed.[4] Inert gas is acceptable for purging an empty extractor, but the handbook calls steam purging the surer method for removing solvent vapour.[4] Before welding in the extraction area, all solids and liquids are emptied and the hexane is stored in isolated tanks. All equipment that held hexane or miscella is then steam purged and filled with water. The flake connections to the preparation building are water sealed, and a portable gas analyser is used to find any flammable mixture.[4]
The most serious case is a breakdown with the extractor full of solvent-laden flakes that cannot be emptied. Often the fault can only be found by entering the unit.[4] The extractor is cooled to about 40 °C and then purged with air by a sparkproof purge blower, sized for one extractor volume every 3 minutes, which equals 20 air changes per hour.[4] Inert gas purging of an extractor that failed under load does not ensure a nonflammable condition.[4] Without a purge blower, the unit is steam purged for 24 to 48 hours or longer. Air leaving the extractor is monitored continuously, and anyone entering wears a harness and an air mask under constant supervision.[4]
Other failures follow the same logic. If cooling water fails, the process is stopped, the steam shut off and the vapour slide gates closed. The emergency cooling water supply should be large enough for a safe shutdown.[4] Running above the design capacity is a hazard of its own, because the condensers can no longer recover all the solvent. Vent pressures then rise, and vapour may be forced into the atmosphere or carried out with the flakes.[4]
Safety devices described for NFPA 36
The handbook describes several temperature interlocks that guard against solvent leaving the process with a product stream. A low-temperature alarm sounds when meal leaving tray 5 of the D-T-D-C falls to 96 °C (205 °F). An automatic switch stops the feed at 90 °C (195 °F). In the United States, NFPA 36 requires both devices.[2] A similar pair protects the wastewater line. An alarm sounds at 85 °C (185 °F), and the extractor drive stops at 80 °C (175 °F).[3]
These devices exist because of a real event. In 1981, a soybean plant in Louisville, Kentucky, without such an alarm released a massive quantity of hexane into the sewers. The vapour exploded along 10 km (6 miles) of the sewer system.[3]
Extraction plants are now also fitted with high-pressure alarms and shutdowns on the extractor and the top of the D-T-D-C.[3] NFPA 36 also requires relief valves on the extractor, solvent work tank, miscella tank and solvent-water separator. These give emergency venting in a fire and protect the vessels against rupture. Their discharge lines to the atmosphere must not be fitted with a flame arrester.[3] The 2004 edition, effective from 5 February 2004, also added rules for drainage and spill control at the separation sump and for vent openings in conveying systems.[4][5] According to the handbook, the NFPA 36 committee was then considering further alarms on the final oil stripper, for low oil temperature and low vacuum.[5]
Layout, construction and fire protection
Plant layout uses separation distances to isolate or dissipate solvent vapour before it reaches ignition sources.[5] A typical layout described in the handbook places the extraction process area inside a fenced restricted area within a wider controlled area. Separation dimensions range from 1.25 m (4 ft) to 30.5 m (100 ft) between the process area, solvent tanks, other buildings, a boiler or other ignition source and the property line.[5] The conveyor that carries prepared material to the extractor has an air-break vent opening at its highest point. Rules for such vent openings in conveying systems were added in the 2004 edition of NFPA 36.[5][13]
Vapour-proof slide gates around the extractor and water seals on the flake connections to the preparation building act as barriers between the extraction and preparation areas.[4] They resemble the chokes that Lataille (2008) describes for conveying systems, which help stop a flash fire from spreading.[15] Measures that stop a flame front in connected equipment are treated more generally under explosion isolation.
The extraction and preparation buildings should be of fire-resistive or noncombustible construction with some form of explosion relief.[5] Electrical wiring and equipment must suit the presence of flammable vapours, which is a matter of hazardous area classification.[5] All vessels, pipes, tubes and hoses that hold solvent are bonded and grounded against static charge, and portable flammable gas detectors are kept available.[5] Programmable logic controllers in the extraction building control room are not built for Class I, Groups C and D, Division 1 locations. The control room is therefore designed as a purged and pressurised enclosure to NFPA 496, using Type X purging. This reduces the classification inside the room from Division 1 to nonhazardous.[5]
For fire protection, the handbook considers water spray, deluge or foam-water systems suitable for extractor buildings, alone or combined. Automatic sprinklers suit preparation buildings.[5] Portable extinguishers may protect the solvent unloading and storage area if it is isolated from exposures. Standpipes with combination nozzles and a yard hydrant system complete the protection, with a water supply adequate for both.[5][13]
In a fire, the described response is to activate the extinguishing systems and trip the plant interlock that stops all solids conveying. Staff then shut the main steam valve, leave the area and notify the fire department.[13] Safety devices must never be bypassed, output should stay within the design capacity, and a safety audit programme should check all safety devices regularly.[13]
Limits of the guidance
The description above reflects US practice and NFPA 36 (2004 edition) as presented in the 2008 handbook, and later editions may differ. The handbook itself notes that some rules of the 2004 edition were unchanged since 1959. They were written for plants of about 250 tons per day, whereas plants of up to 14,000 tonnes per day now operate in Argentina, Brazil and the United States. It states that the NFPA 36 committee would need to review whether these large plants are adequately covered.[8] The EPA solvent loss limits are US rules, and the handbook only expects similar limits to be adopted elsewhere in time.[8]
Some values in the sources do not agree. The handbook text gives the flammable range of hexane as 1.2–6.9 %, its property table gives 1.2–7.7 % for commercial hexane, and the SFPE Handbook gives 1.2–7.4 % for n-hexane.[3][8][9] The lower limit of 1.2 % is the same in all three, and it is the value that matters for dilution and purging.
The purging criterion after a breakdown is also written in two ways on the same page. One reads "0.25 percent or less of the lower explosive limit (LEL) of hexane in air by volume", the other "below 0.25 LEL of hexane".[4] Read literally, the first is about 0.003 % hexane by volume and the second, a quarter of the LEL, about 0.3 % by volume, so the handbook alone does not settle the value. The vapour estimate in this article assumes complete evaporation and uniform mixing, so it shows scale but cannot replace gas detection in the plant.
See also
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-131.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-134.
- ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17 Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-135.
- ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-137.
- ↑ 5.00 5.01 5.02 5.03 5.04 5.05 5.06 5.07 5.08 5.09 5.10 5.11 5.12 Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-138.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-132.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-133.
- ↑ 8.00 8.01 8.02 8.03 8.04 8.05 8.06 8.07 8.08 8.09 8.10 8.11 8.12 8.13 Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-136.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 Beyler (2002b), p. 2-176.
- ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-19.
- ↑ Slye (2008), p. 6-202.
- ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-104.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 Kingsbaker (2008), p. 9-139.
- ↑ Yu and Newman (2008), p. 2-87.
- ↑ Lataille (2008), p. 8-11.
References
- Beyler, C. L. (2002b). Flammability limits of premixed and diffusion flames. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-172–2-187). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
- Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- Kingsbaker, C. L. (2008). Oilseed solvent extraction plants. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-131–9-140). National Fire Protection Association.
- Lataille, J. I. (2008). Air-Moving equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-3–8-15). National Fire Protection Association.
- Slye, O. M., Jr. (2008). Flammable and combustible liquids. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-197–6-208). National Fire Protection Association.
- Yu, H.-Z., & Newman, J. S. (2008). Theory of fire extinguishment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-79–2-92). National Fire Protection Association.
- Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.