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'''Elevator recall''' is the automatic or manual return of elevators to a designated floor when a fire is detected, so that the cars leave public service and wait there for the fire service.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-64.</ref><ref name="Klote-4-289">Klote (2002), p. 4-289.</ref> In North American practice it is the first stage, called Phase I, of firefighters' emergency operation under [[ASME A17.1]], the safety code for elevators and escalators. The second stage, Phase II, lets firefighters operate a recalled car from inside with a key.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> Recall is started by [[smoke detector]]s in elevator lobbies, machine rooms and hoistways, or by a key switch at the designated floor.<ref name="Donoghue-10-60">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-60.</ref> It answers a simple hazard: an elevator in normal service can carry passengers to the fire floor and trap them there.<ref name="Donoghue-10-63-64">Donoghue (2008), pp. 10-63–10-64.</ref>
'''Elevator recall''' is the automatic or manual return of elevators to a designated floor when a fire is detected, so that the cars leave public service and wait there for the fire service.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-64.</ref><ref name="Klote-4-289">Klote (2002), p. 4-289.</ref> In North American practice it is the first stage, called Phase I, of firefighters' emergency operation under [[ASME A17.1]], the safety code for elevators and escalators. The second stage, Phase II, lets firefighters operate a recalled car from inside with a key.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> Recall is started by [[smoke detector]]s in elevator lobbies, machine rooms and hoistways, or by a key switch at the designated floor.<ref name="Donoghue-10-60">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-60.</ref> It answers a simple hazard: an elevator in normal service can carry passengers to the fire floor and trap them there.<ref name="Donoghue-10-63-64">Donoghue (2008), pp. 10-63–10-64.</ref>


New York City required an emergency recall system in 1973, and the requirement was later taken into ASME A17.1.<ref name="Lew-161">Lew et al. (2005), p. 161.</ref> By 2008, recall was common, and detectors to actuate it tended to be provided for any new or retrofit elevator work.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-108">O'Connor and Cohn (2008), p. 4-108.</ref> Its performance depends on coordination with sprinklers, power shutdown and hoistway pressurisation.<ref name="Donoghue-10-60" /><ref name="Donoghue-10-62">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-62.</ref> Recall does not turn elevators into exits, although recalled cars under Phase II can be used to evacuate people with disabilities.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-107">O'Connor and Cohn (2008), p. 4-107.</ref>
New York City required an emergency recall system in 1973, and the requirement was later taken into ASME A17.1.<ref name="Lew-161">Lew et al. (2005), p. 161.</ref> The 2008 handbook describes recall as common, with detectors to actuate it tending to be provided for any new or retrofit elevator work.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-108">O'Connor and Cohn (2008), p. 4-108.</ref> Its performance depends on coordination with sprinklers, power shutdown and hoistway pressurisation.<ref name="Donoghue-10-60" /><ref name="Donoghue-10-62">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-62.</ref> Recall does not turn elevators into exits, although firefighters can use recalled cars under Phase II to evacuate people with disabilities.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-107">O'Connor and Cohn (2008), p. 4-107.</ref><ref name="Donoghue-10-64" />


== Why elevators are recalled ==
== Why elevators are recalled ==
Elevators make high-rise buildings feasible, and in the United States accessibility rules require them in most buildings with two or more storeys.<ref name="Donoghue-10-57">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-57.</ref> The hoistway that serves every floor also connects them. Through the [[stack effect]], an enclosed hoistway acts as a chimney that moves smoke and combustion products from lower to upper levels.<ref name="Donoghue-10-58">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-58.</ref> In the [[MGM Grand Hotel fire]] in Las Vegas in 1980, heat and smoke spread from the casino through seismic joints, elevator shafts and stairways to the 21 residential floors.<ref name="Bryan-4-20">Bryan (2008), p. 4-20.</ref><ref name="HallCote-3-24">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-24.</ref> Of the 85 fatalities, 79 body locations were documented, and five victims were found in elevators.<ref name="Bryan-4-20" /> The elevators had no special smoke protection and were one of the major paths of smoke to the upper floors.<ref name="Klote-4-288">Klote (2002), p. 4-288.</ref>
Elevators make high-rise buildings feasible, and in the United States accessibility rules require them in most buildings with two or more storeys.<ref name="Donoghue-10-57">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-57.</ref> The hoistway that serves every floor also connects them. Through the [[stack effect]], an enclosed hoistway acts as a chimney that generally moves smoke and combustion products from lower to upper levels.<ref name="Donoghue-10-58">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-58.</ref> In the [[MGM Grand Hotel fire]] in Las Vegas in 1980, heat and smoke spread from the casino through seismic joints, elevator shafts and stairways to the 21 residential floors.<ref name="Bryan-4-20">Bryan (2008), p. 4-20.</ref><ref name="HallCote-3-24">Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-24.</ref> Of the 85 fatalities, 79 body locations were documented, and five victims were found in elevators.<ref name="Bryan-4-20" /> The elevators had no special smoke protection and were one of the major paths of smoke to the upper floors.<ref name="Klote-4-288">Klote (2002), p. 4-288.</ref>


The 2008 ''Fire Protection Handbook'' gives four reasons why an elevator in normal service is unsafe in a fire. People may wait for a car that never comes, losing escape time. Elevators do not prioritise calls, so one of them may be at the fire floor. A car cannot start until its doors close, and crowding can block them. Finally, power can fail at any time and trap the passengers.<ref name="Donoghue-10-63-64" />
The 2008 ''Fire Protection Handbook'' gives four reasons why an elevator in normal service is unsafe in a fire. People may wait for a car that never comes, losing escape time. Elevators do not prioritise calls, so one of them may be at the fire floor. A car cannot start until its doors close, and crowding can block them. Finally, power can fail at any time and trap the passengers.<ref name="Donoghue-10-63-64" />
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A car can also be delivered to the fire floor in several ways. This happens when a passenger presses the car button for that floor, when someone presses a corridor call button there, or when heat melts or deforms that button or its wiring.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> Incidents in which people were trapped after elevators stopped at fire floors led to the familiar lobby sign telling occupants to use the stairs.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-107" /> ASME A17.1/CSA B44 recognises these conditions and mandates firefighters' emergency operation on all new elevators.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" />
A car can also be delivered to the fire floor in several ways. This happens when a passenger presses the car button for that floor, when someone presses a corridor call button there, or when heat melts or deforms that button or its wiring.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> Incidents in which people were trapped after elevators stopped at fire floors led to the familiar lobby sign telling occupants to use the stairs.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-107" /> ASME A17.1/CSA B44 recognises these conditions and mandates firefighters' emergency operation on all new elevators.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" />


In New York City, Local Law 5 of 1973 required an emergency recall system, and NIST reports that the requirement was later incorporated into ASME A17.1.<ref name="Lew-161" /> As summarised by NIST, the code requires signs stating that passenger elevators cannot be used during a fire. Detectors in every elevator lobby and machine room must recall the elevators to the ground floor, where the doors open and the cars are taken out of service. Fire service personnel can then operate any individual car manually with a special key, and at least one elevator serving every floor must have emergency power.<ref name="Lew-161" />
NIST traces recall to New York City's Local Law 5 of 1973, whose requirement later passed into ASME A17.1.<ref name="Lew-161" /> As summarised by NIST in 2005, ASME A17.1 requires signs stating that passenger elevators cannot be used during a fire. Detectors in every elevator lobby and machine room must recall the elevators to the ground floor, where the doors open and the cars are taken out of service. Fire service personnel can then operate any individual car manually with a special key. NIST adds that the elevator and building codes require at least one elevator serving every floor to be connected to emergency power.<ref name="Lew-161" />


== Phase I: recall to the designated level ==
== Phase I: recall to the designated level ==
Phase I is the automatic or manual return of elevators to a designated level or an alternate level, and it keeps elevators away from the general public during a fire.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> The designated level is the main floor or another floor that best serves emergency personnel for firefighting or rescue. If the fire is in the lobby of the designated level, the cars go to the alternate level instead.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> The SFPE Handbook describes recall to an alternative floor, for a fire on the ground floor, as a recent refinement of recall to the ground floor.<ref name="Klote-4-289" />
Phase I is the automatic or manual return of elevators to a designated level or an alternate level, and it keeps elevators away from the general public during a fire.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> The designated level is the main floor or another floor that best serves emergency personnel for firefighting or rescue. If the fire is in the lobby of the designated level, the cars go to the alternate level instead.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> The SFPE Handbook (2002) calls recall to an alternative floor, for a ground-floor fire, a recent refinement.<ref name="Klote-4-289" />


Manual recall uses key switches. A three-position switch (on, off and reset) in the designated-level lobby controls each group of elevators, and a two-position switch may be added in the central control station.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> In the on position, all controlled elevators return nonstop to the recall floor and all registered calls are cancelled. An elevator travelling upward stops and reverses without opening its doors. Visual and audible signals in the car tell the passengers, or the attendant, that the car is returning.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" />
Manual recall uses key switches. A three-position switch (on, off and reset) in the designated-level lobby controls each group of elevators, and a two-position switch may be added in the central control station.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> In the on position, all controlled elevators return nonstop to the recall floor and all registered calls are cancelled. An elevator travelling upward stops and reverses without opening its doors. Visual and audible signals in the car tell the passengers, or the attendant, that the car is returning.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" />


Automatic recall links the key switch to the fire alarm system, with smoke detectors at each floor lobby. A lobby detector acts like the key switch in the on position, except that the detector at the designated level sends the cars to the alternate level.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> The key switch overrides that detector and brings the cars back to the designated level, but it never recalls them to the alternate level itself. A pictograph above every hall call button tells the public that elevators may not be available during a fire.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" />
Automatic recall links the key switch to the fire alarm system, with smoke detectors at each floor lobby. A lobby detector acts like the key switch in the on position, except that the detector at the designated level sends the cars to the alternate level.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> The key switch overrides that detector and brings the cars back to the designated level, but it never recalls them to the alternate level itself. A pictograph above every hall call button tells the public that elevators may not be available during a fire.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" />
[[File:fse-elevator-recall-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Flowchart of Phase I elevator recall: lobby smoke detectors and key switch send cars to the designated or alternate level|Logic of Phase I recall. A lobby smoke detector or the key switch returns the cars nonstop to the designated level; the detector at the designated level sends them to the alternate level, and the key switch overrides it.]]


After arrival, the hoistway doors on the recall floor should remain open. Arriving firefighters then see which cars have been recalled and which must still be found, and hall position indicators help them locate errant cars.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> The open doors also admit air to the hoistway. With the fire below the [[neutral plane]], this air reduces the smoke entering the hoistway from the fire floor. With the fire above it, more air flows from the hoistway to the fire floor, which the handbook also judges beneficial.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> In another arrangement, the doors close again once the passengers have had enough time to leave.<ref name="Klote-4-289" />
After arrival, the hoistway doors on the recall floor should remain open. Arriving firefighters then see which cars have been recalled and which must still be found, and hall position indicators help them locate errant cars.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> The open doors also admit air to the hoistway. With the fire below the [[neutral plane]], this air reduces the smoke entering the hoistway from the fire floor. With the fire above it, more air flows from the hoistway to the fire floor, which the handbook also judges beneficial.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> In another arrangement, the doors close again once the passengers have had enough time to leave.<ref name="Klote-4-289" />
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Local rules have differed in detail. As summarised by NIST for the design of WTC 7, the New York City Building Code of 1968, with amendments to 1985, required smoke detectors at each elevator landing.<ref name="GrillJohnson-45">Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 45.</ref><ref name="GrillJohnson-80">Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 80.</ref> One activated detector in a lobby only annunciated at the fire command station, while activation of both detectors in a lobby recalled selected elevators nonstop to the designated level.<ref name="GrillJohnson-80" /> In a building sprinklered throughout, a waterflow alarm also had to initiate Phase I.<ref name="GrillJohnson-80" />
Local rules have differed in detail. As summarised by NIST for the design of WTC 7, the New York City Building Code of 1968, with amendments to 1985, required smoke detectors at each elevator landing.<ref name="GrillJohnson-45">Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 45.</ref><ref name="GrillJohnson-80">Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 80.</ref> One activated detector in a lobby only annunciated at the fire command station, while activation of both detectors in a lobby recalled selected elevators nonstop to the designated level.<ref name="GrillJohnson-80" /> In a building sprinklered throughout, a waterflow alarm also had to initiate Phase I.<ref name="GrillJohnson-80" />


The value of automatic recall shows where it was missing. A fire in the unsprinklered, 36-storey Cook County Administration Building in Chicago on 17 October 2003 caused six deaths.<ref name="Bryan-4-25">Bryan (2008), p. 4-25.</ref><ref name="Quiter-20-74">Quiter (2008), p. 20-74.</ref> In a later survey, 51 % of the responding occupants said they had tried to evacuate by elevator, despite signs stating that elevators were out of service in a fire.<ref name="Bryan-4-29">Bryan (2008), p. 4-29.</ref> The handbook notes that the signs were not entirely correct, because the elevators had no automatic recall and would keep running until recalled manually or electronically.<ref name="Bryan-4-29" />
The fire in the unsprinklered, 36-storey Cook County Administration Building in Chicago on 17 October 2003 shows a building without automatic recall. Its six victims all died in a stairwell locked from the stair side.<ref name="Bryan-4-25">Bryan (2008), p. 4-25.</ref><ref name="Quiter-20-74">Quiter (2008), p. 20-74.</ref> In a later survey, 51 % of the responding occupants said they had tried to evacuate by elevator, despite signs stating that elevators were out of service in a fire.<ref name="Bryan-4-29">Bryan (2008), p. 4-29.</ref> The handbook notes that the signs were not entirely correct, because the elevators had no automatic recall and would keep running until recalled manually or electronically.<ref name="Bryan-4-29" />


== Phase II: in-car operation by firefighters ==
== Phase II: in-car operation by firefighters ==
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The keys for Phase I and Phase II must be the same, and operating instructions must be placed at or next to the key switches. A flashing visual signal in the car warns of an impending problem, and further use of the elevator is then not advised.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> ASME A17.1/CSA B44 does not itself require standby power, which normally comes from the building code. It does require the same operation on standby as on normal power, and a manual switch for firefighters to select the cars that receive standby power.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> In high-rise buildings, the US model building codes also require a fire department communication system from the elevator lobby, car and machine rooms to the central control station.<ref name="Donoghue-10-63">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-63.</ref>
The keys for Phase I and Phase II must be the same, and operating instructions must be placed at or next to the key switches. A flashing visual signal in the car warns of an impending problem, and further use of the elevator is then not advised.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> ASME A17.1/CSA B44 does not itself require standby power, which normally comes from the building code. It does require the same operation on standby as on normal power, and a manual switch for firefighters to select the cars that receive standby power.<ref name="Donoghue-10-64" /> In high-rise buildings, the US model building codes also require a fire department communication system from the elevator lobby, car and machine rooms to the central control station.<ref name="Donoghue-10-63">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-63.</ref>


Without working elevators, fire service access in tall buildings is slow. NIST found that first responders carrying gear need about a minute per floor on the stairs, a pace hard to keep beyond about 20 storeys. Even at that pace, reaching the 60th floor would take about an hour.<ref name="Lew-lviii">Lew et al. (2005), p. lviii.</ref> After its investigation of the [[World Trade Center collapse]], NIST recommended fire-protected and structurally hardened elevators for the exclusive use of emergency responders in tall buildings.<ref name="NIST-218">National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 218.</ref> Such elevators correspond to the [[firefighting lift]] in a protected shaft, required for years in the United Kingdom and other countries that follow British standards.<ref name="Lew-lviii" /><ref name="MeachamGalioto-1-132">Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-132.</ref>
Without working elevators, fire service access in tall buildings is slow. In its World Trade Center investigation, NIST found that first responders carrying gear typically need about a minute per floor on the stairs, a pace hard to keep beyond about 20 storeys. Even at that pace, reaching the 60th floor would take about an hour.<ref name="Lew-lviii">Lew et al. (2005), p. lviii.</ref> After its investigation of the [[World Trade Center collapse]], NIST recommended fire-protected and structurally hardened elevators for the exclusive use of emergency responders in tall buildings.<ref name="NIST-218">National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 218.</ref> Such elevators correspond to the [[firefighting lift]] in a protected shaft, required for years in the United Kingdom and other countries that follow British standards.<ref name="Lew-lviii" /><ref name="MeachamGalioto-1-132">Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-132.</ref>


== Interaction with sprinklers, power shutdown and pressurisation ==
== Interaction with sprinklers, power shutdown and pressurisation ==
Sprinklers in the hoistway or machine room conflict with recall. Water on the controls has been known to short safety circuits and let a car run with an open door, and wet brakes may fail to hold the car.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" /> ASME A17.1/CSA B44 therefore requires the main line power to be disconnected when a sprinkler discharges in the machine room, or in the hoistway more than 610 mm (2 ft) above the pit floor. The intended sequence is that a smoke detector first recalls the elevator, the power then disconnects, and only then does the sprinkler discharge.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" /> If recall has not finished, stopping the car with its passengers is considered safer than running it under a discharging sprinkler.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" />
Sprinklers in the hoistway or machine room conflict with recall. Water on the controls has been known to short safety circuits and let a car run with an open door, and wet brakes may fail to hold the car.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" /> As summarised in the 2008 handbook, ASME A17.1/CSA B44 therefore requires the main line power to be disconnected when a sprinkler discharges. This applies in the machine room, and in the hoistway more than 610 mm (2 ft) above the pit floor. The intended sequence is that a smoke detector first recalls the elevator, the power then disconnects, and only then does the sprinkler discharge.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" /> If recall has not finished, stopping the car with its passengers is considered safer than running it under a discharging sprinkler.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" />


The power shutdown can be triggered by heat detectors within 0.6 m (2 ft) of each sprinkler, with a lower temperature rating and a higher sensitivity than the sprinkler. It can also be triggered by pressure or waterflow switches, which must act without a time delay. Either way, the design assumes that recall has already taken place through the smoke detectors.<ref name="Leber-14-46" /> The handbook considers delaying the power removal until Phase I is complete impractical when the controls are involved in the fire or the machine room is far above its design temperature.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" />
The power shutdown can be triggered by heat detectors within 0.6 m (2 ft) of each sprinkler, with a lower temperature rating and a higher sensitivity than the sprinkler. It can also be triggered by pressure or waterflow switches, which must act without a time delay. Either way, the design assumes that recall has already taken place through the smoke detectors.<ref name="Leber-14-46" /> The handbook considers delaying the power removal until Phase I is complete impractical when the controls are involved in the fire or the machine room is far above its design temperature.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" />
[[File:fse-elevator-recall-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Time line: smoke detector recalls elevator, heat detector or waterflow switch cuts main power, then sprinkler discharges|Intended sequence in a sprinklered elevator machine room: recall by smoke detector, disconnection of the main line power by a heat detector next to each sprinkler, then sprinkler discharge.]]


=== Worked example: heat detector before sprinkler ===
=== Worked example: heat detector before sprinkler ===
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The response times are those published in the SFPE Handbook.<ref name="Schifiliti-4-21" /> The fire sizes follow from the t-squared equation. For the fast fire, the detector responds at t = t<sub>g</sub>, when the fire has by definition reached 1,055 kW, and the sprinkler at 1055 × (65/50)² ≈ 1,780 kW. For the slow fire, the values are 1055 × (300/600)² ≈ 264 kW and 1055 × (370/600)² ≈ 401 kW. Recalculating with the same equations gives 50.4 s and 65.5 s for the fast fire, and 306 s and 372 s for the slow fire.
The response times are those published in the SFPE Handbook.<ref name="Schifiliti-4-21" /> The fire sizes follow from the t-squared equation. For the fast fire, the detector responds at t = t<sub>g</sub>, when the fire has by definition reached 1,055 kW, and the sprinkler at 1055 × (65/50)² ≈ 1,780 kW. For the slow fire, the values are 1055 × (300/600)² ≈ 264 kW and 1055 × (370/600)² ≈ 401 kW. A recalculation for this article, not part of the SFPE example, gives about 50 s and 65 s for the fast fire and 306 s and 372 s for the slow fire.
[[File:fse-elevator-recall-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Two t-squared fire curves with markers showing heat detector response before sprinkler response for fast and slow fires|Heat release rate of a t-squared fire in an elevator machine room with the response of a 57 °C heat detector and a 74 °C sprinkler, for a fast fire (left) and a slow fire (right).]]


The detector therefore leads by about 15 s in the fast fire and about 65 s in the slow fire. The authors add that other scenarios, response time indexes, ambient temperatures and ceiling clearances should be checked in a real design.<ref name="Schifiliti-4-21" /> Such a margin is what lets the equipment be de-energised before water is discharged on the controls and brakes.<ref name="Schifiliti-4-21" />
On the published values, the detector leads by about 15 s in the fast fire and about 70 s in the slow fire (66 s in the recalculation). The authors add that other scenarios, response time indexes, ambient temperatures and ceiling clearances should be checked in a real design.<ref name="Schifiliti-4-21" /> Such a margin is what lets the equipment be de-energised before water is discharged on the controls and brakes.<ref name="Schifiliti-4-21" />


=== Hoistway pressurisation and door closing ===
=== Hoistway pressurisation and door closing ===
Some local codes require the hoistway to be kept at a minimum positive pressure above the elevator lobby, to stop smoke flowing into the shaft.<ref name="Donoghue-10-58" /><ref name="Klote-4-289" /> Because ASME A17.1/CSA B44 limits the closing force and kinetic energy of power-operated doors, a door may then be unable to close. The handbook gives an example: 0.35 in. of water, about 87 Pa, produces a lateral force of about 125 N (28 lb) on each panel of a 1,118 mm (44 in.) landing door.<ref name="Donoghue-10-59">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-59. The page prints the SI values as "8.7 Pa" and "12.7 kg"; 0.35 in. of water converts to 87 Pa, and 28 lb of force to 125 N.</ref>
Some local codes require the hoistway to be kept at a minimum positive pressure above the elevator lobby, to stop smoke flowing into the shaft.<ref name="Donoghue-10-58" /><ref name="Klote-4-289" /> Because ASME A17.1/CSA B44 limits the closing force and kinetic energy of power-operated doors, a door may then be unable to close. In the handbook's example, about 87 Pa (0.35 in. of water) produces a lateral force of about 125 N (28 lb) on each panel of a 1,118 mm (44 in.) landing door.<ref name="Donoghue-10-59">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-59. The SI values in the text are corrected here: the page prints "8.7 Pa", but 0.35 in. of water is 87 Pa; it gives the force as "12.7 kg", which is the mass equivalent of 28 lb, whereas a force of 28 lb is about 125 N.</ref>


The handbook describes three resulting failures.<ref name="Donoghue-10-60" /> If pressurisation starts before Phase I, cars standing with open doors cannot close them, and service is lost one car at a time. If Phase I is active, such cars never reach the designated level, so arriving firefighters lose time searching for them. If firefighters activate Phase II, the doors still cannot close and the elevators are lost to them.<ref name="Donoghue-10-60" /> Door gaskets meant to keep smoke out raise a similar concern, because their friction may prevent complete closure.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" /> The handbook regards an enclosed elevator lobby with smoke and draft control doors as the most practical alternative, and notes that such a lobby can also serve as a staging area for firefighting.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" />
The handbook describes three resulting failures.<ref name="Donoghue-10-60" /> If pressurisation starts before Phase I, cars standing with open doors cannot close them, and service is lost one car at a time. If Phase I is active, such cars never reach the designated level, so arriving firefighters lose time searching for them. If firefighters activate Phase II, the doors still cannot close and the elevators are lost to them.<ref name="Donoghue-10-60" /> Door gaskets meant to keep smoke out raise a similar concern, because their friction may prevent complete closure.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" /> The handbook regards an enclosed elevator lobby with smoke and draft control doors as the most practical alternative, and notes that such a lobby can also serve as a staging area for firefighting.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" />
[[File:fse-elevator-recall-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Plan of a pressurised hoistway pushing on a landing door panel, with three scenarios where doors cannot close|Hoistway pressurisation against the lobby: about 87 Pa (0.35 in. of water) gives about 125 N on each landing door panel, enough to stop power-operated doors from closing in three typical scenarios.]]


== Recall, egress and evacuation lifts ==
== Recall, egress and evacuation lifts ==
Recall supports the code position that elevators are not exits. The [[Life Safety Code]] (NFPA 101), as described in the 2008 handbook, does not accept elevators as exits except in towers with limited occupancy, but permits them for evacuating mobility-impaired people.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-107" /> It allows elevators to be used from places of refuge when they are arranged for fire fighter service, their power supplies are protected and the shaft meets the requirements for a smokeproof enclosure.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-108" /> The 1991 edition already permitted elevators with firefighter service from [[area of refuge|areas of refuge]], and the 1997 edition accepted a firefighter service elevator as the second means of egress from towers.<ref name="Bryan-4-42">Bryan (2008), p. 4-42.</ref> In such towers, occupied by not more than 90 persons, the elevator must have fire fighter service controls to ASME A17.1 and wiring protected for at least 1 hour of operation.<ref name="Holmes-20-224">Holmes (2008b), p. 20-224.</ref><ref name="Holmes-20-225">Holmes (2008b), p. 20-225.</ref>
The [[Life Safety Code]] (NFPA 101), as described in the 2008 handbook, does not accept elevators as exits except in towers with limited occupancy, but permits them for evacuating mobility-impaired people.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-107" /> It allows elevators to be used from places of refuge when they are arranged for fire fighter service, their power supplies are protected and the shaft meets the requirements for a smokeproof enclosure.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-108" /> The 1991 edition already permitted elevators with firefighter service from [[area of refuge|areas of refuge]], and the 1997 edition accepted a firefighter service elevator as the second means of egress from towers.<ref name="Bryan-4-42">Bryan (2008), p. 4-42.</ref> As summarised in the 2008 handbook, NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000 permit this only in towers occupied by not more than 90 persons. The elevator then needs fire fighter service controls to ASME A17.1 and wiring protected for at least 1 hour of operation.<ref name="Holmes-20-224">Holmes (2008b), p. 20-224.</ref><ref name="Holmes-20-225">Holmes (2008b), p. 20-225.</ref>


Under manual in-car firefighter control, trained building or fire personnel can operate elevators to assist evacuation. Occupants then use the stairs for the initial escape and the elevator to complete the travel to the street.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-108" /> The weaknesses that recall addresses still apply to such use. In the 1993 explosion and fire at the World Trade Center, loss of power in both towers, including emergency power, trapped occupants in elevators.<ref name="Bryan-4-42" /> One car stopped at the ninth floor held nine unconscious occupants after about 2 hours of smoke exposure in the shaft.<ref name="Bryan-4-42" />
Under manual in-car firefighter control, trained building or fire personnel can operate elevators to assist evacuation. Occupants then use the stairs for the initial escape and the elevator to complete the travel to the street.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-108" /> The weaknesses that recall addresses still apply to such use. In the 1993 explosion and fire at the World Trade Center, loss of power in both towers, including emergency power, trapped occupants in elevators.<ref name="Bryan-4-42" /> One car stopped at the ninth floor held nine unconscious occupants after about 2 hours of smoke exposure in the shaft.<ref name="Bryan-4-42" />
Line 96: Line 100:
A common misconception is that recall makes an elevator safe to use. Recall only removes the cars from public service, and firefighters lose the elevators whose machinery is in a machine room involved in the fire.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" /> A second misconception is that a sign saying elevators are out of service means that recall is fitted, which the Cook County fire disproved.<ref name="Bryan-4-29" /> Recall also depends on power, and emergency power can be ineffective if elevator cabling or machinery is affected.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-107" /> Elevator service can be lost when the machine-room air conditioning is shut down, or when the hoistway is vented through the machine room.<ref name="Donoghue-10-58" /><ref name="Donoghue-10-62" />
A common misconception is that recall makes an elevator safe to use. Recall only removes the cars from public service, and firefighters lose the elevators whose machinery is in a machine room involved in the fire.<ref name="Donoghue-10-62" /> A second misconception is that a sign saying elevators are out of service means that recall is fitted, which the Cook County fire disproved.<ref name="Bryan-4-29" /> Recall also depends on power, and emergency power can be ineffective if elevator cabling or machinery is affected.<ref name="OConnorCohn-4-107" /> Elevator service can be lost when the machine-room air conditioning is shut down, or when the hoistway is vented through the machine room.<ref name="Donoghue-10-58" /><ref name="Donoghue-10-62" />


Recall does not stop smoke from entering the hoistway, and stairwells and elevators frequently become smoke-logged in building fires.<ref name="Klote-4-274">Klote (2002), p. 4-274.</ref> Elevator shafts with normally open vents can significantly enhance the stack effect in a tall building.<ref name="Quiter-20-80">Quiter (2008), p. 20-80.</ref> To limit the chance that one fire knocks out all elevator service, codes generally allow no more than four elevators in one hoistway enclosure.<ref name="Donoghue-10-61">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-61.</ref> Elevator [[smoke control]] was rarely used in 2008, and even a pressurised shaft or lobby can draw in smoke through the piston effect of a moving car.<ref name="MilkeKlote-18-51">Milke and Klote (2008), p. 18-51.</ref><ref name="Klote-4-288" />
Recall does not stop smoke from entering the hoistway, and stairwells and elevators frequently become smoke-logged in building fires.<ref name="Klote-4-274">Klote (2002), p. 4-274.</ref> Elevator shafts with normally open vents can significantly enhance the stack effect in a tall building.<ref name="Quiter-20-80">Quiter (2008), p. 20-80.</ref> So that one fire cannot knock out all elevator service, US building codes, as summarised in the 2008 handbook, generally allow one shared hoistway only for three or fewer elevators. Four elevators need two enclosures, and no more than four may share one.<ref name="Donoghue-10-61">Donoghue (2008), p. 10-61.</ref> The 2008 handbook describes elevator [[smoke control]] as rarely used, and even a pressurised shaft or lobby can draw in smoke through the piston effect of a moving car.<ref name="MilkeKlote-18-51">Milke and Klote (2008), p. 18-51.</ref><ref name="Klote-4-288" />


Recall is only as reliable as its interfaces. When a sprinkler system is tested, interfaced systems such as elevators may be actuated or de-energised inadvertently, and bypassed functions must be reconnected after the test.<ref name="Leber-14-43">Leber (2008), p. 14-43.</ref> The handbook chapter on fireground operations still classes elevators as an atypical rescue method that often exposes rescuer and victim to extraordinary danger.<ref name="KlaeneSanders-13-7">Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-7.</ref> In 2008, an effort coordinated by ASME was expected to bring provisions for hardened fire service elevators and occupant evacuation elevators into the next editions of the US model codes.<ref name="MeachamGalioto-1-132" />
Recall is only as reliable as its interfaces. When a sprinkler system is tested, interfaced systems such as elevators may be actuated or de-energised inadvertently, and bypassed functions must be reconnected after the test.<ref name="Leber-14-43">Leber (2008), p. 14-43.</ref> The handbook chapter on fireground operations still classes elevators as an atypical rescue method that often exposes rescuer and victim to extraordinary danger.<ref name="KlaeneSanders-13-7">Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-7.</ref> In 2008, an effort coordinated by ASME was expected to bring provisions for hardened fire service elevators and occupant evacuation elevators into the next editions of the US model codes.<ref name="MeachamGalioto-1-132" />

Latest revision as of 08:25, 13 November 2026

Elevator recall is the automatic or manual return of elevators to a designated floor when a fire is detected, so that the cars leave public service and wait there for the fire service.[1][2] In North American practice it is the first stage, called Phase I, of firefighters' emergency operation under ASME A17.1, the safety code for elevators and escalators. The second stage, Phase II, lets firefighters operate a recalled car from inside with a key.[1] Recall is started by smoke detectors in elevator lobbies, machine rooms and hoistways, or by a key switch at the designated floor.[3] It answers a simple hazard: an elevator in normal service can carry passengers to the fire floor and trap them there.[4]

New York City required an emergency recall system in 1973, and the requirement was later taken into ASME A17.1.[5] The 2008 handbook describes recall as common, with detectors to actuate it tending to be provided for any new or retrofit elevator work.[6] Its performance depends on coordination with sprinklers, power shutdown and hoistway pressurisation.[3][7] Recall does not turn elevators into exits, although firefighters can use recalled cars under Phase II to evacuate people with disabilities.[8][1]

Why elevators are recalled

Elevators make high-rise buildings feasible, and in the United States accessibility rules require them in most buildings with two or more storeys.[9] The hoistway that serves every floor also connects them. Through the stack effect, an enclosed hoistway acts as a chimney that generally moves smoke and combustion products from lower to upper levels.[10] In the MGM Grand Hotel fire in Las Vegas in 1980, heat and smoke spread from the casino through seismic joints, elevator shafts and stairways to the 21 residential floors.[11][12] Of the 85 fatalities, 79 body locations were documented, and five victims were found in elevators.[11] The elevators had no special smoke protection and were one of the major paths of smoke to the upper floors.[13]

The 2008 Fire Protection Handbook gives four reasons why an elevator in normal service is unsafe in a fire. People may wait for a car that never comes, losing escape time. Elevators do not prioritise calls, so one of them may be at the fire floor. A car cannot start until its doors close, and crowding can block them. Finally, power can fail at any time and trap the passengers.[4]

A car can also be delivered to the fire floor in several ways. This happens when a passenger presses the car button for that floor, when someone presses a corridor call button there, or when heat melts or deforms that button or its wiring.[1] Incidents in which people were trapped after elevators stopped at fire floors led to the familiar lobby sign telling occupants to use the stairs.[8] ASME A17.1/CSA B44 recognises these conditions and mandates firefighters' emergency operation on all new elevators.[1]

NIST traces recall to New York City's Local Law 5 of 1973, whose requirement later passed into ASME A17.1.[5] As summarised by NIST in 2005, ASME A17.1 requires signs stating that passenger elevators cannot be used during a fire. Detectors in every elevator lobby and machine room must recall the elevators to the ground floor, where the doors open and the cars are taken out of service. Fire service personnel can then operate any individual car manually with a special key. NIST adds that the elevator and building codes require at least one elevator serving every floor to be connected to emergency power.[5]

Phase I: recall to the designated level

Phase I is the automatic or manual return of elevators to a designated level or an alternate level, and it keeps elevators away from the general public during a fire.[1] The designated level is the main floor or another floor that best serves emergency personnel for firefighting or rescue. If the fire is in the lobby of the designated level, the cars go to the alternate level instead.[1] The SFPE Handbook (2002) calls recall to an alternative floor, for a ground-floor fire, a recent refinement.[2]

Manual recall uses key switches. A three-position switch (on, off and reset) in the designated-level lobby controls each group of elevators, and a two-position switch may be added in the central control station.[1] In the on position, all controlled elevators return nonstop to the recall floor and all registered calls are cancelled. An elevator travelling upward stops and reverses without opening its doors. Visual and audible signals in the car tell the passengers, or the attendant, that the car is returning.[1]

Automatic recall links the key switch to the fire alarm system, with smoke detectors at each floor lobby. A lobby detector acts like the key switch in the on position, except that the detector at the designated level sends the cars to the alternate level.[1] The key switch overrides that detector and brings the cars back to the designated level, but it never recalls them to the alternate level itself. A pictograph above every hall call button tells the public that elevators may not be available during a fire.[1]

Flowchart of Phase I elevator recall: lobby smoke detectors and key switch send cars to the designated or alternate level
Logic of Phase I recall. A lobby smoke detector or the key switch returns the cars nonstop to the designated level; the detector at the designated level sends them to the alternate level, and the key switch overrides it.

After arrival, the hoistway doors on the recall floor should remain open. Arriving firefighters then see which cars have been recalled and which must still be found, and hall position indicators help them locate errant cars.[1] The open doors also admit air to the hoistway. With the fire below the neutral plane, this air reduces the smoke entering the hoistway from the fire floor. With the fire above it, more air flows from the hoistway to the fire floor, which the handbook also judges beneficial.[1] In another arrangement, the doors close again once the passengers have had enough time to leave.[2]

Initiating devices and the fire alarm interface

Recall is one of the emergency control functions, called fire safety control functions in the 2008 handbook, that a fire alarm system can perform.[14] The interface is generally a relay, driven by the fire alarm control unit and connected to the elevator controller. The handbook considers it reasonable to use circuits monitored for integrity under NFPA 72, so that someone is notified if the link fails. In its examples, the relay is mounted within 0.9 m (3 ft) of the equipment it controls.[14]

Phase I can be started by a smoke detector in the elevator lobby, the machine room or the hoistway.[3] In most US jurisdictions, only the lobby and machine-room detectors are required to initiate recall. ASME A17.1 originally set these detector locations, but by 2008 all detection and interface requirements were contained in NFPA 72, with local codes able to add more.[14]

Local rules have differed in detail. As summarised by NIST for the design of WTC 7, the New York City Building Code of 1968, with amendments to 1985, required smoke detectors at each elevator landing.[15][16] One activated detector in a lobby only annunciated at the fire command station, while activation of both detectors in a lobby recalled selected elevators nonstop to the designated level.[16] In a building sprinklered throughout, a waterflow alarm also had to initiate Phase I.[16]

The fire in the unsprinklered, 36-storey Cook County Administration Building in Chicago on 17 October 2003 shows a building without automatic recall. Its six victims all died in a stairwell locked from the stair side.[17][18] In a later survey, 51 % of the responding occupants said they had tried to evacuate by elevator, despite signs stating that elevators were out of service in a fire.[19] The handbook notes that the signs were not entirely correct, because the elevators had no automatic recall and would keep running until recalled manually or electronically.[19]

Phase II: in-car operation by firefighters

Phase II is the emergency in-car operation that lets firefighting personnel run a recalled elevator from inside the car.[1] NIST describes it as the use of an elevator by a firefighter, under manual control with a special key, for fire service access or the rescue of people with disabilities.[5] In US high-rise buildings, firefighters routinely use elevators to carry equipment and to deliver crews to floors that are not on fire. The edition of ASME A17.1/CSA B44 described in the 2008 handbook calls for Phase II on all new elevators and standardises its procedures across manufacturers.[1]

The keys for Phase I and Phase II must be the same, and operating instructions must be placed at or next to the key switches. A flashing visual signal in the car warns of an impending problem, and further use of the elevator is then not advised.[1] ASME A17.1/CSA B44 does not itself require standby power, which normally comes from the building code. It does require the same operation on standby as on normal power, and a manual switch for firefighters to select the cars that receive standby power.[1] In high-rise buildings, the US model building codes also require a fire department communication system from the elevator lobby, car and machine rooms to the central control station.[20]

Without working elevators, fire service access in tall buildings is slow. In its World Trade Center investigation, NIST found that first responders carrying gear typically need about a minute per floor on the stairs, a pace hard to keep beyond about 20 storeys. Even at that pace, reaching the 60th floor would take about an hour.[21] After its investigation of the World Trade Center collapse, NIST recommended fire-protected and structurally hardened elevators for the exclusive use of emergency responders in tall buildings.[22] Such elevators correspond to the firefighting lift in a protected shaft, required for years in the United Kingdom and other countries that follow British standards.[21][23]

Interaction with sprinklers, power shutdown and pressurisation

Sprinklers in the hoistway or machine room conflict with recall. Water on the controls has been known to short safety circuits and let a car run with an open door, and wet brakes may fail to hold the car.[7] As summarised in the 2008 handbook, ASME A17.1/CSA B44 therefore requires the main line power to be disconnected when a sprinkler discharges. This applies in the machine room, and in the hoistway more than 610 mm (2 ft) above the pit floor. The intended sequence is that a smoke detector first recalls the elevator, the power then disconnects, and only then does the sprinkler discharge.[7] If recall has not finished, stopping the car with its passengers is considered safer than running it under a discharging sprinkler.[7]

The power shutdown can be triggered by heat detectors within 0.6 m (2 ft) of each sprinkler, with a lower temperature rating and a higher sensitivity than the sprinkler. It can also be triggered by pressure or waterflow switches, which must act without a time delay. Either way, the design assumes that recall has already taken place through the smoke detectors.[14] The handbook considers delaying the power removal until Phase I is complete impractical when the controls are involved in the fire or the machine room is far above its design temperature.[7]

Time line: smoke detector recalls elevator, heat detector or waterflow switch cuts main power, then sprinkler discharges
Intended sequence in a sprinklered elevator machine room: recall by smoke detector, disconnection of the main line power by a heat detector next to each sprinkler, then sprinkler discharge.

Worked example: heat detector before sprinkler

Whether a heat detector really responds before the sprinkler can be checked with the ceiling-jet methods of the SFPE Handbook. Its Example 13 treats an elevator machine room where codes may require such a detector within 0.61 m of every sprinkler.[24] It assumes a t-squared fire, whose heat release rate grows with the square of time. The growth is expressed by the fire growth time, the time at which the fire reaches 1055 kW (1000 Btu/s):[25]

Q˙=1055tg2t2

In a square layout, the largest horizontal distance from a fire to the nearest sprinkler is half the diagonal of the square, so the spacing is 1.41 times this distance:[26]

r=S2

Symbol Description Unit
Q˙ heat release rate of the fire kW
t time from the start of t-squared growth s
tg fire growth time (time to reach 1055 kW) s
S spacing of sprinklers in a square layout m
r horizontal distance from the fire axis to the device m
RTI response time index of the sprinkler or detector m1/2s1/2

The example assumes an ambient temperature of 15 °C, a ceiling 4 m above the fire and a convective fraction of 75 %.[24] The sprinklers are spaced at 3.0 m and operate at 74 °C with an RTI of 110 m1/2s1/2. The heat detectors operate at 57 °C with an RTI of 42 m1/2s1/2. The spacing gives r = 3.0/√2 = 2.12 m for the sprinkler, and a detector 0.61 m further away sits at 2.73 m.[24] Device heating follows from the Heskestad and Delichatsios ceiling-jet correlations and the analytical solution of Beyler.[27] Two fires are checked: a fast fire with tg = 50 s and a slow fire with tg = 600 s.[24]

Fire growth time Sprinkler response Heat detector response Fire size at detector response Fire size at sprinkler response
50 s 65 s 50 s 1,055 kW about 1,780 kW
600 s 370 s 300 s about 264 kW about 401 kW

The response times are those published in the SFPE Handbook.[24] The fire sizes follow from the t-squared equation. For the fast fire, the detector responds at t = tg, when the fire has by definition reached 1,055 kW, and the sprinkler at 1055 × (65/50)² ≈ 1,780 kW. For the slow fire, the values are 1055 × (300/600)² ≈ 264 kW and 1055 × (370/600)² ≈ 401 kW. A recalculation for this article, not part of the SFPE example, gives about 50 s and 65 s for the fast fire and 306 s and 372 s for the slow fire.

Two t-squared fire curves with markers showing heat detector response before sprinkler response for fast and slow fires
Heat release rate of a t-squared fire in an elevator machine room with the response of a 57 °C heat detector and a 74 °C sprinkler, for a fast fire (left) and a slow fire (right).

On the published values, the detector leads by about 15 s in the fast fire and about 70 s in the slow fire (66 s in the recalculation). The authors add that other scenarios, response time indexes, ambient temperatures and ceiling clearances should be checked in a real design.[24] Such a margin is what lets the equipment be de-energised before water is discharged on the controls and brakes.[24]

Hoistway pressurisation and door closing

Some local codes require the hoistway to be kept at a minimum positive pressure above the elevator lobby, to stop smoke flowing into the shaft.[10][2] Because ASME A17.1/CSA B44 limits the closing force and kinetic energy of power-operated doors, a door may then be unable to close. In the handbook's example, about 87 Pa (0.35 in. of water) produces a lateral force of about 125 N (28 lb) on each panel of a 1,118 mm (44 in.) landing door.[28]

The handbook describes three resulting failures.[3] If pressurisation starts before Phase I, cars standing with open doors cannot close them, and service is lost one car at a time. If Phase I is active, such cars never reach the designated level, so arriving firefighters lose time searching for them. If firefighters activate Phase II, the doors still cannot close and the elevators are lost to them.[3] Door gaskets meant to keep smoke out raise a similar concern, because their friction may prevent complete closure.[7] The handbook regards an enclosed elevator lobby with smoke and draft control doors as the most practical alternative, and notes that such a lobby can also serve as a staging area for firefighting.[7]

Plan of a pressurised hoistway pushing on a landing door panel, with three scenarios where doors cannot close
Hoistway pressurisation against the lobby: about 87 Pa (0.35 in. of water) gives about 125 N on each landing door panel, enough to stop power-operated doors from closing in three typical scenarios.

Recall, egress and evacuation lifts

The Life Safety Code (NFPA 101), as described in the 2008 handbook, does not accept elevators as exits except in towers with limited occupancy, but permits them for evacuating mobility-impaired people.[8] It allows elevators to be used from places of refuge when they are arranged for fire fighter service, their power supplies are protected and the shaft meets the requirements for a smokeproof enclosure.[6] The 1991 edition already permitted elevators with firefighter service from areas of refuge, and the 1997 edition accepted a firefighter service elevator as the second means of egress from towers.[29] As summarised in the 2008 handbook, NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000 permit this only in towers occupied by not more than 90 persons. The elevator then needs fire fighter service controls to ASME A17.1 and wiring protected for at least 1 hour of operation.[30][31]

Under manual in-car firefighter control, trained building or fire personnel can operate elevators to assist evacuation. Occupants then use the stairs for the initial escape and the elevator to complete the travel to the street.[6] The weaknesses that recall addresses still apply to such use. In the 1993 explosion and fire at the World Trade Center, loss of power in both towers, including emergency power, trapped occupants in elevators.[29] One car stopped at the ninth floor held nine unconscious occupants after about 2 hours of smoke exposure in the shaft.[29]

Outside the United States, the use of elevators in fire is treated as a design question. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005) include the elevators the fire service would use among the items whose design and maintenance must support fire service intervention.[32] They call the use of lifts to evacuate people with disabilities an area of growing interest and research.[33] In Australia, the Fire Safety Verification Method handbook (2020) states that there are no Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions for using lifts in a fire emergency.[34] An evacuation lift must instead satisfy Performance Requirement DP7, which covers factors such as travel distance, occupants, waiting time, capacity, reliability and emergency procedures.[35] Evacuation models increasingly offer lifts used for escape as an option.[36]

Limitations and common misconceptions

A common misconception is that recall makes an elevator safe to use. Recall only removes the cars from public service, and firefighters lose the elevators whose machinery is in a machine room involved in the fire.[7] A second misconception is that a sign saying elevators are out of service means that recall is fitted, which the Cook County fire disproved.[19] Recall also depends on power, and emergency power can be ineffective if elevator cabling or machinery is affected.[8] Elevator service can be lost when the machine-room air conditioning is shut down, or when the hoistway is vented through the machine room.[10][7]

Recall does not stop smoke from entering the hoistway, and stairwells and elevators frequently become smoke-logged in building fires.[37] Elevator shafts with normally open vents can significantly enhance the stack effect in a tall building.[38] So that one fire cannot knock out all elevator service, US building codes, as summarised in the 2008 handbook, generally allow one shared hoistway only for three or fewer elevators. Four elevators need two enclosures, and no more than four may share one.[39] The 2008 handbook describes elevator smoke control as rarely used, and even a pressurised shaft or lobby can draw in smoke through the piston effect of a moving car.[40][13]

Recall is only as reliable as its interfaces. When a sprinkler system is tested, interfaced systems such as elevators may be actuated or de-energised inadvertently, and bypassed functions must be reconnected after the test.[41] The handbook chapter on fireground operations still classes elevators as an atypical rescue method that often exposes rescuer and victim to extraordinary danger.[42] In 2008, an effort coordinated by ASME was expected to bring provisions for hardened fire service elevators and occupant evacuation elevators into the next editions of the US model codes.[23]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 Donoghue (2008), p. 10-64.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Klote (2002), p. 4-289.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Donoghue (2008), p. 10-60.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Donoghue (2008), pp. 10-63–10-64.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 Lew et al. (2005), p. 161.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 O'Connor and Cohn (2008), p. 4-108.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 Donoghue (2008), p. 10-62.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 O'Connor and Cohn (2008), p. 4-107.
  9. ↑ Donoghue (2008), p. 10-57.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 Donoghue (2008), p. 10-58.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Bryan (2008), p. 4-20.
  12. ↑ Hall and Cote (2008), p. 3-24.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Klote (2002), p. 4-288.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 Leber (2008), p. 14-46.
  15. ↑ Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 45.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 80.
  17. ↑ Bryan (2008), p. 4-25.
  18. ↑ Quiter (2008), p. 20-74.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 Bryan (2008), p. 4-29.
  20. ↑ Donoghue (2008), p. 10-63.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 Lew et al. (2005), p. lviii.
  22. ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 218.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-132.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 24.3 24.4 24.5 24.6 Schifiliti et al. (2002), p. 4-21.
  25. ↑ Schifiliti et al. (2002), p. 4-10.
  26. ↑ Schifiliti et al. (2002), p. 4-11.
  27. ↑ Schifiliti et al. (2002), pp. 4-10–4-11.
  28. ↑ Donoghue (2008), p. 10-59. The SI values in the text are corrected here: the page prints "8.7 Pa", but 0.35 in. of water is 87 Pa; it gives the force as "12.7 kg", which is the mass equivalent of 28 lb, whereas a force of 28 lb is about 125 N.
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 29.2 Bryan (2008), p. 4-42.
  30. ↑ Holmes (2008b), p. 20-224.
  31. ↑ Holmes (2008b), p. 20-225.
  32. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-8.
  33. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 2.8-2.
  34. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 58.
  35. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 106.
  36. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §8.3.
  37. ↑ Klote (2002), p. 4-274.
  38. ↑ Quiter (2008), p. 20-80.
  39. ↑ Donoghue (2008), p. 10-61.
  40. ↑ Milke and Klote (2008), p. 18-51.
  41. ↑ Leber (2008), p. 14-43.
  42. ↑ Klaene and Sanders (2008), p. 13-7.

References

  • Australian Building Codes Board. (2020b). Handbook: Fire Safety Verification Method (Print version 1.1).
  • Bryan, J. L. (2008). Human behavior and fire. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 4-3–4-47). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Donoghue, E. A. (2008). Building transportation systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 10-57–10-68). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Grill, R. A., & Johnson, D. A. (2005b). Fire protection and life safety provisions applied to the design and construction of WTC 1, 2, and 7 and post-construction provisions applied after occupancy (NIST NCSTAR 1-1D). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
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