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The protection side covers what happens if ignition occurs despite prevention. The 2008 handbook describes NFPA 69 rules for the strength of containment vessels and notes that the use of deflagration suppression systems is discussed in NFPA 69. It also states that NFPA 69 includes requirements for the installation of in-line flame arresters.<ref name="UG-17-154" /><ref name="UG-17-157" /><ref name="UG-17-158">Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-158.</ref> Zalosh (2008) refers to the various deflagration isolation systems described in NFPA 69 as a way to prevent long flame propagation lengths in pipes.<ref name="Zalosh2008-2-100">Zalosh (2008), p. 2-100.</ref> Spark detection and extinguishing systems are also described in NFPA 69.<ref name="UG-17-151" />
The protection side covers what happens if ignition occurs despite prevention. The 2008 handbook describes NFPA 69 rules for the strength of containment vessels and notes that the use of deflagration suppression systems is discussed in NFPA 69. It also states that NFPA 69 includes requirements for the installation of in-line flame arresters.<ref name="UG-17-154" /><ref name="UG-17-157" /><ref name="UG-17-158">Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-158.</ref> Zalosh (2008) refers to the various deflagration isolation systems described in NFPA 69 as a way to prevent long flame propagation lengths in pipes.<ref name="Zalosh2008-2-100">Zalosh (2008), p. 2-100.</ref> Spark detection and extinguishing systems are also described in NFPA 69.<ref name="UG-17-151" />
[[File:fse-nfpa-69-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Flow diagram splitting explosion prevention and four protection strategies between NFPA 69 and NFPA 68|Methods of explosion prevention and protection and the NFPA standards that the 2008 Fire Protection Handbook links them to.]]


== Status as a standard ==
== Status as a standard ==
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=== Worked example: hydrogen in a battery room ===
=== Worked example: hydrogen in a battery room ===
NUREG-1805 estimates the hydrogen generation of a 60-cell antimony-type battery of 3,730 ampere-hours near the end of its life, on equalising charge, as 0.538 ft³/min (0.0152 m³/min).<ref name="IS-16-13">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-13.</ref> To keep the hydrogen at or below the 1 percent recommended by NFPA 805 with reference to NFPA 69, the steady-state concentration ''G''/''Q'' must not exceed 0.01.<ref name="IS-16-6" /> The air flow must therefore be at least 0.538/0.01 = 53.8 ft³/min, or 1.52 m³/min. With an air flow of 100 ft³/min (2.83 m³/min), the steady-state hydrogen concentration is 0.54 percent. For perfect mixing (''K'' = 1), the room reaches 63 percent of that value after one air change and 95 percent after three. For comparison, the lower flammable limit of hydrogen is widely quoted as 4 percent.<ref name="IS-B-26">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-26.</ref>
NUREG-1805 estimates the hydrogen generation of a 60-cell antimony-type battery of 3,730 ampere-hours near the end of its life, on equalising charge, as 0.538 ft³/min (0.0152 m³/min).<ref name="IS-16-13">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-13.</ref> To keep the hydrogen at or below the 1 percent recommended by NFPA 805 with reference to NFPA 69, the steady-state concentration ''G''/''Q'' must not exceed 0.01.<ref name="IS-16-6" /> The air flow must therefore be at least 0.538/0.01 = 53.8 ft³/min, or 1.52 m³/min. With an air flow of 100 ft³/min (2.83 m³/min), the steady-state hydrogen concentration is 0.54 percent. For perfect mixing (''K'' = 1), the room reaches 63 percent of that value after one air change and 95 percent after three. For comparison, the lower flammable limit of hydrogen is widely quoted as 4 percent.<ref name="IS-B-26">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-26.</ref>
[[File:fse-nfpa-69-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Curve of hydrogen concentration rising towards 0.54 percent over five air changes, below the 1 percent limit line|Hydrogen concentration in a ventilated battery room with a release of 0.538 ft³/min and an air flow of 100 ft³/min, for perfect mixing, compared with the 1 percent limit.]]


== Pressure containment ==
== Pressure containment ==
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| <math>P_\mathrm{Cont}</math> || Maximum anticipated deflagration pressure to be contained || psig or kPa (gauge)
| <math>P_\mathrm{Cont}</math> || Maximum anticipated deflagration pressure to be contained || psig or kPa (gauge)
|-
|-
| <math>P_\mathrm{max}</math> || Maximum deflagration pressure at standard initial conditions, as a multiple of standard pressure || atm (gauge)
| <math>P_\mathrm{max}</math> || Ratio of maximum deflagration gauge pressure at standard initial conditions to <math>P_\mathrm{std}</math> || – (dimensionless)
|-
|-
| <math>P_i</math> || Initial pressure, gauge, in the same unit as <math>P_\mathrm{std}</math> || psig or kPa
| <math>P_i</math> || Initial pressure, gauge, in the same unit as <math>P_\mathrm{std}</math> || psig or kPa
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=== Worked example: containment of a cornstarch deflagration ===
=== Worked example: containment of a cornstarch deflagration ===
Schwab (2008c) gives a maximum explosion pressure of 106 psig (731 kPa) for a commercial cornstarch product.<ref name="Schwab-6-143">Schwab (2008c), p. 6-143.</ref> Expressed as a multiple of standard pressure this is 106/14.7 = 7.21 atm gauge. For a vessel operating at atmospheric pressure and 25 °C, the equation returns ''P''<sub>Cont</sub> = 106 psig. If the vessel had to withstand this without rupture, its MAWP would need to be at least 1.5 × 106/3.5 = 45.4 psig (313 kPa). If it also had to remain free of permanent deformation, the MAWP would need to be at least 1.5 × 106/1.75 = 90.9 psig (626 kPa).
Schwab (2008c) gives a maximum explosion pressure of 106 psig (731 kPa) for a commercial cornstarch product.<ref name="Schwab-6-143">Schwab (2008c), p. 6-143.</ref> Expressed as a ratio to standard pressure, this is 106 psig / 14.7 psi = 7.21, the dimensionless value used for ''P''<sub>max</sub> in the equation. For a vessel operating at atmospheric pressure and 25 °C, the equation returns ''P''<sub>Cont</sub> = 106 psig. If the vessel had to withstand this without rupture, its MAWP would need to be at least 1.5 × 106/3.5 = 45.4 psig (313 kPa). If it also had to remain free of permanent deformation, the MAWP would need to be at least 1.5 × 106/1.75 = 90.9 psig (626 kPa).


The initial conditions matter. At an initial gauge pressure of 2 psig and 25 °C, ''P''<sub>Cont</sub> rises to 122 psig (844 kPa). At atmospheric pressure but 80 °C, it falls to 89.5 psig (617 kPa). These numbers only illustrate the equation. A real design needs test data for the actual material, because the explosibility of a dust depends on its composition, moisture content, particle size and shape.<ref name="UG-17-156">Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-156.</ref> After a contained deflagration, the hot combustion gases must also be kept from passing into connected process units, which is the task of isolation.<ref name="UG-17-155" />
The initial conditions matter. At an initial gauge pressure of 2 psig and 25 °C, ''P''<sub>Cont</sub> rises to 122 psig (844 kPa). At atmospheric pressure but 80 °C, it falls to 89.5 psig (617 kPa). These numbers only illustrate the equation. A real design needs test data for the actual material, because the explosibility of a dust depends on its composition, moisture content, particle size and shape.<ref name="UG-17-156">Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-156.</ref> After a contained deflagration, the hot combustion gases must also be kept from passing into connected process units, which is the task of isolation.<ref name="UG-17-155" />
[[File:fse-nfpa-69-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Line of contained pressure falling from 116 to 75 psig as initial temperature rises from 0 to 150 degrees, with MAWP bars|Pressure to be contained for a cornstarch deflagration (Pmax = 106 psig) as a function of initial temperature at atmospheric initial pressure, with the minimum MAWP at 25 °C for the two strength criteria.]]


== Suppression, isolation and spark extinguishing ==
== Suppression, isolation and spark extinguishing ==

Latest revision as of 08:31, 9 November 2026

NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems, is a US standard of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) on systems that prevent deflagrations in process equipment or limit their effects.[1][2] The Fire Protection Handbook (2008) and older engineering sources describe its subjects. They include inerting to below the limiting oxidant concentration, control of combustible concentrations by ventilation and pressure containment. They also include explosion suppression systems, explosion isolation and spark detection and extinguishing systems.[3][4][5]

Deflagration venting is the subject of a separate standard, NFPA 68.[6] The two standards share a narrow definition of an explosion: "the bursting or rupture of an enclosure or a container due to the development of internal pressure from a deflagration".[1] Many chapters of the handbook refer to NFPA 69 for the design of explosion prevention and protection, for example for dust collectors in woodworking plants.[7] The sources in this article describe the 1997 and 2008 editions. Like any NFPA standard, it is a voluntary document unless a jurisdiction adopts it, and its requirements apply where it is adopted, mainly in the United States.[8]

Scope and structure

NFPA 69 deals with deflagrations, the type of explosion in which the combustion front moves through a nearly premixed fuel-air mixture at less than the speed of sound. The fuel may be a gas, vapour, dust or mist, or a combination of these.[1] Ural and Garzia (2008) group explosion protection into four strategies: pressure containment, deflagration venting, deflagration suppression and deflagration isolation.[2] Venting is the subject of NFPA 68. The other three strategies, and the prevention methods that act before ignition, are among the subjects that the 2008 handbook links to NFPA 69.[2][4]

The prevention side of the standard aims to keep the atmosphere in a process volume nonflammable. This can be done by reducing the concentration of fuel, by reducing the concentration of oxidant, or by adding an inert gas.[9] NFPA 69 gives values of the limiting oxidant concentration (LOC) for oxidant control. Ural and Garzia (2008) refer to the 2008 edition for LOC values of gases, metals and carbonaceous dusts.[3] An earlier edition contained a Table C-1 of LOC values with nitrogen and carbon dioxide, which the SFPE Handbook reproduces.[10] For combustible concentration control, Appendix D of NFPA 69 gives guidance on the design of ventilation systems.[3]

The protection side covers what happens if ignition occurs despite prevention. The 2008 handbook describes NFPA 69 rules for the strength of containment vessels and notes that the use of deflagration suppression systems is discussed in NFPA 69. It also states that NFPA 69 includes requirements for the installation of in-line flame arresters.[2][4][11] Zalosh (2008) refers to the various deflagration isolation systems described in NFPA 69 as a way to prevent long flame propagation lengths in pipes.[12] Spark detection and extinguishing systems are also described in NFPA 69.[5]

Flow diagram splitting explosion prevention and four protection strategies between NFPA 69 and NFPA 68
Methods of explosion prevention and protection and the NFPA standards that the 2008 Fire Protection Handbook links them to.

Status as a standard

NFPA 69 is produced in the US voluntary consensus system. Cote and Grant (2008) describe that system as a deliberative committee structure with a balanced representation of all affected interests. These include users, manufacturers, testing laboratories, enforcers and government officials.[13] The authors of the explosion chapters in both handbooks used here served on NFPA committees for explosion protection. Ural was a member of the NFPA Technical Committee on Explosion Protection Systems, and Zalosh had been a member of the NFPA committee on explosion protection systems for more than 20 years.[1][14]

The legal force of the document depends on its use. Cote and Grant (2008) quote the World Trade Organization definitions: compliance with a technical regulation is mandatory, while a standard provides rules or guidelines for common and repeated use with which compliance is not mandatory.[8] A standard of this kind gains legal force only where it is adopted, for example by a jurisdiction or through a reference in another code.[13] An example from US nuclear practice is NFPA 805 (2001 edition), which recommends that battery rooms be ventilated to limit hydrogen to 1 percent by volume in accordance with NFPA 69.[15] Other documents simply refer to it for guidance. Wysocki (2008) notes that NFPA 69 gives guidance on carbon dioxide systems used for inerting or purging.[16]

The content of the standard changes between editions. The SFPE Handbook (2002) and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission guide NUREG-1805 (2004) both cite the 1997 edition.[17][18] The Fire Protection Handbook (2008) refers to the 2008 edition.[3] Values quoted in this article therefore describe those editions as summarised by these sources, not the current text of the standard.

Oxidant and combustible concentration control

For oxidant control, NFPA 69 uses the limiting oxidant concentration. The 1997 edition defines the LOC as the maximum safe oxygen concentration for explosion prevention by inerting.[14] NUREG-1805 quotes the definition as the concentration of oxidant below which a deflagration cannot occur in a specified mixture.[19] The design oxygen level must lie below the LOC with a safety margin. Zalosh (2002) summarises the NFPA 69 (1997 edition) guideline as at least 2 vol% below the LOC where the oxygen concentration is monitored continuously, with a greater margin otherwise.[17]

NUREG-1805 summarises the safety margins as 60 percent of the LOC where the LOC is above 5 percent, with a stricter margin below 5 percent. Where the flammable gas concentration is controlled instead, it must stay below 25 percent of the lower explosive limit (LEL).[19] Ural and Garzia (2008) list the reasons for such margins: uneven mixing, temperature and pressure fluctuations, measurement and alarm accuracy, response time and the consequences of false alarms.[20]

NFPA 69 also provides a method to calculate how fast a flammable gas builds up in an enclosed space, as described in NUREG-1805. If a constant source of gas is released into a ventilated enclosure, the concentration approaches the ratio of gas release rate to air flow rate. The approach is exponential in the number of air changes, and a mixing efficiency factor corrects for imperfect mixing:[21]

C=GQ(1−e−KN)orln⁡(1−CQG)=−KN

Symbol Description Unit
C Gas concentration by volume – (volume fraction)
G Discharge rate of the flammable or combustible gas m³/min (ft³/min in the source)
Q Air flow rate through the enclosure m³/min (ft³/min in the source)
K Mixing efficiency factor (1.0 for perfect mixing) –
N Number of theoretical air changes –

The mixing efficiency factor K ranges from 0.2 for air entering through cracks with a single exhaust opening to 0.9 for a perforated ceiling supply with multiple exhaust openings.[22] The equation applies to a constant source of flammable gas.[21]

Worked example: hydrogen in a battery room

NUREG-1805 estimates the hydrogen generation of a 60-cell antimony-type battery of 3,730 ampere-hours near the end of its life, on equalising charge, as 0.538 ft³/min (0.0152 m³/min).[23] To keep the hydrogen at or below the 1 percent recommended by NFPA 805 with reference to NFPA 69, the steady-state concentration G/Q must not exceed 0.01.[15] The air flow must therefore be at least 0.538/0.01 = 53.8 ft³/min, or 1.52 m³/min. With an air flow of 100 ft³/min (2.83 m³/min), the steady-state hydrogen concentration is 0.54 percent. For perfect mixing (K = 1), the room reaches 63 percent of that value after one air change and 95 percent after three. For comparison, the lower flammable limit of hydrogen is widely quoted as 4 percent.[24]

Curve of hydrogen concentration rising towards 0.54 percent over five air changes, below the 1 percent limit line
Hydrogen concentration in a ventilated battery room with a release of 0.538 ft³/min and an air flow of 100 ft³/min, for perfect mixing, compared with the 1 percent limit.

Pressure containment

Where no emission from a vessel can be tolerated, for example because of toxicity or environmental pollution, the vessel can be designed to contain the deflagration.[2] No credit is then taken for pressure relief devices. Explosion protection standards allow two approaches to the vessel strength: preventing rupture but allowing permanent deformation, based on the ultimate strength, or preventing permanent deformation, based on the yield strength. As described by Ural and Garzia (2008), NFPA 69 allows loads up to two-thirds of the yield or ultimate strength for containment design.[2] For vessels built to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, NFPA 68 and NFPA 69 allow the same fraction. Because pressure vessel codes include a larger inherent safety factor, the deflagration pressure may then exceed the stamped maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP).[2]

The pressure to be contained follows from the maximum deflagration pressure measured at standard conditions, corrected for the initial pressure and temperature of the process:[2]

PCont=[(Pmax+1)(Pi+Pstd)−Pstd]×298273+Ti

The MAWP of the vessel is then chosen with a strength ratio of the material:[6]

PMAWP≥32PContFuorPMAWP≥32PContFy

Symbol Description Unit
PCont Maximum anticipated deflagration pressure to be contained psig or kPa (gauge)
Pmax Ratio of maximum deflagration gauge pressure at standard initial conditions to Pstd – (dimensionless)
Pi Initial pressure, gauge, in the same unit as Pstd psig or kPa
Pstd Standard pressure, 1 atm = 14.7 psia psia or kPa
Ti Initial temperature °C
PMAWP Maximum allowable working pressure of the vessel psig or kPa (gauge)
Fu Ratio of ultimate stress to allowable stress of the material (about 3.5 for carbon steel) –
Fy Ratio of yield stress to allowable stress of the material (about 1.75 for carbon steel) –

The Fu form prevents rupture and the Fy form prevents permanent deformation. The values of about 3.5 and 1.75 apply to carbon steel or low-alloy stainless steel.[6] The factor 3/2 is the inverse of the two-thirds load fraction.

Worked example: containment of a cornstarch deflagration

Schwab (2008c) gives a maximum explosion pressure of 106 psig (731 kPa) for a commercial cornstarch product.[25] Expressed as a ratio to standard pressure, this is 106 psig / 14.7 psi = 7.21, the dimensionless value used for Pmax in the equation. For a vessel operating at atmospheric pressure and 25 °C, the equation returns PCont = 106 psig. If the vessel had to withstand this without rupture, its MAWP would need to be at least 1.5 × 106/3.5 = 45.4 psig (313 kPa). If it also had to remain free of permanent deformation, the MAWP would need to be at least 1.5 × 106/1.75 = 90.9 psig (626 kPa).

The initial conditions matter. At an initial gauge pressure of 2 psig and 25 °C, PCont rises to 122 psig (844 kPa). At atmospheric pressure but 80 °C, it falls to 89.5 psig (617 kPa). These numbers only illustrate the equation. A real design needs test data for the actual material, because the explosibility of a dust depends on its composition, moisture content, particle size and shape.[26] After a contained deflagration, the hot combustion gases must also be kept from passing into connected process units, which is the task of isolation.[6]

Line of contained pressure falling from 116 to 75 psig as initial temperature rises from 0 to 150 degrees, with MAWP bars
Pressure to be contained for a cornstarch deflagration (Pmax = 106 psig) as a function of initial temperature at atmospheric initial pressure, with the minimum MAWP at 25 °C for the two strength criteria.

Suppression, isolation and spark extinguishing

For enclosed vessels where overpressure or rupture is the main concern, explosion suppression systems are required to be designed in accordance with NFPA 69, as described by Gagnon (2008). Rooms and open areas are instead protected by ultra-high-speed water spray systems under NFPA 15.[27] A suppression system detects an incipient deflagration and injects an agent fast enough to keep the reduced pressure Pred below the strength of the equipment.[6] Methods for determining Pred are found in NFPA 68 and NFPA 69, according to Zalosh (2008).[28]

Deflagration isolation keeps a deflagration that starts in one item of equipment from travelling through pipes and ducts to another.[4] This matters because, as Zalosh (2008) notes, length-to-diameter ratios above 100 are needed for deflagration-to-detonation transition in most hydrocarbon-air mixtures. Detonations are therefore much more likely in large piping systems than in buildings or vessels.[12] NFPA 69 includes requirements for flame arresters mounted in-line, at a distance from the pipe end.[11]

Spark detection and extinguishing systems detect burning particles in conveying ducts and extinguish them before they reach a dust collector. In woodworking, Cholin (2008d) states that such systems cannot be used where deflagration conditions exist in the ducts. Explosion prevention systems that meet NFPA 69, or venting to NFPA 68, must then be employed.[29] For the dust collector itself, Cholin (2008d) lists three practical options: venting to NFPA 68, a listed dust retention and flame-quenching vent assembly to NFPA 69, and deflagration suppression to NFPA 69.[7]

Use in industry

The handbook refers to NFPA 69 in many occupancy and process chapters. In mining and mineral processing, NFPA 68 and NFPA 69 are described as covering dust and gas explosion hazards in detail for industrial facilities.[30] For air-moving equipment and duct systems, Lataille (2008) refers to NFPA 69 for explosion prevention.[31] For industrial occupancies, Demers (2008a) notes that specialised equipment to detect, suppress and control explosions is available, and refers to NFPA 69 for further information.[32] In the nuclear sector, NUREG-1805 cites NFPA 69 for inerting of tanks and vessels and for the battery room hydrogen limit.[19][15]

Limits and misconceptions

NFPA 69 is not a universal rule. It is a US standard, and its provisions apply only where it is adopted; the values in this article come from summaries of the 1997 and 2008 editions.[8][17][3] NUREG-1805 also notes that NFPA 69 provides standards for inerting tanks, but that codes for flammable liquid storage containers do not require such inerting. Examples are NFPA 30 (1996 edition) and FM data sheets 7-88 and 7-29 (1999), which recognise that ignition sources are not present in passive containers.[19]

The standard can also be conservative for particular fuels. NUREG-1805 points out that the lower explosive limit of hydrogen is widely quoted as 4 percent, but that overpressures were observed in large-vessel tests only above 8 percent. This behaviour is not reflected in documents such as NFPA 69, which therefore contain an implicit additional safety factor for hydrogen.[24]

A common misconception is that NFPA 69 and NFPA 68 are alternatives that cover the same ground. They are complementary: NFPA 68 covers venting, and NFPA 69 covers prevention and the other protection methods.[1][2] Another misconception is that meeting the standard removes the need for analysis. Ural and Garzia (2008) call a thorough process hazard analysis perhaps the most important task of any explosion prevention or protection project. That analysis must cover start-up, shutdown and emergencies, and it must be updated whenever the process or the protection changes.[33]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-141.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-154.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-149.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-157.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-151.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-155.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Cholin (2008d), p. 9-22.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 Cote and Grant (2008), p. 1-58.
  9. ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-145.
  10. ↑ Beyler (2002b), p. 2-179.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-158.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Zalosh (2008), p. 2-100.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Cote and Grant (2008), p. 1-57.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Zalosh (2002), p. 3-402.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-6.
  16. ↑ Wysocki (2008), p. 17-7.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 Zalosh (2002), p. 3-403.
  18. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-5.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-27.
  20. ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-148.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-9.
  22. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-10.
  23. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-13.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-26.
  25. ↑ Schwab (2008c), p. 6-143.
  26. ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-156.
  27. ↑ Gagnon (2008), p. 16-110.
  28. ↑ Zalosh (2008), p. 2-99.
  29. ↑ Cholin (2008d), p. 9-25.
  30. ↑ L. J. Moore (2008), p. 9-217.
  31. ↑ Lataille (2008), p. 8-14.
  32. ↑ Demers (2008a), p. 20-205.
  33. ↑ Ural and Garzia (2008), p. 17-143.

References

  • Beyler, C. L. (2002b). Flammability limits of premixed and diffusion flames. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-172–2-187). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Cholin, J. M. (2008d). Woodworking facilities and processes. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-3–9-25). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Cote, A. E., & Grant, C. C. (2008). Codes and standards for the built environment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 1-51–1-71). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Demers, D. P. (2008a). Industrial occupancies. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 20-203–20-210). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Gagnon, R. M. (2008). Ultra-High-Speed water spray systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 16-109–16-133). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Lataille, J. I. (2008). Air-Moving equipment. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 8-3–8-15). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Moore, L. J. (2008). Mining and mineral processing. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 9-203–9-223). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Schwab, R. F. (2008c). Dusts. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 6-141–6-152). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Ural, E. A., & Garzia, H. W. (2008). Explosion prevention and protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-141–17-165). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Wysocki, T. J. (2008). Carbon dioxide and application systems. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 17-3–17-15). National Fire Protection Association.
  • Zalosh, R. (2002). Explosion protection. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 3-402–3-421). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Zalosh, R. (2008). Explosions. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., & R. E. Solomon (Eds.), Fire protection handbook (20th ed., pp. 2-93–2-106). National Fire Protection Association.