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A '''Lithium-ion battery fire''' is a fire involving the cells, electrolyte, packaging or surrounding materials of a lithium-ion battery or battery pack. It can be driven or sustained by thermal runaway, a failure mechanism that heats the cell and can propagate to neighbouring cells. Flammable gases, toxic combustion products, re-ignition and difficult access to the cells make these fires different from many ordinary combustible-material fires.<ref name="NIPV-22">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), p. 22.</ref><ref name="NUREG-B15">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. B-15.</ref>
A '''lithium-ion battery fire''' is a fire in a lithium-ion battery or battery pack that is driven by [[thermal runaway]]. Thermal runaway is a failure mechanism in which a battery cell heats itself up, and it can result in fire.<ref name="NIPV-22">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 22.</ref> Many electric cars store their energy in lithium-ion packs, which can hold 100 kWh or more.<ref name="NIPV-21">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 21.</ref> Once thermal runaway has started, heat can pass from cell to cell, flammable gases may be released and the fire keeps re-igniting until the energy in the pack is used up. The pack is sealed against moisture and dirt, so water cannot reach the cells directly and cooling needs a lot of water for a long time.<ref name="NIPV-22" />


Battery packs are often sealed to protect them from moisture and dirt, which also makes direct cooling of the cells difficult. Flame extinction alone may not stop the underlying reactions, so repeated ignition can occur. Continued cooling, temperature monitoring and management of contaminated water and residue are therefore part of the response.<ref name="NIPV-22" /><ref name="NIPV-45">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), pp. 45–46.</ref>
In tests, burning electric cars reached temperatures and peak heat release rates similar to those of petrol and diesel cars.<ref name="NIPV-23">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 23.</ref><ref name="NIPV-25">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 24–25.</ref> Their fires nevertheless develop more slowly, last longer, can involve repeated small explosions and flash fires, and release more hydrogen fluoride, a toxic and corrosive gas.<ref name="NIPV-29">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 29.</ref><ref name="NIPV-30">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 30.</ref> Together with high voltages, these risks are one reason why firefighting in indoor car parks may be limited or impossible.<ref name="NIPV-11">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 11.</ref> A 2021 study by the Netherlands Institute for Public Safety (NIPV) on indoor car parks with electric vehicles found that the probability of such fires could hardly be determined from empirical data.<ref name="NIPV-20">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 20.</ref>


These fires can occur in vehicles, energy-storage installations and other equipment, but their development depends on cell type, state of charge, packaging and installation. Evidence from electric-vehicle studies should not be applied unchanged to every stationary system. The particular battery, enclosure and fire scenario must be assessed.<ref name="NIPV-28">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), pp. 27–28.</ref><ref name="NIPV-33">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), pp. 32–33.</ref>
== How thermal runaway starts ==


== Thermal runaway and initiation ==
A battery pack in an electric car consists of cells of about 4 V, joined into modules of up to 60 V that together form a pack of 300 to 1,000 V.<ref name="NIPV-21" /> The SFPE Handbook explains the general principle of self-heating: heat produced by a chemical reaction competes with heat lost to the surroundings. Most reaction rates rise almost exponentially with temperature, but heat losses by conduction rise only linearly. Ignition, or thermal runaway, therefore begins where the temperature is highest, if it occurs at all.<ref name="Gray">Gray (2002), pp. 2-211–2-212.</ref>


[[Thermal runaway]] is a failure mechanism that causes self-heating in a battery or cell and can result in fire. Each battery pack has a safety window, and exceeding it can lead to further heating. The reported onset range of 70 to 250 °C depends on battery type and is not a universal ignition temperature.<ref name="NIPV-22" />
In a battery, each pack has its own safety window, and beyond it the pack can heat up further and go into thermal runaway.<ref name="NIPV-22" /> The temperature at which this can start depends on the type of battery: the NIPV report gives 70 to 250 °C in one place and 50 to 270 °C in another.<ref name="NIPV-22" /><ref name="NIPV-18">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 18.</ref> Every electric car has a battery management system that monitors the individual cells.<ref name="NIPV-22" /> When limits are exceeded, it can switch on active cooling during charging, stop charging or disconnect the pack. The system is designed to be fail-safe, so a fault in the system itself also switches the pack off.<ref name="NIPV-23" />


The mechanism can begin with design or manufacturing errors involving electrodes, separators, electrolyte or related processes. External heat, misuse, collision damage and charging faults can also contribute. A battery management system is intended to monitor abnormalities and intervene, but its presence does not remove every failure path.<ref name="NIPV-22" /><ref name="NIPV-28" />
A battery can fail because of a design or manufacturing error in the electrode, separator or electrolyte. This can lead to failures in the battery management system and to overcharging, but such errors are rare and, once detected, generally lead to a recall.<ref name="NIPV-23" /> Outside causes include external heat, misuse and damage in a collision.<ref name="NIPV-23" /> Parking and charging electric cars in car parks add causes that do not exist with petrol and diesel cars. Examples are a damaged cable or charging station, a fault in the battery management system, a collision with a charging station and a defective pack that has gone unnoticed.<ref name="NIPV-29" /> Radiant heat from a neighbouring burning car may also cause thermal runaway in an electric car parked next to it.<ref name="NIPV-32">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 32–33.</ref>


The battery management system can support active cooling, stop charging or disconnect the pack when threshold conditions are detected. Its functions depend on the condition of the system and the fault being experienced. NIPV describes fail-safe deactivation for its discussed electric-vehicle packs, not as a guarantee for every battery system.<ref name="NIPV-22" /><ref name="NIPV-28" />
How often batteries fail is uncertain. Estimates quoted in the NIPV report range from one failure in a million or fewer to about one in 100 million. The report concludes that the probability of battery failure seems relatively low. Still, no lithium-ion battery is intrinsically safe: no pack design can completely prevent the release of enough energy for thermal runaway.<ref name="NIPV-23" />


Ageing changes battery behaviour. Increased internal resistance can increase heating, while a lower maximum state of charge can reduce the intensity and gas production of a later thermal runaway. Those effects should not be reduced to a simple claim that every older battery is either more or less dangerous.<ref name="NIPV-28" />
== Gases, chain reactions and explosions ==


A [[Battery energy storage system]] can contain many cells whose arrangement, monitoring and enclosure affect propagation and cooling. The supplied NIPV source addresses electric-vehicle packs rather than providing a complete stationary-storage design standard. No universal stationary-installation rule is therefore stated here.<ref name="NIPV-28" /><ref name="NIPV-33" />
A heating cell can release flammable gases. These may ignite if there is enough oxygen and the ignition temperature is reached, and the casing of the cell may be hot enough for this. The heat of one cell can also push the cells next to it into thermal runaway, so that the failure spreads through the pack as a chain reaction.<ref name="NIPV-22" /> Gases held in a pouch or cartridge can escape if the pack or its pressure valve fails under high pressure. If the pack is mechanically damaged, the pressure wave can throw out parts and fragments, which may be burning.<ref name="NIPV-22" />


== Gas release and propagation ==
Gas that does not ignite at once can build up into an explosive mixture in a confined or poorly ventilated space.<ref name="NIPV-27">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 27.</ref> If the mixture reaches its lower explosion limit, the lowest concentration at which a flame can spread through it, and is then ignited, a gas explosion can occur.<ref name="NIPV-27" /><ref name="NUREG-16">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-2.</ref> Among the gases that burning packs give off are hydrogen, methane and carbon monoxide.<ref name="NIPV-26">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 26.</ref> Hydrogen alone has a lower flammability limit in air of 4.1 per cent by volume, and its flame is often invisible in daylight.<ref name="NUREG-16" /> The NIPV report counts repeated small explosions, flying parts and flash fires among the ways in which fires in electric cars differ from other car fires.<ref name="NIPV-29" />
[[File:fse-lithium-ion-battery-fire-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=One hot cell heats neighbours, releasing gases that accumulate and can ignite or explode.|Thermal runaway can propagate and produce flammable gases. Based on Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 22 and p. 27.]]


A cell undergoing thermal runaway can release flammable gases as it heats. Those gases may ignite if sufficient oxygen and a suitable ignition condition are present. If gases accumulate in a confined or poorly ventilated space, they can produce a flammable or explosive mixture.<ref name="NIPV-22" /><ref name="NIPV-27">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), p. 27.</ref>
== Heat release and fire development ==


The heat from one cell can raise the temperature of adjacent cells and cause a chain reaction. The geometry of the pack and the ease of heat transfer influence that propagation. A fire involving one cell can therefore develop into a much larger battery-pack event.<ref name="NIPV-22" />
In terms of temperature, fires in electric cars do not differ significantly from those in conventional cars. Battery tests reviewed in the NIPV report measured maximum flame temperatures of 798 to 863 °C, rising with how fully the batteries were charged. Full-scale tests on both types of car measured 800 ± 100 °C.<ref name="NIPV-23" /> The heat radiation from an electric car with a fully charged pack was also similar to that from a conventional car.<ref name="NIPV-25" />


Pressure can build in a pouch, cartridge or other enclosure and release gases if the enclosure or pressure valve fails. Mechanical damage can also eject burning parts and fragments from the pack. Those hazards differ from a fire that spreads only by ordinary surface flame.<ref name="NIPV-22" />
The heat release rate, the amount of heat a fire releases per second, largely determines how intense a fire is.<ref name="VR-4.5">Van Rossum (2027), §4.5.</ref> A review of published tests found similar peaks of about 6 MW for electric and fossil-fuelled cars. The total heat released was 4.7 to 8.5 GJ for electric cars and 3.3 to 10 GJ for the others.<ref name="NIPV-25" /> Larger batteries raise the peak: packs of about 15 to 25 kWh gave about 4 to 6 MW, while packs of more than 100 kWh give about 8 MW. That is significantly higher than the approximately 6.8 MW of an average mid-range conventional car.<ref name="NIPV-25" /> ''Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering'' gives a peak of 8.5 MW for a car and 2.5 MW for an average sofa.<ref name="VR-4.5" />


Unignited gas does not make the situation safe. Continued degassing can create a cloud that later ignites, and an explosion can occur when the mixture and ignition conditions are suitable. Assessment must therefore include gas transport, ventilation and the timing of ignition.<ref name="NIPV-27" />
The course of the fire over time differs more. In a petrol or diesel car, the plastic tank can fail and suddenly release fuel that catches fire, so the temperature rises very rapidly in the first minutes. Battery cells first need time to warm up and give off gas. The temperature therefore rises evenly, at about 0.2 °C per minute, until thermal runaway makes it climb by more than 10 °C per minute.<ref name="NIPV-26" /> A normal passenger car fire generally burns for just over half an hour and peaks at about 5 MW after 10 to 15 minutes. An electric car left to burn without intervention burns out in about 90 minutes, and an extinguished one can keep re-igniting for several hours.<ref name="NIPV-26" />


An [[Electric vehicle fire]] can involve the battery pack, passenger compartment, charging equipment or an external fire exposing the vehicle. NIPV presents separate scenarios for a pack fire, radiation exposure from another vehicle and several packs burning. Those scenarios have different prevention and suppression requirements.<ref name="NIPV-33" />
An [[electric vehicle fire]] in a car park can spread from car to car as a travelling car fire. The NIPV report expects electric cars to make such fires more likely, because a long-burning pack radiates heat to its neighbours for longer.<ref name="NIPV-29" /> In 2021, Dutch building regulations, standards and guidelines were still based on fires in conventionally fuelled cars, and modern cars contain more plastic than older steel models.<ref name="NIPV-11" /> The car-fire curve in the Dutch standard NEN 6098 rests on a design fire set by TNO in 1999. In the TNO tests, fire could spread to the adjacent cars 10 to 15 minutes after the first one. With more plastics in modern cars, such curves may be less conservative in some situations.<ref name="VR-8.6">Van Rossum (2027), §8.6.</ref>
 
== Fire development and re-ignition ==
 
Battery-pack fire development can differ from a liquid-fuel vehicle fire. NIPV describes a slower initial heating period followed by rapid development when thermal runaway occurs. The source compares the pack with hydrocarbon-fuel fire behaviour, not with every possible vehicle interior fire.<ref name="NIPV-25">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), pp. 25–26.</ref>
 
The source reports a conventional passenger-car fire of just over half an hour with about 5 MW after 10 to 15 minutes, and an electric-vehicle burnout of about 90 minutes without intervention. These are study-specific examples, not universal fire curves. Vehicle materials, battery condition and ventilation can change the outcome.<ref name="NIPV-25" />
 
Re-ignition is a defining concern in many battery-pack scenarios. The reactions can continue after visible flames are suppressed, releasing gases that ignite again. NIPV reports re-ignition for several hours after the start in the cited study, which requires a longer assessment than initial flame knockdown.<ref name="NIPV-25" /><ref name="NIPV-45" />
 
Continuous temperature monitoring helps identify renewed heating and the need for continued cooling. Extinguishing whenever the pack reignites and applying continuous cooling are different operational choices. Both require sustained attention to the battery's temperature and remaining energy.<ref name="NIPV-45" /><ref name="NIPV-46">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), p. 46.</ref>
 
The fire can spread through vehicles to other cars and structures. Radiant heat from an adjacent fire can initiate thermal runaway in a pack that was not the original ignition source. Prevention and suppression must therefore consider both internal failure and external fire exposure.<ref name="NIPV-33" />


== Toxic and corrosive products ==
== Toxic and corrosive products ==


[[Fire toxicity]] includes the effects of gases and other products released by the cells, electrolyte, packaging and surrounding plastics. NIPV lists methane, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, hydrogen, hydrogen fluoride and hydrogen chloride among the products in its reviewed battery fires. The actual mixture depends on the battery and the fire.<ref name="NIPV-26">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), pp. 26–27.</ref>
The toxic hazard of a fire, the subject of [[fire toxicity]], depends on how quickly and how much toxic products are produced, and on how potent they are.<ref name="Purser">Purser (2002), p. 2-91.</ref> Burning battery packs release corrosive substances from the electrolyte and combustion products from the plastics and packaging. Besides methane, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and hydrogen, they release the toxic gases hydrogen fluoride and hydrogen chloride.<ref name="NIPV-26" /> The SFPE Handbook counts these acid gases among the most important irritants in fire smoke. Irritants can impair escape or incapacitate people through pain and breathing difficulty.<ref name="Purser" />
 
Hydrogen fluoride is a particular concern in the cited vehicle research. NIPV reports a source estimate of about 20 to 200 mg HF per Wh, implying 2 to 20 kg for a 100 kWh pack depending on state of charge. Another cited comparison found about 1.8 times as much HF for electric vehicles as for conventional vehicles.<ref name="NIPV-26" />
 
Those numbers belong to the cited tests and assumptions and must not be used as a universal emission factor. Battery chemistry, state of charge and test arrangement affect releases. The report itself emphasises the differences between studies and the uncertainties in those results.<ref name="NIPV-26" /><ref name="NIPV-28" />
 
HF is reactive and can bind to other substances and particles, forming deposits on floors, walls and ceilings. NIPV reports that this reduced airborne HF concentration in the cited work but increased contamination of firefighting clothing. Deposition therefore changes rather than eliminates the hazard.<ref name="NIPV-26" />
 
Combustion products can spread into stairwells and escape routes through open doors or building openings. Location and ventilation affect where exposure occurs. The safety assessment must include smoke movement and people who take longer to leave, not only firefighters at the battery.<ref name="NIPV-39">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), pp. 39–40.</ref>
 
== Suppression and cooling ==
 
Putting out visible flames is different from stopping thermal runaway. The battery's closed construction can prevent water from reaching the cells directly, so surface application may not stop the underlying reactions. NIPV describes prolonged cooling with substantial water as necessary for control in its studied scenarios.<ref name="NIPV-22" /><ref name="NIPV-30">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), p. 30.</ref>
 
Water can enter the pack only where the design provides access or where another method is used. NIPV describes immersion of the vehicle or battery pack as the currently successful approach in its cited fire-service guidance. Effectiveness depends on water reaching the affected cells and on continued monitoring afterwards.<ref name="NIPV-30" /><ref name="NIPV-46" />


[[Fire classes]] can guide initial agent selection, but a battery fire does not fit every assumption behind an ordinary solid or electrical-equipment label. Chemical reactions, sealed packaging, high voltage, gas release and re-ignition must also be assessed. Class selection cannot replace mechanism-specific evidence.<ref name="NUREG-B16">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. B-16.</ref><ref name="NIPV-22" />
A study cited in the NIPV report found about 20 to 200 mg of hydrogen fluoride per watt-hour of battery capacity. A 100 kWh pack can thus emit 2 to 20 kg, depending on its charge. Comparable tests on electric and conventional cars found hardly any difference in other toxic gases, but the electric cars appeared to produce about 1.8 times more hydrogen fluoride.<ref name="NIPV-26" /> Hydrogen fluoride binds to other substances and smoke particles and settles on floors, walls and ceilings. In one study this more than halved its concentration in the smoke within 10 to 20 minutes, but made firefighting clothing more contaminated.<ref name="NIPV-26" /> According to the report, a fire attack requires the clothing to be decontaminated because of the toxic and corrosive gases, unlike an attack on a conventional car fire.<ref name="NIPV-30" />
[[File:fse-lithium-ion-battery-fire-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Battery smoke travels through air and deposits on clothing, walls, floors and residue.|Battery-fire contamination includes airborne and deposited hazards. Based on Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 26, 29–30, 39 and 47.]]


Sprinklers and water mist can reduce the probability of spread to adjacent structures and vehicles, but NIPV says they cannot necessarily extinguish the pack fire. Further research is needed on which systems best control different electric-vehicle scenarios. Their effect should not be equated with stopping thermal runaway.<ref name="NIPV-36">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), p. 36.</ref>
For people escaping, the extra hydrogen fluoride changes little. The plastic parts of any burning car already create severely toxic smoke, and the report puts the effect of the extra hydrogen fluoride on escape safety at zero. Systemic health effects seem unlikely, although slight exposure may irritate the skin and severe exposure may cause chemical burns.<ref name="NIPV-30" /> Research cited in the report found that firefighters in protective equipment can carry out a "safe" attack with proper hygiene if their exposure to the smoke lasts no more than 20 to 30 minutes.<ref name="NIPV-26" /> The report sees no reason to assume that they need more protective equipment than at a fire in a conventional car.<ref name="NIPV-47">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 47.</ref>


Covering a vehicle in foam is not supported as a useful method in the cited NIPV discussion because re-ignition can occur under the foam, even with limited oxygen. That is specific evidence about the battery mechanism, not a general claim that foam has no other role in the incident.<ref name="NIPV-47">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), p. 47.</ref>
Smoke with extra hydrogen fluoride can spread from a car park through open doors into the escape routes and stairwells of buildings above.<ref name="NIPV-30" /> People who leave at once are exposed only briefly, but those who cannot escape or take longer are exposed for longer. For this reason the report advises against placing charging stations near pedestrian escape routes.<ref name="NIPV-39">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 39.</ref>


== Firefighting and salvage ==
== Extinguishing and cooling ==


Firefighting assessment must include explosions, toxic gases, high voltage, structure stability and uncertain fire development. NIPV identifies those factors as increasing the risks and uncertainties of a repressive attack. The presence of a battery also extends the period for which cooling and monitoring may be required.<ref name="NIPV-30" /><ref name="NIPV-43">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), pp. 43–45.</ref>
Fighting a battery fire involves two tasks: putting out the flames, and cooling the pack for a long time so that thermal runaway does not set it alight again. Putting out the flames needs no more capacity than for a conventional car.<ref name="NIPV-46">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 46.</ref> Stopping thermal runaway is much harder, because the closed construction of the pack keeps water away from the cells.<ref name="NIPV-22" /> According to the NIPV report, a burning pack can only be controlled by prolonged cooling with a lot of water, and extinguishing it requires water inside the pack.<ref name="NIPV-30" />


The attack location and cooling capacity affect which tactics are possible. NIPV's principles ask whether the seat of fire is known, whether it can be reached from outside and whether sufficient cooling capacity exists. The answers determine whether an offensive exterior attack is possible.<ref name="NIPV-44">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), pp. 44–45.</ref>
After the flames are out, the pack catches fire again within a short time. It therefore needs continuous cooling, and its temperature has to be monitored for a long time.<ref name="NIPV-46" /> Firefighters can extinguish continuously or each time the fire re-ignites, and the amount of water needed depends on the pack and how fully it is charged.<ref name="NIPV-46" /> For packs without special facilities, the most successful way to get water inside is to immerse the pack in water.<ref name="NIPV-30" /> An immersion container is currently the best method available for long-term cooling, but its effect depends on how far the water can reach the cells.<ref name="NIPV-46" />
[[File:fse-lithium-ion-battery-fire-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Flames are knocked down before prolonged cooling, temperature monitoring and salvage.|Battery-fire response continues after visible flames disappear. Based on Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 45–47.]]


NIPV gives low-pressure guidance of 450 litres per minute generally sufficient for a heat-release rate up to 10 MW and high-pressure guidance of 125 litres per minute for up to 2.5 MW. These are source-specific rules of thumb, not universal cooling guarantees for battery packs. The report separately stresses prolonged cooling and access to the cells.<ref name="NIPV-45" />
Fixed sprinkler or water mist systems cannot extinguish a fire in an electric car, because the water droplets cannot enter the pack. They can, however, reduce the probability that the fire grows and spreads to nearby structures and vehicles.<ref name="NIPV-37">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 37.</ref> Covering the car in foam is not a useful method for the time being. The fire can re-ignite under the foam, because packs in thermal runaway can re-ignite even when little oxygen is available.<ref name="NIPV-47" />


Salvage planning should begin early. A vehicle may need to be removed to a suitable container or tank where cooling can continue until thermal runaway stops. The capabilities of the salvage company and the access conditions in the car park can limit that option.<ref name="NIPV-42">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), p. 42.</ref><ref name="NIPV-46" />
[[Fire classes]] sort fires by the type of fuel. In the US scheme of NFPA 10 (2002 edition), summarised in NUREG-1805, fires in energised electrical equipment form Class C, for which the agent must not conduct electricity.<ref name="NUREG-B">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-13.</ref> The NIPV report, which deals with lithium-ion packs in cars, relies on water for cooling and extinguishing them.<ref name="NIPV-30" /> Although electric cars carry up to about 400 V, with peaks of up to 800 V, the probability of electrocution is negligible when the fire is fought from a distance.<ref name="NIPV-11" /><ref name="NIPV-43">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 43.</ref>


Firefighting clothing and equipment can become contaminated by HF and other products. NIPV calls for decontamination in its electric-vehicle discussion and notes that this differs from conventional-vehicle incidents. Protective arrangements must address both airborne and deposited contamination.<ref name="NIPV-26" /><ref name="NIPV-30" />
== Firefighting and salvage in car parks ==


== Prevention, detection and management ==
In an indoor car park, a fire in an electric car adds several problems for the fire service. It is uncertain how the fire will develop and spread, and the pack can re-ignite and burn for longer. Explosions, flare fires and specific toxic gases can occur, and the deployment may be long and need a lot of water.<ref name="NIPV-43" /> The stability of the structure is uncertain, and a burning electric car may even start to move.<ref name="NIPV-30" /> The report concludes that the risks and uncertainties of an attack have increased compared with car parks without electric cars.<ref name="NIPV-43" />


Prevention includes battery and charging-equipment condition, user instructions and the condition of the electrical installation. NIPV identifies damaged cables and charging stations, battery-management faults, collisions with charging equipment and unnoticed defective packs as additional causes. Those conditions must be considered in the building's risk assessment.<ref name="NIPV-28" />
Dutch fire services prefer to fight a fire from the outside. Before choosing an attack, they establish whether the location of the fire is known, whether it can be reached from outside and whether enough cooling capacity is available. Only if all three conditions are met can the fire be put out from the outside. Otherwise the attack becomes defensive, and a large structure such as a car park is in principle considered beyond saving.<ref name="NIPV-44">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 44.</ref> For car parks, the report concludes that an attack from inside is generally not safely possible, although the commanding officer may still decide on one.<ref name="NIPV-45">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 45.</ref> The fire service will not automatically enter, so a car park may burn out.<ref name="NIPV-47" />


Clear identification of electric vehicles and charging locations supports response. The source recommends recognisable charging spaces and information at entrances, while warning that clustering can increase travelling-fire exposure. Identification and spacing must therefore be assessed together.<ref name="NIPV-42" />
Cooling capacity is estimated with rules of thumb. A high-pressure jet of 125 litres per minute is generally sufficient for a heat release rate of up to 2.5 MW. A low-pressure jet of 450 litres per minute generally suffices for up to 10 MW.<ref name="NIPV-45" /> Fires in electric cars call for low-pressure jets, and several burning cars will probably need several jets.<ref name="NIPV-44" /> ''Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering'' explains the idea behind such rules: the expected heat release rate of a fire indicates the cooling capacity needed to fight it.<ref name="VR-8.6" />


Early detection supports suppression and evacuation. NIPV describes smoke, heat and carbon-monoxide detection options and stresses prompt alarm follow-up. It also notes that local standardisation and certification may not treat carbon-monoxide detection as a standard fire-detection method.<ref name="NIPV-36" /><ref name="NIPV-40">Van der Graaf, Hessels, and Rosmuller (2021), p. 40.</ref>
Because a pack can re-ignite after the fire is out, the report advises planning how an electric car can be removed from the car park. Together with a properly equipped salvage company, the fire service removes the car, which can then be left to react in a water tank until thermal runaway has stopped.<ref name="NIPV-42">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 42.</ref> Not every salvage company has the right equipment, and smoke or poor access can delay removal from an underground car park.<ref name="NIPV-46" /> In a fire in the Singelgarage car park in Alkmaar in 2020, the pack of one electric car kept re-igniting. A police robot towed the car out, and it was then cooled for a long time in an immersion container.<ref name="NIPV-12">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 12.</ref>


User instructions should address fault messages, distance from released gases, stopping charging, alerting the fire service and providing vehicle information. Public and private car parks require different communication arrangements. Instructions must match the people who actually use the space.<ref name="NIPV-40" />
Ordinary extinguishing water from electric car fires harms the environment hardly more than that from other car fires and can go into the sewer.<ref name="NIPV-46" /> Cooling water in an immersion tank is different. Burnt packs contain lithium oxide, which reacts with water to form lithium hydroxide, so the pH of the water can keep rising.<ref name="NIPV-29" /> Such cooling water may not be discharged directly into the sewer, and a residue with a neutral pH on the outside may still contain heavy metals.<ref name="NIPV-47" />


Runoff and residue require management. NIPV distinguishes cooling water in an immersion tank, which may be contaminated and must not go directly into the sewer, from other research on ordinary extinguishing water. The disposal route must be established for the actual water and residue.<ref name="NIPV-46" />
== Prevention in car parks ==


== Assessment and evidence limits ==
In the Netherlands, the 2021 NIPV report discusses prevention against the Building Decree 2012, whose fire safety rules did not specifically address parking and charging electric cars.<ref name="NIPV-17">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 17.</ref> Under that decree, enclosed indoor car parks of more than 1,000 m² needed an automatic fire alarm system with full detection, and new indoor car parks had to have charging facilities.<ref name="NIPV-37" /><ref name="NIPV-10">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 10.</ref> Amendments proposed in 2021 for its successor, the Building Works and Living Environment Decree, would make sprinklers mandatory in certain car parks. They would also require a facility to switch off all charging points at once.<ref name="NIPV-18" />


Battery fires require scenario-specific assessment rather than a single fire curve. Cell type, state of charge, pack design, external heat, ventilation and fire-service access can all alter the event. Evidence from one pack or vehicle should be compared carefully with the system being evaluated.<ref name="NIPV-28" /><ref name="NIPV-33" />
The report offers its measures as a range from which to build a tailor-made set, not as a detailed standard.<ref name="NIPV-34">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 34.</ref> It sees a sprinkler or water mist system as the most obvious way to hold a fire to a few cars and so prevent a travelling fire.<ref name="NIPV-36">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 36.</ref><ref name="NIPV-49">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 49–50.</ref> Fast detection helps, but its effect depends on prompt follow-up of the alarm.<ref name="NIPV-37" /><ref name="NIPV-40">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 40.</ref> Carbon monoxide detectors gave the fastest alert in one study, but in the Netherlands they are not used as fire detection.<ref name="NIPV-37" /> Collision protection for charging stations is a further measure.<ref name="NIPV-36" />


The likelihood of battery failure is itself uncertain. NIPV reports differing estimates and warns that technologies are still developing. It does not support a general claim that electric vehicles always have a higher or lower fire probability than conventional vehicles.<ref name="NIPV-22" /><ref name="NIPV-28" />
The report prefers parking spaces for electric cars near the vehicle entrances and at street level, so that a fire can be fought from outside and a car removed quickly.<ref name="NIPV-41">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 41–42.</ref> It advises against places where ventilation air is supplied.<ref name="NIPV-39" /> Grouping charging points in one marked area helps the fire service find electric cars, but such clustering can also lead to a travelling car fire.<ref name="NIPV-42" /> Users can be told not to park a car whose battery management system reports a fault and to keep their distance if gases are released.<ref name="NIPV-40" />


Suppression evidence is also incomplete. The report calls for research into which fixed systems best control incipient electric-vehicle fires and how travelling fires differ between vehicle types. A suppression measure that limits spread cannot be assumed to stop the pack's reactions.<ref name="NIPV-36" /><ref name="NIPV-42" />
== Uncertainties and limits ==


Toxicity and environmental assessments must distinguish air, deposition, residue and contaminated water. Each can contain hazardous products, and a neutral surface pH reading does not prove the residue is free of hazardous substances. The complete exposure and disposal path matters.<ref name="NIPV-26" /><ref name="NIPV-46" />
How often electric cars catch fire is largely unknown, because there are no reliable datasets.<ref name="NIPV-54">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 54.</ref> The report judges that a parked electric car is unlikely to catch fire more often than a fossil-fuelled car. Charging, however, is expected to raise the probability, because it adds an activity, the technology is still in its teething phase and existing electrical installations may not be safe enough.<ref name="NIPV-28">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 28.</ref> Ageing probably raises the internal resistance of the cells, which increases the heat they produce. An older battery also holds a lower maximum charge, however, so its thermal runaway is less intense and releases fewer flammable gases.<ref name="NIPV-28" />


The incident record should preserve those uncertainties alongside the chosen response. It should identify the pack, fire origin, gas and smoke pathways, cooling method, monitoring period and disposal arrangements. That gives a more accurate basis for judging both immediate and later consequences. It also shows which conclusions depend on a particular pack, test or operational assumption and therefore require renewed assessment when those conditions change.<ref name="NIPV-30" /><ref name="NIPV-46" />
The NIPV report covers only lithium-ion passenger cars in Dutch indoor car parks, and "lithium-ion" itself covers many kinds of lithium batteries that respond differently to fire.<ref name="NIPV-18" /> It warns that test results vary greatly with the amount of fuel, the battery capacity and the plastics in the car, so single studies cannot simply be generalised.<ref name="NIPV-20" /> Battery packs can also be combined into systems of 10 to 400 kWh, for example in trucks and electric ships. Stationary installations such as a battery energy storage system lie outside the report's scope.<ref name="NIPV-21" /><ref name="NIPV-18" /> Open questions include the exact process of thermal runaway, the conditions under which packs re-ignite and the best detection and suppression systems.<ref name="NIPV-55">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 55.</ref>


== See also ==
== See also ==


* [[Battery energy storage system]]
* [[Car park fire]]
* [[Electric vehicle fire]]
* [[Tunnel fire]]
* [[Thermal runaway]]
* [[Warehouse fire]]


== Notes ==
== Notes ==
Line 113: Line 90:
== References ==
== References ==


* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2005). ''Fire dynamics tools: Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. nuclear regulatory commission fire protection inspection program'' (NUREG-1805). Author.
* Gray, B. (2002). Spontaneous combustion and self-heating. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed., pp. 2-211–2-228). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
* Van der Graaf, J., Hessels, T., & Rosmuller, N. (2021). ''Fire safety of indoor car parks accommodating electrically powered vehicles''. Netherlands Institute for Public Safety (NIPV). English translation published 2023.
* Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). ''Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program'' (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
* Purser, D. A. (2002). Toxicity assessment of combustion products. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed., pp. 2-83–2-171). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
* Van der Graaf, J., Hessels, T., & Rosmuller, N. (2023). ''Fire safety of indoor car parks accommodating electrically powered vehicles''. Nederlands Instituut Publieke Veiligheid. (Original work published 2021)
* Van Rossum, E. (2027). ''Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering''. Fire Safety Academy.


[[Category:Special Hazards & Building Types]]
[[Category:Special Hazards & Building Types]]

Latest revision as of 22:34, 2 November 2026

A lithium-ion battery fire is a fire in a lithium-ion battery or battery pack that is driven by thermal runaway. Thermal runaway is a failure mechanism in which a battery cell heats itself up, and it can result in fire.[1] Many electric cars store their energy in lithium-ion packs, which can hold 100 kWh or more.[2] Once thermal runaway has started, heat can pass from cell to cell, flammable gases may be released and the fire keeps re-igniting until the energy in the pack is used up. The pack is sealed against moisture and dirt, so water cannot reach the cells directly and cooling needs a lot of water for a long time.[1]

In tests, burning electric cars reached temperatures and peak heat release rates similar to those of petrol and diesel cars.[3][4] Their fires nevertheless develop more slowly, last longer, can involve repeated small explosions and flash fires, and release more hydrogen fluoride, a toxic and corrosive gas.[5][6] Together with high voltages, these risks are one reason why firefighting in indoor car parks may be limited or impossible.[7] A 2021 study by the Netherlands Institute for Public Safety (NIPV) on indoor car parks with electric vehicles found that the probability of such fires could hardly be determined from empirical data.[8]

How thermal runaway starts

A battery pack in an electric car consists of cells of about 4 V, joined into modules of up to 60 V that together form a pack of 300 to 1,000 V.[2] The SFPE Handbook explains the general principle of self-heating: heat produced by a chemical reaction competes with heat lost to the surroundings. Most reaction rates rise almost exponentially with temperature, but heat losses by conduction rise only linearly. Ignition, or thermal runaway, therefore begins where the temperature is highest, if it occurs at all.[9]

In a battery, each pack has its own safety window, and beyond it the pack can heat up further and go into thermal runaway.[1] The temperature at which this can start depends on the type of battery: the NIPV report gives 70 to 250 °C in one place and 50 to 270 °C in another.[1][10] Every electric car has a battery management system that monitors the individual cells.[1] When limits are exceeded, it can switch on active cooling during charging, stop charging or disconnect the pack. The system is designed to be fail-safe, so a fault in the system itself also switches the pack off.[3]

A battery can fail because of a design or manufacturing error in the electrode, separator or electrolyte. This can lead to failures in the battery management system and to overcharging, but such errors are rare and, once detected, generally lead to a recall.[3] Outside causes include external heat, misuse and damage in a collision.[3] Parking and charging electric cars in car parks add causes that do not exist with petrol and diesel cars. Examples are a damaged cable or charging station, a fault in the battery management system, a collision with a charging station and a defective pack that has gone unnoticed.[5] Radiant heat from a neighbouring burning car may also cause thermal runaway in an electric car parked next to it.[11]

How often batteries fail is uncertain. Estimates quoted in the NIPV report range from one failure in a million or fewer to about one in 100 million. The report concludes that the probability of battery failure seems relatively low. Still, no lithium-ion battery is intrinsically safe: no pack design can completely prevent the release of enough energy for thermal runaway.[3]

Gases, chain reactions and explosions

A heating cell can release flammable gases. These may ignite if there is enough oxygen and the ignition temperature is reached, and the casing of the cell may be hot enough for this. The heat of one cell can also push the cells next to it into thermal runaway, so that the failure spreads through the pack as a chain reaction.[1] Gases held in a pouch or cartridge can escape if the pack or its pressure valve fails under high pressure. If the pack is mechanically damaged, the pressure wave can throw out parts and fragments, which may be burning.[1]

Gas that does not ignite at once can build up into an explosive mixture in a confined or poorly ventilated space.[12] If the mixture reaches its lower explosion limit, the lowest concentration at which a flame can spread through it, and is then ignited, a gas explosion can occur.[12][13] Among the gases that burning packs give off are hydrogen, methane and carbon monoxide.[14] Hydrogen alone has a lower flammability limit in air of 4.1 per cent by volume, and its flame is often invisible in daylight.[13] The NIPV report counts repeated small explosions, flying parts and flash fires among the ways in which fires in electric cars differ from other car fires.[5]

One hot cell heats neighbours, releasing gases that accumulate and can ignite or explode.
Thermal runaway can propagate and produce flammable gases. Based on Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 22 and p. 27.

Heat release and fire development

In terms of temperature, fires in electric cars do not differ significantly from those in conventional cars. Battery tests reviewed in the NIPV report measured maximum flame temperatures of 798 to 863 °C, rising with how fully the batteries were charged. Full-scale tests on both types of car measured 800 ± 100 °C.[3] The heat radiation from an electric car with a fully charged pack was also similar to that from a conventional car.[4]

The heat release rate, the amount of heat a fire releases per second, largely determines how intense a fire is.[15] A review of published tests found similar peaks of about 6 MW for electric and fossil-fuelled cars. The total heat released was 4.7 to 8.5 GJ for electric cars and 3.3 to 10 GJ for the others.[4] Larger batteries raise the peak: packs of about 15 to 25 kWh gave about 4 to 6 MW, while packs of more than 100 kWh give about 8 MW. That is significantly higher than the approximately 6.8 MW of an average mid-range conventional car.[4] Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering gives a peak of 8.5 MW for a car and 2.5 MW for an average sofa.[15]

The course of the fire over time differs more. In a petrol or diesel car, the plastic tank can fail and suddenly release fuel that catches fire, so the temperature rises very rapidly in the first minutes. Battery cells first need time to warm up and give off gas. The temperature therefore rises evenly, at about 0.2 °C per minute, until thermal runaway makes it climb by more than 10 °C per minute.[14] A normal passenger car fire generally burns for just over half an hour and peaks at about 5 MW after 10 to 15 minutes. An electric car left to burn without intervention burns out in about 90 minutes, and an extinguished one can keep re-igniting for several hours.[14]

An electric vehicle fire in a car park can spread from car to car as a travelling car fire. The NIPV report expects electric cars to make such fires more likely, because a long-burning pack radiates heat to its neighbours for longer.[5] In 2021, Dutch building regulations, standards and guidelines were still based on fires in conventionally fuelled cars, and modern cars contain more plastic than older steel models.[7] The car-fire curve in the Dutch standard NEN 6098 rests on a design fire set by TNO in 1999. In the TNO tests, fire could spread to the adjacent cars 10 to 15 minutes after the first one. With more plastics in modern cars, such curves may be less conservative in some situations.[16]

Toxic and corrosive products

The toxic hazard of a fire, the subject of fire toxicity, depends on how quickly and how much toxic products are produced, and on how potent they are.[17] Burning battery packs release corrosive substances from the electrolyte and combustion products from the plastics and packaging. Besides methane, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and hydrogen, they release the toxic gases hydrogen fluoride and hydrogen chloride.[14] The SFPE Handbook counts these acid gases among the most important irritants in fire smoke. Irritants can impair escape or incapacitate people through pain and breathing difficulty.[17]

A study cited in the NIPV report found about 20 to 200 mg of hydrogen fluoride per watt-hour of battery capacity. A 100 kWh pack can thus emit 2 to 20 kg, depending on its charge. Comparable tests on electric and conventional cars found hardly any difference in other toxic gases, but the electric cars appeared to produce about 1.8 times more hydrogen fluoride.[14] Hydrogen fluoride binds to other substances and smoke particles and settles on floors, walls and ceilings. In one study this more than halved its concentration in the smoke within 10 to 20 minutes, but made firefighting clothing more contaminated.[14] According to the report, a fire attack requires the clothing to be decontaminated because of the toxic and corrosive gases, unlike an attack on a conventional car fire.[6]

Battery smoke travels through air and deposits on clothing, walls, floors and residue.
Battery-fire contamination includes airborne and deposited hazards. Based on Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 26, 29–30, 39 and 47.

For people escaping, the extra hydrogen fluoride changes little. The plastic parts of any burning car already create severely toxic smoke, and the report puts the effect of the extra hydrogen fluoride on escape safety at zero. Systemic health effects seem unlikely, although slight exposure may irritate the skin and severe exposure may cause chemical burns.[6] Research cited in the report found that firefighters in protective equipment can carry out a "safe" attack with proper hygiene if their exposure to the smoke lasts no more than 20 to 30 minutes.[14] The report sees no reason to assume that they need more protective equipment than at a fire in a conventional car.[18]

Smoke with extra hydrogen fluoride can spread from a car park through open doors into the escape routes and stairwells of buildings above.[6] People who leave at once are exposed only briefly, but those who cannot escape or take longer are exposed for longer. For this reason the report advises against placing charging stations near pedestrian escape routes.[19]

Extinguishing and cooling

Fighting a battery fire involves two tasks: putting out the flames, and cooling the pack for a long time so that thermal runaway does not set it alight again. Putting out the flames needs no more capacity than for a conventional car.[20] Stopping thermal runaway is much harder, because the closed construction of the pack keeps water away from the cells.[1] According to the NIPV report, a burning pack can only be controlled by prolonged cooling with a lot of water, and extinguishing it requires water inside the pack.[6]

After the flames are out, the pack catches fire again within a short time. It therefore needs continuous cooling, and its temperature has to be monitored for a long time.[20] Firefighters can extinguish continuously or each time the fire re-ignites, and the amount of water needed depends on the pack and how fully it is charged.[20] For packs without special facilities, the most successful way to get water inside is to immerse the pack in water.[6] An immersion container is currently the best method available for long-term cooling, but its effect depends on how far the water can reach the cells.[20]

Flames are knocked down before prolonged cooling, temperature monitoring and salvage.
Battery-fire response continues after visible flames disappear. Based on Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 45–47.

Fixed sprinkler or water mist systems cannot extinguish a fire in an electric car, because the water droplets cannot enter the pack. They can, however, reduce the probability that the fire grows and spreads to nearby structures and vehicles.[21] Covering the car in foam is not a useful method for the time being. The fire can re-ignite under the foam, because packs in thermal runaway can re-ignite even when little oxygen is available.[18]

Fire classes sort fires by the type of fuel. In the US scheme of NFPA 10 (2002 edition), summarised in NUREG-1805, fires in energised electrical equipment form Class C, for which the agent must not conduct electricity.[22] The NIPV report, which deals with lithium-ion packs in cars, relies on water for cooling and extinguishing them.[6] Although electric cars carry up to about 400 V, with peaks of up to 800 V, the probability of electrocution is negligible when the fire is fought from a distance.[7][23]

Firefighting and salvage in car parks

In an indoor car park, a fire in an electric car adds several problems for the fire service. It is uncertain how the fire will develop and spread, and the pack can re-ignite and burn for longer. Explosions, flare fires and specific toxic gases can occur, and the deployment may be long and need a lot of water.[23] The stability of the structure is uncertain, and a burning electric car may even start to move.[6] The report concludes that the risks and uncertainties of an attack have increased compared with car parks without electric cars.[23]

Dutch fire services prefer to fight a fire from the outside. Before choosing an attack, they establish whether the location of the fire is known, whether it can be reached from outside and whether enough cooling capacity is available. Only if all three conditions are met can the fire be put out from the outside. Otherwise the attack becomes defensive, and a large structure such as a car park is in principle considered beyond saving.[24] For car parks, the report concludes that an attack from inside is generally not safely possible, although the commanding officer may still decide on one.[25] The fire service will not automatically enter, so a car park may burn out.[18]

Cooling capacity is estimated with rules of thumb. A high-pressure jet of 125 litres per minute is generally sufficient for a heat release rate of up to 2.5 MW. A low-pressure jet of 450 litres per minute generally suffices for up to 10 MW.[25] Fires in electric cars call for low-pressure jets, and several burning cars will probably need several jets.[24] Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering explains the idea behind such rules: the expected heat release rate of a fire indicates the cooling capacity needed to fight it.[16]

Because a pack can re-ignite after the fire is out, the report advises planning how an electric car can be removed from the car park. Together with a properly equipped salvage company, the fire service removes the car, which can then be left to react in a water tank until thermal runaway has stopped.[26] Not every salvage company has the right equipment, and smoke or poor access can delay removal from an underground car park.[20] In a fire in the Singelgarage car park in Alkmaar in 2020, the pack of one electric car kept re-igniting. A police robot towed the car out, and it was then cooled for a long time in an immersion container.[27]

Ordinary extinguishing water from electric car fires harms the environment hardly more than that from other car fires and can go into the sewer.[20] Cooling water in an immersion tank is different. Burnt packs contain lithium oxide, which reacts with water to form lithium hydroxide, so the pH of the water can keep rising.[5] Such cooling water may not be discharged directly into the sewer, and a residue with a neutral pH on the outside may still contain heavy metals.[18]

Prevention in car parks

In the Netherlands, the 2021 NIPV report discusses prevention against the Building Decree 2012, whose fire safety rules did not specifically address parking and charging electric cars.[28] Under that decree, enclosed indoor car parks of more than 1,000 m² needed an automatic fire alarm system with full detection, and new indoor car parks had to have charging facilities.[21][29] Amendments proposed in 2021 for its successor, the Building Works and Living Environment Decree, would make sprinklers mandatory in certain car parks. They would also require a facility to switch off all charging points at once.[10]

The report offers its measures as a range from which to build a tailor-made set, not as a detailed standard.[30] It sees a sprinkler or water mist system as the most obvious way to hold a fire to a few cars and so prevent a travelling fire.[31][32] Fast detection helps, but its effect depends on prompt follow-up of the alarm.[21][33] Carbon monoxide detectors gave the fastest alert in one study, but in the Netherlands they are not used as fire detection.[21] Collision protection for charging stations is a further measure.[31]

The report prefers parking spaces for electric cars near the vehicle entrances and at street level, so that a fire can be fought from outside and a car removed quickly.[34] It advises against places where ventilation air is supplied.[19] Grouping charging points in one marked area helps the fire service find electric cars, but such clustering can also lead to a travelling car fire.[26] Users can be told not to park a car whose battery management system reports a fault and to keep their distance if gases are released.[33]

Uncertainties and limits

How often electric cars catch fire is largely unknown, because there are no reliable datasets.[35] The report judges that a parked electric car is unlikely to catch fire more often than a fossil-fuelled car. Charging, however, is expected to raise the probability, because it adds an activity, the technology is still in its teething phase and existing electrical installations may not be safe enough.[36] Ageing probably raises the internal resistance of the cells, which increases the heat they produce. An older battery also holds a lower maximum charge, however, so its thermal runaway is less intense and releases fewer flammable gases.[36]

The NIPV report covers only lithium-ion passenger cars in Dutch indoor car parks, and "lithium-ion" itself covers many kinds of lithium batteries that respond differently to fire.[10] It warns that test results vary greatly with the amount of fuel, the battery capacity and the plastics in the car, so single studies cannot simply be generalised.[8] Battery packs can also be combined into systems of 10 to 400 kWh, for example in trucks and electric ships. Stationary installations such as a battery energy storage system lie outside the report's scope.[2][10] Open questions include the exact process of thermal runaway, the conditions under which packs re-ignite and the best detection and suppression systems.[37]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 22.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 21.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 23.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 24–25.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 29.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 30.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 11.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 20.
  9. ↑ Gray (2002), pp. 2-211–2-212.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 18.
  11. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 32–33.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 27.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-2.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 26.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 Van Rossum (2027), §4.5.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Van Rossum (2027), §8.6.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 Purser (2002), p. 2-91.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 47.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 39.
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 20.3 20.4 20.5 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 46.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 37.
  22. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-13.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 23.2 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 43.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 44.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 45.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 42.
  27. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 12.
  28. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 17.
  29. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 10.
  30. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 34.
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 36.
  32. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 49–50.
  33. ↑ 33.0 33.1 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 40.
  34. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), pp. 41–42.
  35. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 54.
  36. ↑ 36.0 36.1 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 28.
  37. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 55.

References

  • Gray, B. (2002). Spontaneous combustion and self-heating. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-211–2-228). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
  • Purser, D. A. (2002). Toxicity assessment of combustion products. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering (3rd ed., pp. 2-83–2-171). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
  • Van der Graaf, J., Hessels, T., & Rosmuller, N. (2023). Fire safety of indoor car parks accommodating electrically powered vehicles. Nederlands Instituut Publieke Veiligheid. (Original work published 2021)
  • Van Rossum, E. (2027). Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering. Fire Safety Academy.