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'''Fire service access''' is the provision that allows fire service vehicles, personnel and equipment to reach and work at a building during a fire. It includes vehicle hard-standing, unobstructed routes to the building and connections, and safe internal access to the fire area. Access must also support water delivery, information gathering and protection of the firefighters' way out.<ref name="CVM2-53">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 53.</ref><ref name="IFEG-1-2-10">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.2-9–1.2-10.</ref>
'''Fire service access''' is the set of provisions that let the fire service reach a building, deliver water to every part of it, and carry out [[firefighting]] and rescue inside with reasonable safety.<ref name="CVM2-53">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 53.</ref><ref name="IFEG-1.2-10">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-10.</ref> In New Zealand, the Building Code clauses restated in Verification Method C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) cover a hard-standing for fire vehicles, water throughout the building, routes to the fire floor and information for firefighters.<ref name="CVM2-53" /> The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005 edition) treat access to the site and to the building as part of fire services intervention, one of the six sub-systems of a fire safety design.<ref name="IFEG-1.2-10" /> Access matters because the time needed to bring water to a fire affects how far the fire develops and whether it can still be suppressed.<ref name="NIPV-66">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 66.</ref> A fire service that arrives after the fire has grown beyond flashover may have no effect on it at all.<ref name="IFEG-1.9-7">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-7.</ref> Requirements differ between countries; in the Netherlands, for example, the Building Works and Living Environment Decree (Bbl) counts the preservation of fire service attack routes among its sub-goals.<ref name="VR-1.2">Van Rossum (2027), §1.2.</ref>


Access is more than a road leading to an address. Firefighters need to reach entry points, water inlets and the fire floor with their equipment. They also need information about hazards and available systems, and structural conditions that do not expose them to premature collapse.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 54–55.</ref>
== What fire service access includes ==


The required provisions depend on jurisdiction, building size and the fire scenario. New Zealand's C/VM2 provides a specific verification scenario for safe firefighting operations. Its dimensions and time assumptions belong to that method and should not be presented as universal rules.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54" />
New Zealand's Building Code clause C5 deals with access and safety for firefighting operations. Its functional requirements, as printed in the 2013 commentary, ask for a low probability that firefighters are delayed or impeded, and a low probability that they are injured or made ill.<ref name="Comm-32">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 32.</ref> Verification Method C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) restates the performance clauses. Fire service vehicles need a hard-standing from which an unobstructed path leads to the building within 20 m of the firefighter entrance and of any sprinkler or hydrant inlets. Firefighters, with their protective equipment and standard training, must be able to reach the floor of fire origin, search the area around it and protect their way out.<ref name="CVM2-53" /> Clear information about the fire and the building is also required, and the structure that carries the access routes must stay stable during and after the fire.<ref name="CVM2-53" />
[[File:fse-fire-service-access-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Arrival leads through hard-standing, connections and internal routes to firefighting and egress.|Fire service access connects vehicles, equipment, personnel and safe withdrawal. Based on Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), pp. 53–55.]]


== Objectives and system boundary ==
In Australia, the handbook to the Fire Safety Verification Method (print version 1.1, 2020) lists facilities for firefighting among the broad fire safety objectives of the National Construction Code.<ref name="ABCBH-27">Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 27.</ref> It calls for a firefighter strategy, a plan by which the fire brigade is notified of the fire and its location and gains access to the site. The brigade also receives the correct fire location and communication facilities on arrival, documents on the fire safety strategy, and a set-up area with facilities for firefighting and for search and rescue. The plan has to be developed with the fire authority, using the Fire Brigade Intervention Model where appropriate.<ref name="ABCBH-29">Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 29.</ref>


The main objective is to facilitate firefighting and rescue. C/VM2 links that objective to vehicle access, water delivery, firefighter reach, information, system failure and structural stability. These requirements address the complete operation rather than only arrival at the site.<ref name="CVM2-53" />
The International Fire Engineering Guidelines cover public fire services as well as private ones, such as the fire brigade of an industrial complex.<ref name="IFEG-1.9-1">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-1.</ref> For this sub-system they list measures such as the type of fire service, full-time or volunteer, its capability and resources, access to the site and the building, and water supplies.<ref name="IFEG-1.2-10" /> In the Netherlands, the Bbl keeps the attack routes of the fire service intact as one of its sub-goals.<ref name="VR-1.2" /> Under the Bbl, a non-enclosed space through which an escape route runs must also remove enough heat and smoke, and admit enough fresh air, to stay usable for escape, rescue and firefighting work.<ref name="VR-7.7">Van Rossum (2027), §7.7.</ref>
[[File:fse-fire-service-access-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Arrival leads through hard-standing, connections and internal routes to firefighting and egress.|Fire service access connects vehicles, equipment, personnel and safe withdrawal. Based on Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 53–55.]]


[[Firefighting]] involves controlling and extinguishing fires, rescuing people and protecting exposed property. Access determines whether personnel and equipment can perform those tasks at the required location. A road can therefore be present without providing effective operational access.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="NUREG-F25">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), pp. F-25–F-26.</ref>
== How access affects the time to intervention ==


Access begins with the route taken by the appliance and continues through the building. The route includes hard-standing, connection points, doors, stairs and other paths to the fire area. It also includes the firefighters' means of egress, which must remain protected during their work.<ref name="CVM2-53" />
The International Fire Engineering Guidelines describe intervention as a sequence of steps, each of which takes time. The fire service has to be notified, dispatched and driven to the site, and a station with full-time paid firefighters is likely to respond faster than one run by volunteers.<ref name="IFEG-1.9-2">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-2.</ref> On arrival, crews locate the fire from installed equipment, from occupants and from the sight of smoke and flames. They then move vehicles, hoses and other equipment into position, a step that fire conditions in or near the building may affect. Search and rescue and the attack follow, and the attack can be offensive, putting water on the fire, or defensive, protecting adjoining property with hose streams, or both.<ref name="IFEG-1.9-4">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-4.</ref>


The boundary changes as conditions develop. Fire, smoke, structural damage or system failure can make an initially accessible route unsafe. Assessment must therefore consider the expected incident conditions and not just normal building use.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54" />
Access shapes several of these steps. The location of a building and the access to it affect the travel time, while its size, layout and signage affect investigation, search, rescue and firefighting. The location of hydrants, fire indicator panels and other fire service facilities affects how efficiently the fire is suppressed.<ref name="IFEG-1.9-5">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-5.</ref> The guidelines also warn that this sub-system changes over the life of a building, as fire station locations, budgets, equipment and traffic density change.<ref name="IFEG-1.9-2" />


Rescue operations add the need to search the fire area and remove occupants. C/VM2 explicitly includes reaching the fire floor, searching its general area and protecting the way out. Those tasks require more than a connection at street level.<ref name="CVM2-53" />
The arrival time largely decides what an attack can achieve, and the guidelines distinguish three outcomes: no effect, control and extinguishment. No effect fits a fire service that arrives after the fire has grown beyond flashover. Control, in which the fire burns at a steady size until the fuel is used up, is a conservative assumption often made when access to the fire is limited.<ref name="IFEG-1.9-7" /> A risk model in the SFPE Handbook likewise judges the effectiveness of firefighting from the time of flashover and the arrival time of the fire brigade.<ref name="Meacham-5-164">Meacham (2002), p. 5-164.</ref> Studies of fires in health care buildings, quoted by Bryan, single out the period between detection and the arrival of the fire department. They see it as the most important life-saving period for the area in direct contact with the room of origin.<ref name="Bryan-3-315">Lerup et al. (1978), as cited in Bryan (2002), p. 3-315.</ref>
 
In Australia the main tool for estimating these times is the Fire Brigade Intervention Model (FBIM) of the Australasian Fire Authorities Council (AFAC).<ref name="IFEG-2.9-2">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 2.9-2.</ref> It is built from up to 16 flow charts for steps such as notification, dispatch, travel, putting on safety equipment and setting up the water supply.<ref name="IFEG-2.9-3">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 2.9-3–2.9-5.</ref> It can estimate, for example, how long firefighters need to reach a given location in a building.<ref name="IFEG-2.9-4">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 2.9-4.</ref> Its numerical values were prepared solely from Australian data, but because no other country has compiled such a guide, they may have at least a semi-quantitative use elsewhere.<ref name="IFEG-3.9-2">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 3.9-2.</ref>


== Vehicle access and hard-standing ==
== Vehicle access and hard-standing ==


Vehicle access should bring appliances to a usable working position. C/VM2 calls for access to a hard-standing from which an unobstructed path leads to the building. The route must serve firefighter entry and any installed sprinkler or hydrant inlets.<ref name="CVM2-53" />
New Zealand's C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) repeats clause C5.3: a hard-standing from which an unobstructed path leads to the building within 20 m of the firefighter entrance and any sprinkler or hydrant inlets. Under clause C5.4, firecells larger than 5,000 m² without sprinklers need such access on more than one side.<ref name="CVM2-53" /> The 2013 commentary adds that these access points should be spread around the building, not placed on both sides of one corner served by the same hard-standing. It also notes that the clauses use conventional methods that the Fire Service can easily anticipate, so unusual solutions should be agreed with it in advance.<ref name="Comm-33">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 33.</ref> According to the commentary, clauses C5.3 to C5.8 do not apply to detached dwellings, the inside of household units in multi-unit dwellings, backcountry huts, outbuildings or ancillary buildings.<ref name="Comm-32" />
 
C/VM2 refers to a path within 20 m of those points in its cited clause. This is a requirement of New Zealand's second-edition 2025 method, not a universal maximum for every country or building. The applicable local provisions must be checked separately.<ref name="CVM2-53" />
 
Hard-standing provides the physical area where an appliance can be positioned for operations. Its usefulness depends on the paths available to the building and connections. An appliance that reaches the site but cannot deploy hoses or equipment effectively has not achieved the intended access.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54" />
 
C/VM2 requires access to more than one side of larger unsprinklered firecells in its cited provision. That requirement addresses a particular size and protection condition. It should not be generalised to smaller or differently protected buildings.<ref name="CVM2-53" />
 
Site changes can impair access over time. Parking, construction work, new partitions or altered entrances can obstruct routes and connections. Review should therefore include current site conditions as well as the original access drawing.<ref name="IFEG-0-3-8">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 0.3-8.</ref><ref name="CVM2-53" />
 
== Hydrants and system connections ==
 
A [[Fire hydrant]] supplies water to fire department pumpers, while sprinkler and standpipe inlets allow firefighters to supplement installed systems. These connections must be accessible and identifiable. Their locations and supply routes should be known to responding personnel.<ref name="NUREG-F25" /><ref name="CVM2-53" />
[[File:fse-fire-service-access-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Hydrant feeds a pumper, while an inlet feeds a riser and hose outlets inside a building.|Hydrants, inlets and internal risers have distinct functions. Based on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), pp. F-25 and F-61–F-62 and Hopkins, Schoenrock, and Budnick (2005), p. xxxv.]]
 
[[Dry and wet risers]] distribute water to hose outlets within a building. Wet risers are charged with water, while manual standpipes rely on fire service supply. Access must support both the use of existing outlets and the connection of external supplies where required.<ref name="NUREG-F61">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), pp. F-61–F-62.</ref>
 
NIST's WTC account illustrates the relationship between site and system access. Ground-level fire department connections supplemented standpipes and sprinklers, while pre-connected hoses were available in stairwells. These arrangements require knowledge of which valves and zones each connection serves.<ref name="Hopkins-xxxv">Hopkins, Schoenrock, and Budnick (2005), p. xxxv.</ref>
 
Water delivery must reach all relevant parts of the building. C/VM2 provides one method based on an appliance reaching any point within 75 m, approximately three hose lengths. It also permits an internal hydrant designed to the cited New Zealand standard or approved alternative.<ref name="CVM2-54" />
 
Access to connections is not proof of adequate supply. Municipal damage, empty tanks, failed pumps and shared valve errors can prevent water delivery. Assessment must therefore combine physical access with the condition and reliability of the supply network.<ref name="Hopkins-xli">Hopkins, Schoenrock, and Budnick (2005), pp. xli–xlii.</ref><ref name="NUREG-10-2">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. 10-2.</ref>
 
== Internal access and water delivery ==
 
Internal routes must allow personnel to reach the fire floor and the general fire area. C/VM2 addresses this with fire-separated stairs and access provisions in specified building cases. The relevant provisions depend on building height and intermediate-floor arrangements.<ref name="CVM2-54" />
 
Hose routes must be evaluated as actual paths, not straight lines on a plan. Doorways, stairs, partitions and equipment can lengthen and complicate deployment. C/VM2's approximate hose-length method is a design convention and does not prove an unobstructed or safe route.<ref name="CVM2-54" />
 
[[Firefighting lift]] provisions can form part of the access strategy in some buildings, but the supplied sources do not provide a dedicated lift specification. No universal lift design or operating rule is therefore stated here. The applicable system and jurisdiction must be established before crediting one.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="Razza-4">Razza and Grill (2005), p. 4.</ref>
 
Emergency-power arrangements can affect access-related systems. NIST's New York code comparison lists lifts, alarms, emergency lighting and fire pumps among emergency loads in the relevant high-rise provisions. Those dependencies should be assessed for the actual building and incident.<ref name="Razza-4" />
 
Internal access must include a protected way out. Firefighters entering a smoke- or fire-affected area need an egress route whose condition is considered in the design. The access assessment must therefore include both inward deployment and withdrawal.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54" />
 
== Structural safety and incident conditions ==
 
Structural systems supporting firefighter access must remain stable for the required period. C/VM2 identifies those necessary for access to floors during firefighting and rescue and calls for stability during and after fire. The requirement is tied to the building and scenario.<ref name="CVM2-53" />
 
C/VM2 distinguishes provisions for buildings above and below specified escape heights. It uses fire-separated stairs and structural criteria to support access and protect people at ground level and within the building. These details belong to that New Zealand method and should not be used as universal durations.<ref name="CVM2-54" />
 
Intermediate floors require explicit treatment. C/VM2 gives separate provisions for their supporting structure and, in particular cases, shorter periods or exceptions. The analysis must not treat every mezzanine or platform as equivalent to an ordinary floor.<ref name="CVM2-54" /><ref name="CVM2-55">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 55.</ref>
 
Damage to suppression infrastructure can also change access. NIST examined riser and standpipe damage when evaluating system performance after initial impact. A fire-separated access route may remain available while the water system within it is impaired.<ref name="Hopkins-xli" /><ref name="Hopkins-xlii">Hopkins, Schoenrock, and Budnick (2005), pp. xli–xlii.</ref>
 
Conditions at the time of water application matter. C/VM2 specifies radiation and smoke-layer criteria for particular unsprinklered firecells when firefighters first apply water. It does not promise those conditions for every later operation, which depends on the actual development.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54" />


== High-rise buildings and information ==
In Australia, the Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022 requires external fire brigade access and external hydrants for every building assessed under its fire brigade intervention scenario.<ref name="FSVM-16">Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 16.</ref> That scenario applies only to buildings within 50 km road travel of a fire station.<ref name="FSVM-15">Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 15.</ref> For buildings further away, the 2020 handbook states that fire brigade intervention should not be taken into account, and that the design brief should address its absence and any need for compensating measures.<ref name="ABCBH-86">Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 86.</ref>


A [[High-rise building]] increases the effort needed to reach the fire floor and deploy water. NIST's examples use multiple vertical supply zones, pumps and standpipes to address that height. The complete arrangement must be evaluated for both access and hydraulic capability.<ref name="Hopkins-xxxiv">Hopkins, Schoenrock, and Budnick (2005), pp. xxxiv–xxxv.</ref>
Indoor car parks show how access can limit firefighting in practice. A study by the Netherlands Institute for Public Safety (NIPV) names heat, loss of visibility, long hose distances and the difficulty of finding one's bearings. Together they make reconnaissance and firefighting in such car parks difficult and risky.<ref name="NIPV-11">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 11.</ref> It recommends placing charging spaces for electric vehicles near the vehicle entrances and exits and at street level where possible. This aids accessibility and raises the chance that a fire can be fought from outside or the vehicle removed more quickly.<ref name="NIPV-42">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 42.</ref> Higher decks are not always easy to reach, and a fire service entrance that is also an escape route creates conflicting safety interests.<ref name="NIPV-39">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 39.</ref>


Vertical zones can limit which parts of a system are affected by a failure, but shared supplies can still create common vulnerabilities. Riser isolation, pump operation and available alternative routes become important. Responding personnel need clear information about those arrangements.<ref name="Hopkins-xxxv" /><ref name="Hopkins-xli" />
== Water for firefighting: hydrants, inlets and risers ==


C/VM2 requires clear information about the general fire location, available fire-safety systems and hazardous substances or processes. This supports decisions about where to enter and which provisions can be used. Information should reflect the building in its current state.<ref name="CVM2-53" />
A [[Fire hydrant]] is a device that supplies water to fire department pumpers for fighting fires in buildings.<ref name="NUREG-F26">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-26.</ref> A fire department connection is an inlet through which the fire service pumps water from its vehicles into the fire protection system of a building.<ref name="NUREG-F25">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-25.</ref> Inside, a standpipe or riser system of pipes, valves and hose connections carries the water to the floors. Trained occupants can use its hoses until the fire department arrives, and firefighters can connect their own hoses to outlets near the fire.<ref name="NUREG-F61">Iqbal and Salley (2004), pp. F-61–F-62.</ref> [[Dry and wet risers]] differ in how they are filled. A wet system is always full of water and connected to an automatic supply, whereas a manual dry system has only fire department connections and relies on the fire service for water.<ref name="Hopkins-21">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. 21.</ref><ref name="NUREG-F61" />
[[File:fse-fire-service-access-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Fire location, system status and hazardous materials inform access and suppression choices.|Responders need current information as well as physical access. Based on Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 53.]]
[[File:fse-fire-service-access-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Hydrant feeds a pumper, while an inlet feeds a riser and hose outlets inside a building.|Hydrants, inlets and internal risers have distinct functions. Based on Iqbal and Salley (2004), pp. F-25–F-26 and F-61–F-62, and Hopkins et al. (2005), pp. xxxiv–xxxv.]]


Smoke can reduce visibility and complicate search and route selection. Smoke-control provisions can support firefighting, but they rely on detection, power, fans, dampers and make-up air. Their failure must be considered as part of access and safety assessment.<ref name="ABCB-131">Australian Building Codes Board (2020), p. 131.</ref>
New Zealand and Australian rules also limit how far water may have to be carried. Under C/VM2, a pumping appliance parked close to the building must be able to reach any point inside within 75 m, about three hose lengths. Otherwise an internal hydrant is needed, designed to NZS 4510 or approved by the National Commander of Fire and Emergency New Zealand.<ref name="CVM2-54">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), pp. 54–55.</ref> C/VM2 treats access to an intermediate floor as achieved when a hydrant in a safe path lies within 40 m of its most remote point, about two hose lengths.<ref name="CVM2-55">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 55.</ref> Australia's 2022 standard requires internal hydrants in a sprinklered building when reaching all points needs more than 100 m or the building has more than three levels. Without sprinklers the distance threshold is 70 m.<ref name="FSVM-16" />


Emergency lighting and alarms can support orientation and notification. Their availability depends on emergency power and the complete distribution chain. Normal operation does not demonstrate function after power loss or fire damage.<ref name="Razza-4" /><ref name="Ferreira-52">Ferreira and Strege (2005), pp. 52–53.</ref>
Risers shorten the hose that firefighters must lay. The NIPV study notes that a dry riser can shorten the attack time because less hose has to be rolled out. Its most effective location is where the fire service enters the car park.<ref name="NIPV-66" /> A NIST report on the World Trade Center states that avoiding long hose lays from the fire engine to an upper floor of a tall building improves the initial attack. It adds that standpipes are not an alternative to automatic sprinklers.<ref name="Hopkins-21" />


== Reliability and maintenance ==
An accessible inlet does not guarantee water. Sprinkler and pump systems can fail because of a closed supply valve, an empty tank, a fire pump that does not start or loses its power, or an inadequate supply.<ref name="NUREG-10-2">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 10-2.</ref> At World Trade Center 7, the sprinklers on floors 1 to 20 depended on one automatic fire pump and on the city main near the building.<ref name="Hopkins-xli">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. xli.</ref> After the collapse of WTC 1, the fire department could not provide firefighting or supplementary water to WTC 7.<ref name="Hopkins-xliv">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. xliv.</ref> C/VM2 asks that access and firefighter safety be designed with regard to the likelihood and consequences of failure of any fire safety system.<ref name="CVM2-53" />


Access provisions must remain available during normal building use. Routes and connections should not be obstructed by storage, parked vehicles or alterations. Doors, stairs and signs must remain in the condition assumed by the operational plan.<ref name="IFEG-1-8-14">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.</ref><ref name="CVM2-53" />
== Reaching the fire floor: stairs, lifts and high-rise buildings ==


System information should be kept current. Changes to occupancy, hazards, valves, zones and routes can make old instructions misleading. A review after alteration should update both the physical access assessment and the information available to responders.<ref name="IFEG-0-3-8" /><ref name="CVM2-53" />
C/VM2 links the protection of the internal route to the height of the building. Where the escape height exceeds 10 m, floors that cannot be reached directly from street level must be served by fire-separated stairways that resist fire spread until burnout. In lower buildings these stairways must last 60 minutes from ignition or until burnout.<ref name="CVM2-55" /> Pressurised stairwells keep smoke out by holding the stair at a higher air pressure than the fire floor. Their main aim is a smoke-free escape route, and a secondary aim is a smoke-free staging area for firefighters.<ref name="Klote-4-286">Klote (2002), p. 4-286.</ref>


Water-system maintenance must address common dependencies. Closed valves, inadequate supplies, pump failures and damaged mains can affect several connections. Restoration should verify the intended flow and pressure at the relevant point rather than only the condition of one component.<ref name="NUREG-10-2" /><ref name="ABCB-130">Australian Building Codes Board (2020), pp. 129–130.</ref>
In a [[high-rise building]] the climb itself becomes a barrier. NIST's study of the emergency response at the World Trade Center notes that a New York firefighter in full protective clothing and breathing apparatus carries about 23 kg. Extra equipment can add another 23 kg or more.<ref name="Lawson-xliii">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. xliii.</ref> Fully equipped firefighters climbed WTC 1 at about 2.0 minutes per floor, and their fitness for rescue and firefighting fell with every floor climbed.<ref name="Lawson-xliii" /><ref name="Lawson-xliv">Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. xliv.</ref> Another NIST report gives a typical pace of about one minute per floor, which is hard to sustain beyond about the first 20 storeys. Even at that pace, reaching the 60th floor would take about an hour.<ref name="Lew-191">Lew et al. (2005), p. 191.</ref>


Emergency-power and lift arrangements require coordinated checks. A generator may be present while a distribution path or connected system is unavailable. Local backup arrangements also need functional testing in their intended emergency state.<ref name="Razza-4" /><ref name="Ferreira-52" />
A [[firefighting lift]] removes most of that climb. When a fire is detected, lifts are normally taken out of service and recalled to the ground floor. Fire services carry keys that let them run the lifts for rescue and to carry crews and equipment towards the fire.<ref name="Klote-4-289">Klote (2002), p. 4-289.</ref> In 2005, NIST found that US building codes, with a few exceptions, did not permit fire-protected lifts for routine access by first responders. The United Kingdom and other countries using British standards had required such firefighter lifts in protected shafts for a number of years.<ref name="Lew-191" /> NIST's final report recommended fire-protected and structurally hardened lifts in tall buildings, reserved for emergency responders during emergencies.<ref name="NIST-218">National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 218.</ref>


Fire service familiarisation and drills can reveal practical access problems. They can test whether connections are identifiable, hose routes are feasible and information is understandable. Any scenario and assumptions should be documented rather than treating a drill as proof of every incident condition.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54" />
Each World Trade Center tower had four vertical water supply zones, with standpipes in the stairwells feeding hose stations on every floor. Manual fire pumps on the 7th, 41st and 75th floors boosted the pressure, and fourteen ground-level fire department connections served the complex.<ref name="Hopkins-xxxiv">Hopkins et al. (2005), pp. xxxiv–xxxv.</ref> New York City's 2003 building code requires emergency power in new high-rise office buildings for fire pumps, at least three lifts, alarms, emergency lighting and smoke control.<ref name="Razza-4">Razza and Grill (2005c), p. 4.</ref>


== Evaluation and common misunderstandings ==
== Conditions firefighters can work in ==


Access is not equivalent to a public entrance or a road near the building. It includes working space, connections, internal deployment and the safety of personnel. A formally accessible address can still be unusable for firefighting.<ref name="CVM2-53" />
Access is only useful if conditions at the end of the route allow work. New Zealand's clause C3.8 covers unsprinklered firecells within 15 m of a relevant boundary with a fire load above 20 TJ or a floor area above 5,000 m². When firefighters first apply water to such a fire, the radiation at 1.5 m above the floor may not exceed 4.5 kW/m², and the smoke layer must be at least 2 m above the floor.<ref name="CVM2-53" /> C/VM2 lets designers take the time until water is first applied as 1,200 s (20 minutes), or 1,000 s with an automatic alarm connected directly to a remote receiving centre. Another time may be used if a fire brigade intervention model supports it.<ref name="CVM2-54" /> The 2013 commentary on the first edition explains that the same values are rounded 95th percentiles from New Zealand industrial fires, about 1,240 s with a monitored alarm and 1,060 s with a direct connection.<ref name="Comm-149">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 149.</ref>


More provisions do not automatically mean independent resilience. Several inlets, lifts or routes can depend on the same power, structure or water supply. The assessment must identify common failures and what remains available afterwards.<ref name="Hopkins-xli" /><ref name="ABCB-131" />
Australia's 2020 handbook summarises firefighter limits from the FBIM manual, measured 1.5 m above the floor and to be confirmed with the fire brigade. In routine conditions firefighters may work for up to 25 minutes at up to 100 °C and 1 kW/m². In hazardous conditions the limits are 10 minutes, 120 °C and 3 kW/m².<ref name="ABCBH-112">Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 112.</ref> Extreme conditions, such as a snatch rescue or a retreat from flashover, allow 1 minute at 160 °C and 4 to 4.5 kW/m². Above 235 °C or 10 kW/m² conditions are life-threatening, and no search and rescue is possible in a room after flashover.<ref name="ABCBH-112" /><ref name="ABCBH-113">Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 113.</ref> Poor visibility is not a limit in itself, but it slows search and firefighting, and the air supply of the breathing apparatus may run out first.<ref name="ABCBH-111">Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 111.</ref>


A calculated intervention time is not a promise of operational success. C/VM2 allows specified times or another time supported by a fire brigade intervention model. Actual detection, travel, deployment and incident conditions must be considered when using those times.<ref name="CVM2-54" />
In the Netherlands, the standard NEN 6093 on smoke and heat exhaust systems sets limits for a fire service attack in a space with such a system. Visibility must be at least 100 m to light-emitting objects up to 1.8 m above the floor, and radiation from the smoke layer at most 3.5 kW/m² at that height. The smoke layer may reach 200 °C where goods are stored in it and 500 °C otherwise, and it must stay below the critical temperature of the structure.<ref name="VR-9.3">Van Rossum (2027), §9.3 (Results from zone models).</ref> Van Rossum adds that firefighters need to know whether the fire is still local or already a compartment fire, and whether they can attack with the fire in sight.<ref name="VR-9.3" />


A successful access design should make the complete operation traceable. It identifies how appliances arrive, where connections are made, how personnel reach the fire and how water is delivered. It also states the information, structure and system conditions on which those steps depend.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="Hopkins-xli" />
The structure must also hold long enough. C/VM2 requires the structure that gives firefighters access to floors to remain stable during and after the fire, with its fire resistance derived from a full burnout design fire.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54" /> Australia's 2022 standard pairs its fire brigade intervention scenario with a scenario that guards against unexpected catastrophic structural failure.<ref name="FSVM-16" />


The final review should retain source and jurisdictional context. C/VM2's dimensions and structural provisions belong to New Zealand's 2025 second edition, while NIST's arrangements belong to the WTC investigation. Neither should be converted into universal access requirements.<ref name="CVM2-54" /><ref name="Hopkins-xxxv" />
== Information, communication and upkeep ==


An access review should follow the actual sequence of deployment. It starts with detection and appliance arrival, then establishes supply, enters the building and moves towards the fire area. Each stage has its own timing and possible obstructions, so a single travel-time figure cannot represent the complete operation.<ref name="CVM2-54" /><ref name="Hopkins-xli" />
Firefighters arriving at a building need to know where the fire is and what they can use. New Zealand's clause C5.7 asks for clear information on the general location of the fire, the available fire safety systems and any hazardous substances or processes.<ref name="CVM2-53" /> Australia's 2022 standard asks for command and control provisions in unsprinklered buildings and in sprinklered buildings of more than three levels.<ref name="FSVM-16" /> New York City's 2003 code requires two-way voice communication and a fire command station in new office buildings over 75 ft (about 23 m).<ref name="Razza-4" />
[[File:fse-fire-service-access-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Fire location, system status and hazardous materials inform access and suppression choices.|Responders need current information as well as physical access. Based on Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 53.]]


Site and building information should support that sequence at the point of use. Connection labels, valve zones, hazardous-substance information and available systems must be understandable to responders. Information that exists only in an inaccessible office or an outdated report does not provide the intended operational support.<ref name="CVM2-53" />
Access provisions have to stay usable for the whole life of the building. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines list the items whose design and maintenance support intervention: perimeter roads, the access paths and lifts used by the fire service, and equipment such as hydrants. The list also includes protective measures such as structural stability, sprinklers, smoke management and emergency communication.<ref name="IFEG-1.9-8">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-8.</ref> The New Zealand version of the guidelines adds that alterations or a change of use can compromise the original fire engineering design and may call for a new evaluation.<ref name="IFEG-0.3-8-NZ">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), Part 0 (New Zealand), p. 0.3-8.</ref>


Alternative routes and connections should be checked for common vulnerabilities. Two entry paths can be affected by the same fire, and two supplies can depend on the same pump or main. The review should identify which route remains usable after each relevant failure rather than counting provisions without examining dependencies.<ref name="ABCB-131" /><ref name="Hopkins-xli" />
== Limits and common misconceptions ==


Commissioning and exercises should include practical deployment with the relevant equipment. This can reveal blocked access, unclear connections, unsuitable hose routes and insufficient information. Defects should be corrected and retested before the access provisions are treated as available.<ref name="ABCB-130" /><ref name="CVM2-53" />
Fire service access does not make the fire service part of the evacuation design. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines state that evacuation analysis should not rely on fire service intervention, although the needs of fire services must not be discounted.<ref name="IFEG-1.9-1" /> In the Netherlands, an equivalent solution under the 2012 Building Decree cannot take credit for a fire service attack.<ref name="NIPV-15">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 15.</ref> The fire service has an obligation of best efforts rather than of result, so its deployment cannot replace fire prevention measures.<ref name="NIPV-41">Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 41.</ref>


Changes after completion require renewed assessment. A new road layout, partition, occupancy or protection system can alter vehicle access, internal deployment and the assumptions behind intervention time. The original access evidence should be retained, but its continued applicability must be demonstrated for the altered building.<ref name="IFEG-0-3-8" /><ref name="CVM2-54" />
A positive engineering result does not oblige firefighters to attack from inside the building. Van Rossum stresses that this decision always rests with the fire service on site.<ref name="VR-9.3" /> Likewise, the C/VM2 limits describe a single moment, and later operations are decided by the officer in charge according to the conditions found.<ref name="Comm-149" />


The resulting evidence should distinguish demonstrated access from assumed access. Demonstrated access identifies usable routes, connections and information under stated conditions. Assumed access relies on the building drawing or normal daily arrangement without checking fire conditions, impairments or later alterations. Keeping that distinction helps reviewers decide which scenarios still need evaluation.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="IFEG-0-3-8" />
Fire service intervention is also hard to quantify. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines note that its effect does not lend itself easily to calculation, so many aspects rest on qualitative judgement.<ref name="IFEG-2.9-2" /> The FBIM values come from Australian data only.<ref name="IFEG-3.9-2" />


== See also ==
== See also ==


* [[Dry and wet risers]]
* [[Hose reel]]
* [[Fire hydrant]]
* Positive pressure ventilation
* [[Firefighting lift]]
* [[Fire extinguisher]]


== Notes ==
== Notes ==
Line 128: Line 86:
== References ==
== References ==


* Australian Building Codes Board. (2020). ''Fire safety verification method data sheets'' (Version 1.1). Author.
* Australian Building Codes Board. (2020b). ''Handbook: Fire Safety Verification Method'' (Print version 1.1).
* Australian Building Codes Board, National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, & Department of Building and Housing New Zealand. (2005). ''International fire engineering guidelines'' (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
* Australian Building Codes Board. (2022). ''Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022''.
* Ferreira, M. J., & Strege, S. M. (2005). ''Smoke management systems'' (NIST NCSTAR 1-4D). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
* Bryan, J. L. (2002). Behavioral response to fire and smoke. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed., pp. 3-315–3-341). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
* Hopkins, M., Schoenrock, J., & Budnick, E. (2005). ''Fire suppression systems'' (NIST NCSTAR 1-4B). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
* Hopkins, M., Schoenrock, J., & Budnick, E. (2005). ''Fire suppression systems'' (NIST NCSTAR 1-4B). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
* Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025). ''C protection from fire: Verification method C/VM2'' (2nd ed.). New Zealand Government.
* Iqbal, N., & Salley, M. H. (2004). ''Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program'' (NUREG-1805). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
* Razza, J. C., & Grill, R. A. (2005). ''Comparison of the 1968 and current (2003) New York City building code provisions'' (NIST NCSTAR 1-1F). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
* Klote, J. H. (2002). Smoke control. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed., pp. 4-274–4-291). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2005). ''Fire dynamics tools: Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. nuclear regulatory commission fire protection inspection program'' (NUREG-1805). Author.
* Lawson, J. R., & Vettori, R. L. (2005). ''The emergency response operations'' (NIST NCSTAR 1-8). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
* Lew, H. S., Bukowski, R. W., & Carino, N. J. (2005). ''Design, construction, and maintenance of structural and life safety systems'' (NIST NCSTAR 1-1). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
* Meacham, B. J. (2002). Building fire risk analysis. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., & J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed., pp. 5-153–5-175). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
* Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2013). ''Commentary for Building Code clauses C1–C6 and Verification Method C/VM2''.
* Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025b). ''Verification Method C/VM2: Framework for fire safety design'' (2nd ed.).
* National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2005). ''Final report on the collapse of the World Trade Center towers'' (NIST NCSTAR 1).
* National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, & Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). ''International fire engineering guidelines'' (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
* Razza, J. C., & Grill, R. A. (2005c). ''Comparison of the 1968 and current (2003) New York City Building Code provisions'' (NIST NCSTAR 1-1F). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
* Van der Graaf, J., Hessels, T., & Rosmuller, N. (2023). ''Fire safety of indoor car parks accommodating electrically powered vehicles''. Nederlands Instituut Publieke Veiligheid. (Original work published 2021)
* Van Rossum, E. (2027). ''Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering''. Fire Safety Academy.


[[Category:Firefighting & Fire Service]]
[[Category:Firefighting & Fire Service]]

Latest revision as of 22:32, 2 November 2026

Fire service access is the set of provisions that let the fire service reach a building, deliver water to every part of it, and carry out firefighting and rescue inside with reasonable safety.[1][2] In New Zealand, the Building Code clauses restated in Verification Method C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) cover a hard-standing for fire vehicles, water throughout the building, routes to the fire floor and information for firefighters.[1] The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (2005 edition) treat access to the site and to the building as part of fire services intervention, one of the six sub-systems of a fire safety design.[2] Access matters because the time needed to bring water to a fire affects how far the fire develops and whether it can still be suppressed.[3] A fire service that arrives after the fire has grown beyond flashover may have no effect on it at all.[4] Requirements differ between countries; in the Netherlands, for example, the Building Works and Living Environment Decree (Bbl) counts the preservation of fire service attack routes among its sub-goals.[5]

What fire service access includes

New Zealand's Building Code clause C5 deals with access and safety for firefighting operations. Its functional requirements, as printed in the 2013 commentary, ask for a low probability that firefighters are delayed or impeded, and a low probability that they are injured or made ill.[6] Verification Method C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) restates the performance clauses. Fire service vehicles need a hard-standing from which an unobstructed path leads to the building within 20 m of the firefighter entrance and of any sprinkler or hydrant inlets. Firefighters, with their protective equipment and standard training, must be able to reach the floor of fire origin, search the area around it and protect their way out.[1] Clear information about the fire and the building is also required, and the structure that carries the access routes must stay stable during and after the fire.[1]

Arrival leads through hard-standing, connections and internal routes to firefighting and egress.
Fire service access connects vehicles, equipment, personnel and safe withdrawal. Based on Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), pp. 53–55.

In Australia, the handbook to the Fire Safety Verification Method (print version 1.1, 2020) lists facilities for firefighting among the broad fire safety objectives of the National Construction Code.[7] It calls for a firefighter strategy, a plan by which the fire brigade is notified of the fire and its location and gains access to the site. The brigade also receives the correct fire location and communication facilities on arrival, documents on the fire safety strategy, and a set-up area with facilities for firefighting and for search and rescue. The plan has to be developed with the fire authority, using the Fire Brigade Intervention Model where appropriate.[8]

The International Fire Engineering Guidelines cover public fire services as well as private ones, such as the fire brigade of an industrial complex.[9] For this sub-system they list measures such as the type of fire service, full-time or volunteer, its capability and resources, access to the site and the building, and water supplies.[2] In the Netherlands, the Bbl keeps the attack routes of the fire service intact as one of its sub-goals.[5] Under the Bbl, a non-enclosed space through which an escape route runs must also remove enough heat and smoke, and admit enough fresh air, to stay usable for escape, rescue and firefighting work.[10]

How access affects the time to intervention

The International Fire Engineering Guidelines describe intervention as a sequence of steps, each of which takes time. The fire service has to be notified, dispatched and driven to the site, and a station with full-time paid firefighters is likely to respond faster than one run by volunteers.[11] On arrival, crews locate the fire from installed equipment, from occupants and from the sight of smoke and flames. They then move vehicles, hoses and other equipment into position, a step that fire conditions in or near the building may affect. Search and rescue and the attack follow, and the attack can be offensive, putting water on the fire, or defensive, protecting adjoining property with hose streams, or both.[12]

Access shapes several of these steps. The location of a building and the access to it affect the travel time, while its size, layout and signage affect investigation, search, rescue and firefighting. The location of hydrants, fire indicator panels and other fire service facilities affects how efficiently the fire is suppressed.[13] The guidelines also warn that this sub-system changes over the life of a building, as fire station locations, budgets, equipment and traffic density change.[11]

The arrival time largely decides what an attack can achieve, and the guidelines distinguish three outcomes: no effect, control and extinguishment. No effect fits a fire service that arrives after the fire has grown beyond flashover. Control, in which the fire burns at a steady size until the fuel is used up, is a conservative assumption often made when access to the fire is limited.[4] A risk model in the SFPE Handbook likewise judges the effectiveness of firefighting from the time of flashover and the arrival time of the fire brigade.[14] Studies of fires in health care buildings, quoted by Bryan, single out the period between detection and the arrival of the fire department. They see it as the most important life-saving period for the area in direct contact with the room of origin.[15]

In Australia the main tool for estimating these times is the Fire Brigade Intervention Model (FBIM) of the Australasian Fire Authorities Council (AFAC).[16] It is built from up to 16 flow charts for steps such as notification, dispatch, travel, putting on safety equipment and setting up the water supply.[17] It can estimate, for example, how long firefighters need to reach a given location in a building.[18] Its numerical values were prepared solely from Australian data, but because no other country has compiled such a guide, they may have at least a semi-quantitative use elsewhere.[19]

Vehicle access and hard-standing

New Zealand's C/VM2 (second edition, 2025) repeats clause C5.3: a hard-standing from which an unobstructed path leads to the building within 20 m of the firefighter entrance and any sprinkler or hydrant inlets. Under clause C5.4, firecells larger than 5,000 m² without sprinklers need such access on more than one side.[1] The 2013 commentary adds that these access points should be spread around the building, not placed on both sides of one corner served by the same hard-standing. It also notes that the clauses use conventional methods that the Fire Service can easily anticipate, so unusual solutions should be agreed with it in advance.[20] According to the commentary, clauses C5.3 to C5.8 do not apply to detached dwellings, the inside of household units in multi-unit dwellings, backcountry huts, outbuildings or ancillary buildings.[6]

In Australia, the Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022 requires external fire brigade access and external hydrants for every building assessed under its fire brigade intervention scenario.[21] That scenario applies only to buildings within 50 km road travel of a fire station.[22] For buildings further away, the 2020 handbook states that fire brigade intervention should not be taken into account, and that the design brief should address its absence and any need for compensating measures.[23]

Indoor car parks show how access can limit firefighting in practice. A study by the Netherlands Institute for Public Safety (NIPV) names heat, loss of visibility, long hose distances and the difficulty of finding one's bearings. Together they make reconnaissance and firefighting in such car parks difficult and risky.[24] It recommends placing charging spaces for electric vehicles near the vehicle entrances and exits and at street level where possible. This aids accessibility and raises the chance that a fire can be fought from outside or the vehicle removed more quickly.[25] Higher decks are not always easy to reach, and a fire service entrance that is also an escape route creates conflicting safety interests.[26]

Water for firefighting: hydrants, inlets and risers

A Fire hydrant is a device that supplies water to fire department pumpers for fighting fires in buildings.[27] A fire department connection is an inlet through which the fire service pumps water from its vehicles into the fire protection system of a building.[28] Inside, a standpipe or riser system of pipes, valves and hose connections carries the water to the floors. Trained occupants can use its hoses until the fire department arrives, and firefighters can connect their own hoses to outlets near the fire.[29] Dry and wet risers differ in how they are filled. A wet system is always full of water and connected to an automatic supply, whereas a manual dry system has only fire department connections and relies on the fire service for water.[30][29]

Hydrant feeds a pumper, while an inlet feeds a riser and hose outlets inside a building.
Hydrants, inlets and internal risers have distinct functions. Based on Iqbal and Salley (2004), pp. F-25–F-26 and F-61–F-62, and Hopkins et al. (2005), pp. xxxiv–xxxv.

New Zealand and Australian rules also limit how far water may have to be carried. Under C/VM2, a pumping appliance parked close to the building must be able to reach any point inside within 75 m, about three hose lengths. Otherwise an internal hydrant is needed, designed to NZS 4510 or approved by the National Commander of Fire and Emergency New Zealand.[31] C/VM2 treats access to an intermediate floor as achieved when a hydrant in a safe path lies within 40 m of its most remote point, about two hose lengths.[32] Australia's 2022 standard requires internal hydrants in a sprinklered building when reaching all points needs more than 100 m or the building has more than three levels. Without sprinklers the distance threshold is 70 m.[21]

Risers shorten the hose that firefighters must lay. The NIPV study notes that a dry riser can shorten the attack time because less hose has to be rolled out. Its most effective location is where the fire service enters the car park.[3] A NIST report on the World Trade Center states that avoiding long hose lays from the fire engine to an upper floor of a tall building improves the initial attack. It adds that standpipes are not an alternative to automatic sprinklers.[30]

An accessible inlet does not guarantee water. Sprinkler and pump systems can fail because of a closed supply valve, an empty tank, a fire pump that does not start or loses its power, or an inadequate supply.[33] At World Trade Center 7, the sprinklers on floors 1 to 20 depended on one automatic fire pump and on the city main near the building.[34] After the collapse of WTC 1, the fire department could not provide firefighting or supplementary water to WTC 7.[35] C/VM2 asks that access and firefighter safety be designed with regard to the likelihood and consequences of failure of any fire safety system.[1]

Reaching the fire floor: stairs, lifts and high-rise buildings

C/VM2 links the protection of the internal route to the height of the building. Where the escape height exceeds 10 m, floors that cannot be reached directly from street level must be served by fire-separated stairways that resist fire spread until burnout. In lower buildings these stairways must last 60 minutes from ignition or until burnout.[32] Pressurised stairwells keep smoke out by holding the stair at a higher air pressure than the fire floor. Their main aim is a smoke-free escape route, and a secondary aim is a smoke-free staging area for firefighters.[36]

In a high-rise building the climb itself becomes a barrier. NIST's study of the emergency response at the World Trade Center notes that a New York firefighter in full protective clothing and breathing apparatus carries about 23 kg. Extra equipment can add another 23 kg or more.[37] Fully equipped firefighters climbed WTC 1 at about 2.0 minutes per floor, and their fitness for rescue and firefighting fell with every floor climbed.[37][38] Another NIST report gives a typical pace of about one minute per floor, which is hard to sustain beyond about the first 20 storeys. Even at that pace, reaching the 60th floor would take about an hour.[39]

A firefighting lift removes most of that climb. When a fire is detected, lifts are normally taken out of service and recalled to the ground floor. Fire services carry keys that let them run the lifts for rescue and to carry crews and equipment towards the fire.[40] In 2005, NIST found that US building codes, with a few exceptions, did not permit fire-protected lifts for routine access by first responders. The United Kingdom and other countries using British standards had required such firefighter lifts in protected shafts for a number of years.[39] NIST's final report recommended fire-protected and structurally hardened lifts in tall buildings, reserved for emergency responders during emergencies.[41]

Each World Trade Center tower had four vertical water supply zones, with standpipes in the stairwells feeding hose stations on every floor. Manual fire pumps on the 7th, 41st and 75th floors boosted the pressure, and fourteen ground-level fire department connections served the complex.[42] New York City's 2003 building code requires emergency power in new high-rise office buildings for fire pumps, at least three lifts, alarms, emergency lighting and smoke control.[43]

Conditions firefighters can work in

Access is only useful if conditions at the end of the route allow work. New Zealand's clause C3.8 covers unsprinklered firecells within 15 m of a relevant boundary with a fire load above 20 TJ or a floor area above 5,000 m². When firefighters first apply water to such a fire, the radiation at 1.5 m above the floor may not exceed 4.5 kW/m², and the smoke layer must be at least 2 m above the floor.[1] C/VM2 lets designers take the time until water is first applied as 1,200 s (20 minutes), or 1,000 s with an automatic alarm connected directly to a remote receiving centre. Another time may be used if a fire brigade intervention model supports it.[31] The 2013 commentary on the first edition explains that the same values are rounded 95th percentiles from New Zealand industrial fires, about 1,240 s with a monitored alarm and 1,060 s with a direct connection.[44]

Australia's 2020 handbook summarises firefighter limits from the FBIM manual, measured 1.5 m above the floor and to be confirmed with the fire brigade. In routine conditions firefighters may work for up to 25 minutes at up to 100 °C and 1 kW/m². In hazardous conditions the limits are 10 minutes, 120 °C and 3 kW/m².[45] Extreme conditions, such as a snatch rescue or a retreat from flashover, allow 1 minute at 160 °C and 4 to 4.5 kW/m². Above 235 °C or 10 kW/m² conditions are life-threatening, and no search and rescue is possible in a room after flashover.[45][46] Poor visibility is not a limit in itself, but it slows search and firefighting, and the air supply of the breathing apparatus may run out first.[47]

In the Netherlands, the standard NEN 6093 on smoke and heat exhaust systems sets limits for a fire service attack in a space with such a system. Visibility must be at least 100 m to light-emitting objects up to 1.8 m above the floor, and radiation from the smoke layer at most 3.5 kW/m² at that height. The smoke layer may reach 200 °C where goods are stored in it and 500 °C otherwise, and it must stay below the critical temperature of the structure.[48] Van Rossum adds that firefighters need to know whether the fire is still local or already a compartment fire, and whether they can attack with the fire in sight.[48]

The structure must also hold long enough. C/VM2 requires the structure that gives firefighters access to floors to remain stable during and after the fire, with its fire resistance derived from a full burnout design fire.[1][31] Australia's 2022 standard pairs its fire brigade intervention scenario with a scenario that guards against unexpected catastrophic structural failure.[21]

Information, communication and upkeep

Firefighters arriving at a building need to know where the fire is and what they can use. New Zealand's clause C5.7 asks for clear information on the general location of the fire, the available fire safety systems and any hazardous substances or processes.[1] Australia's 2022 standard asks for command and control provisions in unsprinklered buildings and in sprinklered buildings of more than three levels.[21] New York City's 2003 code requires two-way voice communication and a fire command station in new office buildings over 75 ft (about 23 m).[43]

Fire location, system status and hazardous materials inform access and suppression choices.
Responders need current information as well as physical access. Based on Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 53.

Access provisions have to stay usable for the whole life of the building. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines list the items whose design and maintenance support intervention: perimeter roads, the access paths and lifts used by the fire service, and equipment such as hydrants. The list also includes protective measures such as structural stability, sprinklers, smoke management and emergency communication.[49] The New Zealand version of the guidelines adds that alterations or a change of use can compromise the original fire engineering design and may call for a new evaluation.[50]

Limits and common misconceptions

Fire service access does not make the fire service part of the evacuation design. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines state that evacuation analysis should not rely on fire service intervention, although the needs of fire services must not be discounted.[9] In the Netherlands, an equivalent solution under the 2012 Building Decree cannot take credit for a fire service attack.[51] The fire service has an obligation of best efforts rather than of result, so its deployment cannot replace fire prevention measures.[52]

A positive engineering result does not oblige firefighters to attack from inside the building. Van Rossum stresses that this decision always rests with the fire service on site.[48] Likewise, the C/VM2 limits describe a single moment, and later operations are decided by the officer in charge according to the conditions found.[44]

Fire service intervention is also hard to quantify. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines note that its effect does not lend itself easily to calculation, so many aspects rest on qualitative judgement.[16] The FBIM values come from Australian data only.[19]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 53.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-10.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 66.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-7.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Van Rossum (2027), §1.2.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 32.
  7. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 27.
  8. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 29.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-1.
  10. ↑ Van Rossum (2027), §7.7.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-2.
  12. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-4.
  13. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-5.
  14. ↑ Meacham (2002), p. 5-164.
  15. ↑ Lerup et al. (1978), as cited in Bryan (2002), p. 3-315.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 2.9-2.
  17. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 2.9-3–2.9-5.
  18. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 2.9-4.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 3.9-2.
  20. ↑ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 33.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 16.
  22. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 15.
  23. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 86.
  24. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 11.
  25. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 42.
  26. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 39.
  27. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-26.
  28. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-25.
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 Iqbal and Salley (2004), pp. F-61–F-62.
  30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 Hopkins et al. (2005), p. 21.
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 31.2 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), pp. 54–55.
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 55.
  33. ↑ Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 10-2.
  34. ↑ Hopkins et al. (2005), p. xli.
  35. ↑ Hopkins et al. (2005), p. xliv.
  36. ↑ Klote (2002), p. 4-286.
  37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. xliii.
  38. ↑ Lawson and Vettori (2005), p. xliv.
  39. ↑ 39.0 39.1 Lew et al. (2005), p. 191.
  40. ↑ Klote (2002), p. 4-289.
  41. ↑ National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005), p. 218.
  42. ↑ Hopkins et al. (2005), pp. xxxiv–xxxv.
  43. ↑ 43.0 43.1 Razza and Grill (2005c), p. 4.
  44. ↑ 44.0 44.1 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 149.
  45. ↑ 45.0 45.1 Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 112.
  46. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 113.
  47. ↑ Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 111.
  48. ↑ 48.0 48.1 48.2 Van Rossum (2027), §9.3 (Results from zone models).
  49. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.9-8.
  50. ↑ National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), Part 0 (New Zealand), p. 0.3-8.
  51. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 15.
  52. ↑ Van der Graaf et al. (2021/2023), p. 41.

References

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