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	<id>https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?action=history&amp;feed=atom&amp;title=Telecommunications_facility</id>
	<title>Telecommunications facility - Revision history</title>
	<link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?action=history&amp;feed=atom&amp;title=Telecommunications_facility"/>
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	<updated>2026-11-21T22:12:09Z</updated>
	<subtitle>Revision history for this page on the wiki</subtitle>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Telecommunications_facility&amp;diff=6823&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Mark: Remove source references from image captions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Telecommunications_facility&amp;diff=6823&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-13T07:37:02Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Remove source references from image captions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw=&quot;interface&quot;&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-content&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 08:37, 13 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l5&quot;&gt;Line 5:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 5:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Inside a central office, cables enter through the cable vault, where they split into smaller, more fire-resistant cables.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-171.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They rise to the main distributing frame (MDF), where they break into individual wire pairs, and continue to the switching and transmission systems.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Standby generators, battery systems and power distribution equipment support the operation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Major metropolitan central offices are built of reinforced concrete, and traditional equipment areas have ceilings of 4.3 to 4.9 m (14 to 16 ft) for heavy copper cable and tall equipment frames.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Newer equipment areas may have lower ceilings and raised floors, and contain less cable because of fibre optics and data compression.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Inside a central office, cables enter through the cable vault, where they split into smaller, more fire-resistant cables.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-171.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They rise to the main distributing frame (MDF), where they break into individual wire pairs, and continue to the switching and transmission systems.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Standby generators, battery systems and power distribution equipment support the operation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Major metropolitan central offices are built of reinforced concrete, and traditional equipment areas have ceilings of 4.3 to 4.9 m (14 to 16 ft) for heavy copper cable and tall equipment frames.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Newer equipment areas may have lower ceilings and raised floors, and contain less cable because of fibre optics and data compression.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Section through a central office with cable vault, distributing frame, switching, transmission, power plant and standby engine areas|Simplified section through a central office. Cables enter through the cable vault, rise to the main distributing frame and continue to switching and transmission equipment&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;. Based on Transue (2008), pp. 9-170–9-171 and 9-175&lt;/del&gt;.]]&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Section through a central office with cable vault, distributing frame, switching, transmission, power plant and standby engine areas|Simplified section through a central office. Cables enter through the cable vault, rise to the main distributing frame and continue to switching and transmission equipment.]]&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The 2008 handbook describes telecommunications equipment arranged in parallel rows, or &amp;quot;lineups&amp;quot;, 48 to 66 cm wide and 1.83 to 2.14 m high in its then-current generation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; It describes metal cabinets needing forced ventilation and equipment sensitive to rapid changes of a few degrees or a few percent of humidity.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Under NFPA 101, as illustrated in the handbook, equipment areas were treated as special-purpose industrial areas and office areas as offices.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The 2008 handbook describes telecommunications equipment arranged in parallel rows, or &amp;quot;lineups&amp;quot;, 48 to 66 cm wide and 1.83 to 2.14 m high in its then-current generation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; It describes metal cabinets needing forced ventilation and equipment sensitive to rapid changes of a few degrees or a few percent of humidity.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Under NFPA 101, as illustrated in the handbook, equipment areas were treated as special-purpose industrial areas and office areas as offices.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l18&quot;&gt;Line 18:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 18:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;== Fire record ==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;== Fire record ==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Structure fires in US telephone exchanges reported to local fire departments fell from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998, and averaged about 40 to 50 a year in the late 1990s.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Only a small fraction start in the specialised equipment, and most remain very small and develop slowly.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The handbook attributes the low average loss per fire to the use of fire-resistive equipment, wire and cable that meet industry standards.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; These standards were developed after large-loss fires in the 1960s and 1970s.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-167&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Structure fires in US telephone exchanges reported to local fire departments fell from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998, and averaged about 40 to 50 a year in the late 1990s.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Only a small fraction start in the specialised equipment, and most remain very small and develop slowly.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The handbook attributes the low average loss per fire to the use of fire-resistive equipment, wire and cable that meet industry standards.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; These standards were developed after large-loss fires in the 1960s and 1970s.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-167&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Column chart of reported structure fires in US telephone exchanges per year from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998|Structure fires in US telephone exchanges or central offices reported to municipal fire departments, 1980–1998&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;. Based on Transue (2008), p. 9-169&lt;/del&gt;.]]&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Column chart of reported structure fires in US telephone exchanges per year from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998|Structure fires in US telephone exchanges or central offices reported to municipal fire departments, 1980–1998.]]&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;A study for the US Federal Communications Commission covered the years 1988 to 1992 and more than 93% of US telephone lines.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; It found 189 fire events, an average of 38 a year, of which only 8 a year affected service.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The 2008 handbook stated that the US telecommunications industry had recorded no fire deaths up to that time.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Its list of notable North American central office fires covers 1975 to 2006.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;A study for the US Federal Communications Commission covered the years 1988 to 1992 and more than 93% of US telephone lines.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; It found 189 fire events, an average of 38 a year, of which only 8 a year affected service.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The 2008 handbook stated that the US telecommunications industry had recorded no fire deaths up to that time.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Its list of notable North American central office fires covers 1975 to 2006.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l82&quot;&gt;Line 82:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 82:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;== The NFPA 76 protection chain ==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;== The NFPA 76 protection chain ==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The traditional practice of the US industry is a chain of actions and elements, in which any missing link raises the fire risk.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The chain consists of excellent fire prevention, noncombustible construction, compartmentation, fire resistance-rated equipment and cable, very early warning fire detection, rigorous alarm processing and rapid response.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Suppression, power interruption and smoke ventilation follow when needed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The prescriptive solutions in NFPA 76 assume that this chain stays unbroken for the life of the facility.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Where most equipment and cable is not fire resistance-rated, the chain is broken, and an alternative strategy, generally with automatic suppression, is needed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The traditional practice of the US industry is a chain of actions and elements, in which any missing link raises the fire risk.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The chain consists of excellent fire prevention, noncombustible construction, compartmentation, fire resistance-rated equipment and cable, very early warning fire detection, rigorous alarm processing and rapid response.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Suppression, power interruption and smoke ventilation follow when needed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The prescriptive solutions in NFPA 76 assume that this chain stays unbroken for the life of the facility.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Where most equipment and cable is not fire resistance-rated, the chain is broken, and an alternative strategy, generally with automatic suppression, is needed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Chain of eleven linked elements from fire prevention to smoke ventilation, with one broken link replaced by automatic suppression|The chain of fire protection elements behind the prescriptive NFPA 76 solution. Where equipment and cable are not fire resistance-rated the chain is broken and automatic suppression is generally added&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;. Based on Transue (2008), p. 9-172&lt;/del&gt;.]]&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Chain of eleven linked elements from fire prevention to smoke ventilation, with one broken link replaced by automatic suppression|The chain of fire protection elements behind the prescriptive NFPA 76 solution. Where equipment and cable are not fire resistance-rated the chain is broken and automatic suppression is generally added.]]&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The risk factors are the community served, public safety services, life safety, service continuity, the services provided, redundancy and property.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-173.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A switching centre serving a major medical complex, for instance, may be more critical than one serving a small town.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The prescriptive method approximates criticality by size: large facilities have more than 232 m² (2,500 ft²) of enclosed network equipment area and receive more protection.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The performance-based method, which follows the SFPE engineering guide, instead uses the community served, network redundancy, recovery time and business interruption costs.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The risk factors are the community served, public safety services, life safety, service continuity, the services provided, redundancy and property.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-173.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A switching centre serving a major medical complex, for instance, may be more critical than one serving a small town.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The prescriptive method approximates criticality by size: large facilities have more than 232 m² (2,500 ft²) of enclosed network equipment area and receive more protection.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The performance-based method, which follows the SFPE engineering guide, instead uses the community served, network redundancy, recovery time and business interruption costs.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l92&quot;&gt;Line 92:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 92:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The handbook&amp;#039;s NFPA 76 depowering decision tree sends a technician to investigate a VEWFD alert, while an alarm also calls the fire department.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; If a clean agent is released, staff monitor for reignition, and power is cut only if necessary.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The handbook says NFPA 76 recommended a means to disconnect power for every facility, but not an automatic or readily available one; it was meant for knowledgeable provider or fire service personnel.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The handbook&amp;#039;s NFPA 76 depowering decision tree sends a technician to investigate a VEWFD alert, while an alarm also calls the fire department.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; If a clean agent is released, staff monitor for reignition, and power is cut only if necessary.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The handbook says NFPA 76 recommended a means to disconnect power for every facility, but not an automatic or readily available one; it was meant for knowledgeable provider or fire service personnel.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v5.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Flowchart from detection signal through alert or alarm, dispatch of technician and fire department, suppression and depowering only if necessary|Simplified depowering decision tree for telecommunications equipment areas: a very early warning alert sends a technician, an alarm also calls the fire department, and power is removed only if necessary&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;. Based on Transue (2008), p. 9-173&lt;/del&gt;.]]&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v5.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Flowchart from detection signal through alert or alarm, dispatch of technician and fire department, suppression and depowering only if necessary|Simplified depowering decision tree for telecommunications equipment areas: a very early warning alert sends a technician, an alarm also calls the fire department, and power is removed only if necessary.]]&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission&amp;#039;s 2010 interim position uses a simplified event tree for VEWFD in electrical cabinets of 250 V or less in nuclear plants.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The method takes no credit for preventing a fire before flaming and assumes the cabinet lacks fast-acting components that could bypass the detectable incipient phase.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; After an initiating event, outside targets are damaged if a stationed responder fails to suppress the fire promptly, or if detection or response fails and normal suppression then also fails:&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission&amp;#039;s 2010 interim position uses a simplified event tree for VEWFD in electrical cabinets of 250 V or less in nuclear plants.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The method takes no credit for preventing a fire before flaming and assumes the cabinet lacks fast-acting components that could bypass the detectable incipient phase.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; After an initiating event, outside targets are damaged if a stationed responder fails to suppress the fire promptly, or if detection or response fails and normal suppression then also fails:&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l113&quot;&gt;Line 113:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 113:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The report gives &amp;#039;&amp;#039;β&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.01, &amp;#039;&amp;#039;γ&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.005 for a system that identifies the individual cabinet (0.01 otherwise) and &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; = 0.001.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; These values assume at least one hour of warning before open flaming.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; As a conservative worked example, set &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; = 1, so no ordinary suppression is credited. Then &amp;#039;&amp;#039;P&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.99 × 0.995 × 0.001 + (0.01 + 0.99 × 0.005) × 1 ≈ 0.016. This is a model result for the stated nuclear-cabinet conditions, not a measured telecommunications protection rate.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The report gives &amp;#039;&amp;#039;β&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.01, &amp;#039;&amp;#039;γ&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.005 for a system that identifies the individual cabinet (0.01 otherwise) and &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; = 0.001.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; These values assume at least one hour of warning before open flaming.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; As a conservative worked example, set &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; = 1, so no ordinary suppression is credited. Then &amp;#039;&amp;#039;P&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.99 × 0.995 × 0.001 + (0.01 + 0.99 × 0.005) × 1 ≈ 0.016. This is a model result for the stated nuclear-cabinet conditions, not a measured telecommunications protection rate.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Conditional nuclear cabinet event tree with detector, staff and suppression branches and about 0.016 outside-target damage probability under stated assumptions|Illustrative nuclear-cabinet event tree for very early warning detection; the ε1 branch follows the report&#039;s prose rather than its conflicting diagram endpoint&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;. Based on Hyslop et al. (2010), pp. 13-5–13-8&lt;/del&gt;.]]&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Conditional nuclear cabinet event tree with detector, staff and suppression branches and about 0.016 outside-target damage probability under stated assumptions|Illustrative nuclear-cabinet event tree for very early warning detection; the ε1 branch follows the report&#039;s prose rather than its conflicting diagram endpoint.]]&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The report contains an internal conflict. Its prose defines &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; as failure to suppress soon enough to prevent outside-target damage.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Its event tree on p. 13-8 instead labels that branch as having no such damage.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The equation above follows the prose and counts the branch as damage; following the diagram&amp;#039;s endpoint instead gives about 0.015. The largest term in either interpretation is detector unreliability &amp;#039;&amp;#039;β&amp;#039;&amp;#039;, which the report ties to testing, maintenance and setpoint control.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The report contains an internal conflict. Its prose defines &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; as failure to suppress soon enough to prevent outside-target damage.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Its event tree on p. 13-8 instead labels that branch as having no such damage.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The equation above follows the prose and counts the branch as damage; following the diagram&amp;#039;s endpoint instead gives about 0.015. The largest term in either interpretation is detector unreliability &amp;#039;&amp;#039;β&amp;#039;&amp;#039;, which the report ties to testing, maintenance and setpoint control.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;

&lt;!-- diff cache key firesb_pjbsiy42-wiki_:diff:1.41:old-5845:rev-6823:php=table --&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Mark</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Telecommunications_facility&amp;diff=5845&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Peter: Add SVG figures fse-telecommunications-facility-v1.svg, fse-telecommunications-facility-v2.svg, fse-telecommunications-facility-v3.svg, fse-telecommunications-facility-v4.svg, fse-telecommunications-facility-v5.svg (list-3 visual plan)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Telecommunications_facility&amp;diff=5845&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-12T12:14:25Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Add SVG figures fse-telecommunications-facility-v1.svg, fse-telecommunications-facility-v2.svg, fse-telecommunications-facility-v3.svg, fse-telecommunications-facility-v4.svg, fse-telecommunications-facility-v5.svg (list-3 visual plan)&lt;/p&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 13:14, 12 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l5&quot;&gt;Line 5:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 5:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Inside a central office, cables enter through the cable vault, where they split into smaller, more fire-resistant cables.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-171.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They rise to the main distributing frame (MDF), where they break into individual wire pairs, and continue to the switching and transmission systems.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Standby generators, battery systems and power distribution equipment support the operation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Major metropolitan central offices are built of reinforced concrete, and traditional equipment areas have ceilings of 4.3 to 4.9 m (14 to 16 ft) for heavy copper cable and tall equipment frames.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Newer equipment areas may have lower ceilings and raised floors, and contain less cable because of fibre optics and data compression.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Inside a central office, cables enter through the cable vault, where they split into smaller, more fire-resistant cables.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-171.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They rise to the main distributing frame (MDF), where they break into individual wire pairs, and continue to the switching and transmission systems.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Standby generators, battery systems and power distribution equipment support the operation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Major metropolitan central offices are built of reinforced concrete, and traditional equipment areas have ceilings of 4.3 to 4.9 m (14 to 16 ft) for heavy copper cable and tall equipment frames.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Newer equipment areas may have lower ceilings and raised floors, and contain less cable because of fibre optics and data compression.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Section through a central office with cable vault, distributing frame, switching, transmission, power plant and standby engine areas|Simplified section through a central office. Cables enter through the cable vault, rise to the main distributing frame and continue to switching and transmission equipment. Based on Transue (2008), pp. 9-170–9-171 and 9-175.]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The 2008 handbook describes telecommunications equipment arranged in parallel rows, or &amp;quot;lineups&amp;quot;, 48 to 66 cm wide and 1.83 to 2.14 m high in its then-current generation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; It describes metal cabinets needing forced ventilation and equipment sensitive to rapid changes of a few degrees or a few percent of humidity.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Under NFPA 101, as illustrated in the handbook, equipment areas were treated as special-purpose industrial areas and office areas as offices.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The 2008 handbook describes telecommunications equipment arranged in parallel rows, or &amp;quot;lineups&amp;quot;, 48 to 66 cm wide and 1.83 to 2.14 m high in its then-current generation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; It describes metal cabinets needing forced ventilation and equipment sensitive to rapid changes of a few degrees or a few percent of humidity.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Under NFPA 101, as illustrated in the handbook, equipment areas were treated as special-purpose industrial areas and office areas as offices.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l17&quot;&gt;Line 17:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 18:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;== Fire record ==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;== Fire record ==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Structure fires in US telephone exchanges reported to local fire departments fell from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998, and averaged about 40 to 50 a year in the late 1990s.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Only a small fraction start in the specialised equipment, and most remain very small and develop slowly.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The handbook attributes the low average loss per fire to the use of fire-resistive equipment, wire and cable that meet industry standards.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; These standards were developed after large-loss fires in the 1960s and 1970s.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-167&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Structure fires in US telephone exchanges reported to local fire departments fell from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998, and averaged about 40 to 50 a year in the late 1990s.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Only a small fraction start in the specialised equipment, and most remain very small and develop slowly.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The handbook attributes the low average loss per fire to the use of fire-resistive equipment, wire and cable that meet industry standards.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; These standards were developed after large-loss fires in the 1960s and 1970s.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-167&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Column chart of reported structure fires in US telephone exchanges per year from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998|Structure fires in US telephone exchanges or central offices reported to municipal fire departments, 1980–1998. Based on Transue (2008), p. 9-169.]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;A study for the US Federal Communications Commission covered the years 1988 to 1992 and more than 93% of US telephone lines.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; It found 189 fire events, an average of 38 a year, of which only 8 a year affected service.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The 2008 handbook stated that the US telecommunications industry had recorded no fire deaths up to that time.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Its list of notable North American central office fires covers 1975 to 2006.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;A study for the US Federal Communications Commission covered the years 1988 to 1992 and more than 93% of US telephone lines.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; It found 189 fire events, an average of 38 a year, of which only 8 a year affected service.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The 2008 handbook stated that the US telecommunications industry had recorded no fire deaths up to that time.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Its list of notable North American central office fires covers 1975 to 2006.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l80&quot;&gt;Line 80:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 82:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;== The NFPA 76 protection chain ==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;== The NFPA 76 protection chain ==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The traditional practice of the US industry is a chain of actions and elements, in which any missing link raises the fire risk.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The chain consists of excellent fire prevention, noncombustible construction, compartmentation, fire resistance-rated equipment and cable, very early warning fire detection, rigorous alarm processing and rapid response.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Suppression, power interruption and smoke ventilation follow when needed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The prescriptive solutions in NFPA 76 assume that this chain stays unbroken for the life of the facility.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Where most equipment and cable is not fire resistance-rated, the chain is broken, and an alternative strategy, generally with automatic suppression, is needed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The traditional practice of the US industry is a chain of actions and elements, in which any missing link raises the fire risk.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The chain consists of excellent fire prevention, noncombustible construction, compartmentation, fire resistance-rated equipment and cable, very early warning fire detection, rigorous alarm processing and rapid response.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Suppression, power interruption and smoke ventilation follow when needed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The prescriptive solutions in NFPA 76 assume that this chain stays unbroken for the life of the facility.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Where most equipment and cable is not fire resistance-rated, the chain is broken, and an alternative strategy, generally with automatic suppression, is needed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Chain of eleven linked elements from fire prevention to smoke ventilation, with one broken link replaced by automatic suppression|The chain of fire protection elements behind the prescriptive NFPA 76 solution. Where equipment and cable are not fire resistance-rated the chain is broken and automatic suppression is generally added. Based on Transue (2008), p. 9-172.]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The risk factors are the community served, public safety services, life safety, service continuity, the services provided, redundancy and property.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-173.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A switching centre serving a major medical complex, for instance, may be more critical than one serving a small town.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The prescriptive method approximates criticality by size: large facilities have more than 232 m² (2,500 ft²) of enclosed network equipment area and receive more protection.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The performance-based method, which follows the SFPE engineering guide, instead uses the community served, network redundancy, recovery time and business interruption costs.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The risk factors are the community served, public safety services, life safety, service continuity, the services provided, redundancy and property.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-173.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A switching centre serving a major medical complex, for instance, may be more critical than one serving a small town.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The prescriptive method approximates criticality by size: large facilities have more than 232 m² (2,500 ft²) of enclosed network equipment area and receive more protection.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The performance-based method, which follows the SFPE engineering guide, instead uses the community served, network redundancy, recovery time and business interruption costs.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l89&quot;&gt;Line 89:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 92:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The handbook&amp;#039;s NFPA 76 depowering decision tree sends a technician to investigate a VEWFD alert, while an alarm also calls the fire department.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; If a clean agent is released, staff monitor for reignition, and power is cut only if necessary.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The handbook says NFPA 76 recommended a means to disconnect power for every facility, but not an automatic or readily available one; it was meant for knowledgeable provider or fire service personnel.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The handbook&amp;#039;s NFPA 76 depowering decision tree sends a technician to investigate a VEWFD alert, while an alarm also calls the fire department.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; If a clean agent is released, staff monitor for reignition, and power is cut only if necessary.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The handbook says NFPA 76 recommended a means to disconnect power for every facility, but not an automatic or readily available one; it was meant for knowledgeable provider or fire service personnel.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v5.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Flowchart from detection signal through alert or alarm, dispatch of technician and fire department, suppression and depowering only if necessary|Simplified depowering decision tree for telecommunications equipment areas: a very early warning alert sends a technician, an alarm also calls the fire department, and power is removed only if necessary. Based on Transue (2008), p. 9-173.]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission&amp;#039;s 2010 interim position uses a simplified event tree for VEWFD in electrical cabinets of 250 V or less in nuclear plants.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The method takes no credit for preventing a fire before flaming and assumes the cabinet lacks fast-acting components that could bypass the detectable incipient phase.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; After an initiating event, outside targets are damaged if a stationed responder fails to suppress the fire promptly, or if detection or response fails and normal suppression then also fails:&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission&amp;#039;s 2010 interim position uses a simplified event tree for VEWFD in electrical cabinets of 250 V or less in nuclear plants.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The method takes no credit for preventing a fire before flaming and assumes the cabinet lacks fast-acting components that could bypass the detectable incipient phase.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; After an initiating event, outside targets are damaged if a stationed responder fails to suppress the fire promptly, or if detection or response fails and normal suppression then also fails:&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l109&quot;&gt;Line 109:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 113:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The report gives &amp;#039;&amp;#039;β&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.01, &amp;#039;&amp;#039;γ&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.005 for a system that identifies the individual cabinet (0.01 otherwise) and &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; = 0.001.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; These values assume at least one hour of warning before open flaming.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; As a conservative worked example, set &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; = 1, so no ordinary suppression is credited. Then &amp;#039;&amp;#039;P&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.99 × 0.995 × 0.001 + (0.01 + 0.99 × 0.005) × 1 ≈ 0.016. This is a model result for the stated nuclear-cabinet conditions, not a measured telecommunications protection rate.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The report gives &amp;#039;&amp;#039;β&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.01, &amp;#039;&amp;#039;γ&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.005 for a system that identifies the individual cabinet (0.01 otherwise) and &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; = 0.001.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; These values assume at least one hour of warning before open flaming.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; As a conservative worked example, set &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; = 1, so no ordinary suppression is credited. Then &amp;#039;&amp;#039;P&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.99 × 0.995 × 0.001 + (0.01 + 0.99 × 0.005) × 1 ≈ 0.016. This is a model result for the stated nuclear-cabinet conditions, not a measured telecommunications protection rate.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;[[File:fse-telecommunications-facility-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Conditional nuclear cabinet event tree with detector, staff and suppression branches and about 0.016 outside-target damage probability under stated assumptions|Illustrative nuclear-cabinet event tree for very early warning detection; the ε1 branch follows the report&#039;s prose rather than its conflicting diagram endpoint. Based on Hyslop et al. (2010), pp. 13-5–13-8.]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The report contains an internal conflict. Its prose defines &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; as failure to suppress soon enough to prevent outside-target damage.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Its event tree on p. 13-8 instead labels that branch as having no such damage.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The equation above follows the prose and counts the branch as damage; following the diagram&amp;#039;s endpoint instead gives about 0.015. The largest term in either interpretation is detector unreliability &amp;#039;&amp;#039;β&amp;#039;&amp;#039;, which the report ties to testing, maintenance and setpoint control.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The report contains an internal conflict. Its prose defines &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; as failure to suppress soon enough to prevent outside-target damage.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Its event tree on p. 13-8 instead labels that branch as having no such damage.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The equation above follows the prose and counts the branch as damage; following the diagram&amp;#039;s endpoint instead gives about 0.015. The largest term in either interpretation is detector unreliability &amp;#039;&amp;#039;β&amp;#039;&amp;#039;, which the report ties to testing, maintenance and setpoint control.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;

&lt;!-- diff cache key firesb_pjbsiy42-wiki_:diff:1.41:old-4255:rev-5845:php=table --&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Peter</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Telecommunications_facility&amp;diff=4255&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Mark: FSE wiki: Fact-check: date historic NFPA 76 guidance and clarify NRC event-tree assumptions and source conflict (written by Claude Opus 5.5)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Telecommunications_facility&amp;diff=4255&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-08T01:10:43Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;FSE wiki: Fact-check: date historic NFPA 76 guidance and clarify NRC event-tree assumptions and source conflict (written by Claude Opus 5.5)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Telecommunications_facility&amp;amp;diff=4255&amp;amp;oldid=3695&quot;&gt;Show changes&lt;/a&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Mark</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Telecommunications_facility&amp;diff=3695&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Mark: New FSE wiki article: Telecommunications facility (written by Claude Opus 5.5)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Telecommunications_facility&amp;diff=3695&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-07T21:34:21Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;New FSE wiki article: Telecommunications facility (written by Claude Opus 5.5)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;New page&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;A &amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;telecommunications facility&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039; is a building or enclosure that houses the switching, transmission and power equipment of a telecommunications network, such as a telephone exchange, also called a central office (CO). In the United States and Canada, NFPA 76 captures the best practices of network providers and sets a level of network reliability against fire through prescriptive and performance-based methods.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-168.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The main concern is not the size of the fire, which is usually small, but continuity of service: a fire can cut off emergency calls, banking and data traffic for a whole community.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-170.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The 1988 fire in the Hinsdale exchange in Illinois stayed within cable trays covering about 9 m by 12 m, yet most service took 12 days to restore.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-169.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Burning PVC insulation produces dense, corrosive smoke that can damage equipment far from the fire.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-176.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tewarson-3-137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Tewarson (2002), p. 3-137.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Traditional protection therefore relies on a chain of measures: fire-resistant equipment and cable, compartmentation, very early warning detection, rapid response by trained staff and, where needed, automatic suppression.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-172.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Network and facilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States, buildings called central offices or telephone exchanges house the primary control functions of the traditional network. Nearly 25,000 smaller structures support them.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-168&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Each customer telephone connects to one, and only one, central office, so a failure in a central office or in the cables between them isolates all customers on one side of the failure.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-168&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The US network design criteria aim at universal service at a low price, not at uninterrupted service, although established companies provide redundant paths on high-traffic routes.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-168&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Inside a central office, cables enter through the cable vault, where they split into smaller, more fire-resistant cables.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-171.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They rise to the main distributing frame (MDF), where they break into individual wire pairs, and continue to the switching and transmission systems.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Standby generators, battery systems and power distribution equipment support the operation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Major metropolitan central offices are built of reinforced concrete, and traditional equipment areas have ceilings of 4.3 to 4.9 m (14 to 16 ft) for heavy copper cable and tall equipment frames.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Newer equipment areas may have lower ceilings and raised floors, and contain less cable because of fibre optics and data compression.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Telecommunications equipment is arranged in parallel rows, or &amp;quot;lineups&amp;quot;, 48 to 66 cm wide and, in recent generations, 1.83 to 2.14 m high.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Modern equipment sits in metal cabinets that need forced ventilation, and rapid changes of a few degrees or a few percent of humidity can cause serious problems.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Under NFPA 101, as illustrated in the handbook, equipment areas are treated as special-purpose industrial areas and office areas as offices.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Differences from data processing ==&lt;br /&gt;
The equipment looks much like that of a [[Data centre fire protection|data centre]], but several differences change the fire protection approach.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; A telecommunications system does not store customer data; it transfers it in real time. During a disruption all information in transit is lost and cannot be reloaded later, whereas a computer can usually repeat interrupted work from stored data.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The power supply also differs. Data processing equipment receives alternating current, but telecommunications equipment is fed with direct current at 12, 24, 48 or 130 V from a separate power plant.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; An emergency power off switch, common in computer rooms, would abruptly end 9-1-1 and other emergency services, so the industry avoids it.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; NFPA 76 instead uses a decision-based approach to normal electrical disconnection.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Switching usually runs on two processors in parallel, so that one can take over if the other fails.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The control programs can run to millions of lines of code, and restarting an electronic switch after a power loss can take many hours.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The thermal shock of suddenly restoring power to the whole system is another reason for the delay.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The handbook concludes that telecommunications facilities must be analysed on their own merits and characteristics.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-171&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Fire record ==&lt;br /&gt;
Structure fires in US telephone exchanges reported to local fire departments fell from 132 in 1980 to 37 in 1998, and averaged about 40 to 50 a year in the late 1990s.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Only a small fraction start in the specialised equipment, and most remain very small and develop slowly.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The handbook attributes the low average loss per fire to the use of fire-resistive equipment, wire and cable that meet industry standards.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; These standards were developed after large-loss fires in the 1960s and 1970s.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-167&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A study for the US Federal Communications Commission covered the years 1988 to 1992 and more than 93% of US telephone lines.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; It found 189 fire events, an average of 38 a year, of which only 8 a year affected service.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The US telecommunications industry has never recorded a loss of life due to fire.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The notable North American central office fires of 1975 to 2006 show where large outages come from.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|+ Notable central office fires in North America, 1975–2006 (selection), as listed in the handbook (2008)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
! Incident !! Area of fire origin !! Extent of service interruption&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| New York City, 1975 || Cable vault || 170,000 customers, several weeks&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Brooklyn, 1987 || Main distribution frame; smoke spread to fourth floor || 41,000 customers, all restored within 16 days&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Hinsdale, Illinois, 1988 || Cable tray with ac and dc cables || 38,000 customers, most restored in 12 days&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Los Angeles, 1994 || Battery plant under reconfiguration || 9-1-1 service for 12 hours&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Portland, Oregon, 1996 || Cables fire, loss of power to transmission equipment || 88,900 lines, all restored in 15 hours&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Toronto, 1999 || ac switchgear under reconfiguration || 113,000 lines for less than one day&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In none of these fires did an occupant or fire fighter die.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Several started in cables or power equipment, and two began during reconfiguration work. The Hinsdale fire burned for over 3 hours, and the handbook calls it the most significant telecommunications fire in recent history.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-170&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Its consequences are discussed under [[Cable fire]] and [[Business continuity]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Hazard areas and smoke damage ==&lt;br /&gt;
NFPA 76, as summarised in the handbook, divides a facility into eight types of hazard area, each with its own fire scenario.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-174.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-175.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The hazard types are the same whether a prescriptive or a performance-based solution is chosen.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Where one compartment combines several types, it is protected as the most demanding of them.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; NUREG-1805 compares the cable hazard of nuclear power plants with that of telephone exchanges, which also carry many power, control and instrument cables in trays.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IqbalSalley-1-7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 1-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|+ Main hazard areas in telecommunications facilities (after Table 9.13.3 of the handbook)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-175&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
! Area !! Contents !! Fire scenario&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Signal processing equipment area || Electronic equipment in racks or cabinets, cables in racks or under a raised floor || Slowly developing smoky fire with corrosive vapours, typically 5 to 15 kW, not over 150 kW for a fully involved cabinet or rack&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Cable entrance facility || Cables without fire resistance rating from outside, spliced to rated cables || High or low heat release rate; corrosive products can spread&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Power areas || Batteries, rectifiers, switchgear, bus bars, cables || Low heat release rate; some corrosive vapours or acid spill&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Main distribution frame area || Large amounts of low-voltage wire || Low to medium heat release rate smoky fires&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Standby engine area || Engine generator with day tank and batteries || More electrical than fuel fires in the record&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The signal processing values assume that equipment and cable meet the industry fire resistance standards.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-175&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Technical support areas within the equipment areas, administrative areas and building service areas complete the list.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-175&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The IFEG (2005) lists a variable fire load density of 80 MJ/m² for telephone exchanges, from Swiss surveys of 1967–69.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-3.4-2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 3.4-2, 3.4-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Fire load is therefore low, and the hazard lies mainly in smoke. Grouped communications cables can still carry fire through concealed spaces: at One New York Plaza, flame moved through a ceiling plenum that contained communications cables and exposed foam insulation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Davoodi-18-11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Davoodi (2008), p. 18-11.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
PVC wire insulation releases [[Hydrogen chloride|hydrogen chloride]], a corrosive gas that the handbook also names as a useful fire signature for detection in telecommunications facilities.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;CusterMilke-2-76&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Custer and Milke (2008), p. 2-76.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; PVC starts to release it at about 100 °C, and up to about 200 to 220 °C it is the main product.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tewarson-3-138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Tewarson (2002), p. 3-138.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Much telephone equipment and ductwork has zinc-coated surfaces.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tewarson-3-136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Tewarson (2002), p. 3-136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; With hydrogen chloride, zinc forms zinc chloride, which absorbs moisture from air as dry as 10% relative humidity and becomes a conductive liquid that causes serious short circuits.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tewarson-3-136&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tewarson-3-137&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In two major central office losses, zinc chloride governed both the rate of restoration and the ability to salvage equipment.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tewarson-3-137&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Engineers judge smoke damage by the chloride deposited on equipment. In central office fires involving PVC cables, contamination of about 5 to 900 µg/cm² has been observed, whereas clean equipment carries less than 2 µg/cm².&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tewarson-3-137&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; For comparison, an electronic switch collects only about 5 to 9 µg/cm² from its environment over a working life of more than 20 years.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tewarson-3-137&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The levels below link deposition to the chance of restoring the equipment.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tewarson-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|+ Contamination levels for chloride ion deposition on electronic equipment (Tewarson, 2002)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tewarson-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
! Level !! Chloride ion (µg/cm²) !! Damage, cleaning and restoration&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| One || 2 || No damage expected; no cleaning needed&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Two || below 30 || Easily restored by cleaning, little effect on long-term reliability&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Three || 30 to 90 || Restorable by cleaning if the environment is strictly controlled soon after the fire&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Four || above 90 || Cleaning cost approaches replacement cost&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Deposition on wet surfaces was almost four times that on dry surfaces in laboratory tests, so prompt control of humidity after a fire matters.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tewarson-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In room tests with PVC flooring, chloride on most wall surfaces reached 30 to 90 µg/cm², the third level.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tewarson-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; A handbook example of performance criteria for sensitive equipment limits hydrogen chloride at the target to 5 ppm.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mowrer-3-186&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Mowrer and Rosenbaum (2008), p. 3-186.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== The NFPA 76 protection chain ==&lt;br /&gt;
The traditional practice of the US industry is a chain of actions and elements, in which any missing link raises the fire risk.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The chain consists of excellent fire prevention, noncombustible construction, compartmentation, fire resistance-rated equipment and cable, very early warning fire detection, rigorous alarm processing and rapid response.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Suppression, power interruption and smoke ventilation follow when needed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The prescriptive solutions in NFPA 76 assume that this chain stays unbroken for the life of the facility.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Where most equipment and cable is not fire resistance-rated, the chain is broken, and an alternative strategy, generally with automatic suppression, is needed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The risk factors are the community served, public safety services, life safety, service continuity, the services provided, redundancy and property.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-173.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A switching centre serving a major medical complex, for instance, may be more critical than one serving a small town.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The prescriptive method approximates criticality by size: large facilities have more than 232 m² (2,500 ft²) of enclosed network equipment area and receive more protection.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The performance-based method, which follows the SFPE engineering guide, instead uses the community served, network redundancy, recovery time and business interruption costs.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Performance criteria of this kind appear in a handbook example for a data centre with telecommunications equipment.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Harrington-17-134&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Harrington (2008), p. 17-134.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It limits interruption of critical telecommunications operations to 4 hours and of noncritical operations to 48 hours.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Harrington-17-136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Harrington (2008), p. 17-136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Power to critical equipment is maintained during a fire, so the agent must extinguish fires in energised equipment at or below 2 kW.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Harrington-17-136&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Halide acids from the agent are limited to 200 ppm, and reignition must be prevented for at least 10 minutes.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Harrington-17-136&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Detection, response and suppression ==&lt;br /&gt;
Very early warning fire detection (VEWFD), for example with [[Aspirating smoke detection|aspirating smoke detection]], is central to the chain.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-172&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-1.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Laser spot detectors, up to 100 times as sensitive as ordinary units, are also intended for telecommunications hubs.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Dungan-14-22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Dungan (2008a), p. 14-22.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A US nuclear regulatory report cites the sensitivity criteria of NFPA 76 (2009 edition).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They require an alert threshold of at least 0.2% per foot of obscuration and an alarm threshold of 1% per foot at each sampling port.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; These equal about 0.65% and 3.2% per metre. The same report notes that NFPA 76 essentially requires such systems in main distribution frame and signal processing areas.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The response follows a depowering decision tree. A VEWFD alert sends a technician to investigate, while an alarm also calls the fire department.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; If a clean agent is released, staff monitor for reignition, and power is cut only if necessary.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-173&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; NFPA 76 recommends a means to disconnect power for every facility, but not an automatic or readily available one; it is meant for knowledgeable provider or fire service personnel.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The value of this approach can be estimated. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, noting the telecommunications experience, uses a simplified event tree for VEWFD in low-voltage electrical cabinets of nuclear plants (interim position, 2010).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-8.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; A fire damages targets outside the cabinet if the staff stationed after an alert fail to suppress it, or if detection or response fails and normal suppression then also fails:&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;math display=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;P_{damage} = (1-\beta)(1-\gamma)\,\varepsilon_1 + \left[\beta + (1-\beta)\,\gamma\right]\varepsilon_2&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
! Symbol !! Description !! Unit&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;P_{damage}&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Probability of fire damage outside the cabinet, given a fire || –&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;\beta&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Probability that the detection system does not issue an alert (unavailability and unreliability) || –&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;\gamma&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Probability that staff fail to respond to the alert and find the component in time || –&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;\varepsilon_1&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Probability that staff stationed at the cabinet fail to suppress an outbreak of flame (&amp;quot;enhanced&amp;quot; nonsuppression) || –&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;\varepsilon_2&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Probability of &amp;quot;normal&amp;quot; nonsuppression by other means || –&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The report gives &amp;#039;&amp;#039;β&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.01, &amp;#039;&amp;#039;γ&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.005 for a system that identifies the individual cabinet (0.01 otherwise) and &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; = 0.001.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-6.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; These values assume at least one hour of warning before open flaming.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; As a worked example, take the conservative case &amp;#039;&amp;#039;ε&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;sub&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sub&amp;gt; = 1, in which no other suppression is credited. Then &amp;#039;&amp;#039;P&amp;#039;&amp;#039; = 0.99 × 0.995 × 0.001 + (0.01 + 0.99 × 0.005) × 1 ≈ 0.016, so about 98% of cabinet fires are kept from damaging targets outside the cabinet. The largest term is the detector unreliability &amp;#039;&amp;#039;β&amp;#039;&amp;#039;, which is why the report ties the credit to testing, maintenance and setpoint control of the detectors.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Automatic suppression follows the chain logic. Gaseous agents are widely used for telecommunications equipment, and a [[Gaseous extinguishing system|gaseous extinguishing system]] can reach fuel inside closed cabinets.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Harrington-17-124&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Harrington (2008), p. 17-124.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Harrington-17-125&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Harrington (2008), p. 17-125.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Harrington-17-135&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Harrington (2008), p. 17-135.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Clean agent systems even protect telecommunications rooms at the top of air traffic control towers.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Harrington-17-127&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Harrington (2008), p. 17-127.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If power stays on, the fire is a Class C fire that is harder to extinguish and can rekindle.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Harrington-17-125&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Water-based agents and powders have their own limits. FM Global has supported water mist for central offices, but acceptance by North American users has been slow.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mawhinney-16-139&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Mawhinney (2008), p. 16-139.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Water mist does not conduct electricity through the spray, and it can be used in switchboard compartments for 10 minutes or more before leakage currents become dangerous.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mawhinney-16-139&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Dry chemical should not be used where relays and delicate contacts are present, such as in telephone exchanges, because its insulating residue can make equipment inoperative.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Lake-17-20&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lake (2008), p. 17-20.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private exchanges and newer facilities ==&lt;br /&gt;
A private branch exchange (PBX) serves a single building or complex and resembles central office equipment.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; It differs in three ways: it need not meet the rigorous fire resistance standards for central office equipment, replacements are easier to obtain, and it is easier to switch off.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The handbook recommends protecting a PBX like an important computer room, in a room with a fire barrier of at least 1 hour, limited access and strict housekeeping.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The room needs smoke detection that alarms at a constantly attended location and power shutdown procedures for responding fire fighters.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Code exceptions that let central offices omit sprinklers in equipment areas do not apply to PBX rooms or telephone closets.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-174&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Internet servers and routers increasingly share buildings with network equipment.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; They may not have the fire resistance ratings or redundancy of traditional equipment, and they may stand in buildings of less traditional design.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Two arrangements meet NFPA 76: the servers and their cables meet the same fire resistance ratings, or unrated equipment stands in separate fire-resistive compartments with automatic suppression.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Fire service concerns and limits ==&lt;br /&gt;
Fires in telecommunications equipment can produce very large quantities of dense, corrosive smoke, in which visibility may become nearly impossible even with hand lamps.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Even 10 to 12 portable smoke fans may be inadequate, so the handbook advises fire departments to ask owners for manual smoke exhaust systems.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Such systems have proven highly effective in at least one actual telecommunications fire.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Fire fighters must know the owner&amp;#039;s power disconnect procedures, and Illinois, where the Hinsdale fire occurred, requires a power shutdown plan for every telecommunications facility.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Large batteries and electrical power are further hazards, and tours of the facilities help crews prepare.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-176&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The guidance rests on US and Canadian experience and best practice.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Transue (2008), p. 9-177.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Facilities without rated equipment and cable, strong prevention practices or fast response to detection signals need more than the prescriptive measures of NFPA 76, and a performance-based analysis is then required.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-177&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The fire statistics end in 1998 and the incident list in 2006, and the requirements described are those of the NFPA 76 edition summarised in the 2008 handbook.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Transue-9-169&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The event-tree values were set for nuclear plant cabinets and rest on limited data on how long incipient degradation lasts.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hyslop-13-3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hyslop et al. (2010), p. 13-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== See also ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Records protection]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Power station fire protection]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Battery energy storage system]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
* Custer, R. L. P., &amp;amp; Milke, J. A. (2008). Fundamentals of fire detection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 2-75–2-78). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Davoodi, H. (2008). Confinement of fire in buildings. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 18-3–18-21). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Dungan, K. W. (2008a). Automatic fire detectors. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 14-15–14-28). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Harrington, J. L. (2008). Application of gaseous agents to special hazards fire protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 17-123–17-139). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Hyslop, J. S., Kratchman, J., Siu, N., Afshar, C., Najafi, B., Joglar, F., Li, Y., Henneke, D., &amp;amp; Warner, M. (2010). &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire probabilistic risk assessment methods enhancements: Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850 and EPRI 1011989&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1; EPRI 1019259). Electric Power Research Institute; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.&lt;br /&gt;
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* Tewarson, A. (2002). Generation of heat and chemical compounds in fires. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., &amp;amp; J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (3rd ed., pp. 3-82–3-161). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transue, R. E. (2008). Fire protection of telecommunications facilities. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 9-167–9-177). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Special Hazards &amp;amp; Building Types]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Mark</name></author>
	</entry>
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