Hose reel - Revision history

Mark: Revise against the FSE wiki writing guidelines: corrections after independent fact-check (revised by Claude Opus 5.5)

2026-11-02T18:36:38Z

Revise against the FSE wiki writing guidelines: corrections after independent fact-check (revised by Claude Opus 5.5)

Mark: Revise against the FSE wiki writing guidelines: verified and corrected citations, new sources, See also, links, style (revised by Claude Opus 5.5)

2026-11-02T18:09:31Z

Revise against the FSE wiki writing guidelines: verified and corrected citations, new sources, See also, links, style (revised by Claude Opus 5.5)

Show changes

Sanne: Add diagrams fse-hose-reel-v1.svg, fse-hose-reel-v2.svg, fse-hose-reel-v3.svg (level-1 visual plan)

2026-11-02T07:24:47Z

Add diagrams fse-hose-reel-v1.svg, fse-hose-reel-v2.svg, fse-hose-reel-v3.svg (level-1 visual plan)

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:24, 2 November 2026
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	The assembly includes a hose, nozzle and control arrangement connected to a supply. Standpipe cabinets can store pre-connected hose and associated fittings. The control valve must admit water, and the nozzle must form the intended discharge pattern.<ref name="NUREG-F61" />		The assembly includes a hose, nozzle and control arrangement connected to a supply. Standpipe cabinets can store pre-connected hose and associated fittings. The control valve must admit water, and the nozzle must form the intended discharge pattern.<ref name="NUREG-F61" />
			[[File:fse-hose-reel-v1.svg\|thumb\|upright=1.5\|alt=Water supply passes through a valve and hose to a nozzle aimed at the fire.\|A hose reel works as a connected assembly, not as an isolated fitting. Based on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), pp. F-61–F-62.]]

	The operating sequence begins with access to the assembly and activation of the water supply. Water then passes through the supply network and hose to the nozzle. Any closed valve, obstruction, damaged component or inadequate supply can interrupt that sequence.<ref name="NUREG-10-2">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. 10-2.</ref><ref name="NUREG-F61" />		The operating sequence begins with access to the assembly and activation of the water supply. Water then passes through the supply network and hose to the nozzle. Any closed valve, obstruction, damaged component or inadequate supply can interrupt that sequence.<ref name="NUREG-10-2">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. 10-2.</ref><ref name="NUREG-F61" />
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	Supply redundancy can be compromised by shared mains, pumps or valves. A hose reel may be one of several outlets that all lose availability after a common failure. Evaluation should include that shared dependency rather than counting outlets as independent provisions.<ref name="Hopkins-xli" /><ref name="Hopkins-xlii">Hopkins, Schoenrock, and Budnick (2005), pp. xli–xlii.</ref>		Supply redundancy can be compromised by shared mains, pumps or valves. A hose reel may be one of several outlets that all lose availability after a common failure. Evaluation should include that shared dependency rather than counting outlets as independent provisions.<ref name="Hopkins-xli" /><ref name="Hopkins-xlii">Hopkins, Schoenrock, and Budnick (2005), pp. xli–xlii.</ref>
			[[File:fse-hose-reel-v2.svg\|thumb\|upright=1.5\|alt=One riser and pump supply several hose reels, with an independent backup path.\|Shared infrastructure can disable multiple hose outlets at once. Based on Hopkins, Schoenrock, and Budnick (2005), pp. xxxiv–xlii.]]

	== Extinguishing action and compatibility ==		== Extinguishing action and compatibility ==
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	Personnel must be able to reach the hose reel and deploy the hose towards the fire. The actual route can involve doors, stairs, furniture and smoke, so a simple distance on the plan may be misleading. Deployment must also preserve the responder's escape route.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 54–55.</ref>		Personnel must be able to reach the hose reel and deploy the hose towards the fire. The actual route can involve doors, stairs, furniture and smoke, so a simple distance on the plan may be misleading. Deployment must also preserve the responder's escape route.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 54–55.</ref>
			[[File:fse-hose-reel-v3.svg\|thumb\|upright=1.5\|alt=Trained responder deploys hose past obstructions and checks water-compatible fuel and egress.\|Hose deployment requires access, training and a suitable fire scenario. Based on Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 53–55 and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), pp. B-15–B-16.]]

	Training should cover activation, intended fire types, limitations and notification. NUREG's fire-watch description links extinguisher use with hazard identification and proper notification procedures. Those operational capabilities must exist before an incident.<ref name="NUREG-F29">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. F-29.</ref>		Training should cover activation, intended fire types, limitations and notification. NUREG's fire-watch description links extinguisher use with hazard identification and proper notification procedures. Those operational capabilities must exist before an incident.<ref name="NUREG-F29">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. F-29.</ref>

Jan: New FSE wiki article: Hose reel (written by Kimi Code CLI)

2026-11-02T04:08:18Z

New FSE wiki article: Hose reel (written by Kimi Code CLI)

New page

A '''Hose reel''' is a manual firefighting assembly through which a hose and nozzle are connected to a water supply. It provides a ready means of delivering water to a fire and is commonly associated with a standpipe or other fixed supply. Its performance depends on water availability, valve condition, hose and nozzle condition, and the ability of trained personnel to reach and use it.<ref name="NUREG-F61">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), pp. F-61–F-62.</ref><ref name="NUREG-F25">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), pp. F-25–F-26.</ref>

The assembly differs from a portable extinguisher because it relies on a connected water supply rather than only a limited quantity stored in the device. It also differs from a fire hydrant, which supplies a pumping appliance rather than directly providing a hose stream. These provisions can share infrastructure but perform different roles.<ref name="NUREG-F25" /><ref name="NUREG-F61" />

A hose reel does not guarantee effective suppression. Water must be delivered at the required flow and pressure and applied to the burning region. Fire class, spray reach, visibility, access and the responder's safety all affect its usefulness.<ref name="Hopkins-xli">Hopkins, Schoenrock, and Budnick (2005), pp. xli–xlii.</ref><ref name="Bryan-3-318">Bryan (2002), pp. 3-318–3-319.</ref>

== Components and operating chain ==

The assembly includes a hose, nozzle and control arrangement connected to a supply. Standpipe cabinets can store pre-connected hose and associated fittings. The control valve must admit water, and the nozzle must form the intended discharge pattern.<ref name="NUREG-F61" />

The operating sequence begins with access to the assembly and activation of the water supply. Water then passes through the supply network and hose to the nozzle. Any closed valve, obstruction, damaged component or inadequate supply can interrupt that sequence.<ref name="NUREG-10-2">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. 10-2.</ref><ref name="NUREG-F61" />

The supply may be a wet standpipe already charged with water or a manual standpipe supplied by the fire service. Those arrangements have different dependencies and activation times. The actual arrangement must be known before assuming water is immediately available.<ref name="NUREG-F61" />

Hose storage and pre-connection support readiness, but they do not prove hydraulic performance. The water supply must provide the intended flow and pressure through the complete route. That performance should be assessed at the point of application rather than only at the source.<ref name="Hopkins-xli" />

The nozzle determines the form in which water reaches the fire. Cooling requires appropriate contact with the fuel and flame, while radiation attenuation and steam generation depend on the conditions. Delivery must not spread fuel or create unacceptable secondary hazards.<ref name="NUREG-B15">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. B-15.</ref><ref name="Fleming-4-72">Fleming (2002), p. 4-72.</ref>

== Water supplies and standpipes ==

[[Fire water supply]] can include municipal distribution, reserve tanks and pumps. NIST describes those components in the WTC systems and evaluates their capacity under specified scenarios. Their condition and independence determine whether a hose reel can operate when needed.<ref name="Hopkins-xxxv">Hopkins, Schoenrock, and Budnick (2005), p. xxxv.</ref><ref name="Hopkins-xli" />

A [[Dry and wet risers]] arrangement distributes water vertically to outlets inside a building. Wet standpipes are permanently charged with water, while manual standpipes require the fire service to supply them. The hose reel or hose station is the point where the user accesses that network.<ref name="NUREG-F61" />

Standpipe classifications concern intended users and fire streams, not fuel classes. NUREG-1805 describes Class I for heavy-stream use by fire service or trained personnel, Class II for incipient fires and Class III as a combination. Those labels must not be confused with the A, B, C, D and K fuel classes used in the same report.<ref name="NUREG-F61" /><ref name="NUREG-B16">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. B-16.</ref>

NIST's WTC account describes Class III pre-connected hose stations in exit stairs and certain other locations. Each station included a control valve, hose and nozzle intended for a trained brigade or fire department. This is a building-specific example, not a universal hose-reel arrangement.<ref name="Hopkins-xxxiv">Hopkins, Schoenrock, and Budnick (2005), pp. xxxiv–xxxv.</ref>

Supply redundancy can be compromised by shared mains, pumps or valves. A hose reel may be one of several outlets that all lose availability after a common failure. Evaluation should include that shared dependency rather than counting outlets as independent provisions.<ref name="Hopkins-xli" /><ref name="Hopkins-xlii">Hopkins, Schoenrock, and Budnick (2005), pp. xli–xlii.</ref>

== Extinguishing action and compatibility ==

Water cools burning solids and hot gases, reducing pyrolysis and flame feedback. Steam can impede oxygen under some confined conditions, and fog can reduce radiant transfer. The same water can protect exposed materials even where the original fire is not immediately extinguished.<ref name="NUREG-B15" /><ref name="Fleming-4-72" />

Water is not suitable for every fire. It can react with certain substances to produce heat or hazardous gases, and it can create shock hazards around energised equipment. Hot oils and some liquid fuels can also spread or erupt when water is applied incorrectly.<ref name="Fleming-4-72" /><ref name="NUREG-B58">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), pp. B-57–B-58.</ref>

Many hydrocarbon liquids are lighter than water and immiscible with it. A direct water application can allow such fuel to float and continue burning. A suitable foam blanket may be more effective on a two-dimensional pool, while other fire geometries need different evidence.<ref name="Fleming-4-72" /><ref name="Scheffey-4-88">Scheffey (2002), p. 4-88.</ref>

Droplet size and velocity affect whether water reaches the burning surface. Fine droplets can cool hot gases and evaporate, while larger droplets may better penetrate a rising plume. The appropriate discharge depends on the fire and cannot be inferred solely from water flow at the valve.<ref name="NUREG-10-11">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. 10-11.</ref><ref name="Fleming-4-86">Fleming (2002), p. 4-86.</ref>

Visible flame reduction does not prove complete extinction. Hot or deep-seated fuel can remain and re-ignite after application ends. Inspection of the fuel and its surroundings is necessary before declaring the fire controlled or extinguished.<ref name="NUREG-B44">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), pp. B-43–B-44.</ref>

== Hose reels and other provisions ==

A [[Fire extinguisher]] stores its own limited agent and is manually operated, whereas a hose reel depends on a connected water source. This changes the available duration, supply dependencies and potential application area. The provisions should be evaluated by their actual functions rather than both being called manual suppression without distinction.<ref name="NUREG-F25" />

A fire hydrant supplies a pumping appliance rather than directly supplying the hose reel's nozzle. The appliance and its hose team then apply water to the fire. These are different parts of a manual water-delivery system, even where they share pipes or connection points.<ref name="NUREG-F25" /><ref name="NUREG-F61" />

Automatic sprinklers can begin control without requiring someone to operate a hose. A hose reel instead needs access, activation and application by personnel. The two approaches can complement one another, but each has different exposure and failure conditions.<ref name="NUREG-10-1">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), pp. 10-1–10-2.</ref>

[[Firefighting]] also includes rescue, access and information. A hose reel is only one provision within that larger operation. The fire floor must be reached safely, the fire identified and the route for withdrawal protected.<ref name="CVM2-53">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), p. 53.</ref>

Other agents may be needed where water is incompatible. Foam, dry chemicals and gaseous agents use different mechanisms and introduce different secondary effects. Selecting a hose reel for a fire that requires another agent would be a compatibility error, not a performance enhancement.<ref name="NUREG-B15" /><ref name="NUREG-B56">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), pp. B-55–B-56.</ref>

== Access, training and human response ==

Personnel must be able to reach the hose reel and deploy the hose towards the fire. The actual route can involve doors, stairs, furniture and smoke, so a simple distance on the plan may be misleading. Deployment must also preserve the responder's escape route.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54">Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025), pp. 54–55.</ref>

Training should cover activation, intended fire types, limitations and notification. NUREG's fire-watch description links extinguisher use with hazard identification and proper notification procedures. Those operational capabilities must exist before an incident.<ref name="NUREG-F29">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. F-29.</ref>

Bryan describes occupants choosing among firefighting, warning, seeking refuge and evacuation. A person may attempt to use a hose because it is available even when conditions make that action unsuitable. Reassessment is needed as new information about the fire becomes available.<ref name="Bryan-3-318" /><ref name="Bryan-3-319">Bryan (2002), p. 3-319.</ref>

Hose deployment can affect other occupants. A charged hose and discharged water can obstruct a route or reduce visibility, and smoke can be redistributed by airflow and water sprays. Those effects should be included in the incident assessment.<ref name="Evans-70">Evans et al. (2005), p. 70.</ref><ref name="CVM2-53" />

The intended user must be clear. NUREG distinguishes heavy-stream and incipient-fire applications in its standpipe classes, and NIST describes use by trained brigades or fire department personnel. Access to the equipment alone does not establish that an occupant can use it effectively.<ref name="NUREG-F61" /><ref name="Hopkins-xxxiv" />

== Reliability and maintenance ==

Inspection should confirm that the correct hose, nozzle, valve and supply are present and accessible. Stored equipment can be damaged or obstructed without an obvious electronic fault. The physical condition and deployment path must both be reviewed.<ref name="NUREG-F61" /><ref name="IFEG-1-8-14">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.8-13–1.8-14.</ref>

Supply readiness must be tested as a chain. Closed valves, empty tanks, failed pumps, damaged mains and shared isolation errors can prevent water delivery. Restoration should verify flow at the outlet under the intended condition.<ref name="NUREG-10-2" /><ref name="Hopkins-xli" />

Hose and nozzle condition can alter the discharge pattern and effective reach. A supply with correct pressure at the pump may not produce useful application if downstream components are damaged. Assessment should therefore extend from the source to the fire.<ref name="Hopkins-xli" /><ref name="NUREG-10-11" />

Maintenance must also preserve the protected hazard's compatibility. New storage, changed occupancy or different fuel can make water unsuitable or the original delivery inadequate. Review should compare the current fire problem with the provision's design basis.<ref name="IFEG-0-3-8">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 0.3-8.</ref><ref name="NUREG-B15" />

Records should identify the supply, zone, valve and intended user. NIST's reconstruction shows the value of documents in understanding which systems and components serve each area. Current information supports both maintenance and incident response.<ref name="Hopkins-xxxv" /><ref name="CVM2-53" />

== Evaluation and common misunderstandings ==

A hose reel is not an unlimited water supply by definition. Duration and pressure depend on the source, pump, storage and alternative supply arrangements. The response must consider when those sources can be exhausted or interrupted.<ref name="Hopkins-xxxv" /><ref name="Hopkins-xli" />

A hose reel is not equivalent to a fire hydrant or to an automatic sprinkler. The three provisions have different activation, distribution and user requirements. Confusing them can lead to incorrect assumptions about when water will flow and who must apply it.<ref name="NUREG-F25" /><ref name="NUREG-10-1" />

Water discharge alone does not prove suppression. The fire may be shielded, water reactive or too deep-seated for the applied stream to control. Compatibility and the condition of the fuel after application must be assessed.<ref name="NUREG-B15" /><ref name="NUREG-B44" />

Access to the assembly does not guarantee safe use. Smoke, heat, poor visibility and structural conditions can prevent deployment or withdrawal. The operational assessment must include those conditions as well as hose reach and water flow.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54" />

The complete evaluation therefore covers source, network, assembly, discharge, user and fire. It should state which evidence demonstrates each part and which conditions remain uncertain. A hose reel is effective only when those elements work together at the time of the incident.<ref name="Hopkins-xli" /><ref name="NUREG-F61" />

A hose-reel assessment should identify the specific supply zone and its design demand. Several outlets may be fed by the same riser or pump, so simultaneous use can change available flow and pressure. The assessment should consider the expected number and arrangement of active outlets rather than rating one connection in isolation.<ref name="Hopkins-xli" />

Commissioning should demonstrate operation from supply to discharge. Opening a valve can show that a component moves, but it does not by itself establish adequate flow or a useful spray at the fire. Testing should include the intended outlet, connected components and the conditions expected during use.<ref name="NUREG-F61" /><ref name="Hopkins-xli" />

Water application must be evaluated for the actual fuel geometry. Shielded material, deep-seated combustion and rising plumes can prevent effective contact, while incompatible fuels can react with water. Those limitations require a different agent or a different delivery approach, not simply a larger nominal water supply.<ref name="NUREG-B15" /><ref name="NUREG-B44" />

Deployment planning should identify how the hose will be moved through the building. Doors, stairs, obstructions and smoke can lengthen the route and reduce the practicality of the assembly. The review should include both the path to the fire and the route back to safety.<ref name="CVM2-53" /><ref name="CVM2-54" />

Fire conditions can also affect the assembly's usefulness. Heat and smoke can prevent approach, and structural damage can impair the riser supplying it. A hose reel may consequently be present but unavailable at the time its use is required.<ref name="Hopkins-xlii" /><ref name="CVM2-53" />

The management record should preserve that sequence of dependencies. It should identify the assembly, supply, intended users, inspection results and any impairments. This makes it possible to distinguish a mechanical defect from an unsuitable application or an unavailable supply.<ref name="NUREG-10-2" /><ref name="IFEG-1-8-14" />

The final assessment should not infer performance from a similar building's equipment. NIST's analysis uses particular standpipe arrangements, pump capacities and fire assumptions. Those details must be compared with the actual installation before its results are used to support another hose-reel design.<ref name="Hopkins-xli" />

Where a hose reel is credited as part of a safety strategy, its role should be stated explicitly. It may support an initial manual response, supplement fixed suppression or provide water to trained firefighters. Each role has different expectations for timing, user capability and interaction with evacuation and automatic systems.<ref name="NUREG-F25" /><ref name="NUREG-F61" />

The acceptance evidence should match that role. A readiness check may be appropriate for the assembly, but hydraulic and application evidence is needed to establish useful suppression. Training and access evidence is needed to establish that the intended users can deploy it. No one of those checks demonstrates all three aspects.<ref name="Hopkins-xli" /><ref name="CVM2-53" />

Residual conditions after use also matter. Water can affect equipment and escape surfaces, and the fire can remain hot or reignite. Restoration should include the affected area and the supply assembly, not only replacement of the used equipment.<ref name="NUREG-B44" /><ref name="IFEG-1-8-14" />

== See also ==

* [[Fire extinguisher]]
* [[Fire water supply]]
* [[Firefighting]]

== Notes ==

<references />

== References ==

* Australian Building Codes Board, National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, & Department of Building and Housing New Zealand. (2005). ''International fire engineering guidelines'' (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
* Bryan, J. L. (2002). Behavioral response to fire and smoke. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
* Evans, D. D., Peacock, R. D., Kuligowski, E. D., Dols, W. S., & Grosshandler, W. L. (2005). ''Active fire protection systems'' (NIST NCSTAR 1-4). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
* Fleming, R. P. (2002). Automatic sprinkler system calculations. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
* Hopkins, M., Schoenrock, J., & Budnick, E. (2005). ''Fire suppression systems'' (NIST NCSTAR 1-4B). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
* Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025). ''C protection from fire: Verification method C/VM2'' (2nd ed.). New Zealand Government.
* Scheffey, J. L. (2002). Foam agents and AFFF system design considerations. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2005). ''Fire dynamics tools: Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. nuclear regulatory commission fire protection inspection program'' (NUREG-1805). Author.

[[Category:Firefighting & Fire Service]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:36, 2 November 2026
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	A '''hose reel''' is a fire hose kept permanently connected to the water supply of a building, so that trained occupants or employees can fight a fire before the fire department arrives.<ref name="IS-F62">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-62.</ref><ref name="IS-F61">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-61.</ref> The glossary of NUREG-1805 defines a related term, the small hose system, as hose of 5/8 in. to 1½ in. (about 16 to 38 mm) diameter for the use of employees, intended to control and extinguish fires in their earliest stage.<ref name="IS-F50">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-50.</ref> The International Fire Engineering Guidelines name hose reels, together with fire extinguishers, as the means by which building occupants may suppress a fire.<ref name="IFEG-1.7-1">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 1.7-1–1.7-2.</ref> In high-rise buildings, such hoses may hang on the standpipes, which also provide connections for the hoses that firefighters carry in.<ref name="Evans-9">Evans et al. (2005), p. 9.</ref>		A '''hose reel''' is a fire hose kept permanently connected to the water supply of a building, so that trained occupants or employees can fight a fire before the fire department arrives.<ref name="IS-F62">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-62.</ref><ref name="IS-F61">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-61.</ref> The glossary of NUREG-1805 defines a related term, the small hose system, as hose of 5/8 in. to 1½ in. (about 16 to 38 mm) diameter for the use of employees, intended to control and extinguish fires in their earliest stage.<ref name="IS-F50">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. F-50.</ref> The International Fire Engineering Guidelines name hose reels, together with fire extinguishers, as the means by which building occupants may suppress a fire.<ref name="IFEG-1.7-1">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 1.7-1–1.7-2.</ref> In high-rise buildings, such hoses may hang on the standpipes, which also provide connections for the hoses that firefighters carry in.<ref name="Evans-9">Evans et al. (2005), p. 9.</ref>

	Rules for hose reels differ between countries and documents. In the United States, NFPA 14 provides Class II hose stations with 38 mm (1½ in.) hose for trained occupants, designed for about 380 L/min (100 gal/min)~~, as summarised by NIST~~.<ref name="Hopkins-20">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. 20.</ref> The New York City Building Code required occupant hose reels and, for that reason, had no requirements for fire extinguishers.<ref name="Lew-151">Lew et al. (2005), p. 151.</ref> Their value depends on the user: fire engineering analyses customarily assume that occupants will not fight a fire effectively unless they belong to a trained emergency crew.<ref name="IFEG-1.7-7">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.7-7.</ref> Water also does not suit every fire, and NUREG-1805 warns never to use it on burning metals.<ref name="IS-B16">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-16.</ref>		Rules for hose reels differ between countries and documents. In the United States, NFPA 14 (2000 edition), as summarised by NIST, provides Class II hose stations with 38 mm (1½ in.) hose for trained occupants, designed for about 380 L/min (100 gal/min).<ref name="Hopkins-20">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. 20.</ref> The 1968 New York City Building Code required occupant hose reels and, for that reason, had no requirements for fire extinguishers.<ref name="Lew-151">Lew et al. (2005), p. 151.</ref> Their value depends on the user: fire engineering analyses customarily assume that occupants will not fight a fire effectively unless they belong to a trained emergency crew.<ref name="IFEG-1.7-7">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.7-7.</ref> Water also does not suit every fire, and NUREG-1805 warns never to use it on burning metals.<ref name="IS-B16">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. B-16.</ref>

	== Definition and terminology ==		== Definition and terminology ==
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	The 1968 Building Code of the City of New York was used for the design of WTC 1 and 2. It required standpipes to be placed so that a 6.1 m (20 ft) stream from a nozzle on at most 38 m (125 ft) of hose could reach every point of every floor.<ref name="GJ-29">Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 29.</ref> Hose stations had to stand at the standpipe risers, inside or next to the entrances of the stair enclosures.<ref name="GJ-30">Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 30.</ref> In the occupancy groups that included the business use of the towers, the hose was 1½ in. unlined linen hose, and auxiliary hose stations with the same hose were allowed.<ref name="GJ-2">Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 2.</ref><ref name="GJ-30" /> Water had to be available at every hose outlet at all times, or be made available automatically when a hose valve was opened.<ref name="GJ-30" />		The 1968 Building Code of the City of New York was used for the design of WTC 1 and 2. It required standpipes to be placed so that a 6.1 m (20 ft) stream from a nozzle on at most 38 m (125 ft) of hose could reach every point of every floor.<ref name="GJ-29">Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 29.</ref> Hose stations had to stand at the standpipe risers, inside or next to the entrances of the stair enclosures.<ref name="GJ-30">Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 30.</ref> In the occupancy groups that included the business use of the towers, the hose was 1½ in. unlined linen hose, and auxiliary hose stations with the same hose were allowed.<ref name="GJ-2">Grill and Johnson (2005b), p. 2.</ref><ref name="GJ-30" /> Water had to be available at every hose outlet at all times, or be made available automatically when a hose valve was opened.<ref name="GJ-30" />

	~~Under~~ NFPA 14, as summarised by NIST, Class II hose stations ~~are spaced~~ so that every area lies within 6.1 m (20 ft) of the nozzle of a 30 m (100 ft) hose.<ref name="Hopkins-20" /> These stations provide small streams for trained occupants or fire brigades to fight incipient fires and to finish off afterwards. Class I systems instead have 64 mm valves that supply heavy streams for the fire department in advanced fires, and Class III systems combine both.<ref name="Hopkins-20" />		NFPA 14 (2000 edition), as summarised by NIST, spaces Class II hose stations so that every area lies within 6.1 m (20 ft) of the nozzle of a 30 m (100 ft) hose.<ref name="Hopkins-20" /> These stations provide small streams for trained occupants or fire brigades to fight incipient fires and to finish off afterwards. Class I systems instead have 64 mm valves that supply heavy streams for the fire department in advanced fires, and Class III systems combine both.<ref name="Hopkins-20" />

	== Water supply, flow and pressure ==		== Water supply, flow and pressure ==
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	A hose reel is only as good as its [[fire water supply]]. Wet standpipes, the preferred arrangement, are filled with water at all times and connected to an automatic supply such as the city mains, a tank with a pump, or an elevated tank.<ref name="Hopkins-21">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. 21.</ref> Manual dry standpipes have only fire department connections and no automatic supply.<ref name="Hopkins-21" /> In NUREG-1805, a manual standpipe relies on the fire service to supply it, and a semi-automatic standpipe needs a control device to be activated before water reaches the hose outlets.<ref name="IS-F61" />		A hose reel is only as good as its [[fire water supply]]. Wet standpipes, the preferred arrangement, are filled with water at all times and connected to an automatic supply such as the city mains, a tank with a pump, or an elevated tank.<ref name="Hopkins-21">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. 21.</ref> Manual dry standpipes have only fire department connections and no automatic supply.<ref name="Hopkins-21" /> In NUREG-1805, a manual standpipe relies on the fire service to supply it, and a semi-automatic standpipe needs a control device to be activated before water reaches the hose outlets.<ref name="IS-F61" />

	The flows are modest compared with those for the fire service. NFPA 14, as summarised by NIST, designs Class II systems for about 380 L/min (100 gal/min) at about 450 kPa (65 psi) at the most demanding standpipe.<ref name="Hopkins-20" /> Class I and III systems are designed for about 1,900 L/min (500 gal/min) at about 690 kPa (100 psi).<ref name="Hopkins-20" /> In New York, pressure-reducing valves at 1½ in. hose stations ~~were to~~ limit the pressure to about 590 kPa (85 psi) at ~~a flow of about~~ 265 L/min (70 gal/min).<ref name="Hopkins-148">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. 148.</ref> In the WTC towers, tanks of about 19 m³ (5,000 gal) could supply about 1,900 L/min (500 gal/min) for 10 minutes, so that manual firefighting could begin before the manual fire pumps were started.<ref name="Hopkins-39">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. 39.</ref>		The flows are modest compared with those for the fire service. NFPA 14 (2000 edition), as summarised by NIST, designs Class II systems for about 380 L/min (100 gal/min) at about 450 kPa (65 psi) at the most demanding standpipe.<ref name="Hopkins-20" /> Class I and III systems are designed for about 1,900 L/min (500 gal/min) at about 690 kPa (100 psi).<ref name="Hopkins-20" /> The Building Code of the City of New York (1968) specified that pressure-reducing valves at 1½ in. hose stations should limit the pressure to about 590 kPa (85 psi) at 265 L/min (70 gal/min).<ref name="Hopkins-148">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. 148.</ref> In the WTC towers, tanks of about 19 m³ (5,000 gal) could supply about 1,900 L/min (500 gal/min) for 10 minutes, so that manual firefighting could begin before the manual fire pumps were started.<ref name="Hopkins-39">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. 39.</ref>

	Hose reels ~~usually~~ share their supply with other systems. In WTC 7, the hose connections were supplied from combined sprinkler and standpipe systems, so they had the same supply zones as the sprinklers.<ref name="Hopkins-149">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. 149.</ref> For the lowest 20 floors, a loss of power to the automatic fire pump or significant damage to the city main could interrupt that supply.<ref name="Hopkins-xli">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. xli.</ref> According to NUREG/CR-6850, a rupture of the firefighting water main in a US nuclear power plant could make all water-based suppression, including manual hose stations, unavailable until the break is isolated.<ref name="Nowlen-13-3">Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 13-3.</ref> Several outlets on one supply also compete for water. In NIST's calculations, four hose valves at the top of a WTC tower needed three or four fire pumps, while two pumps could supply only one.<ref name="Hopkins-148" />		Hose reels can share their supply with other systems. In WTC 7, the hose connections were supplied from combined sprinkler and standpipe systems, so they had the same supply zones as the sprinklers.<ref name="Hopkins-149">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. 149.</ref> For the lowest 20 floors, a loss of power to the automatic fire pump or significant damage to the city main could interrupt that supply.<ref name="Hopkins-xli">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. xli.</ref> According to NUREG/CR-6850, a rupture of the firefighting water main in a US nuclear power plant could make all water-based suppression, including manual hose stations, unavailable until the break is isolated.<ref name="Nowlen-13-3">Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 13-3.</ref> Several outlets on one supply also compete for water. In NIST's calculations, four hose valves at the top of a WTC tower needed three or four fire pumps, while two pumps could supply only one.<ref name="Hopkins-148" />
	[[File:fse-hose-reel-v2.svg\|thumb\|upright=1.5\|alt=One riser and pump supply several hose reels, with an independent backup path.\|Shared infrastructure can disable multiple hose outlets at once. Based on Hopkins et al. (2005), pp. xli and 149 and Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 13-3.]]		[[File:fse-hose-reel-v2.svg\|thumb\|upright=1.5\|alt=One riser and pump supply several hose reels, with an independent backup path.\|Shared infrastructure can disable multiple hose outlets at once. Based on Hopkins et al. (2005), pp. xli and 149 and Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 13-3.]]

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	== Hose reels, extinguishers and sprinklers ==		== Hose reels, extinguishers and sprinklers ==

	The International Fire Engineering Guidelines treat hose reels and [[fire extinguisher]]s alike, as means of suppression by occupants within the detection, warning and suppression sub-system.<ref name="IFEG-1.7-1" /><ref name="IFEG-1.2-10">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-10.</ref> Building codes do not always require both. NIST found that the New York City Building Code had no requirements for fire extinguishers, because it required occupant hose reels instead.<ref name="Lew-151" /> The Port Authority's design guidelines for the WTC nevertheless required portable extinguishers in all spaces, under a fire department directive and the New York City Fire Prevention Code.<ref name="GJc-17">Grill and Johnson (2005c), p. 17.</ref> For battery rooms in US nuclear power plants, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.189, as summarised in NUREG-1805, says that a hose station and portable extinguishers should be readily available outside the room.<ref name="IS-16-6">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-6.</ref>		The International Fire Engineering Guidelines treat hose reels and [[fire extinguisher]]s alike, as means of suppression by occupants within the detection, warning and suppression sub-system.<ref name="IFEG-1.7-1" /><ref name="IFEG-1.2-10">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-10.</ref> Building codes do not always require both. NIST found that the 1968 New York City Building Code had no requirements for fire extinguishers, because it required occupant hose reels instead.<ref name="Lew-151" /> The Port Authority's design guidelines for the WTC nevertheless required portable extinguishers in all spaces, under a fire department directive and the New York City Fire Prevention Code.<ref name="GJc-17">Grill and Johnson (2005c), p. 17.</ref> For battery rooms in US nuclear power plants, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.189, as summarised in NUREG-1805, says that a hose station and portable extinguishers should be readily available outside the room.<ref name="IS-16-6">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 16-6.</ref>

	Hose reels are not a substitute for automatic sprinklers, and NIST notes that standpipe systems are not considered an alternative to automatic fire suppression.<ref name="Hopkins-21" /> NUREG-1805 explains that sprinklers typically use less water than fire hoses. The human response, from discovering the fire to the arrival of a fire brigade, usually takes much longer than sprinklers need to control a fire in its early stage.<ref name="IS-10-1">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 10-1.</ref> Even in a sprinklered building, people with extinguishers or hose lines are generally needed to put out all the burning, especially where the fire is shielded from the sprinkler spray.<ref name="Evans-9" />		Hose reels are not a substitute for automatic sprinklers, and NIST notes that standpipe systems are not considered an alternative to automatic fire suppression.<ref name="Hopkins-21" /> NUREG-1805 explains that sprinklers typically use less water than fire hoses. The human response, from discovering the fire to the arrival of a fire brigade, usually takes much longer than sprinklers need to control a fire in its early stage.<ref name="IS-10-1">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 10-1.</ref> Even in a sprinklered building, people with extinguishers or hose lines are generally needed to put out all the burning, especially where the fire is shielded from the sprinkler spray.<ref name="Evans-9" />
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	A hose reel can fail anywhere between the water source and the nozzle. For sprinkler systems, NUREG-1805 lists causes of water supply failure such as a closed water supply valve, a broken supply header, an empty water tank and a fire pump that does not start.<ref name="IS-10-2">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 10-2.</ref> Where hose stations share that supply, as they did in WTC 7, the same faults would affect them.<ref name="Hopkins-149" /> For US nuclear power plants, NUREG/CR-6850 asks whether hose stations would survive an earthquake, whether an alternative source of firefighting water exists and whether there is enough hose to use it.<ref name="Nowlen-13-7">Nowlen et al. (2005b), pp. 13-7–13-8.</ref> Where a water hose reel is credited, the analyst also checks that vulnerable components are shielded from water spray and that drainage is adequate. Floor penetrations must be verified as sealed, so that firefighting water cannot run into the compartment below.<ref name="Nowlen-11-18">Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 11-18.</ref>		A hose reel can fail anywhere between the water source and the nozzle. For sprinkler systems, NUREG-1805 lists causes of water supply failure such as a closed water supply valve, a broken supply header, an empty water tank and a fire pump that does not start.<ref name="IS-10-2">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. 10-2.</ref> Where hose stations share that supply, as they did in WTC 7, the same faults would affect them.<ref name="Hopkins-149" /> For US nuclear power plants, NUREG/CR-6850 asks whether hose stations would survive an earthquake, whether an alternative source of firefighting water exists and whether there is enough hose to use it.<ref name="Nowlen-13-7">Nowlen et al. (2005b), pp. 13-7–13-8.</ref> Where a water hose reel is credited, the analyst also checks that vulnerable components are shielded from water spray and that drainage is adequate. Floor penetrations must be verified as sealed, so that firefighting water cannot run into the compartment below.<ref name="Nowlen-11-18">Nowlen et al. (2005b), p. 11-18.</ref>

	Performance records are not kept for standpipe and pre-connected hose systems, and NIST found their performance difficult to assess.<ref name="Hopkins-21" /><ref name="Hopkins-xlii">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. xlii.</ref> At the WTC, these systems met the New York City Building Code but not the flow rates and durations of NFPA 14.<ref name="Evans-xxxi">Evans et al. (2005), p. xxxi.</ref> The International Fire Engineering Guidelines ask that active fire protection equipment be maintained in line with the relevant codes, standards and manufacturer's literature, in some jurisdictions through essential safety provisions.<ref name="IFEG-1.7-8">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.7-8.</ref> Among the American standards, NUREG-1805 lists NFPA 1962 (2003 edition) on the inspection, care and use of fire hose, couplings and nozzles and the service testing of fire hose.<ref name="IS-E12">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. E-12.</ref>		Performance records are not kept for standpipe and pre-connected hose systems, and NIST found their performance difficult to assess.<ref name="Hopkins-21" /><ref name="Hopkins-xlii">Hopkins et al. (2005), p. xlii.</ref> At the WTC, these systems met the 1968 New York City Building Code but not the flow rates and durations of NFPA 14 (2000 edition), against which NIST checked them.<ref name="Evans-xxxi">Evans et al. (2005), p. xxxi.</ref><ref name="Hopkins-148" /> The International Fire Engineering Guidelines ask that active fire protection equipment be maintained in line with the relevant codes, standards and manufacturer's literature, in some jurisdictions through essential safety provisions.<ref name="IFEG-1.7-8">National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.7-8.</ref> Among the American standards, NUREG-1805 lists NFPA 1962 (2003 edition) on the inspection, care and use of fire hose, couplings and nozzles and the service testing of fire hose.<ref name="IS-E12">Iqbal and Salley (2004), p. E-12.</ref>

	== See also ==		== See also ==