Fire risk - Revision history

Jan: Remove links to pages that do not exist; retain displayed text (wiki-wide link audit).

2026-11-02T21:32:52Z

Remove links to pages that do not exist; retain displayed text (wiki-wide link audit).

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:32, 2 November 2026
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	People judge the same risk in different ways. Experts mainly weigh the calculated reduction in fire risk, while ordinary people also weigh costs and other needs. Enforcers act on behalf of society, and managers such as builders are most directly affected by the costs.<ref name="WH-5-1" /> The reduced fire risk of a home sprinkler system, for example, appears to be valued less by the average citizen than the benefit of a new car.<ref name="WH-5-1" /> Risks that are objectively equal are also perceived differently: people prefer certain over uncertain, familiar over unfamiliar, voluntary over involuntary and ordinary over dramatic risks.<ref name="WH-5-3" /> Dying in a fire is perceived as worse than dying in a car accident, and most people who die in fires die at home.<ref name="VR-7">Van Rossum (2027), §7.</ref>		People judge the same risk in different ways. Experts mainly weigh the calculated reduction in fire risk, while ordinary people also weigh costs and other needs. Enforcers act on behalf of society, and managers such as builders are most directly affected by the costs.<ref name="WH-5-1" /> The reduced fire risk of a home sprinkler system, for example, appears to be valued less by the average citizen than the benefit of a new car.<ref name="WH-5-1" /> Risks that are objectively equal are also perceived differently: people prefer certain over uncertain, familiar over unfamiliar, voluntary over involuntary and ordinary over dramatic risks.<ref name="WH-5-3" /> Dying in a fire is perceived as worse than dying in a car accident, and most people who die in fires die at home.<ref name="VR-7">Van Rossum (2027), §7.</ref>

	Reducing fire risk may even increase other risks, as with the potential damage to the ozone layer from halon extinguishing agents. The goal that comes closest to zero risk is risk as low as is technically possible. In fire protection engineering, this may mean accepting the residual risk after all identified risk reduction measures have been adopted. A complication is that this residual risk may then be perceived as zero, although a non-zero risk remains.<ref name="WH-5-4" /> In Australia, workplace health and safety legislation also requires safe design, which a code of practice defines as eliminating risks to health and safety or, if this is not ~~[[ALARP\|~~reasonably practicable]], minimising them.<ref name="ABCB-25">Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 25.</ref>		Reducing fire risk may even increase other risks, as with the potential damage to the ozone layer from halon extinguishing agents. The goal that comes closest to zero risk is risk as low as is technically possible. In fire protection engineering, this may mean accepting the residual risk after all identified risk reduction measures have been adopted. A complication is that this residual risk may then be perceived as zero, although a non-zero risk remains.<ref name="WH-5-4" /> In Australia, workplace health and safety legislation also requires safe design, which a code of practice defines as eliminating risks to health and safety or, if this is not reasonably practicable, minimising them.<ref name="ABCB-25">Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 25.</ref>

	Building regulations rarely state an acceptable risk in numbers. The Australian Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022 notes that the National Construction Code contains no specific safety targets. A design assessed with this method must therefore be at least equivalent to the deemed-to-satisfy provisions.<ref name="ABCB2022-7" /> It adds that a full quantitative probabilistic risk assessment would ideally be used, but the tools and data for it are not included. The method instead permits a simple deterministic comparison of available and required escape times, with additional checks.<ref name="ABCB2022-18">Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 18.</ref>		Building regulations rarely state an acceptable risk in numbers. The Australian Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022 notes that the National Construction Code contains no specific safety targets. A design assessed with this method must therefore be at least equivalent to the deemed-to-satisfy provisions.<ref name="ABCB2022-7" /> It adds that a full quantitative probabilistic risk assessment would ideally be used, but the tools and data for it are not included. The method instead permits a simple deterministic comparison of available and required escape times, with additional checks.<ref name="ABCB2022-18">Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 18.</ref>

Mark: Revise against the FSE wiki writing guidelines: corrections after independent fact-check (revised by Claude Opus 5.5)

2026-11-02T18:38:25Z

Revise against the FSE wiki writing guidelines: corrections after independent fact-check (revised by Claude Opus 5.5)

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:38, 2 November 2026
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	Fire incident data show how often fires start and how severe they are. In the United States, the national fire incident reporting system collects roughly a million fires a year, but only about half of the fires reported to fire departments. A separate survey of fire departments is therefore used to scale the data up to national estimates. Fires with an unknown cause must be allocated over the known causes. If they are ignored while the share of unknowns falls, every known cause can appear to grow although the total number of fires stays the same.<ref name="HallAhrens-5-67">Hall and Ahrens (2002), pp. 5-67–5-68.</ref>		Fire incident data show how often fires start and how severe they are. In the United States, the national fire incident reporting system collects roughly a million fires a year, but only about half of the fires reported to fire departments. A separate survey of fire departments is therefore used to scale the data up to national estimates. Fires with an unknown cause must be allocated over the known causes. If they are ignored while the share of unknowns falls, every known cause can appear to grow although the total number of fires stays the same.<ref name="HallAhrens-5-67">Hall and Ahrens (2002), pp. 5-67–5-68.</ref>

	Not every fire appears in these statistics. Fires handled by the occupants or by private fire brigades are not reported, and fires in buildings with sprinklers or good detection are more likely to be controlled on site. Anecdotes~~, such as reports of large fires,~~ show the range of fires that can happen but cannot be used to estimate rates or probabilities. Detailed databases that are not statistically representative can also mislead, so analysts should not give up statistical validity for detail.<ref name="HallAhrens-5-69">Hall and Ahrens (2002), pp. 5-69–5-70.</ref>		Not every fire appears in these statistics. Fires handled by the occupants or by private fire brigades are not reported, and fires in buildings with sprinklers or good detection are more likely to be controlled on site. Anecdotes show the range of fires that can happen but cannot be used to estimate rates or probabilities. Detailed databases that are not statistically representative can also mislead, so analysts should not give up statistical validity for detail.<ref name="HallAhrens-5-69">Hall and Ahrens (2002), pp. 5-69–5-70.</ref>

	Data on the reliability of fire protection systems are scarce.<ref name="HallAhrens-5-69" /> Expert estimates tend to rate reliable systems even higher and unreliable systems even lower than they really are. Inspection and testing records usually come from well-maintained properties, so they show better reliability than typical buildings achieve. They can also miss short-lived failures, such as a door blocked open.<ref name="HallAhrens-5-71">Hall and Ahrens (2002), p. 5-71.</ref>		Data on the reliability of fire protection systems are scarce.<ref name="HallAhrens-5-69" /> Expert estimates tend to rate reliable systems even higher and unreliable systems even lower than they really are. Inspection and testing records usually come from well-maintained properties, so they show better reliability than typical buildings achieve. They can also miss short-lived failures, such as a door blocked open.<ref name="HallAhrens-5-71">Hall and Ahrens (2002), p. 5-71.</ref>

Mark: Revise against the FSE wiki writing guidelines: verified and corrected citations, See also, links, style (revised by Claude Opus 5.5)

2026-11-02T18:03:27Z

Revise against the FSE wiki writing guidelines: verified and corrected citations, See also, links, style (revised by Claude Opus 5.5)

Show changes

Sanne: Add diagrams fse-fire-risk-v1.svg, fse-fire-risk-v2.svg, fse-fire-risk-v3.svg (level-1 visual plan)

2026-11-02T07:22:37Z

Add diagrams fse-fire-risk-v1.svg, fse-fire-risk-v2.svg, fse-fire-risk-v3.svg (level-1 visual plan)

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:22, 2 November 2026
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	Fire risk cannot be described completely by fire size or by the number of past fires. The assessment must ask what could happen, how severe the consequences would be and how likely those consequences are. The answers depend on the building, occupants, systems and evidence being considered.<ref name="Watts-5-1">Watts and Hall (2002b), pp. 5-1–5-3.</ref><ref name="Hall-5-65">Hall and Ahrens (2002), pp. 5-65–5-67.</ref>		Fire risk cannot be described completely by fire size or by the number of past fires. The assessment must ask what could happen, how severe the consequences would be and how likely those consequences are. The answers depend on the building, occupants, systems and evidence being considered.<ref name="Watts-5-1">Watts and Hall (2002b), pp. 5-1–5-3.</ref><ref name="Hall-5-65">Hall and Ahrens (2002), pp. 5-65–5-67.</ref>
			[[File:fse-fire-risk-v1.svg\|thumb\|upright=1.5\|alt=What could happen, how likely and how severe lead to a risk evaluation.\|Fire risk combines event scenarios, likelihood and consequences. Based on Watts and Hall (2002b), pp. 5-1–5-3 and Watts and Hall (2002a), pp. 5-154–5-156.]]

	Zero risk is not an achievable goal. Fire safety work instead evaluates and reduces risks under stated conditions, then considers whether the remaining risk is acceptable. Acceptability involves values and stakeholder decisions as well as technical calculations.<ref name="Watts-5-4">Watts and Hall (2002b), pp. 5-3–5-4.</ref><ref name="IFEG-0-2-8">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 0.2-7–0.2-8.</ref>		Zero risk is not an achievable goal. Fire safety work instead evaluates and reduces risks under stated conditions, then considers whether the remaining risk is acceptable. Acceptability involves values and stakeholder decisions as well as technical calculations.<ref name="Watts-5-4">Watts and Hall (2002b), pp. 5-3–5-4.</ref><ref name="IFEG-0-2-8">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 0.2-7–0.2-8.</ref>
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	Individual-risk contours describe geographical variation of that potential harm. The cited definition does not require a person to be present for the location-based contour to be drawn. Actual exposure and the presence of people must still be addressed when interpreting the result.<ref name="Barry-5-210" />		Individual-risk contours describe geographical variation of that potential harm. The cited definition does not require a person to be present for the location-based contour to be drawn. Actual exposure and the presence of people must still be addressed when interpreting the result.<ref name="Barry-5-210" />
			[[File:fse-fire-risk-v2.svg\|thumb\|upright=1.5\|alt=Location-based individual contours contrast with cumulative frequency for multiple casualties.\|Individual and societal risk answer different questions. Based on Barry (2002), pp. 5-210–5-211.]]

	[[Societal risk]] considers the likelihood of multiple casualties resulting from fire or explosion. It therefore addresses population outcomes rather than only a single person's location. The population at risk and the likelihood of presence must be defined.<ref name="Barry-5-211">Barry (2002), pp. 5-211–5-212.</ref>		[[Societal risk]] considers the likelihood of multiple casualties resulting from fire or explosion. It therefore addresses population outcomes rather than only a single person's location. The population at risk and the likelihood of presence must be defined.<ref name="Barry-5-211">Barry (2002), pp. 5-211–5-212.</ref>
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	Risk reduction can address the frequency of initiating events, the severity of outcomes or exposure to them. Prevention, suppression, compartmentation, evacuation and management affect different stages. The selection should follow the causal structure rather than relying on one preferred measure.<ref name="Watts-5-157" /><ref name="Barry-5-211" />		Risk reduction can address the frequency of initiating events, the severity of outcomes or exposure to them. Prevention, suppression, compartmentation, evacuation and management affect different stages. The selection should follow the causal structure rather than relying on one preferred measure.<ref name="Watts-5-157" /><ref name="Barry-5-211" />
			[[File:fse-fire-risk-v3.svg\|thumb\|upright=1.5\|alt=Ignition, fire development, exposure and consequences offer different intervention points.\|Risk reduction can act at several points in the fire scenario. Based on Watts and Hall (2002a), pp. 5-157–5-159 and Barry (2002), pp. 5-211–5-212.]]

	The fire safety concepts tree distinguishes preventing ignition from managing fire impact. This supports a systematic review of possible measures without assuming every ignition can be prevented. Residual events still require attention to their consequences.<ref name="Watts-5-158">Watts and Hall (2002a), pp. 5-158–5-159.</ref>		The fire safety concepts tree distinguishes preventing ignition from managing fire impact. This supports a systematic review of possible measures without assuming every ignition can be prevented. Residual events still require attention to their consequences.<ref name="Watts-5-158">Watts and Hall (2002a), pp. 5-158–5-159.</ref>

Jan: New FSE wiki article: Fire risk (written by Kimi Code CLI)

2026-11-02T03:15:40Z

New FSE wiki article: Fire risk (written by Kimi Code CLI)

New page

'''Fire risk''' is the potential for unwanted consequences to human life, health, property or the environment as a result of fire. It involves both the likelihood of events and the losses they may cause. A hazard describes a condition with potential for harm, while risk also requires attention to exposure and probability.<ref name="Watts-5-3">Watts and Hall (2002b), pp. 5-2–5-4.</ref><ref name="Watts-5-155">Watts and Hall (2002a), pp. 5-154–5-156.</ref>

Fire risk cannot be described completely by fire size or by the number of past fires. The assessment must ask what could happen, how severe the consequences would be and how likely those consequences are. The answers depend on the building, occupants, systems and evidence being considered.<ref name="Watts-5-1">Watts and Hall (2002b), pp. 5-1–5-3.</ref><ref name="Hall-5-65">Hall and Ahrens (2002), pp. 5-65–5-67.</ref>

Zero risk is not an achievable goal. Fire safety work instead evaluates and reduces risks under stated conditions, then considers whether the remaining risk is acceptable. Acceptability involves values and stakeholder decisions as well as technical calculations.<ref name="Watts-5-4">Watts and Hall (2002b), pp. 5-3–5-4.</ref><ref name="IFEG-0-2-8">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 0.2-7–0.2-8.</ref>

== Hazard, exposure and consequence ==

A hazard is a chemical or physical condition that can cause injury or damage. Fuel, an ignition source and an impaired barrier can each form part of a hazardous condition. Their presence identifies potential, but does not quantify how likely or severe an event will be.<ref name="Watts-5-3" />

A scenario is a sequence of events leading to a fire loss. It can include ignition, development, system responses, exposure and final consequences. Evaluating only one link would omit the causal path that determines the outcome.<ref name="Watts-5-2">Watts and Hall (2002b), pp. 5-1–5-2.</ref><ref name="Watts-5-157">Watts and Hall (2002a), pp. 5-157–5-158.</ref>

Exposure concerns who or what can experience harm. Occupants, firefighters, a building, its contents and neighbouring property can have different exposures. The same fire can therefore create several different risk problems.<ref name="Watts-5-155" /><ref name="IFEG-1-2-7">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.2-7–1.2-8.</ref>

Consequences describe the effects if the event occurs. They can include injury, death, property damage, business interruption, environmental harm or loss of heritage. Some consequences are measured directly, while others require explicit valuation and assumptions.<ref name="Watts-5-2" /><ref name="Watts-5-155" />

Fire risk analysis must connect these elements. A severe consequence with low likelihood and a frequent event with limited consequences present different decisions. Neither consequence nor frequency alone supplies the full comparison.<ref name="Watts-5-2" /><ref name="Watts-5-4" />

== Likelihood, frequency and probability ==

Frequency describes how often an event occurs within a period. Probability is the proportion of relevant opportunities or time in which the event occurs in a frequency interpretation. A count of fires alone does not provide the opportunities needed to form such a proportion.<ref name="Watts-5-3" /><ref name="Watts-5-159">Watts and Hall (2002a), p. 5-159.</ref>

For example, a rate per building-year requires both the number of incidents and the relevant building exposure. Without that denominator, a larger incident count may simply reflect more buildings or better reporting. The rate's meaning depends on its defined exposure measure.<ref name="Hall-5-65" />

Probability can also represent a degree of belief based on knowledge and judgement. This subjective interpretation can be useful where events are rare or the future differs from the recorded past. It requires transparent treatment of the knowledge and assumptions used.<ref name="Watts-5-3" /><ref name="Watts-5-159" />

Changing buildings and contents complicate future estimates. Past data may describe another fuel arrangement, occupancy or protection system. A statistical frequency is therefore not automatically a prediction of future risk in the altered setting.<ref name="Watts-5-159" /><ref name="Hall-5-70">Hall and Ahrens (2002), pp. 5-69–5-71.</ref>

The distinction between likelihood and consequence must be retained in every scenario. High reliability can reduce the chance of failure but not prove that a failure would be harmless. Likewise, a severe scenario can be credible without being probable enough to dominate a risk decision.<ref name="Watts-5-4" /><ref name="Notarianni-5-43">Notarianni (2002), pp. 5-43–5-44.</ref>

== Individual and societal measures ==

[[Individual risk]] concerns the probability of injury or death to a person at a specified location relative to a defined source. Barry's description uses location within the fire or explosion effect zone. It can be shown as a profile or as contours of equal potential risk.<ref name="Barry-5-210">Barry (2002), pp. 5-210–5-211.</ref>

Individual-risk contours describe geographical variation of that potential harm. The cited definition does not require a person to be present for the location-based contour to be drawn. Actual exposure and the presence of people must still be addressed when interpreting the result.<ref name="Barry-5-210" />

[[Societal risk]] considers the likelihood of multiple casualties resulting from fire or explosion. It therefore addresses population outcomes rather than only a single person's location. The population at risk and the likelihood of presence must be defined.<ref name="Barry-5-211">Barry (2002), pp. 5-211–5-212.</ref>

One presentation is a cumulative frequency plot of events exceeding different fatality numbers. Such a curve shows how the frequency changes with consequence severity. It relies on assumptions about exposed populations, mitigation and the reliability of those assumptions.<ref name="Barry-5-211" />

Individual and societal measures answer different questions and are not interchangeable. A location with high individual risk need not describe the total population consequence. A low expected total can also conceal a high consequence event with small frequency.<ref name="Barry-5-211" /><ref name="Watts-5-2" />

== Fire statistics as evidence ==

[[Fire statistics]] supply incident, exposure and loss data for estimating parts of a risk problem. They can inform ignition frequencies, consequence distributions and the effectiveness of protective measures. Their definitions and collection methods must be compatible with the analysis question.<ref name="Hall-5-65" /><ref name="Hall-5-67">Hall and Ahrens (2002), pp. 5-67–5-69.</ref>

Incident records provide observed cases, but not every fire is reported. Small fires may be handled by occupants or private brigades and never enter municipal records. National estimates consequently require careful treatment of missing populations and reporting practices.<ref name="Hall-5-70" />

Laboratory data provide controlled measurements of ignition, fire growth, material response or system activation. Field observations provide evidence of degradation, impairment and actual use. These sources complement incident statistics rather than competing with them.<ref name="Hall-5-65" /><ref name="Hall-5-72">Hall and Ahrens (2002), pp. 5-71–5-73.</ref>

Unknown or unreported characteristics can distort patterns. If unknown causes are ignored, every known category can appear to grow even when the total number of incidents is unchanged. Allocation methods make assumptions about those unknown records explicit.<ref name="Hall-5-68">Hall and Ahrens (2002), pp. 5-67–5-69.</ref>

Anecdotes can show the diversity of possible events but cannot estimate incident rates or probabilities. Opportunity samples may overrepresent severe or unusual fires. A larger and more detailed database is not automatically representative of the target population.<ref name="Hall-5-70" />

== Objectives and acceptability ==

[[Fire safety objectives]] define the outcomes being pursued and the people or assets to be protected. They determine which consequences must be characterised and which criteria will be used. Risk analysis without those objectives can produce numbers without a clear decision.<ref name="IFEG-1-2-7" /><ref name="Watts-5-155" />

Acceptable risk is a value judgement applied to a particular measure of risk. It requires a decision about both the measurement scale and the person or community whose acceptance matters. Technical experts, enforcers, managers and the public can weigh costs and benefits differently.<ref name="Watts-5-4" /><ref name="Watts-5-2" />

Zero risk is not a realistic acceptance criterion. IFEG repeats that position in its regulatory discussion, while Watts and Hall emphasise that no technology is completely reliable or immune to misuse. Reducing fire risk can also change other risks and must be evaluated in context.<ref name="Watts-5-4" /><ref name="IFEG-0-2-8" />

Stakeholder involvement can clarify the values behind a decision. The Fire Engineering Brief provides a structure for agreeing on objectives, criteria and scenarios. It does not eliminate disagreement, but it makes those choices visible for review.<ref name="IFEG-0-2-8" /><ref name="IFEG-1-2-2">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), pp. 1.2-2–1.2-3.</ref>

[[ALARP]] is a named concept in the term metadata for this topic, but it is not defined in the supplied source documents. No universal ALARP criterion or numerical threshold is therefore stated in this article. The sources instead support evaluation of residual risk, technically possible reduction and stakeholder acceptability.<ref name="Watts-5-4" /><ref name="IFEG-0-2-8" />

== Risk reduction and system performance ==

Risk reduction can address the frequency of initiating events, the severity of outcomes or exposure to them. Prevention, suppression, compartmentation, evacuation and management affect different stages. The selection should follow the causal structure rather than relying on one preferred measure.<ref name="Watts-5-157" /><ref name="Barry-5-211" />

The fire safety concepts tree distinguishes preventing ignition from managing fire impact. This supports a systematic review of possible measures without assuming every ignition can be prevented. Residual events still require attention to their consequences.<ref name="Watts-5-158">Watts and Hall (2002a), pp. 5-158–5-159.</ref>

Protective-system reliability influences risk. A sprinkler, alarm or smoke-control system can be effective when operational but unavailable because of power, supply, detection or maintenance failures. Common dependencies must be represented when several measures are credited.<ref name="NUREG-10-2">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. 10-2.</ref><ref name="ABCB-131">Australian Building Codes Board (2020), p. 131.</ref>

Reliability data also have limitations. Inspection programmes can miss transient impairments and can overrepresent well-maintained properties. Laboratory and field evidence should be combined to understand both tested performance and actual availability.<ref name="Hall-5-72" /><ref name="Hall-5-71">Hall and Ahrens (2002), pp. 5-71–5-72.</ref>

Reducing risk in one area can introduce other effects. Suppression agents, altered routes and new technologies can create secondary hazards or operational demands. The evaluation should include those effects rather than assuming every protective measure is beneficial in every respect.<ref name="Watts-5-4" /><ref name="NUREG-B57">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2005), p. B-57.</ref>

== Uncertainty and variability ==

Uncertainty includes incomplete knowledge about models, data, inputs and future conditions. Variability describes real differences among people, buildings and events. Treating all variation as one distribution can hide the different meaning of those limitations.<ref name="Watts-5-159" /><ref name="Notarianni-5-43" />

Model uncertainty arises when physical processes are omitted, simplified or represented by empirical correlations. Input uncertainty arises from inaccurate or incomplete values. Both can change a result even when the calculation is implemented correctly.<ref name="Notarianni-5-43" /><ref name="Watts-5-160">Watts and Hall (2002a), p. 5-160.</ref>

Human behaviour introduces both uncertainty and variability. Occupants may not begin moving immediately, may need assistance or may choose familiar routes. Those differences can alter risk to different groups and should not be replaced by a single idealised occupant.<ref name="Notarianni-5-43" /><ref name="Proulx-3-342">Proulx (2002), pp. 3-342–3-344.</ref>

Sensitivity analysis examines whether reasonable changes in inputs alter the decision. Notarianni calls a change in acceptability switchover and links it to criteria, scenarios, models and behavioural assumptions. It is a decision-level concern, not only a numerical variation.<ref name="Notarianni-5-43" />

The analysis record should distinguish measured data from expert judgement. Where evidence is missing or unrepresentative, that limitation should be documented. More decimal places cannot resolve those underlying weaknesses.<ref name="Watts-5-160" /><ref name="Hall-5-70" />

== Interpretation and communication ==

Risk results should be presented in a form that matches the decision. Profiles can show spatial variation, cumulative curves can show multiple-casualty outcomes, and option comparisons can show risk reduction. The chosen format must not hide important uncertainty.<ref name="Barry-5-209">Barry (2002), pp. 5-209–5-212.</ref>

Single-value indices can simplify communication but can also conceal the distribution of events. A severe, low-frequency event and a frequent small loss may produce similar aggregate values while requiring different actions. Contributors to the total should remain visible.<ref name="Barry-5-211" /><ref name="Watts-5-2" />

[[Fire risk assessment]] uses these inputs to identify, evaluate and manage risk in a structured way. It can include hazard identification, consequence and likelihood estimation, control options and evaluation of their effects. The scope and depth should suit the decision.<ref name="Watts-5-4" /><ref name="Watts-5-155" />

A completed assessment should not be treated as permanent. Changes to fuel, occupants, building systems or operations can alter the scenarios and evidence. Re-evaluation is needed when those changes affect the safety basis.<ref name="IFEG-0-3-8">Australian Building Codes Board et al. (2005), p. 0.3-8.</ref>

The useful outcome is an informed decision, not a claim of perfect prediction. The record should identify objectives, scenarios, data, assumptions, uncertainty and remaining risk. This allows stakeholders to judge both the technical result and whether it is acceptable to them.<ref name="Watts-5-4" /><ref name="Watts-5-160" />

The scope of a risk study can be retrospective or prospective. A retrospective study examines what happened and infers patterns from incidents, while a prospective study evaluates how a proposed change may alter future outcomes. Both require relevant data and explicit treatment of differences between past and proposed conditions.<ref name="Watts-5-3" />

Fire hazard analysis and fire risk analysis are related but not identical. Hazard analysis examines what can happen and how bad it can be without necessarily assessing likelihood. Risk analysis adds likelihood and evaluates how control options change the resulting risks.<ref name="Watts-5-2" /><ref name="Watts-5-4" />

Different stakeholders can interpret the same risk reduction differently. A technical assessment may emphasise predicted loss reduction, while a manager considers cost and operations and a community considers fairness and other needs. The engineering report should make the evaluation criteria visible so those perspectives can be discussed.<ref name="Watts-5-2" />

Data should be chosen for the particular level of analysis. A national occupancy estimate, a product assessment and a specific building evaluation require different exposure definitions and detail. Evidence that is suitable for one level may be too aggregated or unrepresentative for another.<ref name="Hall-5-65" /><ref name="Watts-5-3" />

Protective options should be compared by their effects on the complete scenario. A measure can reduce ignition probability, limit spread, reduce exposure or change the consequence, and those effects need not be equal. Comparing only equipment efficiency would miss the resulting change in overall risk.<ref name="Watts-5-157" /><ref name="Barry-5-211" />

Residual risk should be stated after the selected measures are evaluated. This includes hazards that remain, uncertainties that could change the outcome and any new effects introduced by the protection. Such a statement gives decision-makers a more accurate basis than describing only the expected benefit.<ref name="Watts-5-4" /><ref name="Watts-5-160" />

Where the evidence cannot distinguish between plausible outcomes, that limitation should remain visible in the conclusion. It may be necessary to obtain better data, evaluate another scenario or change the design rather than select one outcome arbitrarily. Recording this uncertainty preserves the difference between a demonstrated result and an unresolved risk question.<ref name="Watts-5-160" /><ref name="Notarianni-5-43" />

== See also ==

* [[Fire risk assessment]]
* [[Fire statistics]]
* [[Individual risk]]

== Notes ==

<references />

== References ==

* Australian Building Codes Board. (2020). ''Fire safety verification method data sheets'' (Version 1.1). Author.
* Australian Building Codes Board, National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, & Department of Building and Housing New Zealand. (2005). ''International fire engineering guidelines'' (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.
* Barry, T. F. (2002). Quantitative risk assessment in chemical process industries. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
* Hall, J. R., Jr., & Ahrens, M. J. (2002). Data for engineering analysis. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
* Notarianni, K. A. (2002). Uncertainty. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
* Proulx, G. (2002). Movement of people: The evacuation timing. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2005). ''Fire dynamics tools: Quantitative fire hazard analysis methods for the U.S. nuclear regulatory commission fire protection inspection program'' (NUREG-1805). Author.
* Van Rossum, E. (2027). ''Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering''. Fire Safety Academy.
* Watts, J. M., Jr., & Hall, J. R., Jr. (2002a). Building fire risk analysis. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
* Watts, J. M., Jr., & Hall, J. R., Jr. (2002b). Introduction to fire risk analysis. In P. J. DiNenno (Ed.), ''SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering'' (3rd ed.). National Fire Protection Association.

[[Category:Fire Risk Analysis]]