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	<id>https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?action=history&amp;feed=atom&amp;title=Acceptable_risk</id>
	<title>Acceptable risk - Revision history</title>
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	<updated>2026-11-21T22:24:43Z</updated>
	<subtitle>Revision history for this page on the wiki</subtitle>
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		<id>https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Acceptable_risk&amp;diff=8882&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Linda: Add SVG figures fse-acceptable-risk-v1.svg, fse-acceptable-risk-v2.svg, fse-acceptable-risk-v3.svg, fse-acceptable-risk-v4.svg (list-8 visual plan)</title>
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		<updated>2026-11-14T17:15:37Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Add SVG figures fse-acceptable-risk-v1.svg, fse-acceptable-risk-v2.svg, fse-acceptable-risk-v3.svg, fse-acceptable-risk-v4.svg (list-8 visual plan)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw=&quot;interface&quot;&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 18:15, 14 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l7&quot;&gt;Line 7:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 7:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Risk itself is the potential for unwanted, adverse consequences to life, health, property or the environment. It is usually estimated as the probability of an event multiplied by its consequence.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Watts and Hall (2002), p. 5-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hall and Watts (2008) note that fire risk analysis can be separated into risk estimation, which quantifies severity, probability and their uncertainties, and risk evaluation, which decides how important a value of risk is.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-137.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In the fire risk assessment process, the calculated risk is compared with selected criteria to determine whether it is acceptable.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These criteria come from goals and objectives that are value judgements, not purely scientific constructs.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-137&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In an acceptable risk approach, a certain level of risk is defined as acceptable, and all alternatives that meet it are evaluated strictly on cost.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Risk itself is the potential for unwanted, adverse consequences to life, health, property or the environment. It is usually estimated as the probability of an event multiplied by its consequence.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Watts and Hall (2002), p. 5-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hall and Watts (2008) note that fire risk analysis can be separated into risk estimation, which quantifies severity, probability and their uncertainties, and risk evaluation, which decides how important a value of risk is.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-137.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In the fire risk assessment process, the calculated risk is compared with selected criteria to determine whether it is acceptable.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These criteria come from goals and objectives that are value judgements, not purely scientific constructs.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-137&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In an acceptable risk approach, a certain level of risk is defined as acceptable, and all alternatives that meet it are evaluated strictly on cost.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;[[File:fse-acceptable-risk-v1.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Flowchart of a fire risk assessment from goals and criteria through scenarios and risk calculation to the decision whether the risk is acceptable|Fire risk assessment process: the calculated risk is compared with criteria set at the start. If it is not acceptable, the design or decision is changed and the risk is recalculated.]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Regulations use the same idea. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG, 2005) explain that the 2005 National Building Code of Canada words its objectives as &amp;quot;limit the probability&amp;quot; and refers to &amp;quot;unacceptable risk&amp;quot;.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-CA-0.2-2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In that code, acceptable risk is the risk remaining after the code is complied with.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-CA-0.2-2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In New Zealand, Building Code objective C1(a), restated in Verification Method C/VM2 (second edition, 2025), is to safeguard people from an unacceptable risk of injury or illness caused by fire.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;MBIE25-37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 37.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Regulations use the same idea. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG, 2005) explain that the 2005 National Building Code of Canada words its objectives as &amp;quot;limit the probability&amp;quot; and refers to &amp;quot;unacceptable risk&amp;quot;.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-CA-0.2-2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In that code, acceptable risk is the risk remaining after the code is complied with.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-CA-0.2-2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In New Zealand, Building Code objective C1(a), restated in Verification Method C/VM2 (second edition, 2025), is to safeguard people from an unacceptable risk of injury or illness caused by fire.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;MBIE25-37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 37.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l34&quot;&gt;Line 34:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 35:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Performance-based guidance can use the code itself as the benchmark. The IFEG (2005) call this the comparative or &amp;quot;equivalence&amp;quot; approach. A trial design is compared with an otherwise identical building that follows the deemed-to-satisfy (DTS) or prescriptive provisions, using the same models and data. In the absolute approach, results are instead checked against the objectives with agreed acceptance criteria.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-1.2-21&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Performance-based guidance can use the code itself as the benchmark. The IFEG (2005) call this the comparative or &amp;quot;equivalence&amp;quot; approach. A trial design is compared with an otherwise identical building that follows the deemed-to-satisfy (DTS) or prescriptive provisions, using the same models and data. In the absolute approach, results are instead checked against the objectives with agreed acceptance criteria.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-1.2-21&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;[[File:fse-acceptable-risk-v2.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Two side-by-side panels comparing a trial design with a code-compliant reference building and with an agreed absolute criterion|Comparative and absolute evaluation. In the comparative approach the code-compliant reference building implicitly defines the acceptable risk; in the absolute approach an agreed criterion does.]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Australia&amp;#039;s Fire Safety Verification Method uses the comparative route. The FSVM Standard 2022 notes that the National Construction Code has no specific safety targets, and it requires a design to be at least equivalent to the DTS Provisions.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB22-7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These provisions are accepted as reflecting societal expectations for individual risk, societal risk and defence in depth.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB22-7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; According to the ABCB handbook, they evolved in response to, amongst other things, loss of life, and tend to mirror community values and risk appetite.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 22.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The DTS reference building thus indirectly defines acceptable individual and societal risk levels. The stakeholders must record their consensus that it is a reasonable benchmark.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Australia&amp;#039;s Fire Safety Verification Method uses the comparative route. The FSVM Standard 2022 notes that the National Construction Code has no specific safety targets, and it requires a design to be at least equivalent to the DTS Provisions.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB22-7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These provisions are accepted as reflecting societal expectations for individual risk, societal risk and defence in depth.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB22-7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; According to the ABCB handbook, they evolved in response to, amongst other things, loss of life, and tend to mirror community values and risk appetite.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 22.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The DTS reference building thus indirectly defines acceptable individual and societal risk levels. The stakeholders must record their consensus that it is a reasonable benchmark.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l83&quot;&gt;Line 83:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 85:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The ABCB handbook gives a worked example of a comparison between two fire safety systems.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), pp. 118–119.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Deterministic modelling shows that nobody is exposed to untenable conditions if either system works, and 2 people are exposed if it fails. System A, the reference solution, has a reliability of 90 per cent, so it fails with a probability of 0.1. System B, the proposed solution, has a reliability of 70 per cent and fails with a probability of 0.3. The risk measures are 0.1 × 2 = 0.2 for System A and 0.3 × 2 = 0.6 for System B. System B thus exposes occupants to three times the risk, so the systems are not equivalent, although the deterministic analysis alone would rate them equal.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-118&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The ABCB handbook gives a worked example of a comparison between two fire safety systems.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), pp. 118–119.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Deterministic modelling shows that nobody is exposed to untenable conditions if either system works, and 2 people are exposed if it fails. System A, the reference solution, has a reliability of 90 per cent, so it fails with a probability of 0.1. System B, the proposed solution, has a reliability of 70 per cent and fails with a probability of 0.3. The risk measures are 0.1 × 2 = 0.2 for System A and 0.3 × 2 = 0.6 for System B. System B thus exposes occupants to three times the risk, so the systems are not equivalent, although the deterministic analysis alone would rate them equal.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-118&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;[[File:fse-acceptable-risk-v3.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Bar chart: System A with 90 per cent reliability has a risk measure of 0.2, System B with 70 per cent reliability has 0.6|Risk measure (probability of failure × 2 people exposed) for two fire safety systems. System B carries three times the risk of the reference System A, although both give the same deterministic result.]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;A second example concerns the frequency scale of a risk matrix. In Meacham’s (2002) example, anticipated events exceed 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year. Unlikely events exceed 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; but do not exceed 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year. Extremely unlikely events exceed 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; but do not exceed 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year. Events at or below 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year are beyond extremely unlikely.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mea02-5-166&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;A second example concerns the frequency scale of a risk matrix. In Meacham’s (2002) example, anticipated events exceed 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year. Unlikely events exceed 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; but do not exceed 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year. Extremely unlikely events exceed 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; but do not exceed 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year. Events at or below 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year are beyond extremely unlikely.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mea02-5-166&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;[[File:fse-acceptable-risk-v4.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Four by four risk matrix with frequency bins from beyond extremely unlikely to anticipated and consequence levels from negligible to high|Example risk matrix. Thirty scenarios of 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year each fall in the lowest frequency bin on their own, but together (3 × 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year) they fall in the extremely unlikely bin. Stakeholders decide which cells are acceptable.]]&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Meacham warns that frequencies should refer to exceeding a given loss, not to one scenario. One scenario at 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year may suggest that fire is no concern, but 30 such scenarios add up to 3 × 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; fires per year.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mea02-5-166&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; As an illustration, each scenario alone would sit in the lowest bin, while the total falls in the extremely unlikely bin, one step higher.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Meacham warns that frequencies should refer to exceeding a given loss, not to one scenario. One scenario at 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year may suggest that fire is no concern, but 30 such scenarios add up to 3 × 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; fires per year.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mea02-5-166&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; As an illustration, each scenario alone would sit in the lowest bin, while the total falls in the extremely unlikely bin, one step higher.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;

&lt;!-- diff cache key firesb_pjbsiy42-wiki_:diff:1.41:old-4280:rev-8882:php=table --&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Linda</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Acceptable_risk&amp;diff=4280&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Lisa: FSE wiki: fact-check corrections: scope equivalence and FSES, clarify risk units and matrix bins (written by Claude Opus 5.5)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Acceptable_risk&amp;diff=4280&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-08T02:08:38Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;FSE wiki: fact-check corrections: scope equivalence and FSES, clarify risk units and matrix bins (written by Claude Opus 5.5)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw=&quot;interface&quot;&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 03:08, 8 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l31&quot;&gt;Line 31:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 31:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Hall and Watts (2008) describe several bases for an acceptable level.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The level is often set with an eye towards affordability and may be reset when technology changes. In their words, this makes the approach a kind of backdoor cost-benefit analysis. Other bases are historically acceptable risk, under which anything in use for a long time is accepted, and unavoidable risk, such as background radiation used as a guide for medical X-rays. In fire protection, acceptable risk has sometimes been inferred from NFPA codes and standards. The extreme case is a minimum risk approach, in which cost is ignored until all feasible safety improvements have been made.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Hall and Watts (2008) describe several bases for an acceptable level.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The level is often set with an eye towards affordability and may be reset when technology changes. In their words, this makes the approach a kind of backdoor cost-benefit analysis. Other bases are historically acceptable risk, under which anything in use for a long time is accepted, and unavoidable risk, such as background radiation used as a guide for medical X-rays. In fire protection, acceptable risk has sometimes been inferred from NFPA codes and standards. The extreme case is a minimum risk approach, in which cost is ignored until all feasible safety improvements have been made.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;Most regulations &lt;/del&gt;set the level implicitly. Schwartz (2008) describes codes and standards as methods, systems and uses that society deems to provide an acceptable level of safety.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Schwartz-1-73&quot;&amp;gt;Schwartz (2008), p. 1-73.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Puchovsky and Hurley (2008) note that this level was not explicitly defined: how much safety, for whom and under what conditions.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;PH08-3-167&quot;&amp;gt;Puchovsky and Hurley (2008), p. 3-167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;Codes often &lt;/ins&gt;set the level implicitly. Schwartz (2008) describes codes and standards as methods, systems and uses that society deems to provide an acceptable level of safety.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Schwartz-1-73&quot;&amp;gt;Schwartz (2008), p. 1-73.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Puchovsky and Hurley (2008) note that this level was not explicitly defined: how much safety, for whom and under what conditions.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;PH08-3-167&quot;&amp;gt;Puchovsky and Hurley (2008), p. 3-167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Performance-based guidance can use the code itself as the benchmark. The IFEG (2005) call this the comparative or &amp;quot;equivalence&amp;quot; approach. A trial design is compared with an otherwise identical building that follows the deemed-to-satisfy (DTS) or prescriptive provisions, using the same models and data. In the absolute approach, results are instead checked against the objectives with agreed acceptance criteria.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-1.2-21&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Performance-based guidance can use the code itself as the benchmark. The IFEG (2005) call this the comparative or &amp;quot;equivalence&amp;quot; approach. A trial design is compared with an otherwise identical building that follows the deemed-to-satisfy (DTS) or prescriptive provisions, using the same models and data. In the absolute approach, results are instead checked against the objectives with agreed acceptance criteria.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-1.2-21&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Australia &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;follows &lt;/del&gt;the comparative route. The FSVM Standard 2022 notes that the National Construction Code has no specific safety targets, and it requires a design to be at least equivalent to the DTS Provisions.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;ABCB22-7&quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These provisions are accepted as reflecting societal expectations for individual risk, societal risk and defence in depth.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;ABCB22-7&quot; /&amp;gt; According to the ABCB handbook, they evolved in response to, amongst other things, loss of life, and tend to mirror community values and risk appetite.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;ABCB20-22&quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 22.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The DTS reference building thus indirectly defines acceptable individual and societal risk levels. The stakeholders must record their consensus that it is a reasonable benchmark.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;ABCB20-46&quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Australia&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&#039;s Fire Safety Verification Method uses &lt;/ins&gt;the comparative route. The FSVM Standard 2022 notes that the National Construction Code has no specific safety targets, and it requires a design to be at least equivalent to the DTS Provisions.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;ABCB22-7&quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These provisions are accepted as reflecting societal expectations for individual risk, societal risk and defence in depth.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;ABCB22-7&quot; /&amp;gt; According to the ABCB handbook, they evolved in response to, amongst other things, loss of life, and tend to mirror community values and risk appetite.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;ABCB20-22&quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 22.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The DTS reference building thus indirectly defines acceptable individual and societal risk levels. The stakeholders must record their consensus that it is a reasonable benchmark.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;ABCB20-46&quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In the Netherlands, a risk-based alternative to the building regulations (Bbl) is usually referred to as &quot;equivalence&quot;. Article 4.7 of the Omgevingswet allows &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;such a deviation &lt;/del&gt;if at least the &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;same level of fire safety is reached as with &lt;/del&gt;the prescribed measure.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;VR-1&quot;&amp;gt;Van Rossum (2027), §1.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Van Rossum (2027) notes that the Bbl aims to prevent casualties and fire spread to another plot. It does not say how many deaths or injuries may occur in a fire.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;VR-1.2&quot;&amp;gt;Van Rossum (2027), §1.2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The residual risk can be expressed as an acceptable failure probability of a so-called risk subsystem, and one way to set it is comparison with a reference situation based on the regulations.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;VR-1.2&quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;The &lt;/del&gt;Netherlands has no risk-based limit values.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;VR-1.4&quot;&amp;gt;Van Rossum (2027), §1.4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In the Netherlands, a risk-based alternative to the building regulations (Bbl) is usually referred to as &quot;equivalence&quot;. Article 4.7 of the Omgevingswet allows &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;an equivalent measure &lt;/ins&gt;if &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;it achieves &lt;/ins&gt;at least the &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;result intended by &lt;/ins&gt;the prescribed measure.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;VR-1&quot;&amp;gt;Van Rossum (2027), §1.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Van Rossum (2027) notes that the Bbl aims to prevent casualties and fire spread to another plot. It does not say how many deaths or injuries may occur in a fire.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;VR-1.2&quot;&amp;gt;Van Rossum (2027), §1.2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The residual risk can be expressed as an acceptable failure probability of a so-called risk subsystem, and one way to set it is comparison with a reference situation based on the regulations.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;VR-1.2&quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;For quantitative fire safety engineering, Van Rossum (2027) notes that the &lt;/ins&gt;Netherlands has no &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;general &lt;/ins&gt;risk-based limit values.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;VR-1.4&quot;&amp;gt;Van Rossum (2027), §1.4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Explicit criteria state a target. Puchovsky and Hurley (2008) give an objective under which the risk of death due to fire is not higher than the current level for similar properties. An alternative is a limit of a stated number of deaths per 100,000 people exposed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PH08-3-171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Puchovsky and Hurley (2008), p. 3-171.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Barry (2002) lists hazard severity limits, event likelihood limits and management&amp;#039;s risk tolerance among the issues to agree before a quantitative risk assessment.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Barry02-5-177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Barry (2002), p. 5-177.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Explicit criteria state a target. Puchovsky and Hurley (2008) give an objective under which the risk of death due to fire is not higher than the current level for similar properties. An alternative is a limit of a stated number of deaths per 100,000 people exposed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PH08-3-171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Puchovsky and Hurley (2008), p. 3-171.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Barry (2002) lists hazard severity limits, event likelihood limits and management&amp;#039;s risk tolerance among the issues to agree before a quantitative risk assessment.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Barry02-5-177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Barry (2002), p. 5-177.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l54&quot;&gt;Line 54:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 54:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&amp;lt;math display=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;END = \sum_j P_j N_j \qquad ERL = \frac{ELLB}{OP \times t_D}&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&amp;lt;math display=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;END = \sum_j P_j N_j \qquad ERL = \frac{ELLB}{OP \times t_D}&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;The design &lt;/del&gt;is &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;accepted when &lt;/del&gt;the estimated ERL does not exceed the accepted value. That value may be a specified number, in an absolute evaluation, or the ERL of a code-compliant design, in a comparative one.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;IFEG-1.2-23&quot; /&amp;gt; In a comparative evaluation, the same criteria apply to both designs, and the trial design should perform no worse than the benchmark.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;IFEG-1.2-26&quot;&amp;gt;National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-26.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;In the IFEG event-tree example, the acceptance criterion &lt;/ins&gt;is &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;that &lt;/ins&gt;the estimated ERL does not exceed the accepted value. That value may be a specified number, in an absolute evaluation, or the ERL of a code-compliant design, in a comparative one.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;IFEG-1.2-23&quot; /&amp;gt; In a comparative evaluation, the same criteria apply to both designs, and the trial design should perform no worse than the benchmark.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;IFEG-1.2-26&quot;&amp;gt;National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-26.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;In schematic form, the two tests are:&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&amp;lt;math display=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ERL_\mathrm{est} \le ERL_\mathrm{acc} \qquad R_\mathrm{proposed} \le R_\mathrm{reference}&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&amp;lt;math display=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ERL_\mathrm{est} \le ERL_\mathrm{acc} \qquad R_\mathrm{proposed} \le R_\mathrm{reference}&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l61&quot;&gt;Line 61:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 61:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;! Symbol !! Description !! Unit&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;! Symbol !! Description !! Unit&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;|-&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;|-&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;R&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Risk of an undesired event || &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;consequence &lt;/del&gt;per year &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;(or per fire)&lt;/del&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;R&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Risk of an undesired event || &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;expected consequences &lt;/ins&gt;per year&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;|-&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;|-&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;F&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Frequency of the undesired event || 1/year &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;(or per fire)&lt;/del&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;F&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Frequency of the undesired event || 1/year&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;|-&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;|-&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;C&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Expected consequences of the event || deaths, injuries or money&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;C&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Expected consequences of the event || deaths, injuries or money&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l84&quot;&gt;Line 84:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 84:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The ABCB handbook gives a worked example of a comparison between two fire safety systems.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), pp. 118–119.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Deterministic modelling shows that nobody is exposed to untenable conditions if either system works, and 2 people are exposed if it fails. System A, the reference solution, has a reliability of 90 per cent, so it fails with a probability of 0.1. System B, the proposed solution, has a reliability of 70 per cent and fails with a probability of 0.3. The risk measures are 0.1 × 2 = 0.2 for System A and 0.3 × 2 = 0.6 for System B. System B thus exposes occupants to three times the risk, so the systems are not equivalent, although the deterministic analysis alone would rate them equal.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-118&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The ABCB handbook gives a worked example of a comparison between two fire safety systems.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), pp. 118–119.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Deterministic modelling shows that nobody is exposed to untenable conditions if either system works, and 2 people are exposed if it fails. System A, the reference solution, has a reliability of 90 per cent, so it fails with a probability of 0.1. System B, the proposed solution, has a reliability of 70 per cent and fails with a probability of 0.3. The risk measures are 0.1 × 2 = 0.2 for System A and 0.3 × 2 = 0.6 for System B. System B thus exposes occupants to three times the risk, so the systems are not equivalent, although the deterministic analysis alone would rate them equal.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-118&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;A second example concerns the frequency scale of a risk matrix. &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;Meacham &lt;/del&gt;(2002) &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;gives &lt;/del&gt;example &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;bins: &lt;/del&gt;anticipated events &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;above &lt;/del&gt;10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;, unlikely &lt;/del&gt;events &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;from &lt;/del&gt;10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;to &lt;/del&gt;10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;, and extremely &lt;/del&gt;unlikely events &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;from &lt;/del&gt;10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;to &lt;/del&gt;10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year. Events below 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year are beyond extremely unlikely.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Mea02-5-166&quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;He &lt;/del&gt;warns that frequencies should refer to exceeding a given loss, not to one scenario. One scenario at 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year may suggest that fire is no concern, but 30 such scenarios add up to 3 × 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; fires per year.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Mea02-5-166&quot; /&amp;gt; As an illustration, each scenario alone would sit in the lowest bin, while the total falls in the extremely unlikely bin, one step higher.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;A second example concerns the frequency scale of a risk matrix. &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;In Meacham’s &lt;/ins&gt;(2002) example&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;, &lt;/ins&gt;anticipated events &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;exceed &lt;/ins&gt;10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;. Unlikely &lt;/ins&gt;events &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;exceed &lt;/ins&gt;10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;but do not exceed &lt;/ins&gt;10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;. Extremely &lt;/ins&gt;unlikely events &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;exceed &lt;/ins&gt;10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;but do not exceed &lt;/ins&gt;10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year. Events &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;at or &lt;/ins&gt;below 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year are beyond extremely unlikely.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Mea02-5-166&quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;Meacham &lt;/ins&gt;warns that frequencies should refer to exceeding a given loss, not to one scenario. One scenario at 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year may suggest that fire is no concern, but 30 such scenarios add up to 3 × 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; fires per year.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Mea02-5-166&quot; /&amp;gt; As an illustration, each scenario alone would sit in the lowest bin, while the total falls in the extremely unlikely bin, one step higher.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;== Acceptable risk in decision making ==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;== Acceptable risk in decision making ==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l98&quot;&gt;Line 98:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 100:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;An acceptable level is only as sound as the analysis behind it. Meacham (2002) counts the uncertainty in the criteria chosen for assessing acceptability among the uncertainties that often go unrecognised.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mea02-5-159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Meacham (2002), p. 5-159.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Notarianni (2002) notes that performance criteria had not been established or agreed. A different choice of criteria could make the same design acceptable in one jurisdiction and unacceptable in another.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Not02-5-47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Notarianni (2002), pp. 5-46–5-47.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hall and Watts (2008) add that the acceptable risk approach runs counter to most approaches to decision making in business.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;An acceptable level is only as sound as the analysis behind it. Meacham (2002) counts the uncertainty in the criteria chosen for assessing acceptability among the uncertainties that often go unrecognised.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mea02-5-159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Meacham (2002), p. 5-159.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Notarianni (2002) notes that performance criteria had not been established or agreed. A different choice of criteria could make the same design acceptable in one jurisdiction and unacceptable in another.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Not02-5-47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Notarianni (2002), pp. 5-46–5-47.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hall and Watts (2008) add that the acceptable risk approach runs counter to most approaches to decision making in business.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Implicit levels are not consistent either. Van Rossum (2027) explains that Dutch regulations grew partly from consensus and partly from history, without a quantified goal. Per hour of stay, the chance of dying in a fire is much greater in a residential building than in an assembly building. Yet the fire detection requirements are stricter for assembly buildings.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;VR-1.2&quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;The &lt;/del&gt;US Fire Safety Evaluation System &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;is &lt;/del&gt;an index method for &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;showing &lt;/del&gt;equivalence to the 2000 edition of NFPA 101 &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;in &lt;/del&gt;health care facilities. &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;In it&lt;/del&gt;, &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;a &lt;/del&gt;hardship adjustment &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;sets &lt;/del&gt;the risk &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;in &lt;/del&gt;existing &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;buildings at &lt;/del&gt;60 per cent of that for &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;a &lt;/del&gt;new &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;one&lt;/del&gt;.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Watts02-5-132&quot;&amp;gt;Watts (2002), &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;pp&lt;/del&gt;. 5-&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;132–5-133&lt;/del&gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Implicit levels are not consistent either. Van Rossum (2027) explains that Dutch regulations grew partly from consensus and partly from history, without a quantified goal. Per hour of stay, the chance of dying in a fire is much greater in a residential building than in an assembly building. Yet the fire detection requirements are stricter for assembly buildings.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;VR-1.2&quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;In Watts’s 2002 account, the &lt;/ins&gt;US Fire Safety Evaluation System &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;was &lt;/ins&gt;an index method for &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;demonstrating &lt;/ins&gt;equivalence to the 2000 edition of NFPA 101 &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;for certain institutional occupancies, including &lt;/ins&gt;health care facilities.&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Watts02-5-129&quot;&amp;gt;Watts (2002)&lt;/ins&gt;, &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;pp. 5-129–5-132.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Its &lt;/ins&gt;hardship adjustment &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;reduced &lt;/ins&gt;the &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;calculated occupancy-&lt;/ins&gt;risk &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;factor for an &lt;/ins&gt;existing &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;building to &lt;/ins&gt;60 per cent of that for &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;an equivalent &lt;/ins&gt;new &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;building&lt;/ins&gt;.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Watts02-5-132&quot;&amp;gt;Watts (2002), &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;p&lt;/ins&gt;. 5-&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;132&lt;/ins&gt;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Data also limit quantitative criteria. The 2013 commentary on the first edition of New Zealand&amp;#039;s C/VM2 states that a probabilistic risk assessment would ideally be used. The tools and data were, however, not suitable, so the method uses a deterministic egress time comparison with additional checks.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;MBIE13-158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 158.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The same commentary describes the risk of fire spread to adjacent property as small but not insignificant. It quantifies this risk as approximately 3 per cent of all structure fires, based on New Zealand Fire Service statistics for 2005–2010.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;MBIE13-23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Data also limit quantitative criteria. The 2013 commentary on the first edition of New Zealand&amp;#039;s C/VM2 states that a probabilistic risk assessment would ideally be used. The tools and data were, however, not suitable, so the method uses a deterministic egress time comparison with additional checks.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;MBIE13-158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 158.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The same commentary describes the risk of fire spread to adjacent property as small but not insignificant. It quantifies this risk as approximately 3 per cent of all structure fires, based on New Zealand Fire Service statistics for 2005–2010.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;MBIE13-23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;

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&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Lisa</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Acceptable_risk&amp;diff=3157&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Lisa: New FSE wiki article: Acceptable risk (written by Claude Opus 5.5)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://fire-safety.academy/w/index.php?title=Acceptable_risk&amp;diff=3157&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-07T21:11:30Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;New FSE wiki article: Acceptable risk (written by Claude Opus 5.5)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;New page&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;Acceptable risk&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039; is the level of [[fire risk]] that is judged tolerable once fire safety measures are in place. It is a value judgement, made on a chosen scale of risk, about how much probability of death, injury or loss may remain.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Watts and Hall (2002), p. 5-4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The related term &amp;#039;&amp;#039;tolerable risk&amp;#039;&amp;#039; expresses that absolute protection is not possible and that some possibility of damage, injury or loss is accepted in structures.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;MG08-1-116&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Meacham and Galioto (2008), p. 1-116.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Zero risk is not an achievable goal. No universally acceptable level of fire risk exists either, because acceptability depends on the problem and on who is judging.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-4&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In prescriptive codes the acceptable level is usually implicit: it is the risk that remains once the code is complied with.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-CA-0.2-2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), Part 0 – Canada, p. 0.2-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Performance-based design turns it into an acceptance criterion, either by comparison with a code-compliant reference building or by an absolute value such as a maximum expected risk to life.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-1.2-21&amp;quot;&amp;gt;National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-21.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-1.2-23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In the &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire Protection Handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA, 2008), Hall and Watts describe the acceptable risk approach as one that treats risk as a constraint. Options that satisfy it are then compared on cost alone. They also point out its weaknesses.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-138.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Definition and terminology ==&lt;br /&gt;
Watts and Hall define acceptable risk in the &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering&amp;#039;&amp;#039; of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE, third edition, 2002). They describe it as the result of a value judgement applied to a particular scale for the measurement of risk.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-4&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The definition therefore needs two prior decisions. The first is the scale and method used to estimate risk; the second is whose views on acceptability count. For a practising engineer, acceptable risk is likely to be the risk acceptable to the client. For an authority having jurisdiction (AHJ), it is meant to be acceptable to society in general or to a particular community.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-4&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Risk itself is the potential for unwanted, adverse consequences to life, health, property or the environment. It is usually estimated as the probability of an event multiplied by its consequence.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Watts and Hall (2002), p. 5-3.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hall and Watts (2008) note that fire risk analysis can be separated into risk estimation, which quantifies severity, probability and their uncertainties, and risk evaluation, which decides how important a value of risk is.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-137.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In the fire risk assessment process, the calculated risk is compared with selected criteria to determine whether it is acceptable.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hall and Watts (2008), p. 3-136.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These criteria come from goals and objectives that are value judgements, not purely scientific constructs.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-137&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In an acceptable risk approach, a certain level of risk is defined as acceptable, and all alternatives that meet it are evaluated strictly on cost.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Regulations use the same idea. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG, 2005) explain that the 2005 National Building Code of Canada words its objectives as &amp;quot;limit the probability&amp;quot; and refers to &amp;quot;unacceptable risk&amp;quot;.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-CA-0.2-2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In that code, acceptable risk is the risk remaining after the code is complied with.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-CA-0.2-2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In New Zealand, Building Code objective C1(a), restated in Verification Method C/VM2 (second edition, 2025), is to safeguard people from an unacceptable risk of injury or illness caused by fire.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;MBIE25-37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2025b), p. 37.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Why zero risk is not a goal ==&lt;br /&gt;
Watts and Hall (2002) call it an axiom of fire risk analysis that zero risk is not an achievable goal.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-4&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; No technology is 100 per cent reliable or immune to misuse, and lightning, wildland fires, earthquakes and wind storms can also cause fire loss. Reducing fire risk may even increase other risks, as with the potential damage to the ozone layer from halon. The goal that comes closest to zero risk is risk as low as is technically possible. In practice this may mean accepting the residual risk after all identified risk reduction strategies have been adopted.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-4&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Puchovsky and Hurley (2008) state that a risk-free environment cannot be achieved under either prescriptive or performance-based design.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PH08-3-168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Puchovsky and Hurley (2008), p. 3-168.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Extra resources eventually run up against the law of diminishing returns, and stricter requirements cost more to meet. They describe building regulation as a balancing act between the level of safety that society requires and the cost of providing it.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PH08-3-168&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Guidance documents for engineers state the same principle. The IFEG (2005) turn it into a rule for analysis: acceptance criteria must be realistic, and zero risk is not an appropriate criterion.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-1.2-25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-25.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The handbook of the Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB) for the Fire Safety Verification Method (FSVM, 2020) adds that removing fire risk completely is impractical. As that target is approached, the fire safety strategy tends to conflict with the function and use of the building.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-28&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 28.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For communities, Granito (2008) writes that a certain level of fire loss must be accepted as tolerable because resources are limited.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Granito-12-19&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Granito (2008), p. 12-19.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Value judgements and risk perception ==&lt;br /&gt;
Watts and Hall (2002) describe the identification of an acceptable level of risk as more a philosophical task than a technical one.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Watts and Hall (2002), pp. 5-1–5-2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; They note a contradiction in public behaviour: little attention is paid to the fire problem in general, yet every serious fire brings a clamour for change. Accepting a level of risk requires a value judgement, and people make different value judgements.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Watts and Hall illustrate the role of values with four views of residential sprinklers. Experts largely agree that residential sprinklers can significantly reduce calculated fire risk. At the time of writing (2002), however, the average citizen appeared to value that reduction less than the benefit of a new car. Enforcers are often seen as guardians of societal values but must decide when it is acceptable to dictate safety choices. Managerial groups such as architects and builders are likely to be affected more by the costs than by the benefits.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Perception also shapes acceptance. Studies of risk perception, as summarised by Watts and Hall, found that objectively equal risks are perceived differently when they differ in certainty, familiarity, voluntariness, detectability or how dramatic they are.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-3&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Hall (2008) notes that the public wants most of all to be protected from fire risks associated with strangers. Yet people are much more at risk from themselves, their families and friends. Risks are less acceptable when they are unfamiliar or involuntary.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Hall08-5-107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hall (2008), p. 5-107.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Notarianni (2002) adds that some people would accept more risk to fire fighters in return for less risk to the public, while others would not.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Not02-5-46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Notarianni (2002), p. 5-46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For transport vehicles, Bukowski (2002) observes that the public is more hazard averse than risk averse. Accidents with many fatalities are considered unacceptable however unlikely they are, so the concept of acceptable risk may not apply there.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Buk02-5-232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Bukowski (2002), p. 5-232.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Watts and Hall (2002) consider the view that the present public fire risk must be acceptable, because otherwise there would be more concern, not a fully reliable generalisation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-4&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; People may believe the risk to be lower than it is. They may also see no feasible alternative, or have no politically effective way to show that they do not accept it. Puchovsky and Hurley (2008) add that safety goals set by society are value judgements that cannot be compromised, even by the AHJ that verifies compliance. Owners, financers and insurers may set higher goals, as long as these do not conflict with those of society.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PH08-3-175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Puchovsky and Hurley (2008), p. 3-175.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== How acceptable levels are set ==&lt;br /&gt;
Hall and Watts (2008) describe several bases for an acceptable level.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The level is often set with an eye towards affordability and may be reset when technology changes. In their words, this makes the approach a kind of backdoor cost-benefit analysis. Other bases are historically acceptable risk, under which anything in use for a long time is accepted, and unavoidable risk, such as background radiation used as a guide for medical X-rays. In fire protection, acceptable risk has sometimes been inferred from NFPA codes and standards. The extreme case is a minimum risk approach, in which cost is ignored until all feasible safety improvements have been made.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most regulations set the level implicitly. Schwartz (2008) describes codes and standards as methods, systems and uses that society deems to provide an acceptable level of safety.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Schwartz-1-73&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Schwartz (2008), p. 1-73.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Puchovsky and Hurley (2008) note that this level was not explicitly defined: how much safety, for whom and under what conditions.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PH08-3-167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Puchovsky and Hurley (2008), p. 3-167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Performance-based guidance can use the code itself as the benchmark. The IFEG (2005) call this the comparative or &amp;quot;equivalence&amp;quot; approach. A trial design is compared with an otherwise identical building that follows the deemed-to-satisfy (DTS) or prescriptive provisions, using the same models and data. In the absolute approach, results are instead checked against the objectives with agreed acceptance criteria.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-1.2-21&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Australia follows the comparative route. The FSVM Standard 2022 notes that the National Construction Code has no specific safety targets, and it requires a design to be at least equivalent to the DTS Provisions.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB22-7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2022), p. 7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; These provisions are accepted as reflecting societal expectations for individual risk, societal risk and defence in depth.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB22-7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; According to the ABCB handbook, they evolved in response to, amongst other things, loss of life, and tend to mirror community values and risk appetite.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 22.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The DTS reference building thus indirectly defines acceptable individual and societal risk levels. The stakeholders must record their consensus that it is a reasonable benchmark.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 46.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Netherlands, a risk-based alternative to the building regulations (Bbl) is usually referred to as &amp;quot;equivalence&amp;quot;. Article 4.7 of the Omgevingswet allows such a deviation if at least the same level of fire safety is reached as with the prescribed measure.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;VR-1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Van Rossum (2027), §1.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Van Rossum (2027) notes that the Bbl aims to prevent casualties and fire spread to another plot. It does not say how many deaths or injuries may occur in a fire.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;VR-1.2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Van Rossum (2027), §1.2.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The residual risk can be expressed as an acceptable failure probability of a so-called risk subsystem, and one way to set it is comparison with a reference situation based on the regulations.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;VR-1.2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The Netherlands has no risk-based limit values.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;VR-1.4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Van Rossum (2027), §1.4.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Explicit criteria state a target. Puchovsky and Hurley (2008) give an objective under which the risk of death due to fire is not higher than the current level for similar properties. An alternative is a limit of a stated number of deaths per 100,000 people exposed.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PH08-3-171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Puchovsky and Hurley (2008), p. 3-171.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Barry (2002) lists hazard severity limits, event likelihood limits and management&amp;#039;s risk tolerance among the issues to agree before a quantitative risk assessment.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Barry02-5-177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Barry (2002), p. 5-177.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Lane (2008) notes that the accepted level of risk varies between countries and in many cases is not explicitly documented. In Europe, it is implicitly captured in the partial safety factors of each National Annex.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Lane-19-86&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lane (2008), p. 19-86.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In a risk matrix, the stakeholders decide which combinations of consequence and frequency are acceptable.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mea02-5-166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Meacham (2002), pp. 5-166–5-167.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Performance matrices instead group buildings by importance, each group with its own tolerable level of impact.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;MG08-1-116&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Risk measures and acceptance criteria ==&lt;br /&gt;
Barry (2002) writes fire and explosion risk as the frequency of an undesired event times its expected consequences. Risk can therefore be reduced by lowering the frequency, the consequences or both.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Barry02-5-176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Barry (2002), p. 5-176.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Bukowski (2002) applies the same logic to ranking: a scenario with 10 injuries that is ten times more likely than one with 50 injuries is the higher risk.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Buk02-5-232&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;math display=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;R = F \times C&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Two measures of harm to people are common. The ABCB handbook interprets [[individual risk]] as the frequency at which a person may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from a fire in the building.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-22&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; [[Societal risk]] relates frequency to the number of people harmed in a given population. It matters for hazards that can affect many people at once.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-22&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Barry (2002) presents societal risk as F–N curves, which plot the cumulative frequency of multiple fatalities against the number of fatalities. Logarithmic axes are usual because the frequencies span several orders of magnitude.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Barry02-5-210&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Barry (2002), pp. 5-210–5-211.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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For buildings, the IFEG (2005) combine several fire scenarios. Each scenario has a probability of developing after ignition and a number of occupants exposed to untenable conditions, taken as the number of deaths. The expected number of deaths is the sum of probability times deaths over all scenarios.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-2.3-5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), pp. 2.3-4–2.3-5.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The expected risk to life (ERL) divides the expected deaths over the design life by the building population and the design life.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-2.3-5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;math display=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;END = \sum_j P_j N_j \qquad ERL = \frac{ELLB}{OP \times t_D}&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The design is accepted when the estimated ERL does not exceed the accepted value. That value may be a specified number, in an absolute evaluation, or the ERL of a code-compliant design, in a comparative one.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-1.2-23&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In a comparative evaluation, the same criteria apply to both designs, and the trial design should perform no worse than the benchmark.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;IFEG-1.2-26&amp;quot;&amp;gt;National Research Council of Canada et al. (2005), p. 1.2-26.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;math display=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ERL_\mathrm{est} \le ERL_\mathrm{acc} \qquad R_\mathrm{proposed} \le R_\mathrm{reference}&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
! Symbol !! Description !! Unit&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;R&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Risk of an undesired event || consequence per year (or per fire)&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;F&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Frequency of the undesired event || 1/year (or per fire)&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;C&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Expected consequences of the event || deaths, injuries or money&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;END&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Expected number of deaths || deaths (per fire)&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;P_j&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Probability of fire scenario &amp;#039;&amp;#039;j&amp;#039;&amp;#039; developing after ignition || –&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;N_j&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Occupants exposed to untenable conditions in scenario &amp;#039;&amp;#039;j&amp;#039;&amp;#039; || persons&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;ELLB&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Expected number of deaths over the design life of the building || deaths&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;OP&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Number of occupants in the building at the start of a fire || persons&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;t_D&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Design life of the building || years&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;math&amp;gt;ERL&amp;lt;/math&amp;gt; || Expected risk to life || deaths per person per year&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
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The ABCB handbook gives a worked example of a comparison between two fire safety systems.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), pp. 118–119.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Deterministic modelling shows that nobody is exposed to untenable conditions if either system works, and 2 people are exposed if it fails. System A, the reference solution, has a reliability of 90 per cent, so it fails with a probability of 0.1. System B, the proposed solution, has a reliability of 70 per cent and fails with a probability of 0.3. The risk measures are 0.1 × 2 = 0.2 for System A and 0.3 × 2 = 0.6 for System B. System B thus exposes occupants to three times the risk, so the systems are not equivalent, although the deterministic analysis alone would rate them equal.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-118&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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A second example concerns the frequency scale of a risk matrix. Meacham (2002) gives example bins: anticipated events above 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year, unlikely events from 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; to 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year, and extremely unlikely events from 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; to 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year. Events below 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year are beyond extremely unlikely.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mea02-5-166&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; He warns that frequencies should refer to exceeding a given loss, not to one scenario. One scenario at 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; per year may suggest that fire is no concern, but 30 such scenarios add up to 3 × 10&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;−6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; fires per year.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mea02-5-166&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; As an illustration, each scenario alone would sit in the lowest bin, while the total falls in the extremely unlikely bin, one step higher.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Acceptable risk in decision making ==&lt;br /&gt;
Hall and Watts (2008) name [[cost-benefit analysis]] as the most common approach to risk evaluation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-137&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; They warn that the acceptable risk approach can produce unsatisfactory results. If risk exceeds the acceptable level by even a small fraction, no cost is too great to reach it. If risk is already acceptably low, no more money should be spent, however cheaply more safety could be bought.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Because the outcome can be very sensitive to the level chosen, they consider a sensitivity analysis necessary.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In industry, Snyder (2008) describes risk management as dealing with the value judgements involved in setting acceptable levels of risk.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Snyder-12-179&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Snyder (2008), p. 12-179.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The decision rests on organisational goals such as profit, protection of assets, continued operation, employee and public safety, legal and insurance requirements and the environment. An acceptable risk may need no immediate action, but it must be monitored for changes. An unacceptable risk may be avoided, reduced, transferred through insurance, financed through self-insurance or controlled by loss control improvements.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Snyder-12-179&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In Australia, the ABCB handbook notes that work health and safety legislation requires safe design principles. The Safe Work Australia code of practice it cites defines safe design as integrating control measures early to eliminate risks or, if this is not [[ALARP|reasonably practicable]], to minimise them.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;ABCB20-25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Australian Building Codes Board (2020b), p. 25.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The NFPA handbook also describes such choices by fire departments. Johnson and Price (2008) write that a community that selects a longer response travel time must be willing to accept a larger level of risk.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;JP-12-219&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Johnson and Price (2008), p. 12-219.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; R. Wright (2008) describes how an acceptable level of risk for specialised rescue may be determined from an analysis of community risk.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;RW-13-15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;R. Wright (2008), p. 13-15.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In [[community risk reduction]], a planning process selects the highest risks and the mitigation strategies most likely to succeed with the available resources.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Kirtley-12-310&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Kirtley (2008a), p. 12-310.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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On the fireground, the incident commander weighs the risk to fire fighters against the possible outcomes. Once savable occupants have left the building, the level of acceptable risk falls.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;KS-13-6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Klaene and Sanders (2008), pp. 13-6–13-7.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Klaene and Sanders quote the US standard NFPA 1500, under which no risk to members is acceptable when there is no possibility to save lives or property.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;KS-13-6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Limitations and criticism ==&lt;br /&gt;
An acceptable level is only as sound as the analysis behind it. Meacham (2002) counts the uncertainty in the criteria chosen for assessing acceptability among the uncertainties that often go unrecognised.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Mea02-5-159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Meacham (2002), p. 5-159.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Notarianni (2002) notes that performance criteria had not been established or agreed. A different choice of criteria could make the same design acceptable in one jurisdiction and unacceptable in another.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Not02-5-47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Notarianni (2002), pp. 5-46–5-47.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hall and Watts (2008) add that the acceptable risk approach runs counter to most approaches to decision making in business.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;HW08-3-138&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Implicit levels are not consistent either. Van Rossum (2027) explains that Dutch regulations grew partly from consensus and partly from history, without a quantified goal. Per hour of stay, the chance of dying in a fire is much greater in a residential building than in an assembly building. Yet the fire detection requirements are stricter for assembly buildings.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;VR-1.2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The US Fire Safety Evaluation System is an index method for showing equivalence to the 2000 edition of NFPA 101 in health care facilities. In it, a hardship adjustment sets the risk in existing buildings at 60 per cent of that for a new one.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Watts02-5-132&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Watts (2002), pp. 5-132–5-133.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Data also limit quantitative criteria. The 2013 commentary on the first edition of New Zealand&amp;#039;s C/VM2 states that a probabilistic risk assessment would ideally be used. The tools and data were, however, not suitable, so the method uses a deterministic egress time comparison with additional checks.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;MBIE13-158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 158.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The same commentary describes the risk of fire spread to adjacent property as small but not insignificant. It quantifies this risk as approximately 3 per cent of all structure fires, based on New Zealand Fire Service statistics for 2005–2010.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;MBIE13-23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2013), p. 23.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Two misconceptions follow from these sources. Acceptable risk is never zero risk, even when people perceive it so.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;WH02-5-4&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Code compliance does not mean that the level of safety is known, because the implicit level was not explicitly defined.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;PH08-3-167&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== See also ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Fire risk assessment]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Quantitative risk assessment]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Event tree analysis]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Uncertainty analysis]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Safety factor]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
* Australian Building Codes Board. (2020b). &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Handbook: Fire Safety Verification Method&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (Print version 1.1).&lt;br /&gt;
* Australian Building Codes Board. (2022). &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire Safety Verification Method Standard 2022&amp;#039;&amp;#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
* Barry, T. F. (2002). Quantitative risk assessment in chemical process industries. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., &amp;amp; J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (3rd ed., pp. 5-176–5-213). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.&lt;br /&gt;
* Bukowski, R. W. (2002). Fire hazard assessment for transportation vehicles. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., &amp;amp; J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (3rd ed., pp. 5-227–5-233). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.&lt;br /&gt;
* Granito, J. A. (2008). Planning for public fire-rescue protection. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 12-3–12-22). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Hall, J. R., Jr. (2008). Using data for public education planning and decision making. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 5-103–5-118). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Hall, J. R., Jr., &amp;amp; Watts, J. M., Jr. (2008). Fire risk analysis. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 3-135–3-143). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Johnson, R., &amp;amp; Price, M. (2008). GIS for fire station locations and response protocols. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 12-215–12-231). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Kirtley, E. (2008a). Community risk reduction. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 12-309–12-315). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Klaene, B. J., &amp;amp; Sanders, R. (2008). Fireground operations. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 13-3–13-11). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Lane, B. (2008). Approaches to calculating structural fire resistance. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 19-77–19-126). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meacham, B. J. (2002). Building fire risk analysis. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., &amp;amp; J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (3rd ed., pp. 5-153–5-175). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meacham, B. J., &amp;amp; Galioto, C. (2008). Protecting against extreme events. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 1-109–1-136). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2013). &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Commentary for Building Code clauses C1–C6 and Verification Method C/VM2&amp;#039;&amp;#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
* Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. (2025b). &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Verification Method C/VM2: Framework for fire safety design&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (2nd ed.).&lt;br /&gt;
* National Research Council of Canada, International Code Council, Department of Building and Housing, &amp;amp; Australian Building Codes Board. (2005). &amp;#039;&amp;#039;International fire engineering guidelines&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (2005 ed.). Australian Building Codes Board.&lt;br /&gt;
* Notarianni, K. A. (2002). Uncertainty. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., &amp;amp; J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (3rd ed., pp. 5-40–5-64). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.&lt;br /&gt;
* Puchovsky, M. T., &amp;amp; Hurley, M. J. (2008). Performance-Based codes and standards for fire safety. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 3-167–3-181). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Schwartz, A. E. (2008). Legal issues for the designer and enforcer. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 1-73–1-80). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Snyder, M. (2008). Industrial fire loss prevention. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 12-177–12-198). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
* Van Rossum, E. (2027). &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Introduction to Fire Safety Engineering&amp;#039;&amp;#039;. Fire Safety Academy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Watts, J. M., Jr. (2002). Fire risk indexing. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., &amp;amp; J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (3rd ed., pp. 5-125–5-142). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.&lt;br /&gt;
* Watts, J. M., Jr., &amp;amp; Hall, J. R., Jr. (2002). Introduction to fire risk analysis. In P. J. DiNenno, D. Drysdale, C. L. Beyler, W. D. Walton, R. L. P. Custer, J. R. Hall Jr., &amp;amp; J. M. Watts Jr. (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (3rd ed., pp. 5-1–5-7). National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers.&lt;br /&gt;
* Wright, R. (2008). Organizing rescue operations. In A. E. Cote, C. C. Grant, J. R. Hall, Jr., &amp;amp; R. E. Solomon (Eds.), &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Fire protection handbook&amp;#039;&amp;#039; (20th ed., pp. 13-13–13-21). National Fire Protection Association.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[Category:Fire Risk Analysis]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Lisa</name></author>
	</entry>
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